Orr v Geason [2024] TASMC 11

Gunes v Pearson (1996) 89 A Crim R 297

Berlyn v Brouskos [2002] VSC 377

Solicitors: Prosecution Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

Decision Number: [2024] TASMC 11

1. On 31 March 2023 at a lunch in Canberra, the accused was introduced to the complainant by her friend and colleague, Gillian Fiddy, the accused's former wife. There was an immediate connection, and within weeks the two were in a committed relationship. With shared care of her two teenage children in Canberra, the complainant alternated her weeks between her home in Canberra and the accused's home in Hobart. The pair holidayed together in Europe in July, returning as an engaged couple. Upon obtaining employment in Hobart in August, the complainant renegotiated her care arrangements for the children to reside with the accused at his Hobart home. A plan was made for the joint purchase of a shared home for their future.
2. On 1 November 2023, the complainant telephoned Tasmania Police to report an incident of domestic violence she said had occurred on the previous night. She reported fear for her life in consequence of disclosure and uncertainty about how to safely remove herself from the situation. On 2 November 2023, with the assistance of Gillian Fiddy, the complainant packed her belongings and left the accused's home. She met with police. On 2 November at 11.22pm police attended at the accused's home and served a Police Family Violence Order upon him, explaining its purpose and effect. The order included a prohibition on the accused stalking (as defined in the Criminal Code Act 1924) or contacting the complainant directly or indirectly (including by any form of electronic or other communication).
3. On 1 December 2023, the accused was arrested and charged with the offences now before this Court. He was released, and has remained, on bail.

1. Charge 1 alleges that, in breach of Section 9 of the Family Violence Act 2004, between 30 April 2023 and 29 November 2023 at Hobart in Tasmania, the accused pursued a course of conduct, namely:
   1. Tracking the complainant's movements using technology;
   2. Coercing the complainant into establishing a shared phone account to gain access to her electronic records;
   3. Interrogating the complainant about her location, including details about her companions;
   4. Scrutinising the complainant's electronic devices and reviewing her messages, including deleted messages;
   5. Subjecting the complainant to verbal abuse, including remarks about her professional and personal life. Persistent yelling and screaming at her;
   6. Demanding the complainant contribute $300,000 equity from her own home;
   7. Pressuring the complainant to sign the contract of sale on a home in West Hobart;
   8. Exhibiting jealousy, rage, anger and aggression;
   9. Making ongoing contact with the complainant on 13 separate occasions between 20 November 2023 and 29 November 2023, in contravention of a Police Family Violence Order;

that the accused knew or ought to have known was likely to have the effect of unreasonably controlling or intimidating, or causing mental harm, apprehension or fear, to his partner.

1. Charge 2 alleges that in breach of Section 35 (1) of the Police Offences Act 1935 on 31 October 2023 at Battery Point in Tasmania, the accused unlawfully assaulted the complainant by grabbing her by her arms and squeezing, shaking and striking her to the chest with his hand whilst holding onto her arm and pushing her to the chest.

1. Section 9 of the Family Violence Act 2004 provides:

(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct that he or she knows, or ought to know, is likely to have the effect of unreasonably controlling or intimidating, or causing mental harm, apprehension or fear in, his or her spouse or partner.

(2) In this section a course of conduct includes limiting the freedom of movement of a person's spouse or partner by means of threats or intimidation.

1. Each charge is a summary charge. The accused pleads not guilty to each charge. The burden of proving each charge is upon the Prosecution. The standard of proof, applicable to each element of both offences is beyond reasonable doubt. This burden of proof does not rest upon the Prosecution with respect to every aspect of the case as it is put. It applies to the proof of the elements of the offence. There are no alternative offences in regard to either charge. The evidence with respect to each charge is to be considered separately and each count decided solely on the evidence that is admissible in relation to that charge. A determination that the accused is guilty or not guilty of one charge is irrelevant to the question of guilt of the other. It is necessary to ensure that evidence is used for an identified and permissible purpose.
2. With respect to Charge 1 the matters to be proven beyond reasonable doubt by the Prosecution are:
   1. That between 30 April 2023 and 29 November 2023 the accused participated in a course of conduct in Tasmania;
   2. That he knew or ought to have known was likely to have the effect of:
      1. unreasonably controlling or intimidating; or
      2. causing mental harm, apprehension or fear in the complainant.
3. The decision of Justice McDonald in Gunes v Pearson (1996) 89 A Crim R 297 ('Gunes v Pearson') is authority for the proposition:

In order for conduct which is engaged in to be a 'course of conduct' the relevant conduct must be conduct which is protracted or which is engaged in on more than one separate occasion.[1]

1. In Berlyn v Brouskos [2002] VSC 377, considering a charge of stalking pursuant to the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), Justice Nettle approved Justice McDonalds' decision with respect to that legislation in Gunes v Pearson, and observed at paragraph 22:

Section 21A would prohibit a person engaging in a pattern of conduct composed of a series of proscribed acts over a period of time, however short, and whether constituted of one or more occasion, if the acts committed evidenced a continuity of purpose and were committed with proscribed intent.

It is readily conceivable that conduct on two separate occasions may not always constitute a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose and it is unlikely that conduct on only one occasion could constitute a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose, unless the conduct were protracted. In order to constitute a pattern of conduct there must be something more.

Something additional about the conduct or the surrounding circumstances will need to be shown before it can be said of the conduct that it amounts to a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose.

1. The acts comprising the 'course of conduct' pursued are not required to be alike. It is the purpose with which the acts are undertaken which must be continuous. Unlike Section 21A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), Section 9 of the Family Violence Act 2004 does not refer to or characterise the particular acts which might contribute to a course of conduct. What is required is that from the proven series of events or protracted event, 'a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose' emerges.
2. The determination of the mental element of the offence is to be made by reference to all of the admissible evidence and requires that the court is satisfied (beyond reasonable doubt) that the accused, at the time of 'pursuing' the course of conduct, either in fact knew, or in all of the circumstances (including those personal to him) ought to have known, the likely effect that it would have upon the complainant in all the circumstances of the complainant (including those personal to her).
3. The maximum penalty upon proof of the offence is a penalty not exceeding 40 penalty units or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years.
4. Charge 2 is a charge pursuant to section 35(1) of the Police Offences Act 1935 which provides:

A person shall not unlawfully assault another person.

1. The maximum penalty upon proof of the offence is a penalty not exceeding 20 penalty units or imprisonment not exceeding 12 months.
2. Section 182 of the Criminal Code Act 1924 defines an assault in the following terms:

(1) An assault is the act of intentionally applying force to the person of another, directly or indirectly, or attempting or threatening by any gesture to apply such force to the person of another if the person making the attempt or threat has, or causes the other to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or the act of depriving another of his liberty.

(2) Words alone cannot constitute an assault.

(3) An act which is reasonably necessary for the common intercourse of life if done only for the purpose of such intercourse, and which is not disproportionate to the occasion, does not constitute an assault.

(4) Except in cases in which it is specially provided that consent cannot be given, or shall not be a defence, an assault is not unlawful if committed with the consent of the person assaulted unless the act is otherwise unlawful, and the injury is of such a nature, or is done under such circumstances, as to be injurious to the public, as well as to the person assaulted, and to involve a breach of the peace.

1. The Prosecution allege an assault involving the application of force.
2. The elements of the offence to be proven beyond reasonable doubt by the Prosecution in the circumstances of this case are:
   1. the accused applied force to the complainant's body directly or indirectly;
   2. the application of force was intentional; and
   3. the application of force was not reasonably necessary for the common intercourse of life, or was not done only for that purpose, or was disproportionate to the occasion in which that necessity arose.
   4. The application of force took place without the consent of the complainant.

Evidence of admissions and incriminating conduct

1. The Prosecution seek to rely upon the following evidence as admissions of the accused with respect to the alleged assault which is the subject of Charge 2:
   1. An SMS message to the complainant on 2 November 2023:

"I' m sorry for all the messages but I love you and need you. I get that I fucked up and that is not me and it will never happen again. You have my word."

1. An SMS message to the complainant's friend Camilla Savage on 15 November 2023:

"You know I fucked up. Like I never fucked up before because I panicked. I needed to pause but in a moment of madness I thought that she was going and I panicked."

1. An implied admission arising from silence in response to Ms Savage saying:

"But P never should have been injured like that."

1. Section 81 of the Evidence Act 2001 provides that the evidence of an admission and related representations is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Section 88 of the Evidence Act 2001 provides:

For the purpose of determining whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the court is to find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that the person made the admission.

1. An admission is defined in section 3 of the Evidence Act 2001 as:

(a) made by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding, including a defendant in a criminal proceeding; and

(b) adverse to the person's interest in the outcome of the proceeding.

1. The court may only use an alleged admission if satisfied:
   1. it is made by the accused, and
   2. its substance is truthful.[2]
2. The evidence must establish that the admission related to the specific conduct alleged in the proceeding. In order to be satisfied that the statement constitutes a truthful representation of the accused's involvement in the crime the evidence must establish that the words used in the admission were intended to be an admission of guilt of the offence charged.[3] Where the evidence is ambiguous, the court is required to determine whether the accused effectively admitted his involvement in the offence charged_.[4]_
3. The Prosecution seek to rely upon particular internet searches allegedly undertaken by the accused on his iPhone and iPad in the days following the departure of the complainant and the service of the Police Family Violence Order as an implied admission of guilt with regard to the charge of assault. The law requires that the evidence establish that this conduct occurred, and that the only reasonable explanation of the conduct is that the accused believed that he had assaulted the complainant.[5]

The admissibility of extra-jurisdictional evidence as 'context' for the purpose of proof of Charge 1

