//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2024] QCA 107
respondent. The application for an extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal from the District Court orders in appeals 2916/20, 2918/20, 3079/20 and 3353/20 was refused.
Palmer applied nearly 20 months late for more time to seek leave to appeal four District Court decisions. Three involved appeals against bail refusals, which the District Court had no jurisdiction to hear under s 222 of the Justices Act. The fourth was a sentence appeal that the primary judge decided after Palmer did not attend. The Court of Appeal found the primary judge had acted unfairly and contrary to the Act when abridging time on his own initiative, but that defect did not affect the merits decision. It found no reasonable argument that the sentence appeal was wrongly decided and refused the extension.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,575 words · generated 08/10/2026
In Palmer v Commissioner of Police [2024] QCA 107, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an application for an extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal under s 118(3) of the . Palmer sought to challenge four decisions of a District Court judge. The Court, comprising Bowskill CJ, Bond JA and Brown AJA, agreed with reasons delivered by Bond JA.
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
Three of the four District Court decisions concerned attempted appeals from Magistrates Court decisions refusing bail. Those appeals were numbered 2916/20, 3079/20 and 3353/20. The District Court judge dismissed them because s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 did not confer jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a refusal of bail. Bond JA agreed, explaining that s 222 concerns an order made “in a summary way on a complaint for an offence or breach of duty”, and that an order refusing bail is not such an order. The Court considered an appeal from those jurisdictional decisions futile.
The fourth District Court decision, appeal 2918/20, concerned Palmer’s appeal against a sentence imposed on 30 September 2020. He had pleaded guilty to 11 charges: two receiving-tainted-property charges and nine fraud charges. The frauds involved use of debit and credit cards, with transactions totalling $196.96 and $532.41 respectively. The Magistrate sentenced him to 171 days’ imprisonment and declared 171 days of pre-sentence custody as time served.
The sentencing material included Palmer’s criminal history, a pre-sentence custody certificate and a report by Dr Foxcroft. The judgment describes the report as diagnosing significant PTSD and secondary polysubstance abuse disorder following an incident at a youth detention centre in 1990. Palmer also raised his earlier abuse and referred to further material about his conduct during his 17 years in prison. The Magistrate had not seen that material. Palmer did not complain or seek an adjournment to put it before the Magistrate. The Magistrate said the matters presented, including the guilty pleas, personal circumstances, diagnosis and remorse, had been considered.
Palmer appealed the sentence on grounds that the Magistrate had not implemented a reduction for his early guilty pleas and that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The primary judge heard the appeal on 16 April 2021. Palmer did not attend, although he had been told when the hearing would take place and had said he would be present, assuming he obtained bail. The primary judge had written submissions from both parties and decided the appeal on its merits, dismissing it.
Palmer’s Court of Appeal application was filed on 1 December 2022, almost 20 months after the primary judge’s reasons. He did not provide evidence explaining that delay. The Court of Appeal refused the extension application.
Bond JA identified the governing considerations by referring to R v Tait [1999] 2 Qd R 667; [1998] QCA 304, and to McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255 and Commissioner of Police v Antoniolli [2021] QCA 237. The Court considered both the reason for delay and the broader interests of justice. In practical terms, the relevant matters included the length of the extension sought, whether an appeal was needed to correct substantial injustice, and whether a reasonable argument of error existed.
The delay was lengthy: almost 20 months. Palmer offered an oral explanation relating to his criminal record, release and re-incarceration, and communication difficulties with the Court. The Court found that explanation inadequate for the period involved. Bond JA noted that the absence of evidence explaining delay was not necessarily fatal, so the Court also considered whether there was an arguable error that might justify an extension despite the delay.
The Court identified one error in the primary judge’s handling of the appeal procedure. Under s 224(1) of the Justices Act, a District Court judge can make procedural orders and directions and adjourn an appeal. But s 224(3) requires the judge, when exercising a power under that section on the judge’s own initiative while the parties are not before the court, to direct the parties to attend. Separately, s 229(3) permits an appeal to be struck out for the appellant’s failure to appear only where proof exists that the required warning notice was sent to the appellant’s address for service at least 10 days before the hearing.
