Page & Coleman [2025] FedCFamC2F 915 (12 June 2025)

(a) X'S experience of parenting by his Mother and any fears and concerns he has

(b) Provision of strategies and tools for X to deal with any concerns and fears he has

(c) The repair of X'S relationship with his Mother

(d) Providing support for the implementation of Court orders

1. The costs associated with X attending upon the practitioner referred to in Order 3 be met out of the current Mental Health Care Plan obtained by Mr Coleman, and Mr Coleman authorise the transfer of any outstanding sessions available to him to the new practitioner.
2. The parents abide by all reasonable directions of the practitioner referred to in Order 3 as to frequency and duration of attendance.
3. The practitioner referred to in Order 3 be provided with a copy of the following documents by the Independent Children's Lawyer within 7 days of the first appointment with X:

(a) The interim orders dated 12 June 2025

(b) The Family Report by Ms D dated 17 October 2024

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer be at liberty to liaise with the practitioner referred to in Order 3 from time to time in relation to the progress of the counselling.
2. The Trial be adjourned to Judge Mansini sitting at the Melbourne Registry commencing Monday 28 July 2025 at 10.00am with an estimated hearing of 2 days ('the adjourned date').

1. Mr Coleman seeks that his appearance at the adjourned date be by way of video link given that the proceedings will now be heard in the Melbourne Registry and that request be considered by the trial Judge.
2. The Respondent Father consented to orders 1, 2, 3 and 8 save for the venue of the hearing.

1. Pursuant to ss.65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and these particulars are included in these orders.

1. If in any proceedings there are allegations of family violence and the provisions of section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 apply (see attached Family Violence Information Sheet), any unrepresented party will not be permitted to personally cross-examine the other party/parties.
2. Affected unrepresented parties may apply to the court and then to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme ("the Scheme") for representation but any such application must be made at least 12 weeks prior to the final hearing.
3. Further information about the legislation and the Scheme can be found at Part 4 of the attached Family Violence Information Sheet.
4. If s102NA applies and a party becomes unrepresented after trial directions have been made, that party is required to promptly advise the Court.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are the settled reasons of a judgment delivered ex tempore. These reasons were delivered orally. These settled reasons have been corrected from the transcript where appropriate to correct grammatical errors, to add citations, passages of authorities and evidence, and to attempt to make the orally delivered reasons easier to read. The substance is unchanged.
2. These are very short reasons dealing with a situation where, unfortunately, a trial long listed to commence today was unable to be accommodated because I was hearing another matter. In those circumstances, my associates made inquiries, and another judge is able to arrange her calendar so that she can commence this case on 28 July 2025.
3. The matter was listed in before me for two days when the matter was booked in and, at least one side asserts, can still be managed in two days. I have some circumspection about that, but I am only pressing that the matter commence on the two days that Judge Mansini has kindly made available.

1. In regard to the proposed orders, all parties agree to proposed orders 1, 3, and part of 8. The dispute between the parties relates to whether, in the short time relative to the pace of the litigation otherwise, there should be an attempt to retain another counsellor or therapist or psychotherapist for the child X ('X').

1. X is eight and could be regarded as being eight and a half. He lives with his father, Mr Coleman aged 45 ('Mr Coleman'), and has done so since traumatic events in or around November 2021. Until then (X was about six at that time) X had lived his whole life in the care of his mother, Ms Page aged 40 ('Ms Page'). In preparation for a trial, the parties had engaged in a Family Report.

1. Back in May of 2024, interim orders were made by the Court by Senior Judicial Registrar Kaur that provided for unsupervised daytime between Ms Page and X. It is common ground that that time occurred but not in compliance with the orders, in the sense that X did not spend time with Ms Page without Mr Coleman present.
2. It is important to note that E who is aged 11 ('E'), the Mother's other child, was removed from his mother's care as a result of reports by parties (independent of the parents) of E's complaints about being either assaulted or struck by his mother and having bruises on his face.
3. It is also important to note that Ms Page alleges controlling and violent behaviour against Mr Coleman. It is Mr Coleman's position, as I understand it, that it was necessary for him to be present on those occasions when X attended with his mother to ensure that X attended and/or did not run away and that, without his attendance and presence, X simply would not have attended the time with his mother.
4. That is, depending whether or not that is accurate or not, commendable by Mr Coleman or, if it is an attempt to control the situation, deplorable by Mr Coleman. However on this interim hearing, I am not going to make a finding one way or the other.