1. With respect to Charge 1, the Prosecution have identified in written submissions multiple incidents relied upon to found the alleged course of conduct. (The parties do not seek to distinguish a course of conduct which the accused knew or ought to have known was likely to have the effect of unreasonably controlling or intimidating the complainant from that which the accused knew or ought to have known was likely to cause mental harm, apprehension or fear in the complainant).
2. In written submissions the Prosecution seek to rely upon alleged events which occurred outside Tasmania, which is interstate or overseas, as relevant in proof of a course of conduct comprised by events occurring in Tasmania. The Prosecution submit that these "extra-jurisdictional events" are admissible to "place all the events that occurred within Tasmania into a proper context."
3. This is an issue which falls to be determined at a point in the proceedings at which the evidence, which includes evidence of a number of witnesses with respect to events said to have taken place outside of Tasmania, is closed. No objection was taken in the course of the evidence as to the admissibility of evidence of alleged extra-jurisdictional events, and Defence counsel led evidence from the accused and two witnesses with regard to alleged extra-jurisdictional events.
4. The Prosecution do not rely upon events which took place outside Tasmania as part of the course of conduct, and submit that if the charge is proven, the accused can only be sentenced for that conduct which occurred in Tasmania. The Prosecution argue, however, that the events can be used to assess events that occurred within Tasmania in a proper context, that to restrict the evidence to the conduct of the accused when he was in Tasmania "would be artificial and unrealistic."
5. Refining the submission in oral submissions, the Prosecution identified the relevant purpose for which the extra-jurisdictional evidence is sought to be relied upon as the rebuttal of the suggestion that evidence of events alleged to have occurred in Tasmania came "out of the blue."
6. Specifically, the evidence sought to be relied upon as admissible for context is:
   1. Evidence of the complainant of incidents occurring in Dubrovnik, Croatia in July 2023 (Event 1 by reference to Prosecution written submissions), in Sydney, Australia on 11 August 2023 (Event 3 by reference to Prosecution submissions), and in Sydney on an unspecified date (Event 13 by reference to Prosecution submissions) as events in which the accused displayed anger in the context of alcohol consumption. The evidence is relied upon to rebut any suggestion that the complainant's evidence of the conduct of the accused (Event 2 by reference to Prosecution submissions) to have occurred in Hobart came "out of the blue".
   2. Evidence of an incident (Event 22b by reference to Prosecution submissions) in which it is alleged that the only inference available is that the accused in Canberra on 23 November 2023 tracked the headphones of the complainant to their location and came face to face with her son, Will, who was in possession of them. The Prosecution seek to rely upon this event to rebut the suggestion that the complainant's evidence that she was monitored by the accused by use of the 'Find My' App came "out of the blue."
7. Defence accepts the Prosecution position that events outside of Tasmania do not themselves form part of the alleged course of conduct. The Defence submit that the extra-jurisdictional conduct is irrelevant to an assessment of whether the charge in count 1 has been proved. It cannot be used to prove a course of conduct comprised of other events. Defence submit that to rely upon the extra-jurisdictional events in proof of the existence of facts constituting the physical element of the charge (a course of conduct in Tasmania) invites impermissible tendency reasoning, and not a contextual use. Defence argue that the evidence sought to be relied upon does not rebut the suggestion that alleged events occurred "out of the blue" save by reference to a tendency of the accused.
8. Evidence which provides essential background information that allows assessment and evaluation of other evidence may be admissible as 'context evidence.' Such evidence may be relevant to the assessment and evaluation of other evidence given in the case in a complete and realistic context.
9. In DWG v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 45 ('DWG v Western Australia') the Western Australian Court of Appeal distinguished tendency evidence from context evidence. The court observed at paragraph 22:

Although the evidence may not go to establishing the accused's guilt of the charged offence, it may be relevant to the evaluation of other evidence on which the Prosecution relies.

1. The court referred to the variety of different uses of evidence noted in LNN v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 39 which (relevantly) included:

The evidence may enable a complainant to give a full account so that their evidence of the accused's conduct on the day of the offence in a familial setting would not appear to be 'out of the blue' and inexplicable on that account.[6]

1. In DWG v Western Australia, the court cautioned of the risk that evidence 'that is only capable of being used for propensity purposes is mischaracterised as context evidence.'[7]
2. With respect to both categories of evidence which the prosecution submit are admissible for a context purpose, I accept the Defence submission that to rely upon the extra-jurisdictional events for the purposes identified by the Prosecution invites impermissible tendency reasoning. In each instance the evidence references a tendency of the accused to act in a particular way.
3. As a result of this ruling, only evidence of events which occurred in Tasmania is admissible to prove Charge 1.

1. In considering and assessing the evidence of witnesses in the proceeding I direct myself that I may accept or reject all, some or none of a witnesses' evidence. The fact that I do not accept one aspect of a witness's evidence does not prevent me from accepting another aspect of the witness's evidence.
2. The primary evidence of the two charges is that of the complainant and the accused. The Prosecution case is almost entirely dependent upon the evidence of the complainant. I am satisfied that in the circumstances of this proceeding it is appropriate that I direct myself in accordance with the decision in R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12:

Where there is only one witness asserting the commission of the crime, the evidence of that witness must be scrutinised with great care before a conclusion is arrived at that a verdict of guilty should be brought in.

1. I refer, in summary, to the evidence of the complainant in relation to each event relied upon by the Prosecution as contributing to the alleged course of conduct. For ease of reference, I adopt, as Defence did in their submissions, the number ascribed to each event by Counsel for the Prosecution. I refer to the events, to the degree that it is possible, in a chronological sequence.
2. Event 27: It was the evidence of the complainant that in the early months of the relationship, during a holiday with her children to Thailand, the accused contacted her repeatedly asking her whereabouts, who she was with and what she was doing.
3. Event 2: The accused and the complainant agree that in July 2023 they met Bevan and Lindy Schwaiger for dinner in Hobart and all present drank alcohol. The complainant alleges that on the walk home the accused verbally abused the complainant repeatedly calling her a "slut," "a no-good slut," and that she sat on a park bench and wept as the accused came and went and continued his abuse.
4. Event 4: The complainant said that when she commenced employment in Hobart on approximately 20 August 2023 her workplace was within close proximity to the accused's place of work. The accused expected that she would accompany him home for lunch, as was his preference. He expressed disapproval in the event that she made or proposed to make other plans for her lunch break. When she did, the accused messaged that he missed her, disparaged her alternative plan, and enquired of her, "Who are you seeing, where are you going?"
5. Event 5: The complainant said that if she did not accept a lift with the accused to or from her work on any occasion during the period of her Hobart employment the accused complained that he missed her.
6. Event 6: The complainant said that the accused made unsolicited purchases of clothing, gifted them to her and continued to do so following her remonstration that she had not asked for them.
7. Event 26: The complainant said that the accused gave the complainant access to his Uber account. The complainant said that she had expressed no dissatisfaction with using her own Uber account. It is the evidence of the complainant that on an occasion when she was in Canberra and the accused in Hobart, she used the accused's Uber account to travel home from a waxing appointment. Upon her return to Hobart the accused questioned her; "What were you doing taking an early morning Uber coming back from the Novotel?" He showed her the record of the travel. She provided her explanation, he responded, "I just thought that you'd spent the night at the Novotel with someone else."
8. Event 7: In September, the accused gave the complainant an iPhone to be utilised by her. He demonstrated the 'Find My' feature of the phone and explained that it enabled him to see her location on his iPhone and her to see his. Headphones, Airpods and an Apple watch were gifted to the complainant and paired by the accused so that they also could be located. It was the evidence of the complainant that on three or four occasions when she turned the 'Find My' feature off the accused made a series of escalating demands that she communicate her whereabouts and reprimanded her. The complainant came to believe that the accused monitored her whereabouts through the 'Find My' function.
9. Event 8: The complainant said that the accused pressured her to merge her Aldi phone plan with his Vodaphone phone plan. The complainant said that she had expressed no dissatisfaction with her own phone and Aldi phone plan.
10. Event 9: The complainant said that the accused gave her an American Express card linked to his account for her use. She had not requested it, and rarely used it.
11. Event 10: The complainant said that on two occasions the accused used a surveillance camera installed prior to the commencement of their cohabitation to monitor her. On the first occasion the accused returned from work and asked her why she had gone into his office that day. The accused said to her that he had observed her to do so on the surveillance camera. On the second occasion, while working at home in the accused's absence, the complainant turned the surveillance camera to the wall. When the accused returned from work, he demanded; "How dare you turn the camera around to the wall. I was so concerned about you. I didn't know what you were doing. Don't ever do that again."
12. Event 11: The complainant received a gift of books for her birthday on 15 September 2023. She said that the accused demanded to know who gave them and became abusive and angry, throwing things around their bedroom when she told him that they were from a male friend. He demanded of the complainant; "How would you feel if other people or another woman was sending me birthday presents?" The accused continued angrily to abuse and berate her.
13. Event 12: The complainant described an occasion on which she left her workplace to share a beer with her colleague, Darien Williams, at a bar. She did not take her phone with her. She said the accused began to WhatsApp message and email demanding to know where she was. When he collected her from work that evening, he expressed his anger and concern at being unable to contact her, demanding to know where she had been and with whom, criticising her conduct in leaving work and going to a bar. At home he continued with the same complaints for two hours with increasing anger. He grabbed her by the upper arms and called her "a disgrace." She retreated to the spare room.
14. Event 28: In the course of the relationship the accused told the complainant that her curriculum vitae (CV) was "shit" and "embarrassing".
15. Event 29: The complainant said that in the course of the relationship the accused referred to significant people in her life by derogatory terms. When the complainant argued with him the accused deliberately referred to her as "Sarah" (his former fiancé's name) because, he said, they were both "sluts" and they both argued with him.
16. Event 30: The complainant said in evidence that in the course of the relationship the accused displayed such jealousy when she spoke of highly qualified (particularly male) acquaintances that she took to ascribing to those people whom she anticipated he might be threatened by, professions such as "plumber" and "drug dealer".
17. Event 31: It was the complainant's evidence that in the course of the relationship the accused declined to walk up Mount Wellington with her as she had been on the walk with a former partner.
18. Event 32: In the course of the relationship, the complainant said, she had asked for the accused's assistance to write a letter to the father of her children, she said the accused prefaced the letter, "Dear Cunt".
19. Events 14 and 15: It is the complainant's evidence that having agreed to jointly purchase a house with the accused, agreed on a property, negotiated a price, and signed the contract with a deposit of $50,000 contributed by the accused, she became very concerned when the proposed arrangement to finance the purchase was put to her. The arrangement put to her was that the equity in her Canberra home ($300,000) be used as collateral and that the accused would contribute the $50,000 cash deposit. The balance of the purchase price (which she was unable to recall) would be financed by a joint loan secured by a mortgage on the purchased property. She said that she was concerned because the accused did not propose to make an equivalent financial contribution, and also that the accused insisted that they be registered on the title as tenants in common. These were concerns, she said, that she expressed to the accused and that led to arguments between them. She told him that she was worried about his spending and reluctance to provide full disclosure of his financial circumstances to her. She told him that she wanted safeguards including changes to their life insurance and wills, and a binding financial agreement. The accused reacted with anger.
20. The complainant obtained independent advice and in October 2023, during a lunch break at home, told the accused that her advice was not to proceed. The accused became very angry, threw papers around, and yelled at her for the duration of the lunch break. The accused told the complainant; "Our relationship is over; we're not going ahead. You've ruined me." The complainant packed her belongings in response to this reaction and said that she intended to leave. The accused came home before she did leave and saw the packed bags. He became angry and said, "You are not going to leave me." The complainant did not leave.
21. On a further occasion, the complainant said, she told the accused that she would not agree to the terms of the finance for the house purchase. The accused became very angry. She told him, "You are going to kill me if I don't sign those papers, aren't you?" He became angrier, saying "You have ruined me if we don't get this house, it's our dream, it's our future together, you can't back out now, it's the end of the relationship if you do." When the accused went to work the complainant packed her bags again, turned off her phone and used her laptop to book a hotel. She took a taxi with her bags to the hotel, but the reservation had not gone through. Exhausted and distressed, the complainant turned her phone on again to discover missed calls and messages from the accused. She called him and he arrived to collect her and her luggage. Together they returned to his home.
22. After a weekend together in Canberra, the accused presented the loan application to her and demanded that she "sign it now." She said that she was exhausted by his persistence and complied.
23. Event 16: The complainant described an occasion on which she met Gillian Fiddy for drinks to celebrate Gillian's birthday (which was on 19 October 2023). While at the hotel she said that she received more than 20 messages from the accused. He demanded that she come home, that Gillian would turn her against him. He asked who she was with and, hearing a male voice in the background, who she was talking to. He arrived at the hotel (despite the fact that she had not informed him where she was) and escorted her home, berating her all the while.
24. Events 24 and 25: The complainant said that on 27 November 2023 she noticed that the accused had posted twice on her Facebook account. On 29 November she accidentally dialled the accused on WhatsApp. In response she received a phone call from the accused (which she did not answer) and then two text messages.

