P -v- A [2025] WASCA 145 (7 October 2025)

The primary proceedings, the trial and the primary decision

1. The trial commenced on 5 February 2024.
2. Although the parties were agreed that G should spend significant time with the father, the father's position was that G should live within 55 km of Margaret River. In effect, the father sought orders that G live with the mother in any of Margaret River, Augusta, Busselton, Capel, Cowaramup, Dunsborough or Vasse. The father proposed that the mother live with G in a property he owned or one owned by his parents, both properties being in Margaret River. As an alternative, the father offered to pay a weekly amount towards the mother's rent.
3. The primary judge accepted that the father was required to oversee the building work undertaken by his business, which operated from Margaret River,[4] and that his employment was firmly tied to the South West.[5]
4. In the course of her evidence at trial, the mother acknowledged that her allegations of family violence against the father should not have been made and apologised to the father for having done so. Nonetheless, the mother's position was that G should remain in Perth, with her. When the trial commenced the mother and G were living with one of the mother's sisters in a home purchased by their parents. The mother was not required to pay rent. Her sister had relocated from Canberra to Perth to assist the mother. Those arrangements had been in place since January 2022.
5. The mother also received support from another sister and her husband, who also resided in Perth and lived within five minutes' travel of the mother.[6]
6. The primary judge found that, if G was not permitted to remain in Perth with the mother, the mother would move to the South West, with G.[7] The mother's evidence was that she could not live in any property owned by the father or his parents, and did not believe that she could live in Margaret River herself. The mother's evidence was that she had a lot of bad memories associated with Margaret River.[8]
7. The primary judge found that the mother could likely secure employment in the Margaret River vicinity as a midwife. It was possible that the mother might do so for higher pay than she was presently earning.[9] Her Honour accepted that, if the mother moved to Margaret River, her family would continue to visit and provide support to the mother, but found that the mother would lose the immediate practical and emotional support provided by her two sisters and her brother‑in‑law.[10]
8. The primary judge characterised the mother's oral evidence as 'woeful'.[11] Her Honour found that the mother struggled to answer questions put to her by senior counsel for the father.[12] However, the primary judge expressly rejected the contention that the mother would intentionally lie, especially to a court.[13] Her Honour was not persuaded that the mother's difficulty in answering counsel's questions was necessarily a sign of evasiveness, but was rather a reflection of several factors. These included the mother's lack of confidence in herself and her decision‑making; her timid and non‑confrontational personality - which led the primary judge to believe that on occasion the mother gave an answer which she thought was the 'right' one, as opposed to an 'authentic' answer which genuinely reflected her view; the way in which the mother processed information; and an inability to appreciate that her family might have influenced her perspective of her relationship with the father and her approach to the proceedings.[14]
9. Pre-trial orders were made by consent for the appointment of a single expert witness, Mr Darin Cairns.
10. Mr Cairns is a clinical psychologist. As at 2023 Mr Cairns had 20 years' experience working with children and families. Mr Cairns also had 10 years' experience conducting assessments of the type requested of him by the parties for the Family Court of Western Australia and 14 years' experience in providing similar assessments for the Children's Court of Western Australia and the Department of Child Protection. Mr Cairns was jointly instructed by the parties pursuant to consent orders which set out the questions the parties wished him to address.[15]
11. Mr Cairns' evidence was that, had he undertaken his assessment prior to the mother leaving Margaret River, he would not have supported G's relocation to Geraldton and then Perth, as remaining in Margaret River would have enabled G to have access to both her parents in a way conducive to her development. Mr Cairns' opinion was, however, that there were different considerations arising from the fact that the mother had been living in Perth for almost two and a half years by the time of his assessment.[16]
12. Mr Cairns' evidence was that, even accepting that the mother was a positive person who would apply herself to whatever she faced, that the father was offering the mother support and that the mother would likely obtain good employment in the South West, he would not support forcing the mother to move to the Margaret River vicinity 'as it could lead to [the mother] becoming depressed due to a profound sense of isolation and a values/identity conflict'[17] (emphasis added). Mr Cairns considered that, while he could see the positive outcomes which would follow for G, the father and possibly the mother if the mother returned to the Margaret River vicinity with G, he was of the view that the mother would be placed under significant stress and strain if she were required to return to Margaret River when her stability and support network were in Perth. This, in Mr Cairns' opinion, would not be good for G so far as the mother was G's primary caregiver. Mr Cairns' view was that the mother, as the primary caregiver, had to be protected.[18]
13. Mr Cairns acknowledged that his position was entirely unfair to the father. Nevertheless, he considered the father was better equipped psychologically to cope with an adverse court outcome.[19]
14. The primary judge accepted Mr Cairns' evidence and concurred with the conclusions he drew.[20]
15. The primary judge addressed the applicable legal principles in orthodox terms.[21] No ground of appeal challenges her Honour's recitation of those principles. It is not necessary, in the circumstances, to reproduce her Honour's statement of the applicable legal principles. In any case, some of the applicable legal principles must be recounted in dealing with ground 1.
16. Having found that the parties were both 'intelligent, kind and incredibly decent parents' who cherished G,[22] the primary judge held that she was not satisfied that an equal time arrangement or G spending substantial and significant time with the father was practicable.[23] In this connection, the primary judge made a finding in the following terms:[24]

I am not comfortably satisfied that a forced move to the Margaret River vicinity would not adversely impact the mother's mental health functioning, which in turn, could impact on her capacity to care for [G].

