of advertisements on or in the v of State highways; and

In exercise of this power the Board passed a by-law of which t] effect of clauses 3 and 4 was to forbid advertising hoardings and adve ments near State highways unless the consent of the Board was given a it. had considered whether certain specified objections existed.

to hoardings or advertisements on or in the vicinity of State highway purposes for or in connectit which the council of any municipality may under sub-section 1 of secti one hundred and ninety-eight of Local Government Act 1928 make laws relating to hoardings or advert ments. In this section 'hi means structure for the exhibiti

advertisements, and includes sky-s Nothing in paragraph (e) of this se shall be construed as_ limiting

authorized the service of an order of the Board directing the removal of H. C. or A.

hoardings, whether constructed before or after the passing of the by-law, when certain conditions were fulfilled, and clause 6 enabled the Board, upon non- compliance with its order, to cause the hoardings to be removed and to sell the materials and reimburse the expenses of removal, Clause 7 enabled the Board by its agent to obliterate or remove any such advertisement if in its opinion it was objectionable.

Held, by the whole Court, that the by-law was valid. Miller v. City of Brighton, (1928) V.L.R. 375; 49 A.L.7. 249, overruled.

And held, by Knor ©.5., Starke and Dixon JJ., that when the purpose of a power includes both prohibiting and regulating, it authorizes a by-law which forbids conditionally, although the conditions may properly be described as regulatory.

Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Full Court): Neale Ads Pty. Lid. v. Country Roads Board, (1930) V.L.R. 169, reversed.

The Country Roads Board made a by-law under the provisions of sec. 61 of the Country Roads Act 1915 (Vict.) as amended by sec. 3 of the Country Roads Act 1927 "for regulating the exhibition of advertisements and the erection of hoardings on or in the vicinity of State highways, and for other purposes." The material provisions of the by-law were as follows : - ' (1) This by-law may be cited as the Hoardings and Advertisements By-law 1927, and shall come into

generality of the provisions of para- graph (d) of this section."

Sec. 198 (1) of the Local Government Act 1928 (Vict.), consolidating the provisions of sec. 198 (1) of the Local Government Act 1915, provide: "198. (1) The council of every mu cipality with the approval of the Governor in Council may make by-laws for the following purposes or any of them or for any purpose in connection therewith : - (a) Regulating and re- straining the erection and construction of buildings, erections, or hoardings or of fences abutting on or within ten feet of any street or road. (b) Requiring the pulling down and removal of build- ings, erections, or hoardings or of fences abutting on or within ten feet of any street or road. (c) Authorizing the council to pull down and remove buildings, erections, or hoardings or fences erected or constructed contrary to any such by-law or not pulled down or removed as required by or under any such by-law, and to sell the materials and apply the proceeds in

reimbursing the expenses of pulling down and removing such buildings, erections, hoardings, or fences and in paying into the municipal fund any fees or penalties due by the owner thereof. For the purpose of this paragraph and paragraphs (a) and (b) 'hoarding' means structure used for the exhibition of advertisements and includes sky-sign. (d) Regulating re- stricting or preventing the exhibition of advertisements in such places and in such manner or by such means as to affect injuriously the amenities of a public park or pleasure promenade or to disfigure the natural beauty of a landscape. (e) Regulating and con- trolling all advertisements attached or fixed to or painted on any hoardings or on any building or on any fence rock cliff or tree, (f) Appointing fees which may be charged and received by the couneil for any act done or to be done by any of its officers under such regula- tions and for any permit or licence to be issued by the council."