1. It is the evidence of the complainant that on 31 October 2023 she was unable to work and remained at the Mona Street property. Toward the end of the day, in a period of one and a half to two hours before the accused returned home, she had drunk about three glasses of pinot grigio. When the accused came home, he opened a bottle of wine and began to drink a glass. She may have had another glass of wine. The complainant engaged in an exchange of messages with her work colleague, Darien Williams. She was deleting the messages due to her apprehension that the accused would be angry if he discovered them. Unaware of being observed by the accused, she opened a photograph sent by Darien Williams which depicted him pulling a face.
2. The complainant said that the accused responded immediately, swore, and demanded to know who was sending the messages. He grabbed the phone and began to look through the messages. He knew her passcode because of helping her previously with the phone settings. When the photo was not there, he was able to retrieve her deleted messages and was becoming more and more angry. He screamed at her, "Who is this person? Who do you think you are? You're disgusting, you're a slut." He handed her his phone and said she could go through it. He sat in his usual brown leather chair.
3. In an attempt to de-escalate the situation, the complainant walked toward the accused and said, "Look there is nothing to be worried about, there is absolutely nothing going on between Darien and I, will you please calm down". The accused stood up and grabbed the complainant by the arms very tightly, she was incredibly scared, and it was very painful. He screamed at her that she was disgusting and how dare she do this to him. The complainant tried to get away and the accused started punching her in the chest and breasts and then he pushed her so that she flew back with force and hit her head on the mantelpiece. The complainant said she recalls a loud crack in her head and blacking out for a while. When she came to, she was standing and had "eggs" on the back of her head and her head was "screaming in pain." She cried out to the accused in outrage and told him she needed help. He responded, "Oh you're so pissed you tripped." It was the evidence of the complainant that she had poor recall of events which followed on that night.
4. The complainant's next clear memory was of events on the following day when she woke in bed with the accused, and he asked if she would come to the gym. The complainant said that her memory was poor regarding the events of the day which followed, but she recalls asking the accused that morning for an explanation for the extensive bruising that she, and he, had seen as she showered. The accused told the complainant that the bruises on her thighs and buttocks had occurred when she had thrown herself against the table. He told her that she bruised easily and told her to put a jacket on. The accused went to work.
5. The complainant saw (but did not recall) that at 8.02pm on 31 October 2023 she had sent Darien Williams an email to his work email account which said; "He's found our deleted text, I've had my head bashed, not good". The email was not successfully delivered to Mr Williams due, she surmised, to security associated with the account. On the morning of 1 November 2023, she sent photographs of some of her bruising to Mr Williams. She called Tasmania Police, reported the incident, and requested assistance. During the day she contacted the finance company to whom the loan application was made and requested that the application be cancelled due to domestic violence. The complainant said she contacted and arranged to meet Darien Williams to ask his advice. She met him at a hotel and told him that she had been assaulted. She said that throughout the day of 1 November she had a terrible headache, felt very dazed, confused, scared and unsure about how to proceed safely. She had made appointments for waxing and hairdressing and told the accused that she would go to them. This was partly an excuse for her leaving the house. She was unable to navigate the city and did not make it to the appointments. She kept up a text conversation throughout the day with the accused in an attempt to maintain normality while she worked out what to do.
6. On the morning of 2 November 2023, the complainant said that the accused woke and prepared to go the gym. When he returned, he told the complainant that he had counted the cars in the street and noted their registration plates so that he knew that no one had visited her. She denied that she and the accused had sex that morning. The accused went to work. The complainant rang her employer to apply for domestic violence leave. When Gillian Fiddy made contact to suggest they meet for a walk, the complainant asked her to come to meet her at the Mona Street home. She showed Ms Fiddy the bruising and told her that the accused had caused it. Ms Fiddy assisted her to pack her belongings and took her to the home of a friend. The complainant replied to attempted contacts from Tasmania Police and agreed to meet with them later that day. The complainant left Tasmania on the following day.

1. I refer, in summary, to the evidence of the accused in relation to each event relied upon by the Prosecution as contributing to the alleged course of conduct. I refer to the events in a sequence corresponding to the sequence I adopted in relation to the complainant's evidence.
2. Event 27: The accused denied that his communications with the complainant during the holiday, which he recalled being in Vietnam, were excessive or inappropriate. They reflected his enthusiasm for their new relationship.
3. Event 2: The accused recalled the dinner with his friends, Bevan and Lindy Schwaiger. He denied the occurrence of the events which are alleged to have followed the dinner. He denied calling the complainant a slut on any occasion.
4. Event 4: It was the evidence of the accused that, though he and the complainant often lunched together, the complainant was under no pressure to do so. He said that in any event he lunched with his parents each week. He understood at the time, from the complainant's sexual and other behaviour, that she willingly shared her lunch break with him.
5. Event 5: The accused agreed that he routinely drove the complainant to and from work. He did so because their workplaces were conveniently proximate, and it would assist the complainant. He said he was motivated only by these considerations and his pleasure in being able to do so. He said that the complainant was not put under any pressure to accept his offer.
6. Event 6: The accused said that he gifted clothing to the complainant out of affection and care. He had no other purpose.
7. Event 26: The accused said that he shared his Uber account with the complainant for her benefit and convenience. He denied that there was an occasion on which he demanded that the complainant explain her use of an Uber from the Novotel Canberra to her home and denied using the Uber account to monitor her.
8. Event 7: The accused agreed that he gifted the complainant an iPhone and denied that it was his intention to, or that he did, use it to monitor her. He agreed that the pre-installed 'Find My' function when activated allowed him to see the location of the complainant's iPhone. He said that this was known and agreed by the complainant, and she was free to turn the function off at any time.
9. Event 8: The accused said that his only intention in joining the complainant to his Vodaphone plan was to provide an improved phone service and a financial benefit to her. He did not dispute that on 9 November 2023 he accessed and took a screen shot of the complainant's mobile phone records, or that the phone records were used between 6 and 22 November to undertake internet searches for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the persons the records showed were called by the complainant. The accused said that he did not recall undertaking those searches. The accused denied that he had accessed the records for the purpose of monitoring the complainant's phone calls prior to that occasion.
10. Event 10: The accused said that a surveillance camera had been installed in his home prior to the commencement of cohabitation with the complainant to enable him to monitor his dog (and the dog's carers) in his absence from the home. He denied that he used the surveillance camera to monitor the complainant. He denied that the conversations described by the complainant took place.
11. Event 11: The accused denied that he confronted the complainant with regard to a gift of books she received for her birthday. The accused denied that on any occasion in the relationship he behaved toward the complainant in the aggressive manner she described.
12. Event 12: The accused denied that he was aware that the complainant left her workplace to have a beer with Darien Williams. He denied that an argument occurred about such an event.
13. Event 28: The accused denied that he disparaged the complainant's CV. To the contrary, the accused said, he told her that she should be proud of the CV and of her professional qualifications.
14. Event 29: It was the accused's evidence that the nicknames which are the subject of this evidence were used both by himself and the complainant, that this was mutual and humorous and in no way intended to denigrate the complainant or her relationships.
15. Event 30: The accused denied that he was jealous of the complainant's male associates or belittling of them. His evidence was that both he and the complainant could become sensitive.
16. Event 31: The accused denied that he declined to walk up Mount Wellington with the complainant because she had previously done so with a former partner.
17. Event 32: The accused said that the offensive address he used to refer to the complainant's former husband was intended to be "light-hearted" and otherwise he contributed constructive advice regarding the letter.
18. Events 14 and 15: The accused gave a detailed account of the progress of the joint decision to purchase and fund a shared home. He and the complainant had seen a house that they agreed upon and made an offer, then jointly negotiated, and agreed the price. When they signed the contract to purchase the property they bought and shared a bottle of champagne in celebration. The settlement was to take place in January. They were "ad idem" with respect to the financial arrangements necessary to make the purchase work. At the outset, he said, he disclosed to the complainant that he was "relatively cash poor...and therefore not in a position to pay the sort of deposit that would be necessary." He told her, "I have the income, and you have the asset." He proposed that he contribute his $50,000 to the deposit and she the equity in her Canberra property. This would get them "under the 80 percent loan to value ratio thing," and, as he had a substantial and secure income, he would refinance through his broker and service both the mortgage on her Canberra home (and in addition two of the complainant's personal loans secured against her home) and on the jointly purchased property. He said, "I think she considered (that) to be a good couple's arrangement." The accused proposed to retain an additional $40,000 in savings he had for incidental costs such as the building inspection and removal costs.
19. The accused said that he was not aware that the complainant had misgivings about the financing until she told him on the drive home for lunch one day that she had had advice from someone she trusted that she should not proceed. The accused conceded that they argued. The complainant had been provided by the broker with details of the financing structure which would enable her to understand the relative advantage she would gain by the "rolled up arrangement." The complainant's resistance to the financing arrangement hardened through October, "as evidenced by her packing her things and going to a hotel." The accused said that he then, by agreement with the complainant, executed a binding death benefit nomination through his superannuation fund. She had agreed to do the same. In addition, he formalised a structure which directed his salary directly to mortgage payments save with joint signatures. The accused sent a copy of the executed binding death benefit nomination to the complainant on 25 October 2023. In response the accused received a message from the complainant; "Awesome, I'll do mine too" The accused said that he understood that these concessions addressed the complainant's concerns; her exposure to debt in the event of his death and his "spending propensity". Thereafter the accused believed that the complainant's reservations with regard to the financing had been resolved. The accused denied that threats were made by him to the complainant in relation to the arrangements for the financing of the property.
20. Event 16: Defence submissions accept that the accused sent repeated messages to the complainant as alleged. The accused gave an account of collecting the complainant from the hotel. He said on this occasion that she was alcohol impaired and required physical assistance to the car from Ms Fiddy. He denied any verbal aggression toward the complainant.
21. Event 24: The accused did not dispute that on 27 November 2023 he posted a heart emoji and a 'like' on the complainant's Facebook account.
22. Event 25: The accused did not dispute the evidence that on 29 November 2023 at 3.36pm there was a call from the complainant's phone to his and that he called her back. He admitted that he sent two messages: at 5.31pm; "I'll assume you called in error that's ok be good to yourself and yes. I love you unconditionally one day X," and then: "I'm into therapy next week I need to go and improve build positivity on what I think is my very good heart. My only worry though is your welfare. You can't reply I know but always know I'm thinking about you and hope you are ok ❤."
23. Event 33: The accused did not dispute that on or about 8 November 2023 (after he had been served with the Police Family Violence Order) he wrote and sent a letter to the complainant's parents in which he expressed his continuing love for their daughter. It was put to the accused that he knew that the complainant's mother was certain to tell her about the letter. The accused denied that he did. He said that his request within the letter that the communication not be disclosed to the complainant reflects his intention that the letter was a private communication.
24. Event 34: The accused did not dispute that on 15 November 2023 he searched the name of the complainant's friend, Camilla Savage, on the internet and located her telephone number on her Facebook page. He sent a series of text messages to her in which he expressed his continuing love for the complainant. The accused said that it was his intention, as he expressly requested in a message, that his communication with Ms Savage would remain private.