1. The finding as so stated is expressed awkwardly. The double negative obscures whether the primary judge is making a positive finding that a forced move to the Margaret River vicinity could adversely impact on the mother's mental health which in turn could adversely impact on the mother's ability to care for G. That ambiguity is compounded by the primary judge's use of the word 'comfortably'. It is one thing for a decision-maker to say that he or she is comfortably satisfied when making a positive finding. In so stating the decision‑maker is signalling that he or she is confident in the positive finding that is being made. But to state that one is not comfortably satisfied that something would not ensue creates a degree of ambiguity as to precisely what is being found.
2. Reading on, however, the primary judge refers to various additional matters and then states:[25]

All these issues inform my conclusion that the mother may not emotionally or psychologically manage a return to the Southwest, which goes beyond her having accommodation, work and establishing or re-establishing support networks. Whilst I accept there could be a reasonable argument put that such a conclusion is founded on speculation, so is the father's belief the mother will be fine if she were to put her mind to it. (emphasis added)

1. It is, in the context of that further finding, clear enough that the primary judge was making a positive finding that a forced move to the Margaret River vicinity could adversely impact on the mother's mental health. This, it should be said, was consistent with Mr Cairns' evidence; and, as has been seen, the primary judge expressly accepted Mr Cairns' evidence and agreed with the conclusions that he drew. The primary judge also attached significance to Mr Cairns' assessment and evidence of the 'potential impact' on the mother's mental health of living somewhere she did not wish where the mother would be without the support systems she had identified as being necessary and valuable to her (and which provided the mother with a sense of security).[26]
2. In coming to the conclusion that a forced move to the Margaret River vicinity could adversely impact on the mother's mental health, her Honour recognised that the circumstances at the time of the trial existed because the court had permitted the interim relocation in November 2021, and that situation had occurred because the court was influenced by the allegations and concerns the mother had raised at that time.[27]
3. The primary judge expressly acknowledged that it was 'not implausible' that there may have been a different outcome in the interim relocation hearing had the mother not made the allegations of family violence that she had.[28] But it was, in her Honour's view, necessary to determine the matter on the circumstances as they existed at the trial - in the time that had passed the mother had built a life in Perth that the mother considered provided her with support and a sense of safety.[29]
4. Although the primary judge expressed concerns as to whether the mother's concerns regarding living in the South West were objectively rational or reasonable,[30] the primary judge was satisfied that those concerns were not 'maliciously held'.[31] Her Honour accepted Mr Cairns' evidence that the mother had issues with perception and that the mother was not yet 'individuated'.[32] This had the consequence that the mother might be unable to navigate the emotional and psychological impact of being forced to return to Margaret River.[33]
5. Her Honour stated that she had seen nothing to suggest that the mother would currently be capable of coping with such a significant change to her life.[34] The primary judge accepted Mr Cairns' opinion that G's best interests would be served by her remaining in Perth with her mother, as Mr Cairns 'could not see a safe way back to Margaret River for the mother'.[35]
6. The primary judge accepted that, if the mother returned to Margaret River, G would be able to spend more time with her father and that the father would be able to have more involvement in G's daily routines and schooling (once that commenced). It would also alleviate the burden on G of travelling between Perth and Margaret River, as required by the existing orders.[36] Her Honour was not, however, persuaded that those benefits outweighed the potential impact on G should her primary caregiver's mental health decline, referring to Mr Cairns' evidence as to the potential risks posed to the mother's mental health were she to return to living in Margaret River.[37] The primary judge stated:[38]

Whilst many benefits would flow to [G] and the father, I am not persuaded that those benefits can be justified when compared with the potential impact on [G] should her primary caregiver's mental health functioning decline. I otherwise refer to Mr Cairns' evidence about the potential for fragility, depression and her positivity turning 'dark'.

1. Although the primary judge found that the parenting arrangements at the time of the trial did not meet the legislative criteria for significant and substantial time, her Honour was not persuaded that the father's time with G could not be structured so that it largely reflected an arrangement that was both significant and substantial.[39] In doing so, her Honour referred to the father being able to take up every opportunity to participate in events in which parents are invited to take part, once G commenced school.[40]
2. The primary judge accordingly ordered that G remain in Perth, with the mother. Other parenting orders were made regarding the father's access to G, which are not directly the subject of the appeal.

1. The principles applicable to an appeal from the making of a parenting order are well established.[41] Very briefly:

(a) The decision under appeal attracts the principles in House v The King.

(b) As such, an appellant must show that the primary judge acted on a wrong principle, allowed extraneous or irrelevant considerations to influence the decision made, has failed to take into account some material consideration, has mistaken the facts or reached a decision that is unreasonable or plainly unjust.

(c) Such an error will only justify this court disturbing the orders made by the primary court if that error is 'material'[42] - in this respect the court has applied, by analogy, the concept of 'materiality' for the purposes of jurisdictional error as explained by the High Court in LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs.[43] It must be demonstrated that 'there is a realistic possibility that the decision that was made in fact could have been different if the error had not occurred' (original emphasis).

(d) Further, findings of primary fact that are largely based on the assessment of the credibility and reliability of witnesses will not be overturned by this court unless it is demonstrated that those findings are flawed by reference to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony; the findings are glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences; or the primary judge has failed to use, or palpably misused, the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses give their evidence.[44]

1. It follows from the principle set out in subpar (c) above that it is not sufficient for an appellant to show that the primary judge erred in making a finding of primary fact. An appellant must go further, and demonstrate that the factual error is material in the sense that there is a realistic possibility that a different decision could have been made if the correct factual finding had been made or the erroneous factual finding not been made at all, as the case might be.
2. For example, a primary judge might, in the context of determining an application for parenting orders, make a mistake as to the age of the child the subject of the application. It would not be sufficient for an appellant seeking to challenge the orders made to show that the primary judge erred in relation to that objective fact. The appellant would have to also demonstrate that a different decision could have been made if the primary judge had not made the error.

