3. Following the interlocutory hearing, the Tribunal gave the parties a short period of further time (3 working days) to prepare and file final short written submissions if they wished to do so.[18] Despite the Tribunal's written directions specifying that extensions of time to file such submissions would not be entertained, by email dated 10 September 2025, the Applicant sought more time to provide those written submissions (which was not granted). The Applicant stated:

I am now arranging the necessary funds, which will take up to 60 days to be available. In order to finalise the work required by my accountants and legal representatives, I respectfully request an additional one month after that 60-day period. This would allow me to provide all submissions, including the SIFC."

1. Following the time extension request being rejected, the Applicant provided an email dated 11 September 2025 summarising its case which said:

I have filed evidence in the substantive Application showing that I have been under audit by the ATO since 2018 for the 2017 and 2018 income years. Since then, I have made every effort to comply with the requirements of the audit and subsequent dispute process. This has included engaging multiple independent forensic accountants and legal professionals at significant personal cost - approximately $300,000 in total.

Evidence from one of those professionals [Mr H] has been filed in the substantive matter.

Despite commissioning detailed reports from [Mr G, Mr M and Mr H], all of which identified legitimate business expenses that I had incurred in the years in question, the ATO has repeatedly rejected these submissions in their entirety. Even basic, clearly identifiable business expenses such as Telstra, Vodafone, and Optus bills paid by the company's AMEX (and reimbursed by the company account) have been disallowed and instead treated as personal income.

I submit that this approach is inconsistent with both the evidence provided and the principles outlined in the ATO's own charter. Had the audit been conducted in accordance with those principles, much of this dispute could have been avoided.

In relation to the Reinstatement Application, I wish to emphasise that I am not seeking to waste the Tribunal's time. On the contrary, I have exhausted significant resources and suffered both financially and personally in my ongoing efforts to resolve this matter. I am currently managing both health issues and a separate criminal matter which required urgent funding, further limiting my capacity to engage in this matter. Nonetheless, I remain fully committed to finalising this process; hence the filing of the Reinstatement Application.

In my most recent affidavit filed in support of the Reinstatement Application, I identified the very significant consequences that I am currently facing, namely, bankruptcy. I also identified what I say is only slight prejudice to the Respondent if my Reinstatement Application is granted, as the next step in the matter, should my Reinstatement Application be granted, falls to me in terms of the filing of the SFIC. The Respondent merely has to sit on its hands and wait for me to do so and that is only required until December [2025].

If given this final opportunity, I will do my absolute best to ensure all submissions, including the SIFC, are lodged by the first week of December 2025. This will be my last request for an extension, and I am confident that with this additional time I can present a complete and properly supported case.

Legal analysis - power of reinstatement under subsection 102(9) of the ART Act

1. The principles that the Tribunal considers when determining whether to reinstate proceedings under subsection 102(9) of the ART Act were set out in Djuric and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 469 ("Djuric"), and followed in KBHN and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 970 ("KBHN") and Australian Gold Dealers Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 1133.
2. Djuric sets out four factors when considering whether it is appropriate to reinstate proceedings that were dismissed pursuant to section 100 of the ART Act:

(a) The explanation for the issue that resulted in the dismissal; > > (b) The merits of the substantive case; > > (c) Prejudice to the parties. In KBHN at [61] the Tribunal considered that prejudice to other litigants is an issue here as well. I consider that to be part of the next factor, the public interest. That is of no particular importance at all; as I certainly agree it is a relevant consideration; > > (d) The public interest - this includes meeting the objectives of the Tribunal and the interests of justice.