The primary judge knew Palmer had been told about the hearing date, but there was no proof that the notice required by s 229(3) had been given in time. The primary judge then purported to abridge the time for service on his own initiative, without telling Palmer that this was under consideration or hearing from him. Bond JA held that this involved a failure to accord procedural fairness and non-compliance with s 224(3). The abridgment could not validly supply the power to strike out the appeal under s 229(3).
That error was not material to the decision under challenge. The primary judge did not strike out Palmer’s appeal. He considered and rejected its merits. The distinction between an invalid procedural step and an error affecting the operative decision was central to Bond JA’s reasoning.
The Court also considered Palmer’s right to be present under s 224A. Bond JA said the right was not absolute, noting that s 224A(4) contemplates an appeal proceeding and a District Court passing sentence despite the appellant’s absence. In this case, Palmer had notice of the hearing and had told the primary judge he would attend. He did not appear and provided no evidence to explain why. The Court was therefore not persuaded that the primary judge erred by proceeding with the merits hearing. The Court also noted that Palmer had not applied to the primary judge to set aside the order and hear the appeal after any circumstances beyond his control had prevented his attendance.
Finally, Bond JA found no reasonable argument that the sentence or the primary judge’s treatment of the appeal involved error. The Magistrate expressly took the guilty pleas into account. The Court rejected the suggestion that the Magistrate had failed to consider them, and found no basis to infer error from the sentence’s alleged manifest excess. The Court also rejected the complaints about the primary judge’s reasons. A bias contention raised orally for the first time was not considered because it had not been advanced in the application.
The judgment’s treatment of s 222 is specific to the statutory language identified in the reasons. Section 222 provides an appeal right concerning an order made “in a summary way on a complaint for an offence or breach of duty”. Bond JA agreed that a Magistrate’s refusal of bail does not fall within that description. The decision therefore confirms, in the context of these proceedings, that Palmer could not use that provision to appeal the bail refusals to the District Court.
The judgment does not describe a broad change to the law of bail appeals, nor does it analyse other statutory routes or any other jurisdiction. Its point is the scope of the particular appeal right in s 222. The Court treated the primary judge’s jurisdictional conclusion as plainly correct.
On procedural fairness, the judgment applies the express requirements of ss 224 and 229. Where a judge acts on their own initiative under s 224 while the parties are not before the court, s 224(3) requires the parties to be directed to attend. A decision to abridge time without notice or an opportunity to be heard did not satisfy that requirement in the circumstances before the Court. The reasons also distinguish notice that a hearing is scheduled from the proof of a timely warning notice required by s 229(3) for a strike-out.
The decision also illustrates that identifying an error does not itself resolve an extension application. The Court examined whether the error mattered to the primary judge’s actual decision. Because the primary judge decided the appeal on its merits rather than striking it out, the defective abridgment did not invalidate the merits decision. The judgment does not state that every procedural error is immaterial where a merits hearing follows. Its conclusion rests on the specific relationship between the abridgment error and the decision made.
As to an appellant’s presence, the Court read s 224A in light of its subsection (4), which allows an appeal to proceed and a sentence to be passed in the appellant’s absence. The reasons do not treat the right to attend as meaningless. Rather, they explain why the right was not shown to have been denied on these facts: Palmer had notice, had said he would attend, and provided no explanation for not doing so.
The judgment applies, rather than replaces, the extension and leave considerations drawn from R v Tait, McDonald and Antoniolli. It does not set out a new numerical threshold for delay or an exhaustive list of relevant factors. It shows the Court weighing delay alongside the existence of a plausible error and the prospect of substantial injustice.
The supplied judgment text does not display numbered paragraphs, so the passages below are identified by their subject rather than by paragraph number.
“An order refusing bail is not such an order.” This refers to the type of order covered by s 222 of the Justices Act. In plain English, the statutory appeal provision relied on in the three bail matters did not give the District Court power to hear those appeals.
“An abridgment order made in such circumstances could not operate validly to confer power to strike out pursuant to s 229(3) of the Justices Act.” The primary judge could not overcome the statutory notice requirement for a strike-out by abridging time in the way described. The judge acted on his own initiative without notice to Palmer and without complying with s 224(3).
“However, the primary judge does not purport to exercise power to strike out the appeal. Rather, he decided it on its merits. Accordingly, I consider this error was not material.” The procedural defect did not change what the primary judge actually did. He did not dispose of the appeal merely because Palmer was absent; he considered the arguments and dismissed them.