1. Those orders of May 2024 included an order for counselling or therapy at orders number 6 through to 7. The extent of the success of that therapy and the reasons behind that are controversial, but it appears that the therapist engaged by Mr Coleman saw X on at least three occasions and that the end result of that therapy, as far as it got, was that from the therapist's point of view and Mr Coleman's, X was refusing to spend time with his mother without Mr Coleman present.

1. The Family Report was released on 21 October 2024. The observations in that Family Report have not been tested, nor has the Family Report writer had the opportunity to update any expert opinion that she may have in the circumstances of the events since that report was prepared. The parties were interviewed for the preparation of that report in early October 2024.
2. I refer to and repeat relevant paragraphs of that report that included:
   1. [X] was observed with [Ms Page] for approximately thirty-five minutes. [Ms Page] hugged and kissed [X] which he accepted but appeared highly conscious of the writer observing. That said X enjoyed playing a game with [Ms Page] on her phone. He appeared to relax into the observation after approximately ten minutes and over time [X] leaned into and against [Ms Page] who put her arm lightly around him. [X] touched [Ms Page]['s] hair at one point in a gentle gesture. [X] appeared to be comfortable and relaxed with [Ms Page] until she said that she would see him again on the following Sunday whereby [X] said he did not want to spend time again. [X] settled again into a relaxed state leaning into [Ms Page] after a few more minutes. [X]'s statement that he did not wish to see [Ms Page] was sharply in opposition to his physical appearance with her after he was relaxed. They chatted on and off about people, pets and [X] was observed to be increasingly forthcoming as the time progressed. [X] spoke about learning to bait hooks while fishing and [Ms Page] appeared warm, affectionate and appropriate throughout the observation.

...

1. [X] is now becoming increasingly resistant to spending time at all, albeit when he is in [Ms Page]'s company for a few minutes he settles and seems comfortable and relaxed. There are concerns that [X] has had only 3 sessions of psychological support and that this too has taken place with [Mr Coleman] present. [X]'s treating mental health social worker assessed that [X] has symptoms of trauma albeit there has been no formal diagnosis. She considers that [X] is unlikely to have verbal memory recall for trauma events apart from the period of separation from [Ms Page] because of [E]'s injury. There is concern that [X] is never separated from [Mr Coleman] it appears unless he is at school. That said [X] was able to separate from [Mr Coleman] easily and to speak with the writer at interview. He reportedly separates to attend school. [X]'s therapist did not say that she is conducting Family Therapy. She reportedly is focussed on trauma treatment. [Mr Coleman] accompanying [X] and staying with him at almost every event except school could meet a Family Violence definition in so far as it might control [X] and what he feels he can say especially when it was clear to the writer that [X] is aware that [Mr Coleman] is fearful for him being with [Ms Page] unsupervised. The writer has concerns for [X] that if time does not increase with [Ms Page] unsupervised, he will refuse completely and lose the benefit of what appeared to be a warm and loving connection, notwithstanding that he has experienced the trauma of abusive verbal and other parenting behaviours, including exposure to family violence. [Ms Page] will benefit from completing the Tuning into Kids/Teens course which should embed emotional listening skills and assist with coregulating with the children when/if that is required. [Ms Page] struggled to admit to using slapping on more than one occasion which is a concern, particularly when child protection had documented substantiation. That said [Dr C] put [Ms Page] at borderline cognitively which may be related to memory performance especially if she was using illegal substances when those events occurred.

2. It is assessed that there is a resist/refuse dynamic that is increasing for [X]. If as a result, he does not have an ongoing relationship with [Ms Page], he is likely to be one of the children who because they have lost a parent to whom they had a primary attachment, develop serious mental illness and substance abuse. [X]'s intimate relationships and friendships are also likely to be negatively impacted. While it is accepted that harm to [E] was substantiated from [Ms Page] and that [X] was also at risk, there needs to be consideration that [X] who was aged just 5 years when separated from [Ms Page], may also have suffered an attachment disruption trauma. Ideally repair of that attachment relationship would go some way to helping with recovery for the trauma. [X] is likely to require episodic therapy periodically during his life to process trauma due to the circumstances of his early childhood and separation. A protective factor in considering trauma is a warm and affectionate parenting relationship. [X] has consistently reported a warm and affectionate relationship with [Mr Coleman]. [X] was also observed to have a warm and loving connection with [Ms Page]. [Ms Page] appeared to have trusted [Mr Coleman] to have [X] in his care substantially in the past, suggesting that she considered him a good enough father, albeit she had some ongoing concerns about control from [Mr Coleman]. The parties are currently in agreement that [X] should continue to live with [Mr Coleman]. [X]is now at school and has the routine and structure of that as well as his friendships there which supports his developmental stage.

