Pachar & Mahal (No 4) [2025] FedCFamC1F 819 (14 November 2025)

Badawi & Badawi (Costs) [2017] FamCAFC 196.

Byrnes v Brisconnections Management Co Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 1432.

Colgate Palmolive Co and Another v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 118 ALR 248.

Cross & Beaumont [2008] FamCAFC 68.

Fitzgerald (as child representative for A (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)) v Fish & another [2005] FamCA 158; (2005) 33 Fam LR 123.

Galbadon & Galbadon [2015] FamCAFC 59.

Hitch & Hitch [2012] FamCAFC 124; (2012) 47 FamLR 603.

Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse (No 3) [2010] WASC 223.

I and I (No 2) [1995] FamCA 80; (1995) FLC 92-625.

Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23.

Jensen & Jensen [1982] FamCA 57; (1982) FLC 91-263.

Kohan & Kohan [1992] FamCA 116; (1993) FLC 92-340.

Lenova & Lenova (Costs) [2011] FamCAFC 141.

Limousin v Limousin (Costs) [2007] FamCA 1178; (2007) 38 Fam LR 478.

Medlon & Medlon (No 6) (Indemnity Costs) [2015] FamCAFC 157; (2015) FLC 93-664.

Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451.

Parke & The Estate of the Late A Parke (2016) FLC 93‑748.

Prantage & Prantage (Costs) [2014] FamCA 850.

Riemann & Riemann and Ors (No. 3) [2017] FamCA 911.

Stoian & Fiening (Costs) [2014] FamCA 944.

Withers & Russell (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1A 197.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

1. The Respondent Wife pay the professional costs and disbursements incurred by the Applicant Husband in these proceedings, including the fees of counsel, for the period 23 January 2025 to the date of these orders on a party and party basis within 28 days of those costs being agreed or assessed.
2. The Application in a Proceeding filed on 6 August 2025 and the Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 22 September 2025 be dismissed.

1. The legal representative for and on behalf of the Respondent Wife has today provided an Undertaking that he will retain a sum of $150,000 in his trust account pending the wife's satisfaction of her obligations pursuant to Order 1 herein.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Pachar & Mahal has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. The wife's application for financial orders pursuant to Part VIII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") was finalised on 9 July 2025 when I made final financial orders and delivered Reasons for Judgment.[1] My reasons for judgment provide context to the dispute between the parties.
2. On 18 August 2025, the husband filed an Application in a Proceeding ("the Costs Application") seeking orders with respect to the costs of and incidental to the proceedings. I heard that application on 30 September 2025. On the same day, I heard argument with respect to the wife's application for costs of and incidental to the proceedings.
3. These reasons explain why I have determined to make an order for the wife to pay the husband for the costs of and incidental to these proceedings including the Costs Application for the period 23 January 2025 to the date of the delivery of this judgment such costs to be certified fit for counsel.

1. The parties married in City J in Country B in 2004 and separated on 12 May 2021.[2] They have two children, namely, a female child aged 17 years and a male child aged 13 years.[3] The children have lived with the husband since separation.
2. The wife commenced parenting proceedings pursuant to Part VII of the Act on 8 July 2021. Those proceedings finalised with the consent of each party on 8 September 2023. Proceedings pursuant to Part VIII of the Act were commenced by the wife on 13 December 2021.
3. My primary judgment recorded that the proceedings were unnecessarily contentious. Particularly, the Court file reflected that subsequent to the commencement of proceedings:

(a) The parties between them filed 258 documents;

(b) The competing applications were the subject of forty-three orders; and

(c) The parties between them filed forty-two subpoenas.

1. For her part, and by her Further Amended Initiating Application, the wife sought:

(a) An order for the sale of the former matrimonial home located at Suburb C. That application was opposed by the husband;

(b) An order that on the sale of the Suburb C property, the wife receive the net proceeds of sale in their entirety;

(c) An order that the wife receive 100 percent of the parties' superannuation interests;

(d) An order that the husband do pay to the wife a sum of $140,000 in respect of his occupation of the Suburb C property subsequent to the parties' separation; and

(e) An order that the husband return jewellery to the wife.

1. For his part, the husband sought a division of the parties' non-superannuation assets and superannuation assets such that he retain sixty-five (65) percent and the wife retain the remaining thirty-five (35) percent.
2. For the reasons referred to in my primary judgment, I ordered a division of the parties' non-superannuation property in the proportions of fifty-eight (58) percent to the husband and the remaining forty-two (42) percent to the wife. I made no order with respect to the parties' respective superannuation assets.
3. It is against this background that the husband filed an Application in a Proceeding on 6 August 2025 seeking orders that:

(a) The wife pays his costs of the substantive proceedings on an indemnity basis fixed in a sum of $130,822.40; or

(b) In the alternative, that the wife pay his costs of the substantive proceedings:

(i) For the period 8 July 2021 to 22 January 2025 on an ordinary basis as agreed or assessed; and

(ii) For the period 23 January 2025 to 9 July 2025 as agreed or assessed.

(a) The wife pay his costs of and incidental to the Costs Application fixed in a sum of $17,600; or

(b) In the alternative, that the wife pay his costs of and incidental to the Costs Application as agreed or assessed.[4]

1. The husband's application was opposed by the wife. Particularly, and by her Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 22 September 2025, the wife sought orders that:

(a) The husband's Costs Application be dismissed;

(b) The husband pay her costs on an indemnity basis fixed in a sum of $257,529.49;

(c) In the alternative, the husband pay her costs as agreed or assessed for the period 8 July 2021 until 22 January 2025 and thereafter, on an indemnity basis; and

(d) The husband pay her costs of and incidental to the competing cost applications or in the alternative, that each party bear his/her own costs of the proceedings.[5]

(a) An Application in a Proceeding filed on 18 August 2025;

(b) An affidavit in the name of the husband's solicitor filed on 6 August 2025; and

(c) Husband's Written Submissions filed 26 September 2025.