“But the right is not absolute.” This qualification concerns Palmer’s right to be present under s 224A. The Court read that right alongside the statutory provision allowing an appeal to proceed in an appellant’s absence. Whether an absence amounts to a denial of the right depends on the circumstances considered by the Court.
“The applicant has not persuaded me that there is a reasonable argument of sentencing error by the Magistrate, or appellate error by the primary judge.” The extension application was not a full rehearing of the sentence appeal. The relevant point was whether Palmer showed a reasonable argument of error that could justify giving him more time to seek leave. The Court concluded that he had not.
The decision is relevant to applications for more time to seek leave to appeal from District Court decisions where the delay is substantial and the applicant’s explanation is unsupported by evidence. It shows that a weak explanation does not automatically end the inquiry: the Court also considered whether an arguable error or substantial injustice might warrant an extension. But the applicant’s failure to establish a reasonable argument of error weighed against granting more time.
The decision is also relevant where a District Court judge considers acting on their own initiative under s 224 of the Justices Act while the parties are not present. Section 224(3) requires the judge to direct the parties to attend. The judgment identifies a related issue where an appellant has not been given the warning notice required by s 229(3), but the court attempts to abridge time without notice or hearing from the appellant.
A further relevant pattern is where an appeal is decided on its merits after the appellant does not attend. The circumstances in Palmer included notice of the hearing, an earlier statement that the appellant would attend, written submissions already filed by both parties, and no evidence explaining the absence. The decision does not establish that proceeding without an appellant is always proper. It says that the right to be present is not absolute and assesses the circumstances presented in this case.
The s 222 discussion is relevant where an appellant seeks to appeal a Magistrate’s refusal of bail using that particular provision. The Court’s analysis turns on the statutory words, “in a summary way on a complaint for an offence or breach of duty”. The judgment does not determine the availability of any other route of review or appeal.
Finally, the materiality analysis is relevant where a procedural error is identified but the challenged decision was made on another basis. Here, the primary judge’s defective abridgment was connected to a possible strike-out, but the primary judge instead heard and determined the appeal on its merits. The Court found that distinction decisive to whether the error affected the decision.
The supplied judgment contains no information about how later courts treated Palmer v Commissioner of Police. It therefore does not establish whether the decision has subsequently been followed, distinguished, applied or otherwise considered.
The reasons themselves refer to earlier authorities. R v Tait [1999] 2 Qd R 667; [1998] QCA 304 is cited for examining both the reason for delay and the broader interests of justice when considering an extension of time. McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255 and Commissioner of Police v Antoniolli [2021] QCA 237 are identified as relevant to considerations governing leave to appeal. The reasons also refer to R v Palmer [2023] QCA 118 for the description of Dr Foxcroft’s report.
Those citations show the authorities Bond JA used or mentioned in reaching the decision, but they do not show later treatment of the 2024 judgment. Any account of subsequent treatment would require sources beyond the judgment supplied here.
The judgment does not consider whether there were alternative procedures for challenging the Magistrates Court bail refusals. It decides only that s 222 did not confer jurisdiction on the District Court for the appeals brought in this case.
The Court found the abridgment error immaterial because the primary judge decided the sentence appeal on its merits. The reasons do not address what the result would have been if the primary judge had instead struck out the appeal under s 229(3), or if the applicant had shown that the absence was involuntary and had affected his ability to present the case.
The judgment also does not provide a detailed account of every possible circumstance in which an appellant’s right to be present under s 224A might be denied. Its conclusion is tied to the facts recited: notice, an expressed intention to attend, failure to appear, and no evidence explaining the absence.
On the extension application, the Court identified relevant considerations but did not purport to prescribe a fixed period that is acceptable or unacceptable. It also did not determine a bias allegation on its merits, because that contention was raised orally for the first time and had not been included in the application.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on, relying on, or using this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
[2024] QCA 107
COURT OF APPEAL
BOWSKILL CJ
BOND JA
BROWN AJA
CA No 288 of 2022
DC No 2916 of 2020
DC No 2918 of 2020
DC No 3079 of 2020
DC No 3353 of 2020
PALMER, Stuart William Applicant
v
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Respondent
BRISBANE
WEDNESDAY, 5 JUNE 2024
JUDGMENT
BOWSKILL CJ: Justice Bond will deliver his reasons first.