• operation upon the date of publication thereof in the Gove

Gazette. (2) 'The Board' in this by-law means the Country R Board. (3) No person shall, without the consent in writing Board, erect or construct, or cause to be erected or constructe on or in the vicinity of any State highway, any hoarding for exhibition thereon of advertisements of any description, or a fix to, or paint any advertisement on any building, fence, rock, elif tree, or elsewhere on or in the vicinity of any such highway. (4 The Board may, in its absolute discretion, refuse its consent to tl exhibition of advertisements in such places and in such mam and by such means on or in the vicinity of any State highway in the opinion of the said Board will be an obstruction to the visic

affect injuriously the amenities of a public park or pleasure promenad or to disfigure the natural beauty of a landseape. (5) If the is satisfied that any hoarding, whether constructed before or the passing of this by-law, on or in the vicinity of any State highway is objectionable or unsightly, or is an obstruction to the vision

persons using such highway, or is in such a state of disrepair as 1 be dangerous to the public, it may by order direct the thereof, or the making of such alteration thereof as to the Beard seems necessary. A copy of such order may be served upon owner of the hoarding, and on the owner for the time being of land on which the same is erected, either personally or by the same to some conspicuous part of such hoarding. (6) If y the time prescribed in the said order the hoarding has not b removed or altered as directed, the Board may, by its agent duly authorized in writing, enter on the land on which such hoardi stands, and pull down and remove, or cause the same to be pulle down and removed, and sell the materials and apply the proceeds in reimbursing the expenses of pulling down and removing s hoarding, and in paying into the Country Reads Board Fund a fee or penalties due by the owner thereof. (7) The Board may also, by its agent authorized as aforesaid, abolish, obliterate, or remove any advertisement attached, fixed to, or printed upon the road surface of any State highway, or upon any hoarding, building, fence, roc

cliff, tree, or elsewhere on or in the vicinity of any such highway, f

in its opinion such advertisement is unsightly, objectionable, or otherwise undesirable. (8) Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of this by-law shall be guilty of an offence, and for every such offence shall be liable to a penalty of not more than twenty pounds."

The appellant, Neale Ads Pty. Ltd., was a company which carried on the business of advertising contractors, and, alleging that it was aggrieved by the by-law, applied to the Supreme Court of Victoria under sec. 203 of the Supreme Court Act 1915 (sec. 189 of the Supreme Court Act 1928) to quash the by-law either whelly or in part for the illegality thereof on the grounds (1) that the conditions upon which the consent of the Country Roads Board referred to in clauses 3 and 4 of the by-law will be granted or refused should be set out in the by-law; (2) that the Country Roads Board has no power or authority to confer upon itself the discretionary powers purported to be conferred by clauses 4 and 5 of the by-law, and (3) that the Country Roads Board has no power or authority to confer upon itself the power to abolish, obliterate or remove advertisements purported to be conferred by clause 7 of the by-law.

The application was referred by Macfarlan J. to the Full Court _ and came on for hearing before Cussen, McArthur and Lowe JJ.

The majority of the Court (Cussen and Lowe JJ.) were of opinion

that the whole by-law should be quashed. They considered that

clauses 3 and 4 left the power to dispense with compliance with the prohibition in the hands of the Board, and that, the conditions of dispensation not being contained in the by-law itself, the clauses were ultra vires for the reasons expressed in Miller v. City of Brighton

(1). They also considered that, for the reason above stated, clause 5

'was invalid inasmuch as it left each case to the unfettered discretion

of the Board, and that clause 6 depended on and fell with clause 5,

and that clause 7 was to some extent dependent on clause 6 and also

reserved to the Board the same unfettered discretion which was fatal to the earlier clauses. McArthur J. was of opinion that clauses

3, 4 and 5 of the by-law were valid, and that only clause 7 should be

-quashed : - Neale Ads Pty. Lid. y. Country Roads Board (2).

) (1928) V.L.R. 375, at p. 383; 49 A.L.T. 249, at p. 252. )

Rees Country Roaps Boarp v Neate Aps Pry. Lrp.