(d) A Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 22 September 2025;

(e) An Affidavit in the name of the wife's solicitor filed on 22 September 2025; and

(f) Wife's Written Submissions filed on 26 September 2025.

1. The operation of rule 8.15(3)(e) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ('the Rules') was dispensed with and the annexures to the affidavits relied upon by the parties were admitted into evidence.

1. Section 114UB(1) of the Act abolishes for the purposes of family law proceedings, the general rule that in civil proceedings, costs follow the event. It provides that each party should bear his or her own costs in such proceedings.
2. However, the Court retains a discretion to make an order as to costs. The relevant principles are well settled.[6] The Court has a wide discretion, which is to be exercised judicially.
3. Relevantly, section 114UB(2) of the Act reads as follows:

If, in proceedings under this Act, the court is of the opinion that there are circumstances that justify it in doing so, the court may, subject to subsection (3) of this section, sections 114UC and 114UD and the applicable rules of Court, make such order as to costs and security for costs, whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise.

1. When considering what order (if any) is just, the legislation mandates that the court have regard to those matters set out in s 114UB(3) of the Act. The legislation does not identify that any of those seven matters is determinative. However, the Court must consider each matter in the seven alphabetical subsections.[7] There is nothing to prevent any factor being the sole foundation for any order for costs being made.[8]
2. Section 114UB(3) of the Act provides that when considering what costs order (if any) should be made, the court shall have regard to:

(a) the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings;

(b) whether any party to the proceedings is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and, if so, the terms of the grant of that assistance to that party;

(c) the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting paragraphs (a) and (b), the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters, and in relation to their duty of disclosure under subsection 71B(1), 90RI(1) or 90YJA(1);

(d) whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court;

(e) whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;

(f) whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer; and

(g) such other matters as the court considers relevant.

1. It is now appropriate to consider whether there are any circumstances which justify a departure from the general rule provided by s 114UB(1) by virtue of any of the considerations specified in s 114UB(3) of the Act.

Section 114UB(3)(a) - the financial circumstances of each of the parties

1. The wife's financial circumstances are dire. As recorded in my primary judgment, and in July 2021, the wife was charged with the following offences:

(a) Two counts of common assault of the husband on [...] July 2015 and [...] April 2018;

(b) One count of assault of the husband occasioning actual bodily harm on [...] September 2019;

(c) One count of common assault of the parties' daughter on [...] April 2020; and

(d) One count of assault of the parties' son occasioning actual bodily harm on [...] November 2018.[9]

1. In early 2024, the Local Court of New South Wales found the wife guilty of all alleged offences save for an alleged assault of the husband in April 2018.[10] On appeal to the District Court of New South Wales, all convictions save for the conviction relating to a common assault of the parties' daughter were upheld.[11] As a consequence of her convictions, the wife was sentenced to a Community Correction Order for a period of three years commencing in early 2024 and expiring in early 2027.[12]
2. The wife's oral evidence during the final hearing was to the effect that it has been difficult to obtain employment given her criminal convictions. I accepted that many employers require the provision of a police clearance prior to engaging an employee and I accepted that the existence of a conviction may compromise the wife's ability to obtain employment in some sectors.[13] Having said this, I also found that the wife has demonstrated significant flexibility with respect to her employment across many years and I concluded that the wife can obtain employment albeit the income, which the wife may receive is likely to be modest.
3. By the Financial Statement executed by her on 22 April 2025[14], the wife affirmed that:

(a) She is not employed. Indeed, the wife has been unemployed since February 2024 when her employer became aware of the criminal charges against her;[15] and

(b) She receives financial assistance from the Commonwealth Government in a sum of $381.40 per week being "JobSeeker" payments.[16]

(a) The non-superannuation assets in the wife's name are in the order of $3,011 only being monies held in five bank accounts;

(b) The husband was to pay to the wife a sum of $643,736.[17] The husband complied with my Orders. However, and at the hearing on 21 August 2025, the wife's solicitor gave an Undertaking for and on behalf of the wife that he would retain a sum of $150,000 in his trust account pending my determination of the Costs Application.[18]

1. Subsequent to the delivery of my primary judgment, I made an order requiring the wife to pay the costs of a third party such costs fixed in a sum of $11,000.[19] I also note that the wife is indebted to her solicitors by a sum of about $161,000.[20] This being so, and on satisfaction of the costs order in favour of the third party and her own legal fees, the wife will be left with a sum of about $471,736.
2. For his part, and as a consequence of the Orders made by me on 9 July 2025, the husband is in possession of non-superannuation assets with a value of about $902,406. In respect of this sum, the majority is represented by equity in a residential property at Suburb C.[21] The husband refinanced the mortgage secured over the property in order to satisfy my Orders with respect to payment to the wife.
3. Otherwise, and with respect to his circumstances:

(a) Pursuant to Orders made with the consent of the parties on 8 September 2023, the children live with the husband. The orders made simply provide for the children to spend time and communicate with the wife in accordance with their wishes. The children have not spent any time with their mother since the parties separated in May 2021;[22]

(b) In a manner similar to the wife, the husband has been exposed to legal costs in the order of $130,822;[23]

(c) I found that the financial burden of raising the parties' children has rested solely on the husband in circumstances where the amount which the wife pays to the husband by way of child support is nominal.[24] I also concluded that the child support, which the husband is likely to receive in the future will be modest and potentially unreliable;[25] and

(d) I found that the husband's expenses exceed his weekly income, which is in the order of about $1,151 per week.[26]

1. The father submits that neither party has significant financial means. In addition, he says as follows:

To the extent that the wife may assert impecuniosity due to the property adjustment provided for in the Judgement and the magnitude of her own costs such a submission ought to be rejected and in any event, impecuniosity is not a bar to the making of a costs Order.[27]