Ground 1 - alleged failure to take account of a material consideration

1. Ground 1 alleges that, in refusing to make an order requiring G to reside in the South West, rather than in Perth, the primary judge failed to take into account the 'relevant' consideration that the refusal of that order would have 'the practical effect of rewarding' the mother for removing the child from Margaret River without warning to the father and making unfounded allegations of family violence against the father.
2. In a House v The King sense, a material consideration is a factor that a decision maker is bound to take into account in reaching his or her decision. The factors that a decision maker is bound to consider are determined by the construction of the statute which confers the power to make the relevant decision. If the statute does not identify those factors, they are to be determined by implication from its subject matter, scope and purpose.
3. Section 66A of the Family Court Act 1997 (WA) provides that the child's best interests are the paramount consideration in determining whether to make a particular parenting order.[45] At the time of the primary judge's decision,[46] s 66C(1) required that, in determining what is in the child's best interests, the court consider the matters identified as primary considerations in s 66C(2) and the additional considerations identified in s 66C(3). The additional considerations identified in s 66C(3) included, in s 66C(3)(m), 'any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant'. Consistent with the statutory purpose, that is to be read and construed as any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant in determining what is in the child's best interest.[47]
4. Read literally, the effect of s 66C(1) and s 66C(3)(m) was to impose a mandatory requirement that the court consider any circumstance relevant to the determination of what is in the best interests of the child.
5. The court has recognised that the preparedness of a party to comply with court orders is logically relevant to ascertaining the best interests of a child.[48] However, the mother's likely compliance with the court's orders was not in issue before the primary judge. A key issue, if not the central issue, for determination by the primary judge was the potential detrimental impact on the mother's mental health which might flow from her compliance with an order requiring G to live in Margaret River (or its vicinity) and the impact that might have on G's best interests. It was therefore assumed, to a large degree, that the mother would comply with the court's orders. That assumption was justified. The mother complied with the interim parenting orders made in the proceedings for more than two years prior to trial.
6. Nor was there any suggestion that the mother's position that G should remain with her in Perth was due to an ulterior motive, such as a desire to deprive the father of a relationship with G.
7. As framed, ground 1 is directed to a different issue. The proposition advanced by ground 1 is that the court was required to take into account, in assessing the best interests of G at the time of trial, the need to punish - or at least avoid 'rewarding' - the mother for her past conduct in connection with the proceedings. To the extent that ground 1 might also be read as suggesting some need to ensure the integrity of the court's interlocutory processes, the father's case was not put in that way. Accordingly, only the former contention need be examined.
8. The father's written and oral submissions in the appeal failed to identify an intelligible basis for the contention that 'rewarding' or not 'rewarding' a party for past conduct in removing a child and making unfounded allegations of abuse is a material consideration in a parenting case.
9. The father's written submissions referred to a number of authorities in support of the proposition that the primary judge was entitled to take account of the suggested material consideration. The father mentioned In the Marriage of Holmes,[49] A and A (Relocation Approach),[50] W & R[51] and Jarvis & Jarvis.[52] We will not repeat the facts and circumstances of each of those cases. Nor will we recite the passages relied on by the father in his written submissions. It suffices to state that none of these authorities establish the proposition that underpins ground 1 - that not 'rewarding' a parent for removing a child from his or her location without warning, and making unfounded allegations of abuse, is a material consideration in a parenting case.
10. We would emphasise, in this respect, that the gravamen of ground 1 is the alleged material consideration that refusal of the father's preferred order 'would have the practical effect of rewarding' the mother (emphasis added). Self‑evidently, the bare fact of removal without warning, and all the more so the unfounded allegations of abuse, are material considerations so far as those matters may impact on the best interests of the child. But the primary judge was acutely aware of, and took into account, that the mother removed the child from Margaret River to Geraldton without warning and thereafter made unfounded allegations of abuse against the father. The contention by ground 1 is that there is a further material consideration that refusal of the father's preferred orders would have the practical effect of rewarding the mother for her past actions. The implicit premise of the contention is that the mother should not be rewarded for those actions.
11. A consideration to the effect of that posited by ground 1 - that the court was required to take into account the need to avoid rewarding the mother - is inconsistent with the evident purpose of the Act as it relates to the making of parenting orders. That purpose is to ensure that the orders made are in the child's best interests. In that context, the concepts of 'punishment' or 'enforcement' are inappropriate.[53] They are not concerned with the best interests of the child, but rather how the court should deal with the past actions of a parent. So too, in our opinion, the concepts of 'punishment' for or not 'rewarding' a party for his or her past actions are not of themselves a material consideration. A focus on whether a particular parent should be punished or might be rewarded by the court's orders 'may divert attention from the child's welfare, to the competing needs and demands of the parents in conflict',[54] and is consequently inconsistent with the scope and purpose of the Act, as disclosed by s 66A and s 66C.
12. It follows that, notwithstanding the breadth of s 66C(3)(m), whether, if the orders sought by the father were not made, the mother would be 'rewarded' for taking G from Margaret River without warning or making unfounded allegations of family violence, was not relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion. The primary judge did not err in not addressing those matters. Nor did her Honour err in exercising the discretion by having regard to the facts and circumstances relating to G's best interests as they existed at trial.
13. Ground 1 fails.

Ground 2 - alleged failure to take account of material consideration

In exercising her discretion to refuse to make an order requiring the Child to reside in the Father's Preferred Area, rather than in Perth, the learned Judge failed to take account of the absence of evidence that, if [the mother] was forced to live, work and raise the Child, in any of the locations within the Father's Preferred Area, [the mother] would be unable to parent the Child to: (1) the same high degree as [the mother] did in Perth; or (2) an otherwise acceptable level.

See [primary reasons] [204], [234], [238] & [257]. The learned Judge thereby erred in law and her Honour's exercise of discretion under Part 5 of the Family Court Act miscarried.

Particulars

1. [The father] relies on the particulars to ground 5 below.
2. See also Appellant's Evidence Schedule.

1. Ground 2 is misconceived so far as, in its terms, the ground is to be understood as alleging that the primary judge erred in failing to take into account an absence of evidence in exercising the discretion to make a parenting order. Although the absence of any evidence to support a particular finding of fact constitutes an error of law,[55] an error of that type does not constitute a failure to consider a relevant consideration. Nor does it involve the consideration of an irrelevant consideration. In those circumstances, the court has mistaken the facts, having made a finding of fact which is unsupported by evidence.[56]
2. Assuming, contrary to its terms, that ground 2 is intended to allege that the primary judge erred in law in making a finding when there was no evidence to support it, ground 2 still fails. The ground fails for the simple reason that the primary judge did not find that, if the mother was forced to move to the South West, the mother would be unable to parent the child to the same degree as she did in Perth or at an otherwise acceptable level. As discussed below in relation to ground 5, the primary judge's finding was, in substance, that there was a risk that the mother's mental state could be adversely affected if she was required to live in the South West. The primary judge found that, if that risk eventuated, it could impact the mother's ability to parent G, and therefore, it was not in the best interests of G to expose G to that risk.[57]
3. A further reason why ground 2 cannot succeed is that there was ample evidence to support the findings the primary judge did make, as outlined below in relation to ground 5. The primary judge did not err in law, as alleged in ground 2, in making those findings. Ground 2 fails.