From the order of the Full Court quashing the whole by- Sountry Roads Board now, by special leave, appealed to the Court. _

C. Gavan Duffy, for the appellant. The case of Miller v. Brighton (1) was wrongly decided. That case purported to foll Melbourne Corporation v. Barry (2) and net to follow Willia Weston-super-Mare Urban District Council (3), because the Fi Court thought that Melbourne Corporation v. Barry was coi to the English decision. In Miller's Case the Court was in holding that, even if there was power to prohibit, the by-lawm contain the whole prohibition and that it could not reserve the ri to prohibit to the Council. [Counsel referred to Barry's Case | [He was stopped.]

Eager (with him Clyne), for the respondent. The whole b should be quashed, for the reasons given by the majority of th Court. Clause 3 is bad because it leaves an unfettered discretion in Board to give or withhold consent. Sec. 3 of the Country 1927 confers amore limited power on the Board than that confe by sec. 198, sub-secs. 1 and 2, of the Local Government Act 1915 on a municipality to make a by-law. As to clause 4 of the by-law, is not a law at all and there is no authority for its enactment. I merely a pious declaration of intention as to the future conduct the Board. It does not impose any duty on any person, andh no proper place in a by-law. If all that clause 4 does is to mi a declaration of what the Board intends to do, it is harmle otherwise there is no authority for its enactment. As to claus there is no statutory power given to the Board to direct the remo of a hoarding. Such removal might have been directed if 1 Board had the powers conferred by sec. 198 (2) of the Government Act 1915, but such powers were not conferred. Clau:

power of regulating or controlling the exhibition of advertisemet and, in any event, such regulation or control must be exercise

(1) (1928) V.L.R. 375; 49 ALL.T. (3) (1907) 98 L.-T, 537. 249, (4) (1922) 31 C.L.R., at pp. 198, 2 (2) (19: G.LR. 174. 208.

the Board and not by its agent. The by-law should state the conditions on which the advertisement is to be removed.

Knox C.J., Srarke anp Drxon JJ. This is an appeal by special leave from a decision of the Full Court of Victoria quashing a by-law of the Country Roads Board. The subjects with which the by-law deals are the erection of hoardings and the exhibition of advertisements near State highways. The Board may, by resolution, declare to be a State highway any highway which, in its opinion, is of sufficient importance to be so declared, and thereupon the highway comes under the care of the Board, and is maintained by it (secs. 5-8 of the Highways and Vehicles Act 1924, now in Part III. of the Country Roads Act 1928). The Board is empowered to make by-laws for purposes which include " Regulating or prohibiting the erection and construction of hoardings on or in the vicinity of State highways or regulating, restricting, preventing, or controlling the exhibition of advertisements " (sec. 3 of the Country Roads Act 1927, now sec. 60 (d) of the Country Roads Act 1928). In an attempt to exercise this power, the Board, by clause 3 of the by-law, forbad any person without the consent in writing of the Board, in effect, on or in the vicinity of a State highway to erect any " hoarding for the exhibition thereon of advertisements '' or to place any advertise- ments upon any natural or other objects. Clause 4 provides that the Board may in its absolute discretion refuse its consent to the exhibition, on or in the vicinity of a State highway, of advertise- ments which, in its opinion, are open to any of the objections which the clause specifies. The meaning or the application of this provision appears to have been doubted because it does not in terms refer to the erection of hoardings but only to the exhibition of advertisements, and because much of the language in which the grounds for refusing consent are expressed is derived from sec. 198 (1) (d) of the Local Government Act 1915 (now 1928). But the phrase " consent to the exhibition of advertisements " seems a compendium which, although

H.C. or A. not exact, is practically sufficient to describe the consent re

in the preceding clause, and there can be no real doubt that el states, whether exhaustively or not, grounds upon which the | may withhold its consent under clause 3. Thus the effect

