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[2026] ACTSC 343
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-09-10
Ainslie-Wallace AJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: Osborne (a pseudonym) v Vaughn (a pseudonym) (No 2) Citation: [2026] ACTSC 343 Hearing Date: On the papers Decision Date: 10 September 2026 Before: Ainslie-Wallace AJ Decision: (1) The Appellant pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal in the sum of $29,397.56 Catchwords: APPEAL – CIVIL LAW – Appeal from Magistrates Court – where appeal was dismissed – costs Legislation Cited: Personal Violence Act 2016 (ACT) Cases Cited: Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72 Parties: Trent Osborne (a pseudonym) (Appellant) Charlie Vaughn (a pseudonym) (Respondent) Representation: Counsel Self-represented (Appellant) G Bashir SC (Respondent) Solicitors Self-represented (Appellant) Hugo Law Group (Respondent) File Number: SCA 18 of 2026 Decision Under Appeal: Court: ACT Magistrates Court Before: Magistrate Lawton Date of Decision: 29 April 2026 Case Title: Trent Osborne (a pseudonym) v Charlie Vaughn (a pseudonym) Court File Number: PPO 1023 of 2025 AINSLIE-WALLACE AJ:
On 21 August 2026 the Appellant’s appeal against orders of a Magistrate dismissing his application for personal violence orders against the Respondent was dismissed. Relevantly, the Magistrate found the Appellant’s application for orders against the Respondent to be vexatious and had been brought in bad faith.
During the hearing of the Appeal, Counsel for the Respondent sought an order, in the event that the appeal was dismissed, that the Appellant pay the Respondent’s professional costs of the appeal.
No submission was made during the hearing on this point by the Appellant and the orders made on delivery of judgment included an order that the Appellant, should he wish to make submissions on the question of costs should do so within 7 days of the publication of the reasons. No submission was received.
The Respondent made submissions on the question of costs.
Power to make the costs order
Section 67 of the Personal Violence Act 2016 (ACT) provides that parties to proceedings for a protection order before a Magistrate are to be responsible for their own costs, subject to the court’s power to make an order against a party where the application is vexatious or brought in bad faith.
The appeal was brought in the civil jurisdiction of the Court and the question of the costs of the appeal fall to be determined in the exercise of the Court’s discretion rather than by reference to the Personal Violence Act. The discretion while wide must be exercised judicially and mindful of established principle. Ordinarily a successful litigant is entitled to recover their costs from the opposing party (Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72).
Here the appeal was dismissed, and the Appellant should pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
In the submissions, the Respondent sought an order for indemnity costs. There is much in the submissions that favour such an order. The Appellant is a legal practitioner and could not be said to be a naïve litigant. The evidence supporting the application before the Magistrate disclosed no basis for orders against the Respondent and was, correctly, as the Appeal decision determined entirely correctly dismissed.
Here, the Appellant persisted in the Appeal in circumstances where he, as a lawyer, would have known that there was no factual or legal basis for his assertions against the Respondent. It is not to be overlooked that the allegations against the Respondent and said to support the orders sought concern repeated false and dishonest representations.
I accept that to make a costs order on the usual basis will have the effect of leaving the Respondent significantly out of pocket in relation to the costs of defending the appeal.
This is a matter in which an indemnity costs order is appropriate.
I am mindful that the application made during the hearing on the Respondent’s behalf was for his “professional costs” to be met by the Appellant. While not specified in terms as being an application for indemnity costs, given the Appellant is a lawyer, he would have understood the application to be for an order above the usual party and party costs.
I propose therefore to make an order that the Appellant pay the Respondent’s costs of an incidental to the Appeal on an indemnity basis, quantified at $29,397.65 as set out in the annexure to the Respondent’s submissions.
Orders
I certify that the preceding fourteen [14] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Acting Justice Ainslie-Wallace. Associate: Date: 10 September 2026
Osborne (a pseudonym)
Vaughn (a pseudonym) (No 2)
[1998] HCA 11