1. It is the evidence of the accused that when he returned from work on the evening of 31 October 2023 with two bottles of wine, it was apparent to him that the complainant had been drinking. She complained that she had lost her sunglasses and told him that she had been at the Prince of Wales Hotel that afternoon. He rang the hotel to ask if they had been located there. The response he received was that they had already had a call about that, and that the speaker was informed "when she left, they were on her head." He located the sunglasses in the bedroom. While in the kitchen having a few wines and preparing dinner, he glanced out to see the complainant with her phone in her hand pressing on the screen of her phone as one might in order to add an emoji, or to delete. When the complainant eventually came inside, he asked her; "What was that photo that you were pressing on your phone?" When the complainant responded vaguely, he said, "it just looked like a close-up photo of a man's head." The complainant told him who sent the photo. It struck the accused as "an odd thing to send a girl a photo of yourself," and he was concerned about it. He asked, "can you show me that, can I have a look?" The complainant gave him the phone and her passcode, but the photo was not there.
2. The two had by now walked to the bedroom and they sat on the bed. The accused was more concerned now because "the idea of deleting something connotes hiding something." He opened the complainant's recently deleted messages, read them, and asked the complainant why she had deleted them. "I deleted them because I knew they would upset you," she said. The accused was not enraged at this stage, he said, but very upset. The complainant reassured him that there was nothing to worry about. "Have you seen his wife, she's gorgeous, she looks like a model," the complainant said. The accused said his concerns were increased by the fact that the complainant had apparently searched for this information about her colleague's personal life. When the two returned to the living room he told the complainant; "Attention from a female is so easily construed as flirtatious you know, something intended to encourage, I'll call it romantic engagement, and it's not so much what you think, it's what he makes of it". The accused conceded that he raised his voice and said to the complainant, "Look if there's something going on, then really you should just go back to Canberra," and then immediately; "No I don't want you to go back to Canberra because I love you". He was sitting in his brown leather chair. The complainant walked towards him.
3. The accused said he stood and, taking her by the arms he held her and pleaded; "Please tell me there is nothing going on." He was pleading for reassurance. There was no violence in the gesture, no shaking.
4. He said that the complainant bent down toward him in the chair, as she did he raised his open hand, fingers spread, to indicate 'stop' and said, "just leave me I just need some space". In consequence of him raising his hand as the complainant leaned down to him, his hand connected with her chest. The complainant stood up and, in doing so, brushed her cheek against the mantelpiece. The accused had observed the complainant to be unsteady on her feet that evening due, he surmised, to consumption of alcohol. The complainant turned and walked the length of the table and fell hard onto her bottom and her head went back and connected with the side of the table.
5. The accused denied that at any time he shook the complainant, punched her, or pushed her. To assist the complainant on to her feet after her fall, the accused straddled the complainant, grabbed both her upper arms and exerted most of his strength to bring her (almost dead weight) to her feet. The complainant walked toward the bathroom rubbing her head, the accused followed and asked if she was all right. Forming the impression that she was, the accused left her in the bathroom and went to bed and started to cry. The accused said he was upset about the way that things had gone and upset at the way he had handled the situation, that he had allowed things to progress the way they had, "to the point that she had fallen on her bottom and hurt her head". He agreed that he had consumed about six glasses of wine after his return from work. He had had a difficult day. He felt that his response to the messages was "immature," and he was upset.
6. In the morning, the complainant was in bed with him. When the complainant rose from bed, he said to her, "oh dear P how do we come back from this?" The complainant showed him bruising to her arms and "fingerprint marks" on her breasts as she was showering. He went to work. He messaged the complainant throughout the day, and she responded normally. He did not apprehend a change of attitude in her. That evening they ate together and watched television. They slept in the same bed although a spare bedroom was readily available. The accused said that on the morning of 2 November the complainant rose naked and initiated sexual contact. When he returned from the gym, he and the complainant had sex. He went to work as was usual.

The evidence of other prosecution and defence witnesses

1. Ms Wells said she and the complainant had been friends since kindergarten. She received a message from the complainant on 5 November 2023 and invited the complainant to her home. The complainant replied that she was in hospital, that the accused had beaten her. In a follow up call the complainant said she had sustained concussion. The complainant sent photos of bruising to her. Later the complainant came to Ms Wells' home and stayed the night. Ms Wells saw the bruising covering the complainant's chest, and also on her arms and legs and her upper thighs. She observed that the complainant was in shock and in significant pain. Later, when Ms Wells went to the complainant's parents' home, the complainant showed her a series of texts sent by the accused to Camilla Savage, a mutual acquaintance. Ms Wells said that the complainant told her that she could not remember the particulars of what happened, but that she had been assaulted by the accused after he drank wine on an empty stomach. Ms Wells said that she was told by the complainant that the relationship had been a controlling one. When asked in re-examination Ms Wells said she recalled that the complainant had given examples of the accused's controlling conduct; he had bought her a phone, had added her to his phone plan, had bought her clothes and picked her up for lunch. I accept Ms Wells' evidence.

1. Ms Grose is Ms Wells' twin sister, also a kindergarten friend of the complainant. It was her evidence that she saw the complainant at Ms Wells' home on 8 November 2023. She said that the complainant was traumatised, she was shaking and upset, and had very significant bruising. The following day the complainant came to her home and Camilla Savage also visited with her daughter. The complainant had come to her home from the police station and had her statement with her. Ms Grose did not read the statement, but Camilla and Camilla's daughter did. Later, Ms Grose said, the complainant's mother Hennie told her that the accused was messaging the complainant but had then deleted some of the messages. They decided to take screenshots to preserve a record of the messages still on the complainant's phone. Ms Grose responded to cross-examination as she had done in her evidence, with clear, considered answers. She did not read the complainant's statement. She said that when the complainant gave the statement to Camilla to read, she was seeking reassurance that its contents were "rational and straightforward." Ms Grose had cautioned against Camilla's suggestion that she could access the complainant's hospital records. She disapproved of Camilla sharing the statement with her daughter. She presented as a caring friend with good counsel, and a reliable witness.

1. Dr Taylor was the emergency physician who examined the complainant upon her admission to Bendigo Hospital on 5 November 2023. Her qualifications were not challenged. Dr Taylor identified her clinical notes among those produced by Bendigo Hospital, and eighteen photographs she had taken of the complainant's injuries as she made her clinical assessment. She said that her notes were made when the complainant was taken to emergency short stay for scans and observation.
2. The witness confirmed that she had noted that the complainant had reported being assaulted by her partner; that she had been "picked up and thrown against a heavy object", that she was hit "multiple times to the head, torso, limbs", and that she had been beaten by her partner on other occasions". The complainant described pain on breathing, abdominal and chest pain, nausea, and headaches. The witness examined the complainant and could feel swelling, a palpable haematoma, on the complainant's head behind the right ear which she was unable to photograph. She photographed and noted other injuries. She described them as "extensive." Dr Taylor noted that the complainant was at times slow in her responses, seemed tremulous and unsteady on her feet. She considered the symptoms of headache and nausea indicative of concussion and diagnosed the complainant accordingly. She ordered a CT scan to check for any significant injury and referred the complainant to "emergency short stay."
3. The witness was cross-examined with respect to any explanation provided to her by the complainant for specific bruising. She said that it was not her practice to ask. She conceded that she was not forensically trained to comment upon causation of bruising, and that it was beyond her expertise (not being a haematologist) to comment upon propensity to bruising. She said she was confident to express an opinion regarding the presentation of the complainant based on her training and experience as an emergency physician. The witness patiently assisted Counsel with more general questions to assist in navigation of the general hospital notes. She agreed that she had noted, "P had limited recall of all the specifics in the context of head injury." She said, as to whether the complainant said exactly what she noted, that she could not remember. The witness said that from her examination and the history available there was no indication that the complainant was alcoholic. In re-examination she said that there was no evidence that the complainant had a predisposition to bruising.
4. The witness was considered in her answers, cooperative and professional. She identified the parameters of her expertise but expressed her clinical opinion with clarity and confidence. I accept her evidence.