,. two clauses is to forbid advertising hoardings and advertisem

• near State highways unless the consent of the Board is giv

it has considered whether certain specified objections exist. - In the Full Court, Cussen J. and Lowe J., McArthur J. dis were of opinion that clause 3 violated the principle which, case of Miller v. City of Brighton (1), the Full Court, consi Mann J., McArthur J. and Lowe J., had formulated after examined the reasons given in this Court for the judgment in Melb Corporation v. Barry (2), and considered them in relation to authorities. This principle was expressed in Miller's Case Lowe J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, in the follo passage : - " The conclusion at which we thus arrive leads uniform rule which applies to all by-laws, whether they be m under a power to prohibit or a power to restrain, or a power regulate, namely, that the by-law itself must, in the languag Mathew J. in Kruse v. Johnson (4), ' contain adequate informs as to the duties of those who are to obey,' and we add for o1 it does not fulfil this requirement unless the prohibition, or re or regulation, as the case may be, appears from the by-law It may be said that in the present case these conditions thus are literally complied with, because there does appear on of the by-law an explicit prohibition of hoardings and adve without the Board's consent ; and McArthur J. was of this opin But it was not in this sense that Cussen J. and Lowe J. underst e "uniform rule," and in Miller's Case the Court had said (5 "Tn truth, the view that though the prohibition must, the dii tion from the prohibition need not, appear in the by-law itself s founded on the fallacy of supposing that the power of dispensat exists apart from the power to prohibit. There is no powe dispense save as part of the content of the power to prohibit ; (1) (1928) V-L.R. 375 :49 ALT. 249, (4) (1898) 2 K.B. 91, at p. 108, : (2) (1922) 31 CLLR. 174. (5) (1928) V.LR,, at p. 383; 49 Al

(3) (1928) V.L.R, at pp. 383, 384;49 at p. 2 A.L.T., at p. 252.

H.C. or A. course no point when the bylaw-making power includes the purp ee of prohibiting. Indeed, in Miller's Case (1), both in the judgm Couxtry of Irvine C.J. and in that of the Full Court, an objection of

opposite character is suggested when the power exercised is th prohibiting. JZrvine C.J. said (2): - "Had it been free authority I should think ' prohibit ' carried this particular m

no further than ' regulate,' inasmuch as though * regulating *i

'regulating.' I should have thought, too, that a power to prohi did not include a power to license, and that a by-law enabling thing to be done by leave is not a by-law prohibiting that This view rests upon an interpretation of the word " prohibit which leaves it unsatisfied by anything short of entire and ditional suppression. Jt may well bear this meaning in some conte and in relation te some subject matters, but when prohibiting course of conduct is expressed to be the purpose of a bylaw-maki power, it would more often be understood to confer authorit forbid all or any part of that course of conduct and to do so absolute or subject to any condition which appeared convenient. At is clear that when the purpose of a power includes both prohil and regulating, it must authorize a by-law which forbids conditio although the conditions may properly be described as regulatory.

The power given to the Country Roads Board now in quest does include both prohibition and regulation. It is true that : statutory provision uses the disjunctive " or," but it plainly mes to describe or define one power or purpose - not two, to be exerd in the alternative. But the reasoning upon which the princi "uniform rule" of the Victorian Full Court is based is directed t the character of the condition prescribed by the by-law, name the consent of the council. This the Court described as a dispen tion. This term is commonly applied to the exercise of a pow suspend the obligation of a law, or to excuse from obedience to commands. The consent of the Board, however, is not an indep dent power of abrogation, but a condition upon which the te the by-law makes its operation depend. As the passage a

(1) (1928) V.L.R. 375 ; 49 A.L.T. 249. (2) (1928) V.L.R., at p. 377; 49 A.L.T., at p. 249.