Explanation for the issue that resulted in dismissal

1. The issue that resulted in dismissal involved the Applicant failing to meet directions. The Applicant's explanation related to the funding issue and his health.
2. In relation to the funding issue, I do not accept that is a reason for a complete failure on the part of the Applicant to engage with the Tribunal prior to timeframes expiring. Legal skill is not required for the Applicant to engage with the Tribunal on timetabling prior to time periods expiring. He repeatedly failed to do so. In addition, as is noted below[19] the evidence on the file suggests that the diversion of funding for a criminal matter ended two years ago, when criminal proceedings were dismissed. No real detail has been provided of the criminal issue.
3. Perhaps the most telling failure was the last one recorded in the dismissal case, where three months passed without the Applicant engaging with the Tribunal and he made no effort to comply with the Tribunal's last directions of 30 June 2025 despite those directions clearly being to the effect that his proceedings would be automatically dismissed unless he met those timeframes. Once again, there was no engagement by the Applicant. The Applicant took the risk and bore the consequences in the dismissal case. He was clearly warned by the Tribunal. The outcome was his own doing.
4. The other reason given relates to the Applicant's poor health. I agree with the dismissal case that this issue does not substantively form the rationale for the delay, and the real issue is the funding issue. I agree with the Commissioner that this is an ongoing issue and did not prevent the Applicant from focusing on other issues.
5. I understand that the Applicant's ill-health is raised as an explanation for why the Applicant does not believe that he can represent himself, and this is a further reason why the funding issue is so critical. The problem for the Applicant is that while that might be so, there is a pattern of vague unfulfilled promises to resolve the funding issue, and an array of timeframes provided with the only consistency being them not being met. It is not something that appears likely to change, given various timeframes raised at the reinstatement hearing. At some point he needed to pursue his case on his own or withdraw it. At the latest, the Tribunal's directions of 30 June 2025 were that point.
6. The Tribunal's assessment is that the Applicant's reason for the issue that resulted in the dismissal is not a satisfactory explanation. I have concluded that this factor is not in favour of reinstatement.

1. When considering this factor, the case law as summarised in Djuric is to the effect that the assessment of the merits is "necessarily superficial".[20] In KBHN the Tribunal determined the test for there being no merits was whether the Applicant's case is "entirely hopeless" or "without any prospects."[21]
2. In the current matter, the Applicant points to what he says is "expert evidence" of Mr H, and says the funding issue is preventing him from seeking further expert evidence which will resolve the issues between himself and the Commissioner about the default assessments that have been issued.[22] The Commissioner finds the evidence of Mr H wanting and says it will challenge the admissibility of that evidence if the matter progresses.[23]
3. Mr H's report,[24] such that it is, does not meet the requirements to be an expert report. For instance, there are no instructions to him, there is no indication that he has considered the requirements of an expert report including Tribunal Practice Directions for Expert Reports.
4. The attachments to Mr H's report comprise (in the main) bank statements and invoices[25] that are hand marked suggesting some line items are business items. All Mr H does in substance is say the hand markings on bank statements and invoices are right in his view. Mr H's opinion of that has little to no bearing on what the default assessments should be in fact (which is what the Applicant needs to demonstrate). Mr H goes on to suggest that the Commissioner's assessment is not a "bona fide attempt to raise assessment of taxation." Mr H's view is irrelevant and not evidence. The statutory provisions deem the Commissioner's assessments to be correct.[26] Despite the Applicant's submissions, my assessment at a superficial level is that Mr H's report is of very minimal value and does not come close to meeting the Applicant's burden of proof.
5. In any event, Mr H's report appears to be an 'interim document' or 'personal statement' as it records that Mr H expected more evidence to be obtained on summons before drafting a final report.[27] No summons were issued. The Commissioner's Submissions refer to this period of these proceedings immediately after Mr H's report and in 2024 as the Applicant causing considerable delay and expense for all parties by making unsuccessful summons requests and inflammatory allegations against the Commissioner rather than focusing on working through his evidence to meet his burden of proof.[28]
6. In his 11 September 2025 email to the Tribunal the Applicant also refers to reports from Mr G and Mr M. I see no material on the T documents that purports to be anything like a "report" from Mr G. Mr M prepared the objection, so I assume that is what is referred to. This is not evidence.
7. At the interlocutory hearing, the Applicant advised the Tribunal that business bank accounts were comingled with his personal expenditure, and he only had credit cards, no other bank accounts. The Applicant's objection dated 4 May 2022 says that the Applicant's stated banking arrangements were connected to fraud charges[29] that are said (by Mr H) to have been later dismissed against the Applicant[30] and some resistance from the Applicant's bank to providing him an individual account. If these criminal proceedings are a part of the cause of the funding issue, they were, according to Mr H, dismissed in July 2023 - more than two years ago. The Applicant said that the Commissioner's assessments were incorrect as the Commissioner had not even identified what were obvious business expenses nor what was obvious income of another taxpayer such as a related company or the Applicant's spouse.
8. The task for the Applicant is to satisfy the Tribunal on the balance of probabilities that the Commissioner's default assessments are excessive and what they should have been. What is currently before the Tribunal does not come close to meeting that burden. In saying that, there is so little before the Tribunal and there is said to be other material, so I cannot assess the Applicant's case as without prospects or hopeless. It is difficult to make an assessment at all due to the hopelessly thin filings from the Applicant to date.
9. The Applicant's failure to meet directions cannot benefit him in the assessment of this factor, however. It would be wrong for me to say just because the Applicant has not filed anything meaningful, nor met the Tribunal's directions to do so, that he somehow gets the benefit of the doubt he has created when assessing this factor. If I was to assess the merits of the Applicant's case from what has been filed to date, I would consider it unmeritorious. The Applicant says there is more evidence to be presented, however.
10. In the circumstances, I assess this factor as neutral.