1. It is correct that impecuniosity is not a bar to the making of a costs order if the circumstances otherwise justify such an order.[28]

Section 114UB(3)(b) - whether any party to the proceedings is receiving assistance by way of legal aid in respect of the proceedings and, if so, the terms of the grant of the assistance to that party

1. This consideration is irrelevant to my determination.

Section 114UB(3)(c) - the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limited to paragraphs (a) and (b), the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters, and in relation to their duty of disclosure under subsection 71B(1), 90RI(1) or 90YJA(1)

1. This is a significant factor in the context of this matter. The relevant conduct is the party's conduct as a litigant.[29]

1. The final hearing occurred over six days. The mother's conduct as a litigant included:

(a) Failing to comply with orders made by the Honourable Justice Riethmuller on 16 April 2025, which required her to prepare a schedule of fifty entries by reference to inter alia date of transaction, amount of transaction, description of transaction and reference to applicable affidavit material. Although the wife did produce a schedule of fifty transactions, only four of them contained any reference to the wife's affidavit material or the husband's affidavit material;[30]

(b) Efforts by the wife's solicitor advocate to cross-examine the husband with respect to transactions, which were not:

(i) Identified in the schedule prepared by the wife pursuant to the orders of 16 April 2025; or

(ii) The subject of the wife's affidavit filed 25 March 2025, or the husband's response filed 17 April 2025.[31]

I consider that the wife's decision to do so in the face of an order impeded the expeditious progress of the trial and further, precluded the preparation of a joint Balance Sheet, which document I did not receive until the final day of the trial. [32] As I say in my primary judgment, and despite my exhortations, it was not until the final day of trial that I received a Balance Sheet jointly prepared by the parties.[33] Even then, the addbacks sought by the wife in the sum of $1,852,213 exceeded the equity in the primary asset of the marriage, namely, the Suburb C property;[34]

(c) Making application for in excess of 1000 addbacks, which the husband was required to address by the affidavit, which he prepared for the purposes of the final hearing;[35]

(d) The pursuit of addbacks in the order of $2,448,666 (which sum exceeded the non-superannuation assets available for distribution) despite the fact that:

(i) One impugned transaction was made by a third-party proprietary limited company. The husband was neither an officeholder nor a shareholder of the entity at the time of the transaction;[36]

(ii) One impugned transaction was not referred to in the affidavit material of either party nor was it the subject of any cross-examination;[37]

(iii) It was apparent that the monies the subject of one impugned transaction were returned to a company controlled by the husband within a very short time. This being so, there was no basis to any assertion that the transaction represented a premature distribution of property or a course of conduct designed to reduce the value of the matrimonial assets.[38]

1. The wife's approach to the litigation was also irregular in that she:

(a) Maintained a difference of opinion in respect of the value of furniture and effects located at the Suburb C property despite the fact that those items had never been the subject of a valuation;

(b) Included as "to be valued" shares held by the parties in three corporate entities despite the fact that a Judicial Registrar made orders on 28 February 2022, which expressly invited the parties to tender a proposed minute of order with respect to any "outstanding valuation issues" at the next court event. Orders were also made on 13 June 2023 requiring the wife to provide a list of any valuations and/or expert reports, which the wife asserted were required for final hearing. There is no evidence that the wife complied with either order. Further, and at no stage during the litigation, did the wife file any application seeking orders for the valuation of the entities nor did she seek to obtain any expert evidence of her own;[39]

(c) Included in the Balance Sheet jewellery in a sum of $250,000. This is despite the fact that the wife failed to produce any evidence, which would have enabled me to conclude that the jewellery had such a value nor evidence sufficient to enable me to conclude that the husband was in possession of the same;[40]

(d) Included in the Balance Sheet a motor vehicle, which the wife says the husband transferred to his mother subsequent to the parties' separation.[41] The wife did so despite producing no evidence as to the value of the motor vehicle;[42]

(e) Argued that she had been financially abused by the husband despite my finding that at the time of separation, the wife held six bank accounts in her own name;[43]

(f) On 16 April 2025, being one business day prior to the commencement of the trial[44], the wife filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking orders for the joinder of the husband's sister and brother-in-law to the proceedings. The application was in terms similar to the application filed by the wife on 20 January 2025 albeit on that occasion, the application related to the proposed joinder of the husband's sister only. I dismissed that application on 13 February 2025. Whatever the scenario, the wife's Further Amended Initiating Application, the transactions the subject of the schedule prepared pursuant to orders made on 16 April 2025 and the wife's failure to plead her case against the proposed third parties with any particularity meant that I was not satisfied that the facts asserted (insofar as I could discern the same), if proved, grounded the application;[45] and

(g) Pursued an application for Occupation Rent despite such an application being contrary to authority.[46]

1. I consider that the wife's actions as described above unnecessarily complicated and delayed the efficient disposal of the litigation.
2. In my decision of Pachar & Mahal (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 568, I also referred to the wife's pursuit of a third party proprietary limited company. The husband was neither an officeholder nor a director of that entity. In any event, the file maintained by the Court reflects that:

(a) On 7 June 2022, a Senior Judicial Registrar in part upheld Notices of Objection filed by the husband in response to subpoenas directed to three financial institutions. The orders, which were very detailed identify that in a manner similar to the husband, the Court held concern about the scope of the material sought by the subpoenas and particularly, whether the material sought by the subpoenas was relevant to the Part VIII applications. Indeed, Notation C to the Orders made on 7 June 2022 records the following:

1. The Applicant Wife correctly conceded that the Subpoenas were arguably too broad by inclusion of non-exhaustive terms in some items in the Schedule to each Subpoena. The amendments to the Subpoenas effected by Order 3 herein addresses those deficiencies.