_ it follows, in our opinion, as a matter of reason, that the prohibition H. ©. or A. _ which must appear in the by-law itself is the whole prohibition ; or, 1888,

i in other words, that the prohibition, together with the conditions Covyrry _ under which the dispensation will be granted, must so appear." In Pye

_ reaching this result, the learned Judges were much influenced by Nigsen bad _ methods of reasoning which had been used in support of a restrictive Pry. Lev. _ interpretation of powers of regulation but which, in their opinion, Knox C4. _ were of equal application when the purpose of the bylaw-making Pix J'

_ power was to prohibit or restrain. Indeed, in Barry's Case (1)

_ Higgins J. expressly says that even if it be assumed that the power

then in question sanctions a by-law prohibiting a procession because

_ of its nature or purpose, the prohibition must be by by-law, not by

the Council acting at an ordinary meeting, and by the chance

_ majority at that meeting. After thus referring to a by-law which

_forbad processions without the Council's consent, Higgins J.

proceeds to rely upon the provisions of the Local Government Act _ which prescribe the manner of making by-laws; provisions upon _ which Isaacs J. had also relied (2). The actual decision of this Court in Barry's Case, however, was based upon the restricted meaning which the word " regulate " appears primarily to bear; a meaning expressed in the often quoted words of Lord Davey in Toronto | Municipal Corporation v. Virgo (3): "There is marked distinction _ to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and _ the regulation or governance of it, and indeed a power to regulate

and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed." This distinction was expressly referred _ to and maintained in the judgment of Isaacs J. in Barry's Case (4), who said: "The real truth is that the Council's by-law is framed _ exactly as if the word ' prohibiting' were used in the sub-section i instead of the word 'regulating '; and that is, of course, a fundamental. error and cannot be justified." f Gn truth, the essence of the objection to which the actual decision _ in that case gave effect was that the by-law by forbidding processions subject to a condition operated to prohibit them completely if and in So far as the condition was unfulfilled. Such an objection has of

(1) (1922) 31 C.L.R., at p. 208. (3) (1896) A.C. 88, at p. 93. (2) (1922) 31 C.L.R., at p. 195. (4) (1922) 31 G.L.R., at p. 200,

quoted from the judgment in Miller's Case (1) shows, the Full Court treated the dispensation as a discretionary power which could not be granted in the exercise of an authority to make by-laws for the purpose of prohibiting and (presumably) regulating. It considered that such a power authorized no more than " prohibition together with conditions under which dispensation could be granted." But once it is realized that the power authorizes prohibition, complete or partial, conditional or unconditional, what reason is there for denying that the condition may be the consent, or licence, or approval of a person or a body? The answer that there is none was given by the Divisional Court and approved by the Court of Appeal in Williams v. Weston-super-Mare Urban District Council (2); and we respectfully agree. The supposition or suggestion that the conditions or circumstances should be defined in which the consent, Jicence, or approval must be given can rest only upon some justification other than the words in which the power is conferred.

From the passage in the judgment of Higgins J. in Barry's Case (3) already referred to, it appears that he considered that such a justification in the case of municipal councils might be found in the view that the procedure prescribed for making by-laws impliedly forbids the choice of the council as the repository of any discretion upon which the operation of the by-law may be conditioned. But this view rests upon an implication which the canons of interpretation scarcely warrant. The municipal council must conform to the prescribed procedure in formulating a prohibition, conditional or unconditional ; but why does this requirement import any limitation in the exercise under the by-law of powers or authorities upon which it, in terms, makes the extent of its prohibition depend? But in any case no such argument is available in the case of the Country Roads Board, a distinction upon which the dissent of McArthur J. turned.

The whole controversy illustrates the danger which attends the formulation of principles and doctrines and all reasoning a priori in matters which in the end are governed by the meaning of the language in which the Legislature has expressed its will. The simple

