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[2014] VCAT 1171
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2014-09-16
Original judgment source is linked above.
1.1 Complainant 1 was admitted to the Unit on or about 20 August 2010 and was discharged on or about 26 August 2010.
(b) sat closely down on the bed with Complainant 1, face to face, to 'have a talk'; and
(b) hugged Complainant 1, for a prolonged period of time; and
1.4 On or about 26 August 2010, during Complainant 1's exit interview, Mr Singh:
(a) stated that he had Complainant 1's mobile telephone number, and that he would take it home with him so that he could contact her;
(b) attempted to touch Complainant 1's tongue piecing, requesting, repeatedly, that she stick out her tongue so that he could touch the piercing;
(c) told her that he was going to tell his girlfriend to pierce her tongue because 'he loved it so much'; and
2.1 Complainant 2 was admitted to the Unit on or about 14 September 2010 and was discharged on or about 23 September 2010.
2.2 On 16 September 2010, whilst conducting an 'ECG' procedure on Complainant 2 in her room, Mr Singh:
(a) asked Complainant 2 if she wished to shave her legs, which she recalls were hairy;
(c) asked Complainant 2 whether she had any tattoos and, when she responded that she had a dragonfly tattoo on her back, asked to see it; and
(d) mentioned to Complainant 2 that he liked her tongue ring.
2.3 On 16 September 2010, at approximately 6.00 pm, after taking Complainant 2's blood pressure, Mr Singh:
(a) asked Complainant 2 to poke out her tongue because she had a tongue ring;
(c) kissed Complainant 2 on the lips and put his tongue inside her mouth;
(e) put Complainant 2's hand inside his pants to touch his penis and kept her hand there when she tried to remove it; and
(f) asked Complainant 2 for her telephone number and, when she gave him the number, entered it into his iPhone.
2.4 On 16 September 2010, at approximately 7.00 or 7.30 pm, Mr Singh entered Complainant 2's room and attempted to kiss her on the lips and touch her breasts.
2.5 On 16 September 2010, between approximately 8.00 pm and 10.00 pm, Mr Singh entered Complainant 2's room and went with her into the bathroom where:
(b) he pulled down his pants and asked Complainant 2 to kiss his penis; and
(c) he forced Complainant 2's face down towards his penis saying words to the effect of 'just kiss him once and I'll leave you alone'.
2.6 On 17 September 2010, at approximately 7.00 am, while Complainant 2 was sitting in the lounge room of the Unit, Mr Singh made repeated requests that she go to her room with him, in circumstances where he had previously engaged in inappropriate physical contact of a sexual nature with Complainant 2 in her room.
2.7 On 17 September 2010, at approximately midday or shortly thereafter, while Complainant 2 was sleeping, Mr Singh woke her by feeling her breasts under her bra and tshirt.
3.1 Complainant 3 was admitted to the Unit on or about 20 January 2011 and was discharged on or about 25 January 2011.
3.2 On 22 January 2011, in the early afternoon, Mr Singh:
(a) approached Complainant 3 in a common area of the Unit and pinched her cheeks; and
(b) asked her if he could see Complainant 3's tattoo.
3.3 On 22 January 2011, in the early afternoon, Mr Singh:
(c) asked Complainant 3 whether she would like to see him 'on the outside';
(d) kissed Complainant 3 on the lips and on the neck;
(e) touched Complainant 3 in the region of her breasts;
MAROONDAH HOSPITAL MENTAL HEALTH INPATIENT UNIT 2
... he asked me to come and have another one of his talks. I refused and said 'no I am fine today and don't feel like talking'. He again wouldn't take no for an answer so I went with him and thought I would just get it over and done with. This time there was more physical behaviour which I would never have thought a nurse would do. He stood by the bed behind the bathroom which blocked all view of us from other patients and staff in the ward. He said come on you need a hug, as I didn't really understand what was going on I froze with fear. It was a prolonged hug that to me seemed never ending. His left arm was around my waist and his right arm was going around my back with his hand around my shoulders and neck. He leaned in and kissed my neck. I can still remember the smell of him and the breath on the back of my neck. It felt like he was trying to embrace me like a partner would. I took a step back but was still too scared to do anything. My memory of the rest that day is very foggy as I was heavily medicated. I do remember there was a day in between that Rimpy was not working and therefore I got some peace.[4]
He saw on the sheet [on her hospital file] my mobile number and joked that he was going to take it home so he could contact me. Was he really going to do that? My first thought was I'll just change my number
Rimpy had noticed that I had my tongue pierced. He asked me to stick out my tongue so he could touch it. I did, not knowing that he was going to grab it and want to play with it. He told me how much he liked it and he was going to tell his girlfriend to get one. He also said he was going to tell her he would pay for it.[7]
... Rimpy noticed that I had my tongue pierced. I was trying to continue my extremely important phone call while he was trying to grab my mouth and tongue. After I hung up the phone I said can I go home because I go to the baby unit tomorrow so there is no need to be concerned for me anymore. He laughed and was not interested. He was more interested in my piercing and kept requesting me to stick out my tongue so he touch it again. He even told me that he was going to tell his girlfriend to get one done because he loved it so much.[8]
Suddenly there was a noise, a bang, directly outside the treatment room. Rimpy stopped kissing me. He said, 'What's your phone number?' I said, [phone number] and watched as he pulled out his Iphone from his jeans pocket and put the number into it. I felt nothing. I was shocked. Rimpy then pulled the curtain back from the door and walked out of the treatment room.[21]
In cross-examination, Complainant 2 confirmed this evidence.[22]
The letter described this as an extremely serious failure to meet expected standards of practice and behaviour. Mr Singh was issued with a 'final warning' and stated that a process to re-establish expected standards of practice and behaviour would be implemented for Mr Singh. It appears Mr Singh was allowed to resume work in the unit after 4 October 2010.
