Pakuza v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 354

Peck v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 189

Sillay v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] ICQ 16

Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) [2014] QIRC 079

• [1] On 28 August 2025, Mr Karl Pakuza ('Mr Pakuza') appealed a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator') to confirm the rejection of his compensation claim. The Regulator determined that an injury was not sustained in accordance with section 32 of the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('the WC Act').
• [2] On 1 September 2025, the Regulator sought leave of the Commission to be legally represented at any upcoming conferences held pursuant to s 552A of the WC Act or at the hearing of the appeal.
• [3] On 4 September 2025, Vice President O'Connor issued an order granting leave for the Respondent to be legally represented pursuant to s 552B(b) of the WC Act.
• [4] On 22 October 2025, I convened a s 552A conference to discuss the substantive proceedings and standard directions.[1] At the conference, Mr Pakuza indicated he was considering objecting to the grant of leave for legal representation. It was agreed Mr Pakuza would file a Form 4 - Application in existing proceedings if he decided he wished to proceed with his objection.
• [5] On 31 October 2025, Mr Pakuza filed the Form 4 seeking that the grant of leave be revoked.
• [6] On 3 November 2025, I issued Directions requiring the parties to provide submissions in respect of the application within proceedings, with Order 3 outlining the decision would be dealt with on the papers.
• [7] That is the matter subject of this decision.

Relevant statutory framework and legal principles

• [8] Section 552B of the WC Act relevantly provides:

552B Legal representation at appeal or conference

A party may be represented by a lawyer at a conference called under section 552A or at the hearing of an appeal, but only with -

• [9] The Commission is a relevant 'appeal body' for the purposes of s 552B of the WC Act.[2]
• [10] Chapter 13, Part 3, Division 1 of the WC Act provides the statutory backdrop to the substantive appeal and contains the source of power for the grant of legal representation. This is different to the exercise of discretion to grant leave for legal representation under s 530 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) where one of the required jurisdictional facts must be established as a "catalyst to the exercise of power."[3]
• [11] In Peck v Workers' Compensation Regulator ('Peck') Deputy President Merrell outlined the following when considering the discretion that may be exercised pursuant to s 552B:[4]

The Commission, in respect of Mr Peck's appeal, meets the description of 'appeal body' referred to in s 552B(b) of the Act. There are no circumstances prescribed in s 552B of the Act which must exist in order for the Commission to exercise discretion to grant leave for a party to an appeal under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the Act to be represented by a lawyer. While the discretion is unconfined, clearly, it must be exercised judicially, that is to say, not arbitrarily or capriciously.

Because the discretion is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute, some implied limitation on the factors to which the Commission may legitimately have regard. If there is nothing in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute that suggests some implied limitation on the matters to which the decision maker may legitimately have regard, it is largely for the decision marker, in light of the matters placed before it by the parties, to determine which matters are relevant and the comparative importance to be afforded to those matters.

My preliminary view is that there is nothing n the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act that immediately suggests some implied limitation on the matters to which I may legitimately have regard in determining whether or not to grant leave to a party to be represented by a lawyer.

Thus, it is for me, in light of the matters referred to in the parties' submissions, to determine which matters are relevant and the comparative importance to be afforded to those matters as to whether or not I exercise my discretion to give leave to the Regulator to be represented by a lawyer.

• [12] I also adopt this approach and will consider the matters referred to in the application and the parties' submissions.

Why the Appellant says that the grant of leave should be revoked

• [13] Mr Pakuza identified the following six grounds for his objection:
  1. Procedural deficiency: The Regulator's request was not made in the prescribed form and failed to comply with expected procedural standards required of any party before the Commission.
  2. Absence of rationale: the application provided no justification or criteria addressing why legal representation was necessary, contrary to section 552B, which requires the Commission to assess whether representation assists the efficient and fair resolution of the matter.[5]
  3. Premature decision: the granting of leave within three days - based solely on an informal email - suggests the decision was made without sufficient consideration or procedural fairness.
  4. Factual and Legislative Basis: My appeal is factual, relying on clear breaches of Queensland legislation and directives, not complex legal argument.
  5. Inequality of resources: I cannot afford legal representation and am not eligible for free or pro bono assistance. Allowing the Regulator to engage lawyers would create a clear imbalance and undermine fairness.
  6. Public Expenditure: The use of external legal representation by a government body in a straightforward factual appeal represents an inefficient use of taxpayer resources and is contrary to the public accountability principles.
• [14] Mr Pakuza's submissions referred to a list of authorities said to articulate various principles relevant to the present issue of granting legal representation.[6] The Regulator indicated that despite extensive searches, these case authorities could not be located. Chambers similarly were unable to locate the authorities cited.[7]