...

1. [Ms Page] has spoken about a pattern of control and family violence from [Mr Coleman] towards her. If accepted there are concerns that [Mr Coleman]'s accompanying of [X] including into his therapy, may be consistent Family Violence especially as [X] was clearly able to separate at the Family Law process interviews. That said there was no evidence in subpoenaed documents to support an alleged pattern of Family Violence initiated from [Mr Coleman], save that Child Protection substantiated harm from Family Violence. If [Mr Coleman] is using controlling behaviours and using [X] to control [Ms Page], it would be expected that [X] may be fearful of upsetting [Mr Coleman] as he is aware of [Mr Coleman]'s wishes. [X] would be most unlikely to disclose anything that might upset [Mr Coleman] especially while he is present. If accepted that [Mr Coleman] uses control and family violence, it is likely if the Court no longer has oversight, as [Mr Coleman] suggested, that [X]'s relationship with [Ms Page] may cease completely. If accepted that [Mr Coleman] uses controlling behaviours towards [Ms Page] and is using [X] to continue that control, there may be a benefit in considering an ultimately shared care arrangement for [X] to change the balance of the power dynamic between [Ms Page] and [Mr Coleman] and/or that [Ms Page] hold parental decision making. If there is a decision to progress [X]'s time with [Ms Page] and there is also no time for [E] with [Ms Page], there should be consideration of how to ensure that the process for [X] is not undermined by him having contact with [E] and [Mr F].

...

1. That [X] spend unsupervised time with [Ms Page] per current orders, save that there be changeovers at the professional supervised contact service at [G Contact Service] in [Town H]. This will require both parents to re-enrol at the contact service which has capacity to supervise changeovers on weekends and weekdays. There is currently no waitlist for the service

2. That [X] spending increasing unsupervised time with [Ms Page] until it reaches each alternate weekend from after school on Friday until return to school on Monday with progression to time on school holidays graduated until it becomes half the school holidays

...

1. That [X] be formally assessed for psychological therapy. That he be engaged with a suitable treating practitioner for individual child therapy to support his assessed needs including trauma treatment and the progress of his relationship with [Ms Page]. That [Mr Coleman] is not to be included in the individual therapy but that both he and [Ms Page] receive feedback from the individual child therapy about how to support [X]
2. That [Mr Coleman] engage with a therapist to address his trauma from the past, and to address any propensity to use or retaliate with physical violence

1. The matter came before the Court again on 3 December 2024 when further orders were made regarding Ms Page's other child, E who was not a child in the proceedings before me this day. Those orders provided that E, would live with his father, Mr F ('Mr F'), and that there was no obligation upon Mr F in those orders to have E available to spend time with Ms Page. Those orders were made by consent.

1. Further orders were also made by consent relating to X. All previous orders were discharged and X's time was to follow a different regime with his mother, which was supervised at G Children's Contact Service. X had attended that service back in 2022.
2. X was, according to the orders, to attend G Contact Service for supervised time as frequently and at such times as could be accommodated by G Contact Service but, after the completion of five sessions, Ms Page's time was to move to being unsupervised, with supervised changeover only to occur at G Contact Service. It is quite clear or, at least, I infer that it was assumed by all parties that G Contact Service would facilitate the time provided in that order.
3. On 4 January 2025, Mr Coleman attended at G Contact Service service with X, and it appears to be common ground or at least not disputed, that X told G Contact Service that he did not wish to see his mother. It appears to be common ground that the effect of the December 2024 orders had ceased. It is common ground that X has not spent supervised or unsupervised time with his mother since that time.