Ground 3 - alleged failure to take account of material consideration

1. Ground 3 alleges that, in exercising her discretion to refuse to make an order requiring the child to reside in the South West, rather than in Perth, the primary judge did not take into account that the mother had not expressed fear about living in some of the other locations in the South West identified by the father.
2. Ground 3 raises a slightly different point from that identified in ground 2. But it is similarly without merit. Mr Cairns' evidence, in response to a question raised with him by the father's solicitors before trial, was that the mother living in a different town in the South West, rather than Margaret River, might be the worst choice of those available, because the mother would be asked to live in an area that 'was significantly away from her preferred support systems but still some distance away from her, granted very willing but still non‑preferred and fractured Margaret River supports'. Further, the mother would be under the stress and isolation of living somewhere she did not want to live, work or settle in.[58]
3. It was unnecessary for the primary judge to make a specific finding concerning the matters raised in ground 3. The father did not suggest that a submission was made to the primary judge that her Honour should make findings regarding each town within the radius proposed by the father. The submission on appeal rose no higher than that 'the viability of locations within the Father's Preferred Area, but outside Margaret River' was a live issue at trial. That consideration was the subject of Mr Cairns' evidence regarding the undesirability of ordering that G live in a different town in the South West, rather than Margaret River, and the primary judge's broader assessment of the desirability or otherwise of, in effect, requiring the mother to move to the South West.
4. The primary judge had the significant advantage of having seen and heard the mother give evidence. This placed her Honour in a far better position than this court to assess the mother's ability to deal with the stresses associated with, in effect, being forced to live in an area where it was unlikely that she would continue to receive the daily support of her family in raising G. Further, Mr Cairns' evidence as to the risks to the mother's mental health were G to be required to live in the South West - which was accepted by the primary judge - was relevant to each of the towns within the radius identified by the father.
5. There is no merit in ground 3. The ground is premised on there being no concern as to the mother's mental health were the mother to reside with G in some of the locations in the South West identified by the father other than Margaret River. The primary judge made a finding to the contrary. The primary judge held, in substance, that there was a risk that the mother's mental state could be adversely affected if she was required to live in the South West. On the evidence there was an ample basis for that finding.

1. Grounds 4 and 9 each allege a failure to give proper weight to certain s 66C factors. Ground 4 is to the effect that the primary judge failed to give sufficient weight to the finding that the mother would likely find employment in the Margaret River vicinity, possibly at higher remuneration than in Perth. Ground 9 alleges that the primary judge gave too much weight to a lack of evidence as to the likely rental market within that area.
2. A disagreement as to one or more of the s 66C(2) and (3) considerations only on matters of weight does not, in itself, justify appellate interference. In L v P, this court said:[59]

The primary judge was exercising a wide discretion - one in which the paramount consideration was the best interests of M. While, in reaching his conclusion, the primary judge was required to consider the matters set out in s 66C(2) and (3) of the Family Court Act, a disagreement as to one or more of those considerations only on matters of weight does not, in itself, justify appellate interference. The attribution of weight to one or more factors in a combination of factors is the essence of a discretionary judgment. The extent to which matters of weight may justify appellate intervention in respect of a discretionary judgment was discussed by Latham CJ in Lovell v Lovell in a passage that bears repeating:

'If completely irrelevant considerations have been taken into account and they have really affected the decision the case is clear, and the order, though made in the exercise of a discretion, should be set aside. Similarly, if relevant considerations are plainly ignored the same result follows. But when the appellate tribunal is considering questions of weight it should not regard itself as being in the same position as the learned trial judge. In the absence of exclusion of relevant considerations or the admission of irrelevant considerations an appellate tribunal should not set aside an order made in the exercise of a judicial discretion ... unless the failure to give adequate weight to relevant considerations really amounts to a failure to exercise the discretion actually entrusted to the court. (emphasis added)'

1. The matter identified in ground 4 was of lesser importance in the consideration of what would be in G's (as opposed to the mother's) best interests. That the mother might achieve higher paid employment if she moved to the South West was a factor to be considered by her Honour. It had the potential to impact upon the mother's finances and therefore G's best interests. However, of itself, the factor was not of substantial importance to the determination of the latter question, dependent as it was upon a number of other factors. Those additional factors included but were not limited to what might be the cost to the mother of acquiring suitable accommodation, the hours she might be required to work and whether adequate support would be available to the mother to allow her to undertake that work if living in the South West.
2. Similarly, the primary judge noted, but did not place undue emphasis upon, the lack of evidence of the rental market in the Margaret River area.
3. Neither matter demonstrates a failure on the part of the primary judge to properly exercise the discretion conferred upon her. Each of grounds 4 and 9 fail.

Ground 5 - alleged mistaking of the facts in exercise of the discretion

1. Ground 5 alleges that the primary judge acted on the 'factually erroneous premise' that the mother 'will be unable' to mentally cope with living in any of the locations within the father's preferred area (emphasis added). Ground 5 fails because the primary judge did not make any such factual finding. In exercising the discretion the primary judge did not act on the alleged 'factually erroneous premise'.
2. In the particulars to ground 5, the appellant asserts that the primary judge acted on the alleged premise in her reasons at [221] ‑ [225], [228], [230] ‑ [232], [234], [237] ‑ [238] and [257]. It is, in the circumstances, appropriate to reproduce those parts of the primary reasons even though the effect of the primary judge's findings have already been stated. The impugned parts of the reasons state:
   1. At the end of the day, the mother does not want to return to the Southwest, and whether her concerns (or fears) are objectively rational, I do not consider them maliciously held. As noted earlier, I consider the mother struggled to manage the two very different worlds she was navigating whilst in a relationship with the father. For lack of a better way of putting it, the stress of managing this difficult dynamic increased when she became pregnant out of wedlock and came to a head when she gave birth to [G].
   2. I otherwise draw on Mr Cairns' evidence about the mother's issues with perception/interpretation and his view that she has not yet individuated. If I accept Mr Cairns' evidence about both of those matters; which I do, I cannot accept that this puts the mother in a good position to navigate the emotional and psychological impact of her being forced against her will to do something she is strongly opposed to doing and which may, whether objectively reasonable or not, return her to a position of being caught between the two worlds she could not navigate previously. Whilst the father considers a return to the Margaret River area likely to be beneficial to the mother in achieving autonomy and individuation, I have seen nothing to suggest that she would currently be capable of coping with such a significant change to her life.
   3. To the mother's credit, she is not sitting on her hands in this respect, she demonstrated to Mr Cairns an ability to be reflective and she is actively engaged in therapy with a highly experienced clinical psychologist. Notwithstanding this, Mr Cairns' evidence left me with the impression that the mother is in the early stages of this therapeutic work with much more therapy needed.
   4. In the circumstances, I cannot accept that it would be conducive:
      • to the mother's mental health functioning;
      • what she is trying to achieve through therapy, more specifically, addressing the issues Mr Cairns raised in his report and oral evidence, which I do not consider will be an easy process for her; and
      • nor could it be conducive to building a positive co‑parenting relationship,

if the mother were court ordered to relocate to the Margaret River vicinity.