1. Dr Parekh's qualifications and expertise in forensic medicine were not challenged. Her statement of qualifications and experience was provided to the parties and to the court.
2. Dr Parekh did not personally examine the complainant. She relied upon the clinical notes and photographs of the complainant taken by Dr Sinead Taylor and expressed confidence in her capacity to assess the injuries depicted in photographs in the context of a clinical examination by an emergency physician. She said that she examined three or four hundred people per year "in this category of complaint."
3. Dr Parekh observed "at least eighteen individually identifiable areas of bruising over multiple anatomical planes" depicted in the photographs produced to her. She expressed her opinion that the bruising indicated multiple applications of blunt force. It was her opinion that it was significant that "the majority of the bruising appears on protected areas of the body". She said, "the number and location of bruises on her body were very likely to be the result of an assaultive event because of the positioning of those bruises". Due to the positioning of the bruises on protected areas of the body, she said, they are "very unlikely to be accidental," and "extremely unlikely to have been self-inflicted."
4. Dr Parekh was requested to make observations regarding each of the images available and did so. She said that the injuries depicted in images 4, 5, 6 and 15 occurred to protected areas of the body. With regard to images 4 and 5, she said that as fingertip bruising from individual applications of force heal, they can become confluent and merge together. She observed that fingertip bruising is present on both the upper right and left arms of the complainant in images 4 and 5; "You can see the overall impression of multiple applications of separate force which have become confluent". She expressed the opinion that they are likely to be grab marks. As to the bruising depicted in image fifteen, bruising to the chest of the complainant, the witness observed that there are a series of different bruises from more than one application of force. Dr Parekh said that in her experience these are definitely not accidental bruises "because of the way the breasts sit". In reference to image sixteen, the bruising to the right rib area, Dr Parekh observed that it would be unusual if this were accidental, but that she cannot exclude the possibility. In her opinion, the bruises in image 17 to the hands and wrists may be partially defensive but there may be other possible mechanisms as well.
5. The witness maintained these opinions when cross-examined. She was asked if bruising in the individual images could be explained by accidental injury, such as a collision or fall, and said that she could not exclude the possibility of accidental causation of the majority of individual bruises depicted in the images. She said that she had a significant degree of confidence that the bruising depicted in images 4, 5, 6 and 15 was not accidental.
6. Although responsive to questioning regarding her opinion with respect to the causation of the individual images, Dr Parekh insisted, "It is the constellation of injuries that we need to look at." She agreed that the injury to the complainant's cheek might result from walking into an object, that the bruising to the complainant's hip area might be explained by running into a table and those in image 11 might result from a heavy fall to a solid floor and could conceivably all have occurred as a result of that one fall. She agreed that the yellow bruising to the complainant's upper chest might result from pressure applied by a hand. The witness said that it was her duty to the court, as an expert witness, to make it clear that a consideration of the injuries individually would be misleading. She cautioned, "It is misleading to consider these images individually. Look at the totality. They are much more likely to have been inflicted deliberately, not accidentally."
7. The witness said that she did not consider that either Factor V Lieden or medication taken by the complainant (of which she was aware) might have contributed to the degree of bruising. She disagreed that there was any evidence which she had seen to support the proposition that chronic alcohol abuse by the complainant contributed to the degree of bruising. She conceded that she could not clinically exclude that the complainant had a propensity to bruise easily.
8. Dr Parekh was an impressive witness, cooperative, measured, and aware of her obligations as an impartial expert. I accept her evidence.

1. It was clear that the complainant's mother was stressed by the requirement to attend as a witness. She was, however, a competent and cooperative witness. She had met the accused on only two occasions and gave an account of those. She said that she spoke to her daughter weekly when she was with the accused in Hobart and complained that the calls were often put on speaker by the complainant who said that the accused liked to be able to listen.
2. Her evidence was that on 3 November 2023 she received a call from her daughter who told her that she had been badly beaten by the accused and was making arrangements to return to her parents' home. When she and her husband collected their daughter on 4 November 2023 in Melbourne, she said that she was shocked by the complainant's appearance and observed that she was dishevelled, shaking, crying, and had vomit around her mouth. She complained of a splitting headache. When the complainant reluctantly removed her coat, she revealed bruising which she said was caused by the assault. At 8am the next day, the complainant's mother took her to hospital. The witness's evidence was not challenged in cross-examination. I accept her evidence.

1. Mr Williams gave direct answers to questions. He rejected some propositions put by the Prosecution. He conceded that his memory was not complete with respect to some detail of the events he was taken to. He made an effort at recall when requested by both Counsel. Mr Williams is a lawyer. He said that he had become friendly with the complainant when they were colleagues in Hobart, and that he had no continuing connection with her. She had asked that he not contact her after she left Hobart, and she had initiated no contact save by sending him a card on one occasion, which was after he had made his statement to police. I regard him as a reliable and impartial witness.
2. Mr Williams said that before 31 October 2023 the complainant had told him she had allowed the accused location sharing on her phone, and that she was concerned that the accused could see where she was. He said that the complainant told him that if she were not in certain locations the accused would question her in the evenings. She said that she and the accused would fight about this and that the accused is a jealous person. The complainant told Mr Williams that she was very worried about providing equity in her home as security for the joint purchase of a house. She said there were problems in the relationship and that she was very worried. He said that the complainant told him that she had independent legal advice not to proceed and she had told the accused, and he got very upset. On the day following this conversation, the complainant told him by text that she was leaving the accused, and she packed her bags and went to a hotel. Mr Williams said that it is his belief that she returned to the accused the same day.
3. It was the evidence of Mr Williams that on the morning of 1 November 2023, the complainant sent him photographs of bruising on both arms. In the exchange which followed he told her, "If he caused those you should leave and go to police." Later he met her at a hotel, she was there when he got there. Mr Williams said that the complainant requested that he help her to turn off location sharing on her phone. He was able to do that. It was on and he turned it off. Mr Williams said that the complainant told him on that occasion that the accused had beaten her for one hour and then thrown her toward the mantelpiece and that she had hit her head on the mantelpiece. She said that he was now being very apologetic and loving. When he asked what caused the argument, the complainant said "jealousy." He asked, "of who?" she answered, "you or anyone". He saw bruising on her arms but was "not drawn to" any others. He could not recall what the complainant was wearing at the time, his best recollection was shorts and a top.
4. Mr Williams said he was at the hotel with the complainant for about 1 hour and he had at least three drinks but could not say how many the complainant had. He said that the complainant paid because he was unable to use his card. Mr Williams said that the complainant told him that she was worried for her life if she went home, and he told her that she should not. She said she had already told the police, and she would be seeing them the following day.
5. Mr Williams said that he had never seen the complainant drink alcohol during the day, but when prompted about a particular occasion said that he could recall one occasion that he and the complainant left work and went for a drink at about 4pm.
6. I am satisfied that Mr Williams gave impartial evidence. I accept that he is a witness of truth.

1. Ms Fiddy was married for 20 years to the accused, and they have two adult children. They divorced in 2013, and she described their separation as amicable, "textbook". She is a lawyer. Ms Fiddy invited the accused to lunch in Canberra on 31 March 2023, he had been "sad and lonely" in Canberra, and she thought he would get along well with her friend and colleague, the complainant. He travelled from Hobart.
2. Ms Fiddy was asked questions about her observation of the complainant's alcohol use. In effect she described it as problematic; when they were working together in Canberra she said the complainant was keen to leave work to drink and that her use of alcohol was in a 3:1 ratio to her own, she sometimes smelt alcohol on the complainant early in the morning and was told by the complainant that she brought alcohol to work in a metal flask, she supported the complainant's attempt to give up alcohol when she had a health scare and knew that she attended AA (Alcoholics Anonymous) in that period. She said that when drunk the complainant became unsteady on her feet and would tend to trip and fall.
3. For a period of two and a half months Ms Fiddy was living in the accused's Mona Street home and this coincided with the complainant also staying there. She said that she observed both the accused and the complainant to be happy in the relationship, the accused thought the complainant was "the bees' knees," the complainant was less demonstrative but enjoyed the things the accused gave her and appeared to be managing her separation from her children well. Ms Fiddy said that she did not observe that the accused used controlling behaviour toward the complainant, rather the accused was supportive of her and "gave her options," he did not exhibit jealousy or possessiveness.
4. Ms Fiddy gave an account of an incident in which she said that the complainant disguised a glass of wine in a teacup, winding the tag around the handle and pouring some tea on top. She later told the accused of the incident and warned him that it was a "red flag" for her problematic alcohol use. Ms Fiddy agreed that the accused approached her around August of 2023 and told her that she had upset the complainant. Ms Fiddy and the accused had an argument, there were no raised voices, there was no anger. She laughed at the suggestion that the accused then, or on any other occasion, threw things around. But it was this incident which caused Ms Fiddy to immediately leave the accused's home. When she did, she left her car and took the accused's work car (returning it some days later) as her car was inaccessible. On or about 19 October, she met the complainant for a drink for her birthday and together they drank three bottles of wine. When the accused arrived, the complainant stood and was so unsteady she walked into something and required Ms Fiddy's physical support to get to the accused's car. In response to a question in cross-examination Ms Fiddy said that the accused knew where to collect the complainant because the complainant had told the accused where she was when he rang her at the hotel.
5. Ms Fiddy had a text exchange with the complainant on the morning of 2 November 2023 and went to the Mona Street house at the complainant's request at around 9am, she noted that the complainant had been drinking. She saw the bruising to the complainant's arms and was told by her that the accused had done it. The complainant appeared confused and sad. Ms Fiddy made arrangements to take her to a friend's home and assisted her to pack and remove her belongings. Ms Fiddy remained with the complainant through the day and was present when police attended at about 10.30pm and took a statement and photographs of bruising. Ms Fiddy did not recall the complainant's explanation to the police for the bruising on her arms but did recall her tell police that the accused banged her head into the mantelpiece. Ms Fiddy said that the complainant told the police she had a poor recollection of the incident. Ms Fiddy said that the complainant had continued to drink alcohol through the day of 2 November and needed assistance to take the stairs to bed that night as she was quite drunk.
6. Ms Fiddy was aware that a Police Family Violence Order was served on the accused on 2 November 2023. She said that at one point, when the complainant was contemplating asking police to lift the order, she had been asked to be an intermediary, then the complainant changed her mind.
7. Ms Fiddy said that when police approached her to make a statement, the officer asked her to do so to support the complainant. She was concerned that the police were not asking for an objective statement and chose not to make a statement at all. When questioned by Prosecution Counsel on this issue Ms Fiddy became combative. She denied that she had set out to exaggerate the complainant's drinking and denied that she had joined the complainant in the wine in a teacup incident as a shared joke.
8. Ms Fiddy is the former wife of the accused and mother of his children. She has been a loyal friend to the accused, attentive to his happiness (as is evident in her account of circumstances of his introduction to the complainant). She declined, she said, to provide a statement to police out of concern to retain her impartiality but elected to give evidence for the Defence. Her argument with the accused in his Mona Street home was on her evidence calm, but it was the very reason she left his home immediately and in haste (she took the accused car as she would have required assistance to move another vehicle to access her own). In evidence she laughed at the suggestion that the accused threw items around in anger, but responded immediately and admirably when the complainant told her that she had been assaulted by him. It is apparent from Ms Fiddy's evidence that as a witness, she had divided loyalties. I have reservations about the impartiality of her evidence. I cannot conclude that her evidence is reliable.