1. The dispute then before me, dealt with over this lunchtime in the circumstances of another judge being available to hear the matter on 28 July 2025, is whether there should an attempt to put further therapy in place before that final hearing on 28 July 2025.
2. Mr Coleman says that there are a number of difficulties with that proposal being "why, on an interim decision with the limited decision-making abilities of a judge on an interim hearing as compared to a final hearing, would an order for further therapy be made?" Further, when updated with the events that have occurred since the family report, the family report writer might have a different view in regard to the benefits of a further attempt at therapy, and there is substance in those points.
3. Mr Coleman's opposition to the remaining orders relating to the therapy really turn not on the nuts and bolts of that therapy if it occurs but, really, the concept of why it should be implemented at this point at all. There is just short of two months for that to be implemented.
4. Further, Mr Coleman says it is difficult for him to consent to and sign up to an order that he meet the difference or the gap between the publicly funded therapy and the charges of the therapist when he is of modest circumstances and does not receive child support and does not know what those financial arrangements will be. It is not suggested that Ms Page has the capacity to contribute to that at all. Hence, the remaining disputes are not really a dispute but really turn on whether there should be therapy or not.
5. In this case, although untested, the observations of the report writer at paragraph 70 weigh heavily on me (recited above). I expect that any dispute in regard to the family report writer will be around the direction of the way forward and recommendations, rather than whether or not the report writer observed what she said she observed, but that may not come to pass. It is clear enough that Ms Page's position is that Mr Coleman is not supporting any relationship between X and herself. It is clear that Mr Coleman's position is that X has his own views about what he can do or actually facilitate in seeing his mother in the circumstances of what he endured as a child when in his mother's care.
6. I make no finding one way or the other on this interim hearing about that, and that will be the difficult task for the judge. The Independent Children's Lawyer ('ICL') position has some circumspection about the extent to which Mr Coleman supports the therapy and supports X having any relationship with his mother.
7. However, there are enough common ground facts or events for me. It was determined back in May of 2024 that there should be therapy for X. X's time was revisited in December.
8. It appears that all parties including the ICL understood that notwithstanding order 31 of the December 2024 orders, being:
   1. That all previous parenting orders in relation to [X] born [in] 2016 be discharged.

that the orders of May relating to the therapy continued in full force and effect and, as I understand it, Mr Coleman's position is he continued to attempt to have that facility or that therapy continue to the extent that he could, and Ms Page's position is that she assumed or understood that it was continuing, and the ICLs position, which I have been told of today, is that the ICL understood that it was to continue.

1. Hence, it appears to me on a literal reading that what the parties really meant was that all previous parenting orders relating to the time that X would spend with his mother were discharged and were effectively replaced by the scheme of the orders at paragraph 34.[1]
2. Hence, I have a position whereby it is now common ground that the therapy was not successful but was intended by the parties to have commenced back in May 2024 and, on one view, the therapy never got very far and Ms Page has profound criticisms of the therapist who was involved.

1. In all of those circumstances, I am not satisfied that that previously long thought out and attempted to be adhered to plan of therapy should be abandoned because I was unable to hear the matter on a final basis today. It appears to be common ground or, at least, arguably common ground based on the consent to the previous time and what Mr Coleman has told the report writer that there is benefit of X having a relationship with his mother.
2. The previous position of the parties was that it was necessary or, at least, advantageous for X to have therapy as part of that process of having a relationship with his mother. Balancing all of those matters, including the family report writer's concerns at the long-term consequences for X if he does not have a relationship at all with his mother, I am, to the extent that I can be satisfied of anything on an interim hearing, satisfied that it is in X's best interests to continue with therapy, albeit with a new therapist if one can be found in all the circumstances as pressed by the ICL and Ms Page.
3. I note that Mr Coleman's opposition to the particular orders was not opposition to the concept of therapy altogether but, rather, opposition to an attempt to restart therapy at this point, given the closeness of the final hearing. The other part of the proposed orders that was controversial was, now that another judge will deal with the matter and this being a Dandenong matter, was whether the further hearing should be at Melbourne. Judge Mansini sits in Melbourne and has many demands upon her time. I am prepared to put Mr Coleman's position as a notation as discussed with counsel, and his counsel have requested that that notation be included. It simply is not possible for me to comment or predict whether or not Mr Coleman's preferred venue for the hearing can be accommodated or not.
4. However, if push comes to shove, the attention of a final hearing with the ability to get to the bottom of things that a final hearing presents is very much in X's best interests. And whatever other accommodations have to be made, albeit that they would have to be made with great difficulty, maintaining that hearing date, whether in Melbourne or in Dandenong, is of the utmost importance to X.
5. The parties may think there is some irony in me making that comment, given that I was meant to be starting a final hearing today, but I have already explained to them the practical circumstances as to why I am unable to do that. So I will make all of those orders with the notation as proposed, and I will note that Mr Coleman has consented to orders 1, 2 and 3 and order 8, save for the venue issue.
6. Mr Coleman's position is that it is burdensome on him to continue to fund the gap in the therapy. I am satisfied that it may well be. At this point in time and with a hearing on 28 July 2025, if it is determined that therapy is to continue, that issue of cost will be able to be revisited. In the meantime, the cost of that therapy is a part of the cost and burden that Mr Coleman undertakes in raising X but a necessary part. Hence, I will leave that expense to be at Mr Coleman's expense.
7. All of these orders are until further order.
8. Those are my reasons.

I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge O'Shannessy.