1. The next question is whether there is prejudice to the parties. If the Applicant's case was not reinstated there would be prejudice in him not being able to have his case heard. That is prejudice to him.
2. The Applicant says there is no real prejudice to the Tribunal or the Commissioner as all that would be required is for the Commissioner and Tribunal to sit on their hands and wait until the Applicant advises whether the funding issue is resolved. This misguided submission is rejected.
3. This case was filed in 2022. Three years have passed. Multiple engagements have occurred with the Applicant. The prejudice to the Tribunal is in it allocating any resources to a case where the Applicant is not prepared to proceed in anything like a prompt manner. Public money has already been spent on numerous directions conferences, on dealing with summons requests in interlocutory hearings, on setting down hearings and the conciliation, on chasing the Applicant, and on having to vacate dates. The Applicant is requesting this continues and that more public money is outlaid checking on the Applicant and waiting for the matter to proceed. The Applicant's actions to date are prejudicial to the justice system.
4. For the Commissioner, public money has been spent on counsel, external solicitors, on staff allocated to this matter, on correspondence with the Applicant, and on chasing the Applicant. Public money has been spent on attendances at directions conferences, interlocutory hearings, and on engagement with the Tribunal. As the Commissioner points out,[31] the constant delays cause costs for counsel having to continually refresh memory of this case, and may impact available evidence as time drifts on. I agree with that submission. The Applicant is requesting this continues. I recognise there is prejudice to the Applicant, but there is also serious prejudice to the administration of justice.
5. While I recognise the prejudice to the Applicant, the level of delay that has occurred as a result of his actions is significantly prejudicial to the administration of justice and to the Commissioner in terms of its appropriate spending of public money. This factor is, on balance, against reinstatement.

1. There are competing issues. There is a public interest in the Tribunal being able to meet its objectives. Those objectives include the following:

(a) Ensuring issues in dispute are resolved as quickly and with as little formality and expense as a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permits.[32] The Applicant's failures to meet the Tribunal's ordered timetables undermine that objective. As was recorded in the dismissal case, there are more than 100,000 cases before the Tribunal and timetabling is an important feature of managing such a workload. Cases like the Applicant's that involve consideration of default assessments do not drift on for years as the Applicant's has. Cases with more complex facts than the Applicant's do not drift on for years as the Applicant's has. A proper consideration of the Applicant's issues does not require years to pass. > > (b) Another objective is for the Tribunal to be "fair and just".[33] It is neither fair nor just for one party to meet its obligations (the Commissioner) while the other party (the Applicant) has repeatedly failed to do so. > > (c) In addition, the Tribunal expects its directions to be respected, and they have not been. Disrespecting the Tribunal by not meeting orders or directions without a substantive reason is taken very seriously as this does not promote public trust and confidence in the Tribunal, which is another objective.[34] It is the Tribunal that sets timeframes, not the Applicant. > > (d) Another objective is ensuring the Tribunal is accessible and responsive to the diverse needs of parties.[35] The Tribunal has in this case given the Applicant a lot of leeway. He is currently self-represented. He has been given a lot of time.