(b) On 29 January 2025, the husband was represented at a hearing before a Senior Judicial Registrar at which time, and in response to Notices of Objection filed by the husband on 9 December 2024, the Court set aside three subpoenas filed by the wife on 27 November 2024. Notations G and K to the Orders record the following:

1. Whilst the authorities make it plain that the threshold for establishing apparent relevance at this stage is "relatively low" each subpoena schedule is drafted as to be too broad and lacks particularity.

...

1. The subpoena must fail on the basis of a lack of reasonable particularity in relation to the documents sought.

(c) On 30 December 2024, the wife filed an additional nine subpoena in relation to the husband's financial records. The husband filed Notices of Objection on 8 January 2025. Orders made by me on 13 February 2025 (as amended on 27 February 2025) record that:

(i) In relation to each subpoena, I made orders confining the date range of the documents sought; and

(ii) I redacted reference to third party entities in relation to which the husband had no interest.

1. The husband describes the wife's conduct in these proceedings as being "frivolous and vexatious". Certainly, the summary provided above causes me to conclude that the wife made applications and issued subpoenas, which were without merit and/or improperly drawn.
2. Section 95 of the Act is in the following terms:

(1) The overarching purpose of the family law practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes:

(a) in a way that ensures the safety of families and children; and

(b) in relation to proceedings under this Act in which the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration - in a way that promotes the best interests of the child; and

(c) according to law; and

(d) as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the overarching purpose includes the following objectives in relation to proceedings under this Act:

(a) the just determination of all such proceedings;

(b) the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of courts exercising jurisdiction in such proceedings;

(c) the efficient disposal of the overall caseload of courts exercising jurisdiction in such proceedings;

(d) the disposal of all such proceedings in a timely manner;

(e) the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.

1. Section 96(1) of the Act, in the same manner as s 68 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) imposes a duty on litigants in this Court to conduct their litigation consistently with the overarching purpose. Section 96 of the Act is in the following terms:

96 Duty to act consistently with the overarching purpose

Duty of parties

(1) The parties to proceedings under this Act must conduct the proceedings (including negotiations for settlement of the dispute to which the proceedings relate) in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose of the family law practice and procedure provisions.

1. If a party is conducting proceedings consistently with the overarching purpose of the Act, then he or she must be assiduous and careful with respect to the terms of any application filed by him or her or indeed any subpoena filed by him or her to ensure that the documents being sought are clear and relevant to the issues in dispute in the proceedings.
2. The requirements of efficacy, timeliness, cost and proportionality apply to every aspect of litigation in this court. Litigants must make efforts to rationally and carefully present his or her case and avoid unnecessary arguments.
3. For the reasons identified above, the wife failed to conduct her case in a manner, which was consistent with the overarching purpose. Further, the wife acted in a manner, which precluded the efficient disposal of the overall caseload of the court.
4. I also have regard to paragraph 1.4 of the Court's Central Practice Direction, which reads as follows:

The Courts expect parties and their lawyers to have in mind, at all times, the cost of each step in the proceedings and whether it is necessary, and to avoid unnecessary process-driven costs and unjustified use of court resources. In everything they do, parties and lawyers are expected to approach proceedings in a manner directed towards identifying the issues in dispute and ascertaining the most efficient, including cost efficient, method of resolution or determination. This includes giving proper consideration to identifying the issues in dispute, complying with their obligation to provide full and frank disclosure in a timely manner (see Part 6.1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (the Family Law Rules)), engaging in productive and resolution-focused communication with other parties, making appropriate admissions and pressing only issues of genuine significance. Ambit claims should be avoided and aggressive and unnecessarily adversarial conduct will not be tolerated. At all stages in the proceedings, parties must avoid filing evidence that is unnecessarily lengthy or only of limited relevance to the issues genuinely in dispute. Parties should limit the number of witnesses they rely on to those necessary to prove or disprove those issues truly requiring determination.

1. Paragraph 1.5 of the Central Practice Direction provides that any failure to comply with these requirements may attract costs orders against parties. For the reasons discussed above, I have determined to exercise my discretion to make a costs order in favour of the husband.

1. It is the wife's position that the conduct of the husband in these proceedings has been "considerably poor".[47] Particularly, the wife says that:

(a) The husband failed to comply with his obligations as to disclosure as required by rule 6.06 of the Rules and s 71B(1) of the Act; and

(b) The husband's "removal of documents" produced pursuant to subpoenas filed by the wife on 14 April 2022.

1. In support of the first contention, the wife relies on the affidavit of her solicitor filed on 22 August 2025. By that document, the wife sets out what her solicitor describes as:

(a) The wife's "significant difficulty... in obtaining discovery from the husband from the commencement of the proceedings"; and

(b) The husband's "continual frustration of providing sufficient and detailed explanations for some various transactions, the deregistration of his various companies, the amount of bank accounts he controlled" and the sale of an entity, which I referred to in my primary judgment as O Pty Ltd.[48]

1. The complaints repeat complaints made by the Outline of Case Document, which the wife's solicitor prepared for the purposes of trial. By that document, the wife's solicitor advocate made the following submission:

Notwithstanding previous detailed orders made by Registrar [surname] on 30 November 2021 and in accordance with Family Law Rule 6.06 in respect of disclosure, the Respondent has not complied with these Orders in full. Notwithstanding the previous hearings where the Respondent understood the failure to comply and was subject of cross examination he has also failed to comply.[49]

1. At [204] to [208] of my primary judgment, I said as follows with respect to the wife's allegations about disclosure:

In Venter & Venter (No 5) [2023] FedCFamC1F 635, Carew J also considered the fundamental importance of disclosure in financial cases albeit in the context of an application to dismiss a litigant's case on the basis of not disclosing a document as required by the Rules.