1. Whilst I accept the mother may have previously had a friendship network in and around Margaret River, those relationships have not been maintained, and for the main, she does not feel comfortable re‑engaging with those people. Again, whether this is objectively rationale [sic] is moot in circumstances where I accept it is a genuine reflection of how the mother feels. Accordingly, this would place the mother in a position of having to manage what will be a very stressful situation for her, at least until she made a new friendship circle, which she would be required to do without the support system she presently has immediate access to and on which she is reliant.

1. To illustrate my concern, if I take the father's proposition that the mother could find suitable accommodation and employment in the Margaret River area and that employment involved shift work as postulated by the mother, in the absence of her having an immediate support network that she could draw on to assist her with [G], she would be reliant on the father and his family. However amenable and open‑minded the father would be to such a proposition, in fact I accept he would welcome it, it is entirely unrealistic when one considers the fact the mother cannot contemplate handovers at her home, re‑establishing her relationship with the father's family, in particular, [N]; or even sharing her work roster with the father.

1. All these issues inform my conclusion that the mother may not emotionally or psychologically manage a return to the Southwest, which goes beyond her having accommodation, work and establishing or re‑establishing support networks. Whilst I accept there could be a reasonable argument put that such a conclusion is founded on speculation, so is the father's belief the mother will be fine if she were to put her mind to it.
2. Senior Counsel for the father submitted there was no evidence to suggest the mother would not cope, and whilst that is true to an extent, such a submission ignores the state of the mother's mental health and her distress at the time she took [G] to Geraldton. Whilst there is no foundation for the concerns and allegations made by the mother during these proceedings, which she has conceded; events occurring after she fell pregnant and around [G's] birth, and her subjective experience of the same, have clearly shaped her perception of Margaret River. True it is, the mother also had positive experiences of Margaret River prior to [G's] birth, with relationships that were meaningful for her at that time, such a position ignores all the water under the bridge and the mother's perception of how she may be received by others.
3. Of most significance, however, is that such a submission ignores Mr Cairns' assessment and evidence about the potential impact on the mother's mental health of living somewhere she does not wish to live and of her being without the support systems she has identified as necessary and valuable to her, and which provide her with a sense of security. Having regard to this mother's personality style and psychological functioning, I accept these things are of importance.

1. Whilst many benefits would flow to [G] and the father, I am not persuaded that those benefits can be justified when compared with the potential impact on [G] should her primary caregiver's mental health functioning decline. [Mr Cairns described the primary carer as pivotal and should be the focus of stability and wellbeing for the child: SEW2, 13]. I otherwise refer to Mr Cairns' evidence about the potential for fragility, depression and her positivity turning 'dark'.

1. Finally, [G] will benefit from her parents developing a constructive co‑parenting relationship moving into the future. I am unable to say with any confidence that this will be optimised by placing the mother in a situation which is likely to leave her feeling unsupported, isolated and fearful. As tragic as it is, I agree with Mr Cairns' assessment that the father is the parent more likely to manage an adverse outcome. Whilst I understand he will be grief stricken by a determination inconsistent with what he is seeking, he is robust and has excellent family support that will assist him in making the best of the situation.
2. I otherwise observe that my conclusions are supported by Mr Cairns, who in his first report, expressed support for the mother's proposed orders, which he said were 'developmentally sound' [SEW1, 22]. In his review report and in his oral evidence, Mr Cairns' recommendations did not change. Whilst a difficult assessment, he opined that [G's] best interests would be served by her remaining in Perth with the mother, as he could not see a safe way back to Margaret River for the mother. He was also consistent and clear in his opinion that all efforts must be made to assist the father in playing a 'significant role' in [G's] life.