BOND JA: The applicant represents himself and seeks an extension of time for bringing an application for leave to appeal under s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 from four decisions made by a judge of the District Court.
Unfortunately, the application filed by the applicant does not express any intelligible ground on which the application should be granted.
The first three decisions made by the primary judge concern three separate appeals (numbers 2916/20, 3079/20, and 3353/20) all of which purported to be appeals pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 against orders made by a Magistrate refusing applications for bail.
The primary judge dismissed each appeal because he found that s 222 did not confer jurisdiction on the District Court to consider an appeal from a refusal of bail by a Magistrate. Section 222 confers an appeal right in respect of “an order made ... in a summary way on a complaint for an offence or breach of duty.” An order refusing bail is not such an order. The primary judge was plainly right to reach the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from such an order. Any appeal from the primary judge’s decisions would be futile. Insofar as the application before this Court relates to those decisions, it must be refused.
The fourth decision made by the primary judge concerned appeal 2918/20, which was an appeal against a sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court at Sandgate on 30 September 2020.
Before the Magistrate, the applicant had pleaded guilty in respect of 11 charges as follows:
Receiving tainted property (namely, a debit MasterCard) on a date unknown between 26 January 2020 and 29 January 2020;
Fraud on 28 January 2020 (namely, that he dishonestly applied the debit MasterCard to his own use in two transactions totalling $196.96);
Receiving tainted property (namely, a wallet containing credit cards) on 3 February 2020;
Eight charges of fraud on 3 February 2020 (which involved dishonest use of the credit cards the subject of the receiving charge for obtaining groceries, alcohol, tobacco products, pharmaceutical products in transactions totalling $532.41).
The applicant had only recently been released from serving 15 years of a 17-year custodial sentence for attempted murder. He represented himself before the Magistrate. The prosecution tendered a criminal history and a pre‑sentence custody certificate. The prosecution suggested that the certificate showed the applicant had served 171 days declarable time, and submitted that the applicant had “probably served his time”. The prosecution advised the Magistrate that no restitution was formally sought in relation to any of the fraud charges.
For his part, the applicant referred to a report by a Dr Foxcroft, which the Magistrate had an opportunity to read. (I observe that that report diagnosed the applicant as suffering from a significant PTSD and secondary polysubstance abuse disorder following an incident at a youth detention centre in 1990: see R v Palmer [2023] QCA 118 at [9].) The applicant drew the Magistrate’s attention to the circumstances of his abuse as a younger person dealt with in that report. The applicant asked the Magistrate “Does your Honour have to hand the Daryl Dealehr material which sets out chronology of what I’ve been up to in the last 17 years in jail?”. The Magistrate said that he had not, but remarked “I don’t think that will help me today, given that where – given where we’re at now”. The applicant did not make any response. In particular, he neither made a complaint, nor did he seek an adjournment to have an opportunity to put that material before the Magistrate. The applicant told the Magistrate that he took full responsibility for his mistake. He said he offered restitution, to which the Magistrate responded that none had been sought.
The Magistrate sentenced the appellant to 171 days imprisonment, and declared 171 days pre‑sentence custody as time served. His sentencing remarks were to this effect:
“I’ve taken into account today all of those matters that have been placed before me by the prosecutor and from you on your own behalf. Of course your pleas of guilty, mostly early, the previous criminal history that you have, your personal circumstances, and learnt about those. I’m not going to reiterate them in open court, but there is that diagnosis from Dr Foxcroft, who has seen you in very recent times, the remorse that you have expressed, not only by your plea of guilty, but otherwise today. In all of those circumstances, whilst a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate for these matters, you have served 171 days, which is adequate given the totality of this offending. Indeed, whilst there may have been, very likely were, losses, at least to the relevant banks, they are not huge and they were not sought as restitution. In relation to each of the matters that you’ve pleaded guilty to today, you’re convicted and sentenced to 171 days imprisonment. I declare the time already served in accordance with the pre‑sentence custody certificate, so at least so far as these matters are all now concerned, you have done your time.”
The applicant appealed his sentence. The grounds of appeal before the primary judge were set out in the notice of appeal dated 14 October 2020, as follows:
“(a) [The Magistrate] erred in not implementing reduction due to early plea 11 March 2020 and 18 March 2020 respectively, and;
Manifestly excessive sentence given the circumstances of said criminality.”