In this case, I consider that the wife's general complaints about the adequacy of disclosure have been infected by the wife's indefatigable belief that the husband has an interest in real property and/or corporate entities owned by the husband's sister and/or brother-in-law.

I note that the topic of the husband's non-disclosure was found only three times in the wife's affidavit filed on 25 March 2025, namely, at paragraphs 326, 332 and 338. I upheld objections in relation to each of those paragraphs on the basis that among other things, the paragraphs were argumentative only and did not provide me with any evidence of non-disclosure by the husband of documents material to the issues determined by me.[50]

Immediately prior to closing submissions, the wife's solicitor advocate sought to tender a bundle of correspondence, which he asserted related to the husband's failure to make disclosure. He had not alerted the husband's counsel that he would seek to tender the documents and further, the husband was not cross-examined in relation to the correspondence. Indeed, the husband was not cross-examined in any detail at all about his failure to make disclosure.

For these reasons, and in circumstances where the wife simply did not produce sufficient evidence to enable me to make such a finding, I am disinclined to make any adjustment in the wife's favour on account of the husband's non-disclosure of documents relevant to these proceedings.

1. The wife's complaints about disclosure as set out in her solicitor's affidavit filed on 22 August 2025 appear to be infected by the same difficulties as the complaints made during the trial - namely, the complaints about the inadequacy of disclosure appear to emanate from indefatigable belief that the husband has an interest in real property and/or corporate entities owned by the husband's sister and/or brother-in-law. Even if my finding is incorrect, it was not the subject of any appeal. Further, the assertions now made by the wife's solicitors are impossible for me to assess in circumstances where the evidence has not been tested.
2. In addition to the topic of disclosure, the wife's solicitor says that produced pursuant to subpoenas filed by the wife on 14 April 2022. That topic was the subject of Orders made by a Senior Judicial Registrar on 7 June 2022 and I consider it to be immaterial to the husband's application for costs.

Section 114UB(3)(d) - whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court

1. This sub-section is irrelevant to my determination.

Section 114UB(3)(e) - whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings

1. The husband by his Written Submissions says as follows:

It is the husband's position that the case run by the wife was that the contributions under s 79(4)(a), (b) of the Act were "fairly even" during the relationship. [J146] The main issues in contention under this section was wastage, family violence, contribution to the acquisition of the property and non-financial contributions of the husband's mother.

1. The husband submits that the wife was unsuccessful in that:

(a) The wife largely failed in her wastage arguments save and except for the two transactions identified at [141] of my judgment being transactions with a quantum of $420,575;[51] and

(b) The wife failed in establishing that her contributions were made more arduous on account of family violence. I did find that the husband assaulted the wife in February 2021.[52] However, I also brought to account the convictions recorded against the wife's name for assault of the husband and the husband's son. I expressed an opinion that the wife's actions compelled the husband to take steps to be protective of the children.[53]

1. I have identified above the other applications, which were not successfully prosecuted by the wife and the subpoenas filed by the wife, which were discharged.
2. The wife was wholly unsuccessful with respect to her application, which if granted, would have resulted in the wife receiving one hundred percent of the non-superannuation and superannuation assets available for distribution. Indeed, I concluded that the assets of the parties ought to be divided on a 58 /42 basis in the husband's favour.[54] I also declined to include notional property in the manner contended by the wife[55] and declined to make an adjustment in favour of the wife pursuant to s 75(2)(o) of the Act.[56]
3. In contrast, the husband sought a division of the parties' non-superannuation assets and superannuation assets such that he retain sixty-five (65) percent and the wife retains the remining thirty-five (35) percent. Whilst my orders do not reflect the outcome desired by the husband, the division of the parties' non-superannuation and superannuation assets ordered by me was significantly closer to the husband's position than to the mother's position.
4. In Pennisi v Pennisi,[57] the Full Court of the Family Court said as follows:

[I]t is not the law that an offer of greater or equivalent value to that which results from the Court will lead to an order for costs in favour of the offeror... We would also add that just because an offer is marginally less than the amount ordered by a Court does not mean that it is not a factor to be taken into account in determining whether costs should be awarded...

The plain words [of section 117(2A)(f)] do not limit a Court's attention to offers which are greater than the amount awarded. Nor does the paragraph state what consequences flow from whether the offer is greater or lesser than the amount awarded, or how much that is the case. Words of limitation should not be imported into the provision and nor should it be read as though offers in proceedings under the Act carry the same consequences as payment into Court in common law matters.

We do however, consider that the closer the offer is to the award when the offer is under the amount awarded by the Court, the more weight should be given to this factor in considering the question of costs. The principle must not, however, be rigidly applied. Offers must be seen within the context of the case and the extent of the offeree's knowledge of the parties' financial circumstances while the offer is live. In the family law jurisdiction, it is not uncommon to find relationships where one party, often the wife, has significantly less grasp of the parties' financial arrangements, or the financial circumstances are so complex that if would be premature to accept an offer. There are also cases where the contents of the offer are in themselves the subject of disputed value and legitimate subject matter for determination. These and other features of the context of offers must be taken into account when considering whether it was reasonable or not to accept an offer, no matter how close to the ultimate result the offer may be.

1. The husband's application was within the range of outcomes which might be expected to have resulted from a judicial determination. The wife's application was not within such a range and again, I consider that the wife's participation in the proceedings and the orders sought by her were compromised by the wife's indefatigable belief that the husband has an interest in real property and/or corporate entities owned by the husband's sister and/or brother-in-law. I rejected those contentions.
2. As discussed, the wife's untenable position was brought without any proper consideration for her obligations as a litigant, including but not limited to the obligations contained within the Court's Central Practice Direction: Family Law Case Management, and with limited consideration being given to the application of the law to the evidence.