1. Mr Schwaiger had been a close friend to the accused since childhood. He was able to describe two occasions on which he met the complainant with the accused in Tasmania. On 25 August 2023, at a reception following a memorial service in Hobart, he observed that the complainant's alcohol consumption was excessive. At dinner when they met again on 29 August 2023, he observed again that the complainant drank to excess. Mr Schwaiger said that he and his wife invited the accused to stay with them shortly after the complainant left him. He observed that the accused was "a broken man," very distraught and confused. To the extent that evidence of Mr Schwaiger is relevant, I accept it. His evidence does not undermine the credibility of the complainant.

1. The complainant gave evidence in a contained and responsive manner over more than two days. Her account of the progress of the relationship with the accused and the incidents within it was substantially consistent with the accounts she gave to witnesses and police. At times she was unable to recall detail. The matters with respect to which she expressed confident recall remained consistent.
2. Bendigo Hospital notes of 5 November 2023 purport to record the history given by the complainant to triage, and to Dr Taylor at the time of her admission and examination. The notes record some matters which are inconsistent with the complainant's evidence. The records note that the complainant was "picked up and thrown against a heavy object," on 31 October, that there had been two other occasions on which the complainant was "beaten" (once in Sydney and after she had received books from a male colleague). These inconsistencies were put to the complainant and to Dr Taylor. The complainant said that those records which were not consistent with her evidence and recall were incorrect. In cross-examination she conceded in one instance "I have to accept I said this, I must have......but I can't recall saying that."
3. The complainant agreed that the Bendigo Hospital notes of 5 November 2023 record; "P had limited recall of all of the specifics in the context of head injury". She agreed to the proposition that this was what she told the doctors and that at the time she could not recall "all the exact details of the assault." The complainant expanded; "As I said, my mental state at that time was such that I was - I couldn't recollect much at all. I mean I was concussed. I was traumatised. I don't remember saying those things." The complainant said that during the period of her concussion (three weeks severe and limited about ten weeks); "It was very difficult to recall. Memories have come back over that time. It's taken a while for my brain to heal." The complainant said that she was diagnosed with concussion as a result of striking her head on 31 October 2023 and said that she had significantly impaired memory and organisational capacity in the aftermath of that incident. She said that as time passed, her recall improved. The witness said that at the time of her admission to hospital in Bendigo (5 to 7 November), she was "heavily concussed and traumatised". She said she remained impaired for weeks following and was admitted to another hospital for treatment for "trauma" later in November.
4. Defence submit that the complainant's claim that she suffered concussion when she struck her head on 31 October 2023 is inconsistent with her capacity to organise herself to effectively make reports to Darien Williams and to police, seek the cancellation of the joint loan application on the ground of domestic violence, apply for domestic violence leave, and maintain a fictional normality in communication with the accused that the relationship continued. Defence submit that the inconsistencies in accounts given by the complainant to the hospital and to police are attributable not to an error in note taking or the effects of concussion on the complainant but are a reflection upon her credibility and on her reliability. Defence submit that the court can reject the complainant's account of memory lost at the onset of the concussion and recovered as the concussion resolved as inconsistent with judicial experience.
5. On 5 November 2023 Dr Taylor diagnosed concussion and considered the complainant's symptoms consistent with the diagnosis. Witnesses who saw her in the week after she left Hobart describe her as "shocked," "distressed," "confused," "traumatised." There is no evidence which contradicts her assertion that she was significantly impacted by concussion and by trauma as she described. I have no evidentiary basis to reject her evidence that her recall of events improved as her concussion resolved. Dr Taylor made the observation that records made in the hospital triage were not exact and that she was unable to recall what the complainant said, only what she noted. Inconsistencies which appear in the hospital notes are not repeated in contemporaneous accounts given by the complainant to witnesses. Ms Fiddy for one, heard the complainant tell police in Tasmania; "he banged her head into the mantelpiece." It is my assessment that the inconsistencies recorded in the notes are likely the result of confusion or miscommunication rather than misinformation.
6. The complainant was challenged repeatedly with respect to her use of alcohol on specific occasions and generally. The complainant denied that she had a problem with alcohol. She said that she drank "as much as any professional woman of (her) age." The complainant also described occasions on which the accused engaged in problematic drinking. She conceded that when she and the accused were introduced over dinner, they drank wine and that they drank alcohol together again at breakfast, at lunch and at dinner. She conceded that she attended Alcoholics Anonymous early in 2023 and said she was then attempting to abstain from alcohol use. The complainant said that her resolution to abstain was motivated by a health issue (a tumour requiring surgery and found to be benign) and she was supporting a friend who had a cancer diagnosis. The complainant denied that she took a flask of alcohol to work and took opportunities to leave work to drink. She denied that concealing wine in a teacup was a sign of her problematic alcohol use and said that this was simply a joke shared with Ms Fiddy. Ms Fiddy denied that she shared in this joke and said that she described it to the accused as a "red flag." Her evidence described the complainant's use of alcohol as excessive and at times impairing (at the Den hotel on 19 October 2023, on the evening of 2 November 2023, on occasions in Canberra). Mr Schwaiger's evidence was that the complainant drank excessively on each and every occasion that he interacted with her. Mr Williams was a colleague of the complainant. He did not observe her to drink during the workday (save for one 4pm occasion). Dr Taylor did not observe any evidence to warrant more than routine enquiry into the complainant's alcohol use during her examination on 5 November. The accused said he was concerned about the complainant's use of alcohol and spoke to her about it often.
7. My conclusion in the light of all the evidence and my assessment of witnesses is that it is likely that the complainant did use alcohol often and at times, to excess. My impression on the evidence is that her use of alcohol exceeded that of many professional women of her age. I think that it is unlikely that she attended Alcoholics Anonymous unless at the time she acknowledged that her alcohol use was problematic. It is not a matter which impacts to any significant degree my assessment of her credibility. The complainant's unwillingness to make this concession in evidence might well reflect a complex relationship with alcohol. The fact that the complainant's self-assessment of her alcohol use differs to mine or the assessment made by Ms Fiddy, Mr Schwaiger, or the accused, does not impact in a general sense on my assessment of her reliability. Evidence that the complainant was affected by alcohol on any particular occasion warrants consideration as to whether, in the particular circumstances, the effect of alcohol impacts the reliability of the complainant's account.
8. The complainant called Tasmania Police on the morning of 1 November 2023, reported an incident of domestic violence on the previous night and sought assistance. She named the accused with considerable reluctance and expressed fear for her life. The recording of the report evidences the account she gave.
9. At this first contact with police the complainant raised a complaint that the accused had gained access to her texts and email and a belief that he tracks her phone, and if she turns it off it is worse for her. The complainant told Mr Williams before 31 October that the accused was jealous and always wanted to know where she was and that caused arguments between them. She told Dr Taylor and her friends, Kathryn Wells and Michelle Grose, that the accused used controlling behaviours.
10. By SMS message on the morning and later in person on 1 November 2023, the complainant told Darien Williams that she had been assaulted by the accused and showed him bruising to her arms which she said the accused had caused.
11. The complainant provided an account of the incident to Senior Constable Rachel Coomber and Sergeant Marco Consentino and in the presence of the witness, Gillian Fiddy, on 2 November 2023. The complainant gave substantially consistent accounts of the cause of her injuries to her mother on 3 November, to Dr Sinead Taylor at the Bendigo Hospital on 5 November and separately to her friends, Michelle Grose and Kathryn Wells on 7 and 8 November.
12. The injuries recorded by Dr Taylor when she examined the complainant are more extensive than those which are explained by the account given by the complainant to Dr Taylor or her evidence to this court. The complainant conceded that her recollection of the assault she described was limited, and that after she struck her head on the mantelpiece and recovered to stand and feel "eggs" forming on her head, she was unable to clearly recall anything until she woke in bed with the accused the following day. When challenged about the cause of the bruising to her cheek the complainant conceded that she did not know how it was caused. She said, "but there was only Greg and I in the house that night and the next morning. I was covered in bruises so it would have to be related to him." The complainant conceded an inability to explain the bruises to her body save those on her arms and chest (and the pre-existing burns visible on her hands) rather than enter into supposition. Although she is unable to provide a full account, the one given is convincing.
13. The complainant conceded that, even after the events described by her on 31 October 2023, her love for the accused did not just end. She said that she remained uncertain about her future with the accused for some time and, in that period, discussed the prospect of reconciliation with Gillian Fiddy.
14. Taking the whole of the evidence into consideration it is my assessment that the complainant made a genuine and sustained effort to provide truthful evidence. I accept her as a witness of the truth. I accept that there are instances in which her evidence on a particular matter, possibly due to the effects of trauma or concussion, while truthful, may not be reliable. I refer in my findings which follow, to such instances.
15. The Prosecution submit that communications and conduct of the accused are admissible as admissions made by the accused and corroborate the evidence of the complainant. I will deal with the issue of admissions in due course.