• [15] Mr Pakuza's application and submissions focus on perceived procedural and technical deficiencies with the Regulator's request for legal representation and the issuing of the subsequent order. Many of the issues raised are misconceived as they assert the existence of required forms, process and decision-making criteria that are not contained within the relevant provisions.
• [16] A party may object to the grant of leave. Some objections occur immediately following the request being made; and some occur, as in this case, following an order being issued. The Commission then generally adopts the approach outlined in Peck in deciding whether leave should be granted, having heard from each of the parties via submissions.[8]
• [17] The relevant discretion being exercised in relation to the objection is mine. It is for me to assess the matters put before me by the parties, consider the relevant authorities and make my determination in the context of the substantive matter. I will therefore turn to the submissions pertaining to whether or not leave should be granted.
• [18] Mr Pakuza and the Regulator focus on issues of complexity, fairness between the parties and appropriate use of public expenditure. Additionally, the Regulator addresses efficiency, general duty to the court and the Model Litigant Principles.

• [19] Mr Pakuza submits that the appeal falls to be decided on questions of fact and that it involves 'clear breaches of Queensland legislation and directives' as opposed to 'complex legal argument'.[9]
• [20] In contrast, the Regulator submits that the appeal is likely to involve complex questions of fact and law. The Regulator outlines that the questions that are required to be determined in the appeal are:[10]
  • Did the Appellant sustain a personal injury and if so, was it an aggravation of a pre-existing condition?
  • Did the personal injury arise out of, or in the course of, the Appellant's employment?
  • Was the Appellant's employment a significant contributing factor?
  • Did the Appellant's injury arise out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the Appellant's employment?
• [21] More specifically, the Regulator explains that this appeal requires them to investigate and assess medical and factual evidence related to seven alleged errors in the review decision, including alleged breaches of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld).[11] The Regulator further says that legal representation will enable them to more efficiently navigate the evidence that will be required to examine the issue of reasonable management action and establish if Mr Pakuza suffered an aggravation of a pre-existing psychiatric injury.[12]
• [22] In submissions in reply, Mr Pakuza points out that the Regulator 'originally handled the matter without legal representation', submitting this reveals they did not regard it as a legally complex matter.[13]

• [23] Mr Pakuza appears to be assessing the complexity of the matter based primarily on his own view of the righteousness of his case. That approach ignores the questions of law and fact relevant to the determination of the appeal at trial.
• [24] While some of those matters will have been conceded in the Review decision underpinning the appeal, in the hearing de novo those matters will need to be established to the requisite standard through medical and factual evidence adduced and examined at trial. In this case, in addition to numerous factual disagreements, the review decision does not find the medical evidence supports the injury arose out of the employment and if it did, concludes the exclusions in a 32(5) would apply. These matters, by their nature, are complex. It is reasonable for either party to seek to be legally represented in the circumstances of the substantive case.

Inequality of resources/Fairness between the parties

• [25] Mr Pakuza contends the grant of legal representation is unfair because he is self-represented and cannot afford legal representation and is ineligible for free legal assistance.[14] The grant of legal representation is said to create 'a clear imbalance and undermine fairness'.
• [26] The Regulator submit there is no objection to Mr Pakuza being legally represented, but draw my attention to the following statement by Neate IC in Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) which is often considered in the context of disputes about legal representation and the impact legal representation has on fairness between the parties: [15]

The fact that one party, either by choice or circumstances, is not represented by a lawyer is no reason to deny the other party or parties of legal representation, particularly in significant and potentially complex cases. That point is strengthened when, as in this case, the respondent party is meant to act as a model litigant in accordance with the Model Litigant Principles.