Section 114UB(3)(f) - whether any party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer

1. This, along with the respective financial circumstances of the parties, constitutes an important consideration in this case. The import of s 11UB(3)(f) is to ensure that, when offers to settle are made, they are seriously considered by the other party concerned.
2. Litigation is expensive and for that reason is not to be embarked upon lightly. Accordingly, courts such as this one should encourage the parties to litigation to seek a compromise of their proceedings and should discourage a party from cavalierly disregarding any reasonable offers to settle.
3. Negotiations between the parties and/or their legal representatives, to compromise proceedings under section 79 of the Act are privileged.[58] Section 114UB(3)(f) does not specifically delineate how an offer to settle proceedings is to be made, other than it is to be made "in writing". Section 117C is more specific. It authorises offers to settle in accordance with rules made by the court and stipulates that such offers are not to be disclosed to the court itself, until such time as an application arises under section 114UB(2) of the Act.
4. Part 4.2 of the Rules stipulates that an offer to settle is made without prejudice, unless the offer states that it is an open offer. Such offers need not be filed with the court. They may also be withdrawn. They remain privileged until an issue of costs arises following the completion of the matter.
5. Accordingly, sections 114UB(3)(f) and section 117C, together with the applicable rules, recognise the procedure known as a "Calderbank" letter or offer. This procedure was described in Cross on Evidence as follows:

This procedure, known as the Calderbank letter or offer, was first used in matrimonial cases, but is now recognised to be of general application. The consequence of marking an offer "without prejudice save as to costs" is that the document and its contents are treated as being without prejudice for the determination of the substantial issues between the parties - they are privileged. But they may be used after these issues are determined, for the purpose of deciding the incidence of costs. Where the payment into court procedure is available, it is prudent that it be used.[59]

1. On 23 January 2025, the husband sent to the wife what he describes as a "Calderbank Offer".[60]
2. Whilst an offer not in the precise form first suggested by Cairns LJ in Calderbank will not render it inadmissible or necessarily ineffective on an argument as to costs[61], a relaxation in the rigours of formality does not invite wholesale departure from the Calderbank form. A Calderbank offer ought to:

(a) Be marked without prejudice save as to costs;

(b) Be clear, precise and certain in its terms;

(c) State clearly the time in which the offer must be accepted;

(d) Make reference to the offer being one in accordance with the principles enunciated in the decision of Calderbank v Calderbank;

(e) Make some provision for costs separate from the principal offer;

(f) State clearly that the offeror reserves its right to tender the offer on an application for costs if the offer is rejected;

(g) State the costs advantage i.e. indemnity costs or party/party costs that the offeror has in mind to achieve; and

(h) Provide reasons why the offer should be accepted.

1. The husband's offer fell short of satisfying those criterium referred to at (e), (g) and (h) above. Nevertheless, the husband's offer of 23 January 2025 does represent an offer, which is recognised by operation of r 4.07(2) of the Rules. In addition, the offer attached a proposed order, which was not dissimilar in substantive terms to the orders made by me on 9 July 2025. In short, the offer and the proposed order indicated that the husband was prepared to pay to the wife a sum of $1,296,243 on condition that the wife do transfer her interest in the Suburb C property to him. As is evident from my primary judgment:

(a) The Suburb C property was the parties' only existing asset, which had any value;[62] and

(b) The husband's offer represented a sum, which was better than the sum afforded by my orders by an amount of $677,476. That is, the husband offered to pay to the wife a sum of $1,296,243 and pursuant to Order 1 of the Orders made by me on 9 July 2025, I directed that the husband pay to the wife a sum of $618,767. On the husband's calculations, the offer made by him represented 81.6 percent of the assets available for distribution.[63]

1. In these circumstances, the offer made by the husband can only be described as a credible and genuine attempt to reach a compromise satisfactory to each of the parties concerned and to spare them the mutual burden of unnecessary legal costs. In my view, the timing of the offer is important noting that by Orders made on 15 November 2024, Justice Riethmuller made orders regulating the parties' preparation for trial. Order 18(a) of those Orders required the wife to file and serve any affidavits to be relied upon at final hearing by 14 March 2025. Although I subsequently varied those orders by a period of about two weeks,[64] the offer if accepted could have avoided the costs incumbent in preparing the case for trial.
2. Notwithstanding the fact that the Orders I made in the wife's favour present a monetary payment to her significantly less than the payment proposed by the husband on 23 January 2025, the wife asserts that I ought not make an award of costs in favour of the husband on account of the following (adopting phrases used by the wife):

(a) The "disentitling conduct of the husband";

(b) The wife "did not have adequate information for her to consider the offer";

(c) The "complexity of the matter"; and

(d) "Reference to the situation at the time when the offer was made".[65]

1. In respect of "disentitling conduct of the husband", the wife refers to and repeats her criticism of the husband's disclosure. Again, I consider those assertions to simply be an embodiment of the wife's belief that the husband has an interest in real property and/or corporate entities owned by the husband's sister and/or brother-in-law. I rejected those contentions.
2. There is some merit to the wife's assertion that she "did not have adequate information for her to consider the offer" particularly in circumstances where I found that at least in respect of two transactions with a quantum of $420,575, the husband engaged in a course of conduct designed to prematurely distribute the assets of two proprietary limited companies in which he has an interest.[66] With respect to the balance of her assertion, however, I consider it to simply be an embodiment of the wife's belief that the husband has an interest in real property and/or corporate entities owned by the husband's sister and/or brother-in-law.
3. With respect to the wife's assertion that the competing applications were "complex" and that accordingly, I ought not make an award of costs in favour of the husband, I am not persuaded that this ground alone precludes me from making an award of costs. I accept that the proceedings were hard fought, and I accept that the wife was entitled to explore the husband's business dealings and transactions, which he entered either personally or through the auspices of his associated entities. Save for this issue, however, my judgment reflects that the assets available for distribution were modest and the proceedings arose from a relationship of seventeen years. The wife's argument is also defeated by her concession that as at 18 May 2023, she considered that she had sufficient information to make an offer to the husband in an effort to resolve these proceedings.[67]
4. With respect to "the situation at the time the offer was made", I accept the wife's submission that at the time the offer was made, the parties were awaiting a determination in respect of various objections filed with respect to subpoenas issued by the wife on 30 December 2024. As discussed above, I heard argument on 13 February 2025 and on that day, I made orders confining the date range of the documents sought and, I redacted reference to third party entities in relation to which the husband had no interest. Given the limited quantum of transactions, which I found were transactions designed to reduce the assets available for distribution, I do not accept that the wife was otherwise excused from giving the husband's offer close and careful consideration. Indeed, it concerns me that the wife failed to respond to the wife's offer at all or at the very least make an offer, which may have compromised the competing applications.
5. For these reasons, I again find that the wife has failed to conduct her case in a manner, which was consistent with the overarching purpose.