1. The accused was an expansive witness, forthcoming with regard to the history of his relationship with the complainant. His account is of immediate connection with and attraction to the complainant, and the flourishing of a loving relationship.
2. The accused gave a detailed account of events in the relationship to which he was directed. He was well prepared with photographs and records produced to support or clarify his evidence, particularly with respect to the events of 31 October 2023.
3. It is in the context of his commitment to the relationship and his acknowledgment that the complainant was leaving her life in Canberra, he said, that he encouraged the complainant to accept such financial assistance as he could offer; use of his associated American Express card, coverage by his health insurance and gym membership, access to his Uber account and Vodaphone mobile service. It was because they were so happy in each other's company that he was confident that the complainant shared his preference to spend time together when they could; travelling to and from work together, lunching together, visiting the complainant's children together. He said that he had no sense at all that the complainant regarded such shared time and shared resources as anything but a choice. The complainant had freely agreed to location sharing on their phones and understood the utility of the function. The accused acknowledged that he maintained a frequency of communication with the complainant that might be regarded as intense, but he said, it was a reflection of their mutual attachment.
4. The accused denied that he was jealous in the relationship. He said that both he and the complainant could be "insecure" but that it was the nature of their relationship that they acknowledged and supported each other to overcome those insecurities.
5. The accused denied each instance of aggressive behaviour or anger toward the complainant which was put to him. He did not acknowledge the existence of any argument with the complainant prior to the occasion on which she told him that her advice was not to proceed with the joint purchase of a home with the finance as proposed and as tenants in common. It was the accused's evidence, despite the unique occurrence of this argument and the one which followed (both of which led to the complainant packing her belongings in preparation for leaving him), that the complainant actively agreed to the formalisation of the financial arrangements having been appeased by the promise of a binding financial agreement and other safeguards.
6. Accepting the accused's account of the state of the relationship, I am unable to reconcile the accused's belief that his relationship was untroubled with other evidence in the proceeding which is either not disputed or corroborated.
7. The accused said that he and the complainant were "ad idem" with regard to the choice of, price of and financial arrangements for, the purchase of a joint home, and that the first time that he knew of her dissatisfaction was when she told him of her independent advice and they argued. The accused denied that the argument escalated in the manner descried by the complainant. He did not dispute that when he returned from work later in the day he saw that the complainant had packed her bags to leave him. His evidence fails to account for the apparently rapid and drastic deterioration in the complainant's satisfaction with the relationship on that day. Within a short period, there was a second occasion on which the complainant packed her bags and removed herself with them to a hotel. The accused came to her assistance by collecting her and her possessions and returning them to his home. The accused described in his evidence, accommodations made in order to address the complainant's exposure to financial risk associated with the purchase of a home. The accused conceded that he came to appreciate that the complainant was worried about the use of her Canberra home as collateral and about his spending. He did not address the unresolved objections of the complainant (for example, being registered as tenants in common) or the dynamics which brought the relationship to such a crisis.
8. The accused gave a detailed description of the events of 31 October 2023. His account cannot be reconciled with that of the complainant. His account in evidence before the court is consistent with that volunteered by him to police when they attended to serve the Police Family Violence Order on 2 November 2023. I note, as the accused did, that there are matters included by the accused in his evidence to the court that are not referred to in the recorded conversation of 2 November.
9. The accused said that he drank two or three wines before the incident which is the subject of Charge 2 occurred, and he said that he could not dispute that he drank six to eight glasses of wine over the evening.
10. The accused's evidence is that when he saw an image of a man on the complainant's phone, he became concerned. When the complainant let him see the phone and he discovered that the image had been deleted his concern increased. That when he had accessed and read the text exchange and the complainant told him that he had nothing to be concerned about, that he became very upset. He denied that he was jealous. He agreed that he was afraid that something was going on, afraid that he might lose her. The accused attributed his "immature" response in demanding the complainant's reassurance to this fear. I am unable to reconcile the accused's response to this slight provocation with his denial that he was either jealous or inclined to engage in controlling behaviour.
11. The accused described in detail and consistently the sequence of the events of the evening and the physical contact which he made with the complainant. He described her fall to the ground and how she sustained a blow to the head. He referred to photographs of his living room to aid an understanding of his account. The accused's evidence addressed quite explicitly the mechanisms by which the bruising to the complainant's upper arms, to her chest and breasts and to her bottom, and back of thighs might be explained. The accused's evidence did not address the substantial bruising (which Dr Taylor photographed and documented in her examination of the complainant on 5 November 2023) to the complainant's hip, to her hands or wrists. As to bruising to her ribs, thighs, and shins he said only "I don't believe I caused that". He denied causing bruising to her shins, calves and knees. His evidence did not address the reality of the injuries.
12. The accused's account that on the morning of 1 November 2023 he saw the complainant naked in the shower but resumed a normal routine, is discordant. He was asked, "Were you aware of the extent of her bruising at that stage. He responded, "I'd seen the - what I call the fingerprint marks and I'd seen some bruising on her arms". When asked to expand he said, " she showed me .... I think when I was shaving she was showering and so we were in the bathroom together, so she was undressed". He made no reference to observing the other very significant bruises later documented, or the totality of the bruising which Dr Taylor described as "extensive". It is unavoidable that the accused saw the extent of the complainant's injury. He was aware that she had struck her head. By his own account he did nothing, and in his evidence he said nothing, which acknowledged it.
13. The absence of evidence from the accused with regard to these critical matters is a sharp contrast to his otherwise expansive approach to his evidence.
14. The accused said that the complainant bruised easily. There is no evidence that the complainant bruised easily. The accused was asked in relation to his evidence of the inadvertent contact to the complainant's chest; "In the course of your relationship you would have connected with her in such a manner with that degree of force on many occasions, in various interactions?" The accused agreed to the general proposition. He was asked, "and on none of those occasions did you cause such bruising did you?" The accused responded, "on no occasion did I witness bruising like you can see on her chest."
15. The evidence of the accused is unconvincing as an explanation for the totality of the extensive bruising sustained by the complainant. Dr Parekh cautioned with respect to her agreement that all of the bruising save for that sustained to the upper arms and chest of the complainant were conceivably consistent with an accidental cause; "It is misleading to consider these images individually. Look at the totality. They are much more likely to have been inflicted deliberately, not accidentally."
16. For completeness I refer to the Prosecution's objection to breaches of the rule in Browne v Dunn [1893] 6 R 67. After discussion, the Prosecution conceded they had not sought to have the complainant re-called or otherwise to advance the issue. Counsel referred to the issue as "of minor importance." Defence submitted with regard to such failures as did occur, that they pertained to "matters which are not significant." I have not acted on the basis that breaches of the rule affect the weight of, or the credibility of, the accused's evidence.
17. Considering the entirety of the evidence it is my conclusion that the accused cannot be relied upon to give an honest and reliable account of events which are relevant to the proof of the charges before the court.
18. Where the evidence of the accused is not consistent with evidence of witnesses I have found to be honest and reliable, including that of the complainant, I will prefer the evidence of those witnesses.

1. I am satisfied that the complainant is a witness of truth and that her evidence is reliable. I reject the evidence of the accused to contradict her evidence. Having put his evidence to one side as I am required to do, I give consideration to all of the evidence which I do accept. Except when there is other evidence which causes me to have a doubt as to the reliability of the complainant's evidence in a certain particular, I rely upon the evidence of the complainant to make the following findings.