The primary judge heard the appeal on 16 April 2021. The primary judge had previously received written submissions from both the applicant and the respondent. At the hearing, the applicant was called, but there was no appearance. The transcript of the hearing records the primary judge observing that the applicant had appeared before him on 8 April 2021, that he had been told the appeal was to be heard on 16 April 2021, and the applicant had assured the judge personally that he would be present, assuming he was granted bail. The primary judge told him that if he was not granted bail, a video link would be set up. The primary judge ascertained that he had been granted bail. Accordingly, the primary judge proceeded to determine the appeal without receiving oral submissions from the applicant.
In an ex tempore judgment given on 16 April 2021, the primary judge considered and rejected each of the grounds of appeal. He also considered and rejected the possibility that by proceeding without adjourning to enable reception of the foreshadowed “Daryl Dealehr material”, the Magistrate had failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness. The primary judge then turned to the question of manifest excess, adverting to the matters to which I have earlier referred and finding:
“The point is this, that a sentence which required the service of 171 days cannot, in my view, and consistent with the submissions of the respondent, be said to be manifestly excessive. If anything, in my view, the appellant had a favour done by the Magistrate by not, for example, imposing a head sentence which was then suspended and which, given his history of offending whilst incarcerated, may have raised the possibility of breaching the suspended sentence. It be can accepted that a lesser sentence might have been imposed, but one can readily understand why the Magistrate took the view she did. He had served 171 days, and regardless of what sentence she imposed, that fact would not change.
In all of the circumstances, given the significant number of offences and the legitimate approach taken by the Magistrate, I consider the sentence cannot be shown to be manifestly excessive. As I’ve already recorded, I do not consider that there has been an error in the failure to adjourn. And in those circumstances, my order is that the appeal numbered 2918 of 20 is dismissed. I should also note that Mr Palmer has not attended to prosecute the appeal, and I had made orders abridging the time for service of the notice, which I considered to be in the interest of justice at the time.”
The applicant now seeks an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the primary judge dismissing his appeal against sentence. In R v Tait [1999] 2 Qd R 667; [1998] QCA 304, this Court suggested that the Court should examine whether there is good reason to account for the delay, and also the broader question, whether it is in the interest of justice to grant the extension. As the application for extension of time is to allow an application which seeks leave to appeal, reference should also be had to McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255, and to Commissioner of Police v Antoniolli [2021] QCA 237, where the considerations relevant to a grant of leave are examined.
In the present case, the principal considerations which are relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion are:
The length of the extension of time sought and the explanation for the delay;
Whether an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant; and
Whether there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected on appeal.
As to these considerations, I note first that the primary judge’s reasons were published on 16 April 2021, and the application for an extension of time was not filed until 1 December 2022, almost 20 months later. The applicant has not placed any evidence before the Court explaining the delay. He submitted from the bar table that it was to do with his criminal record, the timing of the circumstances of being released and re‑incarcerated, and the difficulties he had with communications with the Court. That is not an adequate explanation for the extent of the delay.
The lack of evidence just mentioned is not necessarily fatal to the present application. The discretion to be exercised must then turn to the broader questions informing whether it is in the interest of justice to grant the extension, did the primary judge err when he proceeded to hear the appeal in the absence of the applicant? If he did, does it matter? Was the applicant denied an opportunity to present a reasonable argument in favour of the appeal? An apparently strong case on either of these questions might go a long way towards persuading the Court to grant leave.
The primary judge did make one error. As to this, I observe:
Section 224 of the Justices Act empowers a District Court judge on the application of a party, or on the judge’s own initiative, and amongst other things, to “make orders and give directions about service of any notice and about any procedure” (s 224(1)(b)) and to “adjourn the appeal for the time decided by the judge” (s 224(1)(d)).
However, s 224(3) imposes a constraint on the exercise of powers on the judge’s own initiative when it provides:
“If a District Court judge is exercising a power under this section on the judge’s own initiative, then, if the parties are not before the court, the judge must direct the parties to attend the court.”
Section 229(3) of the Justices Act provides:
“Also, if the appellant fails to appear on a day the appeal is to be heard, the judge may strike out the appeal on proof that notice of the hearing informing the appellant the appeal may be struck out if the appellant fails to appear was sent to the appellant’s address for service at least 10 days before the date of the hearing.”