CONCLUSION AS TO THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE APPLICATION FOR COSTS

1. It is the responsibility of the court to balance the various matters set out in s 114UB(3) of the Act to arrive at a result, which it considers just. That said, litigants must conduct his/her litigation in a manner, which is focussed and avoids unnecessary expense. I consider that the wife failed to do so. For these reasons, I will order the wife to pay the costs of the husband.
2. The only submission made by the wife as to why the Court ought to make an order for costs in favour of the husband is found at paragraph 79 of her Written Submissions wherein, she says:

It is the wife's ultimate position that her financial circumstances, and the conduct of the husband during the substantive proceedings, entitle her to costs on an indemnity basis.[68]

1. I have addressed the husband's conduct during the proceedings above. Whilst that conduct may be relevant to the quantum of costs to be awarded and/or whether such costs are ordered on a party and party, solicitor and client or indemnity basis, I am not persuaded on the evidence presented by the wife or the content of her submissions that it is appropriate to make an order for costs in favour of the husband. When arriving at this conclusion, I also note the following:

(a) The written offer, which the wife made to the husband's mother with respect to a resolution of proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales is irrelevant to any determination I make with respect to costs in these proceedings;[69] and

(b) The offer, which the wife made to the husband on 18 May 2023 is significantly more than the amount, which I awarded to the wife by my Orders made on 9 July 2025.[70]

Period for which the Court will make an order for costs

1. As identified above, and in their alternate positions, each party invites me to make orders, which reflect different methods of assessment for work performed prior to and work performed subsequent to the written offer made by the wife on 23 January 2025 (supra). When giving consideration to this invitation, I note that on 8 September 2023, and with the consent of the parties, the Court made final parenting orders under Part VII of the Act.
2. As a general proposition, I accept that in circumstances where parties are litigating in respect of parenting and property, it can be difficult to resolve the proceedings. In any event, the husband does not submit either by the affidavit of his solicitor or his written submissions that the wife's conduct with respect to the parenting proceedings was egregious. Certainly, the wife's parenting application was unsuccessful, but I bring to account those matters traversed in my primary judgment, namely, that:

(a) On 15 December 2023, the parties by joint communication, invited Justice Riethmuller to vacate the trial listed to commence on 19 February 2024 in circumstances where the parties were awaiting the delivery of a Judgment by the Supreme Court of New South Wales with respect to a claim by the husband's mother claiming a one-third beneficial entitlement to the Suburb C property;[71] and

(b) As late as April 2023, and by consent, the Court made an order requiring the parties and the children to participate in family therapy.[72]

1. The Court file reflects that there was little activity by the parties with respect to the filing of documents or Court events across 2024. For the reasons traversed above, however, I consider that it is appropriate to make an order in favour of the husband for the period 23 January 2025 to the conclusion of the trial as well as the costs of and incidental to the filing of the husband's application for costs.

1. The husband invites me to make an order that the wife pay his costs on an indemnity basis. In support of that assertion, the husband says:

Bluntly, [the wife's] "scattergun" and "scorched earth" approach to this litigation ignored facts known to her and applicable law that ought to have been known to her legal advisors.

1. In Prantage & Prantage [2013] FamCAFC 105; (2013) FLC 93-544 the Full Court of the Family Court (as it then was) confirmed that indemnity costs should only be awarded if the case has some special or unusual feature. Those special or unusual features were the subject of consideration by Justice Sheppard in Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd [1993] 119 CLR 118. That decision was the subject of consideration by Holden CJ in Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC 92-784 ("Munday v Bowman") at 84, 660 wherein his Honour provided the following non-exhaustive examples of special or unusual features:

(a) Where it appears that an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where a party properly advised should have known that he had no chance of success. In such cases the action must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts;

(b) Making allegations of fraud, knowing them to be false, and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud;

(c) Evidence of particular misconduct causing loss of time to the court and to other parties;

(d) The making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions; and

(e) An imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise.