1. Overall, I am satisfied that [G's] interests would be advanced by her continuing to live in Perth. [G] will continue to live in the home in which she has lived since she was a baby; she will have continuity and stability in her primary care arrangements, which are familiar and predictable for her, and her mother will have ongoing stability in her life together with the continuing support of her family and faith community, which is currently central to the mother's positive mental health functioning. All these matters benefit [G]. (emphasis added)
2. As can be seen, the primary judge did not act on the alleged erroneous factual premise that underpins ground 5. Rather, her Honour found, in substance, that there was a risk that the mother's mental state would be adversely affected if she was required to live in the South West. Ground 5 as formulated cannot succeed.
3. Although ground 5 is misconceived in as much as it alleges error by reference to a factual finding that the primary judge did not make, and fails for that reason, we will nevertheless deal with the particulars to the ground. It will, however, be necessary to consider the appellant's arguments by reference to the finding actually made. Having regard to the father's oral argument, those particulars can be understood to allege four things.
4. First, the father alleges that the primary judge did not consider whether the mother could cope if she was required to move to the South West, but not to Margaret River itself. This is essentially the same contention as that raised by ground 3. The allegation must be rejected. As the above extract from the primary judge's reasons demonstrates, her Honour's consideration was not limited to how the mother would cope if she had to move to the township of Margaret River or its immediate vicinity. Further, the primary judge's repeated references to the 'Margaret River vicinity'[60] and 'the Southwest'[61] elsewhere in her reasons demonstrate that her Honour well understood that the contest was not restricted to whether the mother should live in Perth or the township of Margaret River.
5. Second, the father alleges, in essence, that the primary judge ought not to have relied on the evidence of the single expert witness because Mr Cairns was not in as good a position to express an opinion as the mother's treating psychologist. That submission was not made to the primary judge. As already noted, the parties agreed on the appointment of Mr Cairns as the single expert witness, and on the questions he was to address. Those questions included questions directed to what would be the likely impact on G, each of the parties, and the relationship between G and the parties, of the parents living in Margaret River or of the mother living in Perth and the father living in Margaret River. Mr Cairns interviewed the mother on several occasions for the purposes of preparing his report to the court on those matters.
6. There is nothing to indicate that Mr Cairns was not qualified to give the opinion evidence that he did. Moreover, the father accepted, by consenting to Mr Cairns' appointment as the single expert witness, that he was adequately qualified to answer the questions asked of him. Nor is there anything to suggest that Mr Cairns did not have a proper basis for his opinions. Further, Mr Cairns' evidence was evaluated by the primary judge having regard to the mother's evidence as to her concerns about returning to Margaret River. Having seen the mother give evidence, the primary judge was in a better position than this court to assess the weight and value of both the mother's evidence and Mr Cairns' opinion as to the likely impact on the mother of ordering G to live in Margaret River or the South West.
7. Speculation on the father's part that another psychologist might have given a different opinion from that of Mr Cairns does not establish that the primary judge erred in accepting Mr Cairns' evidence.
8. Finally, assuming for the purposes of the argument that it is possible for the father to challenge the primary judge's acceptance of Mr Cairns' evidence in circumstances where the father had agreed that Mr Cairns give evidence about the matters of which the father now complains, parties are ordinarily bound by the conduct of their case at trial.[62] Had the points now sought to be raised by the father been taken prior to or during the trial, they could have been met by the mother adducing expert evidence from a suitably qualified witness. The father should not be permitted to question the admissibility or weight of Mr Cairns' evidence at this late stage, in the manner raised in support of ground 5, given the obvious prejudice to the mother.
9. There is no merit in the second allegation.
10. Third, the father alleges that, because the mother did not adduce evidence from her treating psychologist, it should be inferred that his evidence would not have assisted her case. That allegation should be rejected. No submission was made on behalf of the father at trial that Mr Cairns' evidence should not be accepted or should be given lesser weight because he had not spoken to the treating psychologist. Accordingly, it was unnecessary for the mother to call that person to give evidence, particularly when the parties had agreed that Mr Cairns be appointed as the single expert witness. There was therefore no reason to draw any inference adverse to the mother from the fact that her treating psychologist was not called.
11. Moreover, senior counsel for the father, who was counsel for the father at trial, did not submit at the trial that a Jones v Dunkel[63] inference should be drawn due to the treating psychologist not being called to give evidence. Ordinarily, it is not open to raise a Jones v Dunkel argument for the first time on appeal. That is because an argument of that type can be addressed by, among other things, seeking leave to reopen in order to give evidence as to why the witness has not been called or to call that witness.[64]
12. Even if it were open to the father to raise this point for the first time on appeal, it was not open to the primary judge to infer, from the absence of the treating psychologist, that the mother would be able to cope with living in the South West. The rule in Jones v Dunkel permits an inference to be drawn that evidence which was not adduced would not have helped the party who failed to adduce the evidence. It also permits the primary judge to draw an inference unfavourable to that party with greater confidence. But the rule does not permit an inference to be drawn in the present case that the evidence of the treating psychologist would have been positively adverse to the mother's case.[65] Any inference to be drawn would not have constituted evidence that the mother would be able to cope with living in Margaret River or its vicinity.
13. Further, any inference that the evidence of the mother's treating psychologist would not have assisted the mother's case would have to have been assessed against the evidence of the mother and Mr Cairns. At its highest for the father, that would have caused the primary judge to weigh the expert opinion of Mr Cairns against the inference that the evidence of the treating psychologist would not have assisted the mother. If the occasion to consider the issue had arisen, we are not satisfied that there is a realistic prospect that the primary judge could have come to a different decision.
14. The third allegation in support of ground 5 is not made out.
15. Fourth, the father alleges that the mother would have support in Margaret River. This is a similar point, if not the same point, as that raised by ground 6.
16. There was some evidence that the father's family had been supportive of the mother after the parties had separated and that the mother had made some friends in Margaret River and Bunbury while living there. The primary judge recorded that the mother appeared to accept in cross-examination that the father and his family could provide support to the mother if she were to live in Margaret River.[66] However, her Honour was not persuaded that the mother considered the possibility viable.[67] The primary judge further found that the proposal that the father and his family provide support to the mother in caring for G while the mother was at work was impractical because it required flexibility and good communication. That was not present in the parties' relationship. Nor was the mother yet at a point where she could envisage providing her work roster to the father or handovers occurring at the mother's home.[68]
17. The primary judge found that, since the making of the interim parenting orders in November 2021, the mother had built and settled into a life in Perth that provided the mother with support and a sense of safety.[69] As already noted, one sister lived with the mother and G in a house where the mother was not required to pay rent. Another sister and her husband lived nearby. The mother's reliance on her family as her primary support network was addressed in Mr Cairns' first report, which was accepted by the primary judge.[70]
18. Although the father sought to challenge the primary judge's finding that the mother would lose the immediate practical and emotional support of the mother's family were she to move to the South West, that was an inference open on the evidence. The evidence was to the effect that the mother's sisters and brother‑in‑law were resident in Perth and the sister living with the mother would remain in Perth if the mother moved to the South West.[71] It was open to and reasonable for the primary judge to infer that the mother's family would not move to the South West in order to continue to provide the same level of support to the mother and G in the event that the court ordered that G live within 55 km of Margaret River.[72]
19. At its heart, the fourth allegation raised by the father's particulars is that the primary judge should have found that the support that might be provided by the father and his family to the mother was sufficient to reduce or remove altogether the risk that the mother's mental health might be adversely affected if she was to live within 55 km of Margaret River. That contention overlooks that the primary judge had the opportunity to observe the mother give evidence at the trial and that Mr Cairns gave evidence relevant to that question. The conclusion reached by the primary judge was based, at least in part, on her Honour's impressions of the mother - and the credibility and reliability of her evidence - as well as the reliability of Mr Cairns' evidence. It was not suggested, nor could it sensibly be suggested, that the findings the primary judge made regarding the issue were contrary to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony, were glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences, or that the primary judge had failed to use, or palpably misused, the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses give their evidence. There is, in the circumstances, no proper basis for this court to interfere with the findings the primary judge made.
20. The fourth allegation therefore fails.
21. For these further reasons ground 5 fails irrespective of the misconception that infects the formulation of ground 5.