2. The other major issue of public interest is the interests of justice. Applicants are entitled to be heard. The Applicant in this case wants to have his case heard.
3. This issue for me to consider is whether the historic problems in this case will be resolved if this matter is reinstated. I am troubled by the Applicant's approach to the interlocutory hearing of his reinstatement application. It was more of the same. Varying timeframes were given by the Applicant to the Tribunal for when the funding issue may be resolved:

(a) Seven months from August 2025 in which he may be able to obtain funding.[36] > > (b) 45 days from the interlocutory hearing date of 8 September 2025 to potentially obtain funding and then further time after that to prepare the material.[37] > > (c) 60 days after the 10 September 2025 email for funding to potentially be available and then an additional month for material to be prepared.[38] > > (d) Until the first week of December 2025 for the Applicant to obtain funding, and the Applicant "would do [his] absolute best" to ensure all submissions are lodged by the first week of December 2025.[39]

4. The Applicant has not changed his approach in the reinstatement case from his approach which resulted in the dismissal case. The dismissal case should have put him on notice that he needed to take prompt action and adopt a different approach. He has provided no certainty of when material will be filed. His actions demonstrate a pattern of promises, and he makes varying submissions of dates when funding may or may potentially be available with (at best) vague timeframes of when material may then be filed thereafter if funding is obtained. There is no evidence of where this funding may come from there is no certainty it will arise at all. Given the history to date, I have no confidence. He has made no efforts himself to try and file anything of substance. A number of years have passed since these proceedings were filed and the Applicant has been given plenty on leeway to get on with his case. He was very clearly warned of the consequences.
5. The history of this matter and the Applicant's submissions at the reinstatement hearing gives me absolutely no confidence that these proceedings will be progressed appropriately.
6. We have already had a drift of time just in 2025 of at least 9 months. Quite simply, this is not how the Courts and the Tribunal work when managing proceedings. The Australian public rightly expects that public funds are spent on the Courts and Tribunal deciding cases, where applicants are prepared to proceed and meet the Tribunal's directions to get to a hearing. Endless rounds of directions conferences with no end in sight is not in the interests of the justice system.
7. In my assessment, it is not in the public interest to allow this matter to be reinstated. This factor is against reinstatement.

1. On balance, I have decided that it is not appropriate for the Applicant's proceedings to be reinstated under section 102(9) of the ART Act. As a result, I dismiss the Applicant's application for reinstatement.

.............................[SGD].............................

[1] The Applicant filed his proceedings in 2022. On 14 October 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal became the Administrative Review Tribunal. Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 proceedings that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are continued and finalised by the Administrative Review Tribunal. Anything done in relation to any such proceeding before 14 October 2024 is taken to have been done by the Administrative Review Tribunal.

[2] As was noted at footnote 19 in Djuric and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 46, section 102(9) of the ART Act is materially the same as the former provision section 42A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) which is now repealed. Cases on the former provision remain relevant.

[3] JBTJ and The Secretary for the Department of Social Services [2025] ARTA 464, [25]-[39], [42]-[47]; KBHN and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 970 [52]-[58].

[4] Respondent's Submissions re Application for reinstatement under section 102(5) of the ART Act dated 29 August 2025 ("Commissioner's Submissions") [5] and following.

[5] NYKS and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 1031, [4]-[21].

[6] NYKS and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 1031, [31]-[34], [38].

[9] Commissioner's Submissions [8]-[9].

[10] Commissioner's Submissions [11].

[11] Commissioner's Submissions [12].

[12] Commissioner's Submissions [13]-[14].

[15] Applicant's Affidavit [10-[12].

[17] Applicant's Affidavit [15]-[20].

[18] The Commissioner confirmed by email dated 11 September 2025 that it would not file further submissions.

[19] See paragraph 30 below.

[20] Djuric [13b] citing Clinnick and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2021] AATA 7, [26].

[22] Applicant's email dated 11 September 2025.

[23] Commissioner's Submissions [11].

[24] Report of Mr H dated 10 November 2023 ("Mr H's report").

[25] It is noted that some invoices are issued by an entity that has exactly the same address as the entity that is purportedly charged the cost at issue and no explanation is provided by Mr H.

[26] Section 350-10 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).

[28] Commissioner's Submissions [11].

[29] T7.1-112 [4.3.2], T7.1-113 [5.1.1].

[31] Commissioner's Submissions [12].

[37] Interlocutory hearing 8 September 2025.

[38] Applicant's email dated 10 September 2025.

[39] Applicant's email dated 11 September 2025.