To the extent that a self-represented party considers it likely that they will be at some disadvantage in proceedings where the other party is, or parties are, represented by lawyers, the self-represented party should proceed on the basis that the Commission will attempt to ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly within the time allotted for the hearing.

• [27] The Regulator submitted that, as they are required to conduct themselves in accordance with the Model Litigant Principles, the grant of legal representation does not give rise to unfairness between the parties. This includes a common occurrence of Respondent's Counsel identifying potential grounds for compromise of an Appeal that may favour the Appellant.
• [28] Finally, the Regulator details how legal representation can be of assistance to the parties and to the Commission because legal representation focuses the attention of the parties on the issues in dispute, observes the distinction between submissions and evidence, and ensures the submissions are confined to matters the Commission must decide. The Regulator says this assistance enhances the efficient conduct of proceedings by shortening the length of the appeal and reducing potential costs to both parties.[16]
• [29] In submissions in reply, Mr Pakuza highlights the capacity of the State to draw on 'publicly funded internal legal resources' that exist for this very function and argues this creates an unfair imbalance in the matter, given he is self-represented and cannot afford to obtain legal representation.

• [30] It is not inherently unfair or unjust for one party to be legally represented because the other party is not. I consider that in the circumstances of this case, efficiency would be gained through the competent legal representation of at least one party. It is the role of the Commission to ensure the proceedings are conducted in a manner that is fair to all parties.

• [31] Mr Pakuza argued that the use of external legal representation by 'a government body' in a 'straightforward factual appeal' constitutes inefficient use of taxpayer money and is 'contrary to public accountability principles'.[17]
• [32] The Regulator did not directly address this submission in their response but their observations about how legal representation can render proceedings more efficient is, in my view, relevant in the context of this contention and is not a reason to revoke legal representation.

• [33] Mr Pakuza's submissions in reply introduce a conflict-of-interest concern related to his view that the Office of Industrial Relations ('OIR') is the true respondent and his original claim related to a complaint he had made against a senior employee in the Department of Education who is now a senior employee in OIR. Mr Pakuza submitted that the 'speed' at which the leave was granted for legal representation is troubling in this context.
• [34] This submission is misconceived. The Respondent in these proceedings is the Regulator under the WC Act. In proceedings under the WC Act, the Commission exercises jurisdiction conferred by statute to determine appeals against decisions of the Workers' Compensation Regulator on a de novo basis. The proceeding is conducted by the Commission, and the Commission is bound to discharge its statutory functions according to law.

• [35] I consider that legal representation of at least one of the parties will assist all parties to focus on and consider relevant matters. Further, the Regulator's adherence to the Model Litigant Principles, together with the Commission's conduct of the proceedings will ensure fairness between the parties if the Regulator is legally represented. I am not persuaded that an order should be made revoking the grant of leave.
• [36] I order accordingly.

The Application to revoke the grant of legal representation is dismissed.

[1] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).

[2] An appeal body is defined in the WC Act as the Industrial Commission: see s 548A(1) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).

[3] Sillay v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] ICQ 16, [40] (Davis P).

[4] Peck v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 189, [13] - [14].

[5] This appears to be a reference to the requirements in s 530 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).

[6] Attachment to Form 4 Application by the Appellant, filed 31 October 2025.

[7] Practice Direction 1 of 2024 is relevant. The Queensland Courts have also recently released guidelines for the responsible use of generative artificial intelligence by non-lawyers that may be relevant.

[8] [2022] QIRC 189.

[9] Form 4 Attachment to Appellant's Form 4 Application, filed 31 October 2025.

[10] Submissions of the Regulator filed 18 November 2025, [3].

[11] Submissions of the Regulator filed 18 November 2025, [4].

[12] Submissions of the Regulator filed 18 November 2025, [5].

[13] Submissions in reply of the Appellant, filed 1 December 2025, 2, [4].

[14] Form 4 Attachment to Appellant's Form 4 Application, filed 31 October 2025.

[15] Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) [2014] QIRC 079, 6 (Neate IC).

[16] Submissions of the Regulator filed 18 November 2025, [7].

[17] Form 4 Attachment to Appellant's Form 4 Application, filed 31 October 2025.