(1) (1928) V.LR., at p. 383; 49 - (2) (1907) 98 L.T. 537; (1910) 103 ALL.T., at p. 252. L.T. 9. (3) (1922) 31 C.LLR., at p. 208,

question in this case is whether a clause which forbids hoardi and advertisements without the consent of the Board answe description of a by-law " prohibiting or regulating the ere hoardings, or regulating, restricting, preventing, or controllir advertisements." If the Full Court had felt itself at liberty so propound the question and to answer it upon a consideration o of the terms used, probably it would have felt no difficulty in the affirmative answer which this Court considers to be requit Clauses 5, 6 and 7 of the by-law need separate consider Clause 5 authorizes the service of an order of the Board directit removal of hoardings whether constructed before or after the p: of the by-law when certain conditions are fulfilled, and clause enables the Board, upon non-compliance with its order, to cau the hoardings to be removed, and to sell the materials and reimbur the expenses of removal. Such a provision is not authorized by much of sec. 3 of the Country Roads Act 1927 as has been a quoted. But sec. 3 goes on to empower the Board in relati hoardings or advertisements on or in the vicinity of State highy to make by-laws for or with respect to any purposes for connection with which the council of a municipality may unt sub-sec. 1 of sec. 198 of the Local Government Act 1915 make by-lay relating to hoardings or advertisements. Par. (b) of sec. 198 | authorizes by-laws for the purpose of, or any purpose in conne with, "requiring the pulling down and removal of ings." According to a decision of the Full Court of Victori Levingston v. President &c. of Shire of Heidelberg (1), the words wl i occur at the end of this paragraph " abutting on or within ten any street or road"' apply only to the word " fences " and do not qu "hoardings." This decision was not challenged at the bar, and it stood so long that we do not propose to consider its correctness. B clauses 5 and 6 do not themselves impose any obligation upon to remove hoardings, whether specified or to be specified. The, operate only to enable the Board after notification directing # removal to perform itself the work of removal. On the whole think that it is not essential that a legal duty to comply with directions should be imposed, and that these clauses are within tht

__ by par. (c) of sec. 198 (1) because that paragraph includes power in relation to hoardings constructed contrary to a by-law or "not _ pulled down or removed as required by or under any such by-law," _ namely, a by-law under par. (b), and clause 5 appears to us to be such a by-law.

_ Clause 7 is based upon sub-sec. 2 of sec. 198, which, however, is ~ not incorporated by the Country Roads Act 1927. So much of sec. 3 ; of that Act, however, as has been already set out includes a power _ tomake by-laws for the purpose of regulating, restricting, preventing, or controlling the exhibition of advertisements on or in the vicinity _ of State highways. The word "exhibition"? may mean the act of _ placing the advertisement where it may be seen, or it may extend _ to the continued display of the advertisement after it has been so

_ placed. On the whole, the latter seems the proper interpretation of

the provision. Upon this interpretation a by-law is authorized which controls or prevents the continued display of advertisements.

• Clause 7 does no more than this, and is therefore good.

Clause 8 was not attacked, but in any case it creates no liability which would not exist under sec. 69 of the Country Roads Act 1915 (now sec. 92 of that of 1928).

The appeal should be allowed, but without costs in view of the fact that no appeal lay as of right. The order of the Supreme Court should be discharged and the order nisi discharged with costs. The sum of £15 paid into the Supreme Court by the respondent should be paid out to the appellant.

Isaacs J. In my opinion the by-law No. 2 which has been impeached is valid throughout. It consists of eight clauses, the first and second being formal only. Clause 3 is the centre of attack. It purports to prohibit certain acts, " without the consent in writing of the Board." This is the qualifying phrase which is said to mar the by-law, by leaving the prohibition undefined. ~ Before examining the law, it is desirable to observe that in construction the prohibition extends to "hoardings" and to "advertisements." As to general locality, clause 3 limits it both

as to hoardings and advertisements by the words "on or in the Vou. xii, 10

powers described by sec. 198 (1) (b) and (c). Clause 6 is supported H.C. or A.