Ground 6 - alleged mistaking of the facts in exercise of the discretion

1. Ground 6 alleges that the learned primary judge acted on the 'factually erroneous premise' that the mother would have no support if she lived within the father's preferred areas.
2. This ground also misstates her Honour's relevant factual finding. The primary judge did not find that the mother would have no support if she lived in Margaret River or its vicinity. Her Honour expressly found that the mother's family would continue to provide support to the mother whether she lived in Perth or Margaret River.[73] However, her Honour determined that an order that G live in Margaret River would require the mother to manage a very stressful situation for her, 'without the support system she presently has immediate access to and on which she is reliant'.[74]
3. The findings her Honour did make (albeit implicitly) were that: (1) the mother would lose the benefit of the rent‑free accommodation in Perth provided to her by her parents;[75] and (2) the mother would lose the immediate practical and emotional support her two sisters and her brother‑in‑law provided[76] (in the context where one sister lived with her in Perth and the other nearby). The primary judge also assessed the proposition that the father's family could provide support to the mother were she to live in Margaret River as being 'entirely unrealistic' when consideration was given to the difficulties the mother had in contemplating handovers at her home, re‑establishing her relationship with the father's family and sharing her work roster with the father.[77]
4. In these respects, the evidence of Mr Cairns was to the effect that the care and support that could be provided if the mother returned to Margaret River was simply not the same as it had been when the mother had previously been living there. Mr Cairns considered that the mother would be returning 'to a context and community where she would not feel readily welcome and would be doing so under a coercive motivation context (ie this is not something she would choose)'.[78]
5. To the extent that ground 6 seeks to raise an error of fact, the findings actually made by the primary judge were well open on the evidence. No error has been demonstrated in her Honour making those findings.
6. Ground 6 fails.

Ground 7 - alleged mistaking of the facts in exercise of the discretion

1. Ground 7 alleges that the primary judge erred in exercising her discretion to refuse to make an order requiring G to reside in the father's preferred area, by acting on 'the factually erroneous premise' that the communication and the dynamic between the parties was such that it was not viable for G to live anywhere within the father's preferred area, so that the exercise of the discretion thereby miscarried.
2. Ground 7 raises substantially the same point as grounds 5 and 6. It calls into question the primary judge's finding that the mother would lack support were she to move to the Margaret River area. That finding was based, to a large degree, on the primary judge's rejection of the proposition that the father or his family could provide support to the mother, addressed above in relation to grounds 5 and 6.[79] Also, as is apparent from the lengthy extract from the primary reasons set out in relation to ground 5, the finding was influenced by the primary judge's assessment of the credibility and reliability of the mother's evidence as to her concerns with returning to Margaret River.
3. The primary judge also found that the arrangement proposed by the father would require flexibility, which her Honour found that senior counsel for the father had established in cross‑examination was not present in the parties' relationship.[80]
4. So far as the parties' lack of communication was concerned, the finding was supported by the report to the court of the family consultant who had seen the parties in October 2023. The consultant stated that 'it was getting difficult for them [ie the father and the mother] to hear the perspective of the other' during their conversation, and that the parties acknowledged that had reflected their communication style for the past couple of years.[81] Mr Cairns' evidence was that the father considered that the mother was 'seemingly more willing to engage and communicate' following the delivery of Mr Cairns' first report. However, the father's view had not altered as to his concerns about the mother's reactions to collaborative contexts. Also, the mother continued to find the father coercive and 'pushy' on occasion, with some of her previous frustrations about him being perhaps too demanding remaining.[82]
5. The findings the subject of ground 7 are based, at least in part, on the primary judge's impressions as to the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, particularly the mother. Accordingly, in order to succeed on ground 7, and demonstrate that the findings challenged are 'factually erroneous', the father must establish error by reference to the principles summarised at [39](d) above. The father did not attempt to do so. Nor, sensibly, could that have been done. The findings sought to be challenged by ground 7 were open on the evidence before the primary judge. The father has failed to establish that the findings were contrary to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony, were glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences, or that the primary judge had failed to use, or palpably misused, the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses give their evidence.
6. Ground 7 fails.

Ground 8 - alleged mistaking of the facts in exercise of the discretion

In exercising her discretion to refuse to make an order requiring [G] to reside in the Father's Preferred Area, rather than in Perth, the learned Judge acted on the factually erroneous premise, when considering the issue of equal time, or substantial and significant time, between [the father] and [G], during the period after [G] commences full time schooling, that [the father] would be able to 'take up every opportunity to participate in events parents and others are invited to participate in'. The learned Judge's exercise of discretion under Part 5 of the Family Court Act thereby miscarried.

1. At [253] of the primary reasons, the primary judge said:

Where issues will arise is when [G] commences fulltime schooling, as it will impact the father's ability to be involved in the day-to-day aspects of her education and her school community. Whilst it is not ideal, the father's evidence has always been that he has a degree of flexibility with his work, which I am satisfied will enable him to have some involvement with her schooling. Given his commitment to [G], I have no doubt he will ensure this happens and that he will take up every opportunity to participate in events parents [are] invited to participate in. (emphasis added)

1. On one view, the primary judge there approached the question whether the father would be able to spend substantial and significant time with G after G commenced schooling on the basis that he would in fact be able to attend every school event. That is evidently the basis on which the father approaches his challenge to this finding by ground 8. The finding is characterised as one whereby the primary judge found that the father 'would be able' to take up every opportunity.
2. It is difficult to reconcile that understanding of the primary judge's reasons at [253] with observations made elsewhere in the reasons. In particular, at [37] the primary judge mentioned that, due to work commitments, there were 16 occasions where the father was unable to spend time with G under the interim orders made in November 2021. At [176](c) the primary judge stated that, if the existing arrangement were to continue, it would present challenges for the father to be as actively involved in G's schooling and extra-curricular activities as he would like. At [253] itself there is a recognition, in the sentence preceding the sentence relied on in support of ground 8, that the distance between Margaret River and Perth is such that - if the present arrangements remain when G commences fulltime schooling - the father will only be able to have 'some' involvement in G's schooling.
3. Also, while the primary judge found that the father had flexible work hours that would enable him to spend time with G,[83] her Honour found that it was important to the father that he oversee the work carried out by his building company.[84] In that respect the father was required to attend the building sites on which his company was carrying out works most days.[85] Her Honour accepted the father's evidence that his preference was to lock up those sites each night.[86] Her Honour found that there could not be any doubt that the father had bent over backwards to spend as much time with G as possible, but acknowledged doing so had been emotionally and financially taxing for him.[87]
4. At [87] of the primary reasons, her Honour stated that she was confident that:

if [G] were to remain living in Perth, the father would continue to travel to Perth every third weekend where possible to spend time with her, and once she commenced formal schooling, he would also commit to attending events in which parents would ordinarily be invited to participate. (emphasis added)