Although the primary judge knew that on 8 April 2021 the applicant had been given notice of the hearing on 16 April 2021, there was no proof before the primary judge that the applicant had been given the notice referred to in s 229(3) within time. Indeed, it seems clear that he had not. Accordingly, the primary judge had no power to make an order striking out the appeal.
On his own initiative, the primary judge did purport to make an order abridging the time within which the notice could be sent, but he did that without providing notice to the applicant that he was considering making an order abridging time, and obviously without hearing from the applicant as to whether such an order should be made. Accordingly, his error was that he failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness in relation to the abridgment of time and he acted on his own initiative without complying with s 224(3). An abridgment order made in such circumstances could not operate validly to confer power to strike out pursuant to s 229(3) of the Justices Act.
However, the primary judge does not purport to exercise power to strike out the appeal. Rather, he decided it on its merits. Accordingly, I consider this error was not material.
Putting the abridgment error to one side, was it an error to proceed to consider the merits of the appeal in the absence of an appearance by or on behalf of the applicant? The primary judge had the benefit of two written submissions from the applicant (filed 13 November 2020 and 7 December 2020) and one from the respondent (filed 15 February 2021). Further, the primary judge recorded that the applicant was notified of the appeal in Court before the primary judge on 8 April 2021, and that the applicant told the primary judge that he would be present. The applicant failed to appear and the judge proceeded to determine the appeal on the merits, despite his absence. Pursuant to s 224A of the Justices Act 1886, the applicant had a right to be present on the hearing of the appeal. In some circumstances, denial of that right might constitute appealable error. But the right is not absolute. In the first place, an appeal can take place and lead to a District Court passing its sentence even though the appellant is not present: s 224A(4). But, second, the right could hardly be regarded as having been denied if an applicant, having notice of the time and place where he could exercise the right, simply chose not to do so. The applicant has not placed any evidence before the Court explaining why he was not present at the appointed hearing date, of which he had notice. In any event, if circumstances beyond the applicant’s control had, in fact, prevented him from being present on the appointed date, then he could have made an application to the primary judge to exercise power pursuant to s 224 to set aside the order which he had made and to hear his appeal. But the applicant did not do that. I am not persuaded that the primary judge erred in proceeding to consider the merits of the appeal despite the applicant’s failure to appear.
But even if there had been some error in so proceeding, it is relevant on an application like the present to consider the question whether the error mattered. The applicant has not persuaded me that there is a reasonable argument of sentencing error by the Magistrate, or appellate error by the primary judge, in disposing of the merits of the appeal. At the hearing today:
He first addressed the question whether there was some specific error in relation to the way in which the Magistrate dealt with the question of his guilty pleas. There was a confused submission that he should have been sentenced by the Magistrate at an earlier time. That is not a basis to challenge the sentence which was given. That then changed into an argument that he should have been given greater discount by reference to the fact of the guilty pleas. There was no basis for argument of specific error because the Magistrate had specifically taken into account the guilty pleas. Nor was there any basis to infer error because the sentence was manifestly excessive.
So far as the primary judge’s actual decision was concerned, the applicant’s principal complaint was that he was not allowed to appear. I have dealt with that point already. His second point was that the primary judge failed to identify the error which was made by the Magistrate. There is no merit in that complaint. His third complaint, advanced for the first time orally on appeal, was a contention that the primary judge was biased against him. That argument was not advanced in his application and it is not appropriate to deal with it.
The result is that I would make the following order:
The application for an extension of the time within which to bring an application for leave to appeal from the orders made by the primary judge in District Court appeals 2916/20, 2918/20, 3079/20, and 3353/20, must be refused.
BOWSKILL CJ: I agree with the reasons and the order proposed by Justice Bond.
BROWN AJA: I also agree with the reasons and the order proposed by Justice Bond.
BOWSKILL CJ: So the order of the Court is that the application for an extension of time within which to bring an application for leave to appeal from the orders made by the primary judge in District Court appeals numbered 2916 of 20, 2918 of 20, 3079 of 20 and 3353 of 20, are refused.
Thank you. Adjourn the Court.
Palmer
Commissioner of Police [2024] QCA 107
The application for an extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal from the District Court orders in appeals 2916/20, 2918/20, 3079/20 and 3353/20 was refused.