Events relied upon to found a course of conduct

1. I accept the complainant's evidence that the accused contacted her repeatedly while she was on holiday in Thailand and asked about her whereabouts, what she was doing and who she was with (Event 27). I am not satisfied, that this conduct can be characterised as an event which contributed to a course of conduct.
2. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that when the complainant and accused lived together in Hobart, the accused expressed displeasure if the complainant declined to travel to and from work with him or to join him for lunch at home, and that if the complainant told the accused that she had another plan, he would disparage her alternative plan or the people she was proposing to spend time with. I accept that the complainant generally came to comply with the accused's expectations because he made things so unpleasant if she resisted him (Event 4).
3. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was disparaging of significant people in the complainant's life, referring to them by nicknames as alleged. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused displayed jealousy in response to positive things said by the complainant about male acquaintances. I accept the complainant's brief account of Event 31 as consistent with such expressions of jealousy or insecurity.
4. I accept beyond reasonable doubt, in the context of this jealousy or insecurity, that the accused became enraged when the complainant received a gift of books from a former male colleague, and that he reacted in the way described by the complainant, verbally abusing and denigrating her (Event 11).
5. I am not satisfied to the requisite standard that the offensive form of address complained of in Event 32 (the substance of which is admitted by the accused) is consistent with such acts of denigration or jealousy. It is open on the evidence to accept that it was intended as a joke by the accused as he claimed.
6. I accept beyond reasonable doubt the evidence of the complainant that on an occasion in Hobart following dinner with Bevan and Lindy Schwaiger, the accused verbally abused her, repeatedly calling her a "slut" and that the complainant sat on a park bench and cried, and that the accused kept returning to her, continuing his abuse (Event 2). The accused denied that this incident occurred, and Bevan Schwaiger did not observe it. I do not accept the denial of the accused. It was not the evidence of the complainant that Bevan or Lindy Schwaiger were present.
7. I also accept beyond reasonable doubt the complainant's evidence that on occasions that she argued with the accused he would call her "Sarah" (the name of his former fiancé) and that he told her that this was because Sarah also argued with him, and they were both sluts (Event 29).
8. I am satisfied that the accused told the complainant that he was proud of her professional achievements. The complainant agreed that he encouraged her in that regard. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused also told her on occasions that her "CV" was "shit" and "embarrassing" (Event 28).
9. I accept beyond reasonable doubt the complainant's evidence that the accused demanded explanations from her with regard to her entry into his study, and her re-orientation of the surveillance camera as she described (Event 10). I find that the only inference open on the evidence is that the accused had observed this behaviour when monitoring the surveillance camera. The evidence does not permit me to exclude the possibility that the accused made these observations in the course of monitoring the surveillance camera to check on his dog. The conduct which is capable of contributing to the course of conduct alleged, is the demand that the complainant provide an explanation for her behaviour, and the accused's expectation that he was entitled to such an explanation.
10. It is not in dispute that the accused gifted the complainant an iPhone or that he assisted her to activate the 'Find My' feature of the phone. I accept that the complainant did not express a desire for an iPhone, and that she felt overborne when the accused insisted that she merge her phone service with his (Event 8). I am not satisfied to the requisite standard that the merging of mobile telephone accounts is an event which contributes to a course of conduct. I accept that the accused gave the complainant access to his gym (where they then shared a personal trainer), to his Uber account and to an American Express card on his account. He joined the complainant to his private health insurance. I accept that it pleased the accused to be able to provide the complainant with these financial benefits.
11. I accept the complainant's evidence regarding the activation of the 'Find My' account on the iPhone gifted to her, and of the pairing of the accessories including headphones by the accused with her knowledge and acquiescence. These matters are not disputed. The complainant did not claim to understand the technical operation of the location sharing capacity enabled by the 'Find My' function. She understood that she could see where her phone and Apple accessories were, and so could the accused. The complainant's evidence that on 1 November she asked Mr Williams to assist her to turn off location sharing because she believed that the accused could use it to locate her was corroborated by Mr Williams.
12. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that when the complainant left her workplace without her iPhone in the company of Darien Williams to go to a bar and drink a beer (Event 12), the accused reacted with escalating anger, ultimately grabbing her arms and calling her a disgrace. Mr Williams confirmed in his evidence that there was an occasion when he and the complainant had left work (at about 4pm) and drank a beer. Mr Williams also recalled that the complainant had told him that she was concerned that the accused could see where she was, that he would question her, and that this led to fights. Mr Williams said that the complainant told her that the accused was jealous.
13. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant turned the 'Find My' function off on three or four occasions and that when she did, she was subjected by the accused to demands that she communicate her whereabouts. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused used location sharing data to hold the complainant accountable for her movements (Event 7). I accept that the complainant did not persist with disabling location sharing because of the inevitability of the accused's displeasure.
14. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that accused demanded that the complainant explain her early morning presence at the Novotel in Canberra to him when he observed an Uber ride from there to the complainant's home because he suspected or feared that she had been unfaithful to him at the hotel (Event 26).
15. I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused monitored the complainant's location in order to locate her with Ms Fiddy at the Den hotel on or around 19 October 2023 (Event 16). In response to a question from Prosecution Counsel, Ms Fiddy said that she overheard the complainant tell the accused where she was when he called her at the Den. Ms Fiddy's evidence corroborates the accused's with respect to the complainant's inebriation on that night. Although I have reservations with respect to the impartiality of Ms Fiddy, and I have generally preferred the complainant's evidence when it is contradicted by the accused's, I cannot be satisfied to the requisite standard that the complainant's evidence is reliable in relation to the events of 19 October 2023.
16. I accept the complainant's evidence that having agreed to jointly purchase a house with the accused, she became worried about the proposal for financing the purchase. I accept beyond reasonable doubt that she told the accused that she was very concerned by the inequity in their contribution to the financing, to holding the property as tenants in common, and to the accused's failure to disclose the details of his financial position. I accept the complainant's evidence that she and the accused had a lot of arguments about the financing over an approximately four-week period. The complainant acknowledged that the accused eventually agreed to accommodate some of these concerns but articulated her unresolved reservations. I accept beyond reasonable doubt the complainant's evidence with regard to her communication to the accused of her ongoing dissatisfaction with the proposed financing of the purchase. I accept beyond reasonable doubt that on (at least) two occasions the accused became verbally aggressive in response to her resistance.
17. On the first of those occasions during a lunch break at home, the complainant told the accused that she had independent advice against proceeding and that the accused became "very, very angry" and refused to compromise. When the accused dropped her back at work she walked home and packed her bags, intending to leave. The accused returned home early and saw the bags, he demanded; "You're not going to leave me!" She did not leave. The evidence of the complainant that at this time she told her colleague Darien Williams that she did not want to sign the documents was corroborated by Mr Williams.
18. On the second occasion, the complainant told the accused that she would not proceed with the purchase and the accused became verbally abusive. The complainant offered to compensate him for half of the $50,000 deposit if they were to lose it. In response to the accused's reaction to her decision, the complainant turned off her phone, packed her bags again, and booked a hotel. The complainant was confused and distressed, and when the hotel had not received her booking and the accused made contact and offered to collect her, she accepted, returning to his home.
19. I accept beyond reasonable doubt this account and that shortly following these events, exhausted by the demands of the accused, the complainant signed the loan application documentation (Events 14 and 15). I satisfied that she did so despite her continuing belief that it exposed her to financial risk.
20. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that these events form a pattern of conduct, coercive of the complainant's will and controlling. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that this pattern of conduct evidences a continuity of purpose on the part of the accused which was to secure control over the complainant.
21. I am not satisfied that events which occurred after 31 October 2023, and upon which the Prosecution seek to rely as evidence of a single course of conduct, fall within the pattern of conduct to which I have referred. It is conceded by the Defence that the evidence establishes to the requisite standard that on dates between 1 November 2023 and 29 November 2023 the accused:
    1. Wrote and sent a letter to the complainant's parents in which he expressed his continuing love for their daughter, and in which he asked that the fact of the communication not be disclosed to the complainant.
    2. Searched the name of the complainant's friend, Camilla Savage, on the internet, located her telephone number on her Facebook page, then sent a series of message to her in which he expressed his continuing love for the complainant, and asked that the fact of the communication not be disclosed to her.
    3. Posted a heart emoji and a 'like' on the complainant's Facebook account.
    4. Called and messaged the complainant after she inadvertently called his phone.
    5. Published poetry written by the complainant and gifted to him on his Facebook page.
22. The events occur in a very different context to those which predate 31 October 2023. I am not satisfied that they evidence a continuity of purpose on the part of the accused as required pursuant to Section 9 of the Family Violence Act 2004.
23. For clarity, based on these findings of fact, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the following 'events' relied upon by the Prosecution comprise the course of conduct pursued by the accused in Tasmania; Events 4, 5, 11, 2, 29, 30, 28, 10, 12, 26, 7, 14 and 15. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that particulars (c), (e), (f), (g) and (h) as alleged in Charge 1 are proven.

1. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused observed the impact of his conduct upon the complainant. I am satisfied that the complainant voiced her resistance to the demands of the accused. I am satisfied that he saw her in tears on the park bench when he castigated her following dinner with the Schwaigers, he saw her retreat in the face of his anger when he confronted her regarding leaving her workplace to drink a beer with her colleague, he saw her pack her bags to leave him on two occasions following his verbal abuse over the financing of the house and return to him defeated.
2. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew or ought to have known that the pursuit of the course of conduct which I have found proven was likely to have the effect of unreasonably controlling or intimidating the complainant.
3. If I am wrong in that regard, I am satisfied that when pursuing the course of conduct which I have found proven, the accused knew or ought to have known that the likely effect of his conduct upon the complainant would include causing her mental harm, apprehension, or fear.
4. Having made these findings with regard to the elements of the offence, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the charge pursuant to Section 9 of the Family Violence Act 2004 is proven.

Evidence of admissions and incriminating conduct

1. It was the evidence of the accused that the statement made by him to the complainant in a SMS message on 2 November 2023 was intended to communicate to the complainant that he accepted responsibility for his immature reaction to her communication with Darien Williams on 31 October and the escalation of events which followed. It was not, he said, an admission of an assault. It was the evidence of the accused that his statement to Camilla Savage in an SMS message on 15 November that he "fucked up like I never fucked up before," was a concession that he took responsibility for precipitating the events of 31 October as he described them in his evidence, with disastrous consequences for the relationship. The accused said that he chose not to respond to Ms Savage's reference to injury suffered by the complainant. He was aware that he and the complainant had different versions of what had occurred on the night, and he did not intend to engage with Ms Savage about that.
2. I have made a finding that the accused cannot be relied upon to give an honest and reliable account of events which are relevant to the proof of the charges before the court. Putting his evidence to one side and taking all of the evidence which I do accept into account, I am not satisfied that either of the two statements or the silence of the accused amount to an unambiguous admission of his involvement in the offence charged.
3. The accused admitted that in the aftermath of the events of 31 October he undertook internet searches in the nature of those relied upon as incriminating conduct by the Prosecution. The accused explained the searches in this way; "I searched anything related to what I was accused of. I allowed myself to let it become an immature engagement." The accused was aware that the complainant had told police that he was abusive and controlling, and that he had assaulted her. He said, in effect, that he was willing to do what it took to show a commitment to the relationship. Setting the accused's evidence aside, and considering the whole of the evidence, I cannot be satisfied that the only reasonable explanation for the conduct is that the accused believed that he had assaulted the complainant.
4. Having made these findings, the evidence is not available in proof of the elements of charge 2.
5. I am satisfied that the complainant is a witness of truth and that her evidence is reliable. I reject the evidence of the accused to the extent that it contradicts her evidence. I do not accept the accused's account of the incidents which followed his observation of the image of Darien Williams on the complainant's phone. I consider his account to be contrived and implausible. It does not accord with the evidence of injury.

First element: The accused applied force to the complainant's body directly or indirectly

1. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that in the living room of the accused's home on the evening of 31 October 2023, the accused applied direct force to the complainant's body in the manner described by her. I am satisfied that the accused became enraged and grabbed the complainant by the arms very tightly and shook her repeatedly. I am satisfied that the complainant struggled, and the accused released one arm and struck her repeatedly to the chest area. I am satisfied that the accused pushed the complainant with the unintended consequence that her head struck the mantelpiece. I am satisfied that the complainant was unable to clearly recall further detail of the incident save that she stood and felt swelling and severe pain to her head. I am satisfied that the complainant made every effort to recall and recount the incident. I am satisfied that the account given by the complainant is consistent with the injuries documented by Dr Taylor, and with the opinions expressed by Dr Parekh as to their causation. The extent of injury to the complainant which is documented by Dr Taylor on 5 November 2023 is unexplained on the evidence.

Second Element: The application of force was intentional

1. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant's evidence establishes that the application of force to the complainant's body by the accused was intentional. The shaking of the complainant, the blows struck to her chest area, and the push were intentional acts.

Third Element: The application of force was not reasonably necessary for the common intercourse of life

1. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence of the complainant that the circumstance in which force was intentionally applied to her body by the accused were in no way necessary for the common intercourse of life. They were acts done in anger.

Fourth Element; The application of force took place without the consent of the complainant

1. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the application of force to her body by the accused.
2. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the charge of assault pursuant to Section 35 (1) of the Police Offences Act 1935 is proven.

[1] Gunes v Pearson (1996) 89 A Crim R 297, 306.

[2] Burns v The Queen (1975) 132 CLR 258.

[3] The Queen v Buckley [2004] VSCA 185; [2004] 10 VR 215.

[4] Magill v The Queen [2013] VSCA 259; [2013] 42 VR 616.

[5] R v Baden-Clay [2016] HCA 35.

[6] LNN v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 39 [175].