1. Seen in the context of these various findings, and reading the reasons as a whole, the final sentence of [253] of the primary reasons should be understood to mean that her Honour considered that the father would take every opportunity to attend school activities to the extent that he felt that his (flexible) work commitments permitted him to do so.
2. While the father might consider that his work commitments meant that he could not attend every school event, the decision to attend a particular event is one the father is entitled to make. The primary judge found no more than that, given his commitment to G and the flexibility his work afforded, the father's ability to choose to attend was a real one. The father has not demonstrated that this finding is wrong. The father sought to support the contention of error by reference to the particulars in support of ground 6. These, however, are concerned with a quite different finding. Nor is the appellant's Consolidated Practice Direction PD 7.4 schedule of any assistance. It fails to correctly identify the material factual finding that is sought to be challenged by ground 8. The PD 7.4 schedule approached the finding solely in terms of ability. Plainly, on the evidence, the father was able to take up the relevant opportunities - it is simply a matter of choice for the father as to whether or not he would elect to do so.
3. It is also possible that by the final sentence of [253] of the primary reasons her Honour considered that the father would take every opportunity to attend school activities that parents are invited to participate in, as opposed to his being able to attend and in fact attending every possible event. There is, in this respect, a difference between every possible schooling activity and those schooling activities that parents are invited to participate in. For example, watching a class recital at a school assembly is not an event that parents 'participate in'. A watching parental activity is passive not participatory. By contrast, a father/child learning or socialisation experience (such as the celebration of Father's Day or a camp or sleepover on school premises) or a parent/teacher meeting is something that parents are invited to participate in. If this is what her Honour meant, this would be an additional reason to reject ground 8.
4. Ground 8 fails.
5. There is a further difficulty with ground 8. Assuming that the primary judge incorrectly approached the issue for determination on the basis that the father could and would attend every school event in Perth, and not just those events that parents are invited to participate in, it is still necessary that the father establish that this error was material, in the sense previously explained. We are not satisfied that this is the case.
6. The primary obstacle to the father having substantial and significant time with G once G commences school will be the distance between them. That is the consequence of the primary judge's determination that G should live in Perth, rather than Margaret River. Assuming, contrary to our conclusion, that error was shown on the part of the primary judge in the finding the subject of ground 8, it has not been demonstrated that there is a realistic possibility that this error could require a different conclusion be reached as to where G should live. The father's ability to attend school events was one of a multitude of competing factors taken into consideration by the primary judge. We are not satisfied that, had a different finding been made regarding that one matter, there is a realistic possibility that the primary judge could have made different parenting orders. To the contrary, having regard to the other findings that were made, we are satisfied that there would have been no different exercise of discretion.
7. Ground 8 therefore fails, even if it is assumed that the primary judge erred in the manner alleged.

1. Each ground of appeal fails. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed. The parties should be heard on whether any other orders are sought consequential on the dismissal of the appeal.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] [2024] FCWA 49 (primary reasons).

[2] Referring to House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504 - 505.

[21] Primary reasons [151] - [165].

[41] See, by way of example, Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte [2017] HCA 8; (2017) 259 CLR 662 [31] ‑ [32]; J v J [2011] WASCA 126 [48] ‑ [53]; X v Y [2015] WASCA 70 [62] ‑ 64]; G v W [2021] WASCA 180 [99]; L v P [2022] WASCA 40 [56]; G v B [2024] WASCA 158 [60] ‑ [64].

[42] J v J [49]; G v B [64]. See also Adlin v Northern Territory Central Authority [No 3] [2021] FamCAFC 70 [36].

[43] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 [7].

[44] See Tabloid Pty Ltd v Pringle [2024] WASCA 152 [99] - [100] where the court collects the relevant principles and authorities.

[45] See also s 86A, which repeats s 66A.

[46] Section 66C was amended by s 25, Family Court Amendment Act (Commonwealth Reforms) Act 2024 (WA) with effect from 10 February 2025.

[47] A and A (Relocation Approach) [2000] FamCA 751; (2000) 26 Fam LR 382 [87].

[48] T v S [2015] WASCA 225 [69] - [71].

[49] In the Marriage of Holmes [1988] FamCA 25; (1988) FLC 91‑918, 76,660, 76,663.

[50] A and A (Relocation Approach) [43], [84] - [88].

[51] W & R [2006] FamCA 25; (2006) 197 FLR 241 [63] - [66].

[52] Jarvis & Jarvis [2007] FamCA 3 [22] (dot point 6).

[53] In the marriage of Craven [1976] FamCA 28; (1976) 10 ALR 148, 150.

[54] AMS v AIF [1999] HCA 26; (1999) 199 CLR 160 [188] - [189].

[55] Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321, 355 ‑ 356.

[56] See, for example, Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Lodestar Anstalt [2012] FCAFC 8; (2012) 202 FCR 490 [18], [44] ‑ [46], [48].

[58] GAB 355 (single expert witness report regarding questions from the father) point 4.

[60] Primary reasons [61], [74] fn 43, [76], [89], [94], [95], [149], [166], [176], [177], [191], [204], [224], [240], [243], [245].

[61] Primary reasons [76], [215], [221], [230].

[62] University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481, 483; Zerjavic v Chevron Australia Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 40 [65] ‑ [67].

[63] Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298.

[64] Musa v Alzreaiawi [2021] NSWCA 12 [81] - [90].

[65] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; (2012) 247 CLR 345 [232].

[75] Primary reasons [88] - [89], [94].

[78] GAB 355 (single expert witness report regarding questions from the father) point 3.

[79] See also primary reasons [137] ‑ [138], [228], [230].

[82] GAB 462 - 463 (single expert witness updated report) point 1.