(Citations omitted)

1. This is not a case where it could be concluded that the wife commenced or continued an action in circumstances where, properly advised, she should have known she had no chance of success. Further, and whilst at least two Applications in a Proceeding made by the wife (supra) were dismissed and numerous subpoenas were set aside (supra), I am not satisfied that the wife deliberately sought to cause loss of time to the Court or the husband or that the wife was otherwise advancing groundless contentions knowing them to be groundless for the purpose of prolonging the case. Instead, and as discussed, I consider that the wife's conduct was driven by an indefatigable belief that the husband had divested himself of monies in an effort to thwart her claim. That assertion was in part made out on cross-examination noting my finding that in respect of a sum of $420,575, the husband engaged in a course of conduct designed to prematurely distribute the assets of two entities, which were established by the husband during the relationship.
2. On balance, I am not inclined to make any order for either party to pay costs for the period prior to 23 January 2025. I will, however, make an order requiring the wife to pay the husband's costs of and incidental to the proceedings subsequent to 23 January 2025.
3. Pursuant to Rule 12.17(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021, I am permitted to make an order that the husband be paid his costs fixed in a specific amount. It has been determined that where a Court orders a party to pay costs, it may be appropriate for the Court to fix a lump sum. By doing so, the Court can avoid further delay and inconvenience being occasioned by the requirement to tax a bill (Byrnes v Brisconnections Management Co Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 1432 at [51]).[73]
4. The difficulty I experience in awarding costs in a fixed sum amount in this case is that the wife's costs have been quantified on an indemnity basis and I have not been provided with an itemised account, which is prepared by reference to Schedule 3 of the Rules. If a short form assessment had been prepared, then I would have evidence before me necessary to determine a logical, fair and reasonable amount for costs.
5. Accordingly, I will make orders for the wife to pay the husband for the costs of and incidental to these proceedings including the Costs Application for the period 23 January 2025 to the date of the delivery of this judgment such costs to be certified fit for counsel.

I certify that the preceding eighty-eight (88) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anderson.

[1] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451.

[2] Wife's affidavit filed 25 March 2025, paragraph 3.

[3] Wife's affidavit filed 25 March 2025, paragraph 5.

[4] Husband's Written Submissions, filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 2.

[5] Husband's Written Submissions, filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 5.

[6] Parke & The Estate of the Late A Parke (2016) FLC 93‑748; Atkins & Hunt (Costs) [2017] FamCAFC 131.

[7] I and I (No 2) [1995] FamCA 80; (1995) FLC 92-625; Hitch & Hitch [2012] FamCAFC 124; (2012) 47 FamLR 603.

[8] Prantage & Prantage (Costs) [2014] FamCA 850 at [12]; Fitzgerald (as child representative for A (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)) v Fish & another [2005] FamCA 158; (2005) 33 Fam LR 123 at 130.

[9] Husband's affidavit filed 17 April 2025, paragraph 172.

[10] Husband's affidavit filed 17 April 2025, paragraph 178; Exhibit H5.

[11] Husband's affidavit filed 17 April 2025, paragraph 180.

[13] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [195].

[15] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [182].

[16] Exhibit W3, Item 12; Also see affidavit in the name of the wife's solicitor filed on 22 September 2025, paragraph 102.

[17] Orders made on 9 July 2025, Order 1.

[18] Orders made on 21 August 2025, Notation A.

[19] Pachar & Mahal (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 568.

[21] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [236].

[22] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [1], [2] and [168].

[23] Husband's affidavit filed 6 August 2025, paragraph 8.

[24] The husband says that the same is $19.89 per fortnight - Husband's Written Submissions filed 6 August 2025, paragraph 32.

[25] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [197].

[26] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [197].

[27] Written submissions of the husband filed 26 September 2025, paragraphs 36 and 37; Sommer & Sommer [2021] FedCFamC1 F 37 at [74]; Nada & Nettle (Costs) [2014) FamCAFC 207.

[28] Davis & Peterson [2023] FedCFamC1A 13; (2023) FLC 94-130 at [75]; D & D (Costs) No 2 [2010] FamCAFC 64; (2010) FLC 93-435 at [21]; Nada & Nettle (Costs) [2014] FamCAFC 207; (2014) FLC 93-612; Lenova & Lenova (Costs) [2011] FamCAFC 141; Daines & Daines (Costs) [2014] FamCAFC 170.

[29] Stephens & Stephens & Anor (Enforcement) (Costs) [2010] FamCAFC 172.

[30] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [31] and [32].

[31] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [34].

[32] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [35].

[34] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [35].

[35] Husband's Written Submissions filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 32.

[36] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [91].

[37] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [102].

[38] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [106].

[39] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [37].

[40] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [71] to [76].

[41] Wife's affidavit filed 25 March 2025, paragraph 447.4.

[42] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [77].

[43] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [185].

[44] The final hearing commenced following the Easter long weekend in April 2025.

[45] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [47].

[46] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [213] to [219].

[47] Wife's Written Submissions filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 20.

[48] Wife's Outline of Case Document filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 22.

[49] Outline of Case Document filed 17 April 2024, paragraph 7.1.

[50] Rule 8.18, Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021.

[51] Wife's Outline of Case Document filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 13.

[52] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [187].

[53] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [189].

[54] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [212].

[55] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [142].

[56] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [192] to [212].

[57] Pennisi v Pennisi [1997] FamCA 39; (1997) 22 Fam LR 249.

[58] See In the Marriage of Steel (1992) 15 Fam LR 556, 560 (Nicholson, Strauss and Nygh JJ).

[59] J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (Lexis Nexis, 12th ed, 2020) 1018 [25360].

[60] Wife's Written Submissions filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 48.

[61] Jones v Bradley (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 258, [15]; Brymount Pty Limited t/as Watson Toyota v Cummins (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 69, [15].

[62] Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [235 and [236].

[63] Wife's Written Submissions filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 39.

[64] Orders made on 31 March 2025, Order 2.

[65] Wife's Written Submissions filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 52.

[66] Wife's Outline of Case Document filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 13.

[67] Wife's affidavit filed 22 September 2025, paragraph 98.2.

[68] Wife's Written Submissions filed 26 September 2025, paragraph 79.

[69] Wife's affidavit filed 22 September 2025, paragraph 98.1.

[70] Wife's affidavit filed 22 September 2025, paragraph 98.2.

[71] Orders made on 15 December 2023, Notation A; Pachar & Mahal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 451 at [161].

[73] See discussion by Deputy Chief Justice McClelland in Vandale & Cino (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 234 at [49] to [52]/