vicinity of any State highway." The Board is so far ca acting within the legal territory marked out in sec. 3 of Act X 3568. As to hoardings, the subject matter is restricted to hoardit " for the exhibition thereon of advertisements of any descrip' and as to the description of advertisements, they are all adver ments attached, fixed to, or painted on anything whatsoever, i it the locality mentioned. But the qualifying phrase as to the consent is not left to operate as if clause 3 stood alone. It is lin by clause 4, which marks out the sphere of consideration which | by-law commits to the Board in giving or refusing its consen That sphere is the same as that which the legislation has adopted in sec. 198 (1) (2) of the Local Government Act 1915, with an obviously proper consideration in the interests of The power, therefore, of the Board to " refuse its consent " (clau is limited to the considerations mentioned. It is not an arbitt power, and it is manifestly a perfectly reasonable mode of de with the subject, if the law permits it. 4 The Supreme Court, by a majority, has held that the law doesn permit that course, but that the prohibition of a hoarding J advertisement, in order to be valid, must be ascertainable from comparison of the by-law itself with the hoarding or advertis itself. That means a practical impossibility unless the prohil is total and absolute, for it would need prophetic vision to indi with necessary precision what and where advertisements will I objectionable, and to leave the decision to various legal tribunal would introduce such diversity and uncertainty, as well as ex 1 as to make the remedy worse than the disease. There is nothing in Barry's Case (1) to invalidate the by Barry's Case was decided on a power of "regulating" and not of " prohibiting " it. A by-law that under the lesser por of regulation assumed to prohibit processions unless with the co of the town clerk was held invalid. If the by-law had been in form of an absolute prohibition, it would have been equally inv (Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgo (2); and

President &e. of Shire of Tungamah v. Merrett (1) ). Barry's Case (2) is, therefore, no authority for the decision appealed from in this case. In the present case there exists the statutory power to prohibit either entirely or partially. The prohibition adopted is not entire, but only extends to instances where the act is done without the written consent of the Board, the power of refusal being limited as mentioned. As I pointed out during the argument, the two positions are essentially different. The power of regulation may, and almost necessarily does, involve some restriction or prohibition. The body entrusted with the power to regulate must in some sufficient way mark out whatever limits of prohibition are to exist. That is to say, legal rights otherwise existing are not to be cut down at the discretion of some individual or individuals, but must be dealt. with by the law. And they are not properly dealt with in that case by first exercising the power of prohibition which is not conferred. But where the by-law itself prohibits, and in the absence of a written consent prohibits completely, the consent if refused simply leaves the by-law to operate without it, and if given satisfies the provision of the by-law by a factum which excludes the given case from its operation. Clauses 3 and 4 are complementary, and, read together, are valid. Clause 5, being limited in locality as before, is valid under the powers referentially included in sec. 3 of the Act No. 3568. Clause 6, which, if dependent solely on sec. 198 (1) (e), might be questioned because clause 5 did not go on to require the owner to comply with the order (as to which I say nothing), is nevertheless valid, because the subject matter is conveyed by sec. 3 of the Act No. 3568, the hoardings being those " on or in the vicinity ofany State highway." Clause 5 may be regarded, for this purpose at all events, as introductory to clause 6, and as identifying the hoard- ings included in the latter clause. Clause 7 is similarly valid.

The appeal should, therefore, be allowed, and the order nisi discharged.

Gavan Durry J. agreed with the judgment of Isaacs J.

(1) (1912) 15 C.L.R. 407, at p. 424. (2) (1922) 31 C.L.R. 174,

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF BANKRUPTCY (DISTRICT OF VICTORIA).

H. C. or A, Debls - Puture Debis - Book debts - Assignment - Registration - Future inst

1930. hire - * Puture debs. . . although not incurred or owing at tl

Sam the assignment" - Hire-purchase agreement - Non-registration as assignm

MELBOURNE, ook; debts - Invalidity of assignment - Assignee not entitled to general. Feb. 20.

in or to charge or equitable security over property assigned - Ins 1915 (Vict.) (No. 2672), secs. 127, 180, 181 - Instruments Act 1 (Wo. 3706), secs. 27, 80, 81.

Traders, who afterwards made a deed of arrangement, obtained upon the security of assignments of hire-purchase agreements whi framed that (i.) after the first period of hire the hirer's right to re