[Her father returned about 20 minutes later, and arranged a meeting between himself, Complainant 3 and Ms Michael-Xavier.]
... the male nurse with the ponytail asked to see my tattoo and followed me to my room where he then hugged/held my hand/kissed my neck. He left & I jumped into bed, then he came back in and yet again hugged me then kissed me (on the lips). He also told me he lived in Oakleigh & would like to see [me] on the outside, he then poked my breasts & told me he would miss me if I left & that I was a naughty girl. This happened between 1.30 & 2.00 pm. 22.1,2011. [Complainant 3].
I cannot recall what I wrote in the first sentence of the note. I made this note very quickly and wrote what I could at the time. I was very distressed and upset at the time and felt under pressure to write down what happened quickly. I am able to remember a lot more of what happened, which I have now explained in this statement ...
HISTORY OF THE INVESTIGATION BY THE BOARD AND AHPRA
The truth is that, when the law requires proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality ... Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the Tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequences of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue had been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the Tribunal. In such matters, "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect inferences.
... the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus, authoritative statements have often been made to the effect that clear or cogent or strict proof is necessary where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found. Statements to that effect should not however be understood as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct. As Dixon J commented in Briginshaw v Briginshaw: "The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved...".
4.1 Complete a review of the attached material and contact us to arrange a time and date to discuss your expert opinion.
4.2.1 Nursing in psychiatric units in public hospitals.
4.2.2 The typical problems and issues faced when dealing with (as a nurse) involuntary psychiatric patients.
4.2.3 The nature of illnesses that may cause involuntary patients to make allegations of this nature.
The 'attached material' was described by Mr Bridges as 'the Board's brief'. It was not made entirely clear what this comprised, but it appeared Mr Bridges had seen many, or possibly all, of the documents in the Tribunal Book.[60]
Having reviewed the 'brief' inclusive of clinical case notes and interviews of the complainants and the subsequent interviews conducted by Eastern Health, and having interviewed Harpreet Singh in person, I am of the considered opinion that Harpreet's actions appeared at all times to be of an acceptable and ethical clinical standard and driven by a desire to perform his clinical nursing duties at the required standard. It is my opinion that Mr Singh at all times demonstrated an awareness and commitment to the clinical care considerations, support needs and clinical risk issues of all patients on the inpatient unit including the complainants listed in this matter.
Consideration of tendency and coincidence evidence in the courts
(1) Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person's character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind unless -
(a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party's intention to adduce the evidence; and
(b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value.
(1) Evidence that 2 or more events occurred is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally unless -
(a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party's intention to adduce the evidence; and
(b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value.
Tendency evidence about an accused, or coincidence evidence about an accused, that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the accused unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused.
The touchstone of admissibility under s 98(1) is similarity. And the degree of similarity must be such as to render the evidence of significant probative value, either by itself or having regard to other evidence to be adduced by the prosecution.
It is true that in the determination of criminal charges, for policy reasons, the common law steadfastly resisted, except in rare instances, the use of evidence of criminal acts other than the acts the subject of the charges. For example, in Hoch v The Queen ... the majority of the High Court held:
Assuming similar fact evidence to be relevant to some issue in the trial, the criterion of its admissibility is the strength of its probative force: ... that strength lies in the fact that the evidence reveals 'striking similarities', 'unusual features', 'underlying unity', 'system' or 'pattern' such that it raises, as a matter of common sense and experience, the objective improbability of some event having occurred other than as alleged by the prosecution.
As the High Court stated in Hoch, the probative value of evidence of this kind -
lies in the improbability of the witnesses giving accounts of happenings having the requisite degree of similarity unless the happenings occurred.
Their Honours cited the well-known passage from the speech of Lord Wilberforce in R v Boardman, as follows:
This probative force is derived, if at all, from the circumstance that the facts testified to by the several witnesses bear to each other such a striking similarity that they must, when judged by experience and common sense, either all be true, or have arisen from a cause common to the witnesses or from pure coincidence.
As the authorities make clear, there is no single criterion for determining whether the asserted similarities are sufficient to render the evidence of 'significant probative value'. The decision in Papamitrou made clear (as had the High Court in Pfennig v The Queen) that it is not necessary to demonstrate 'striking similarity'. In Papamitrou Winneke P went on to say that it was 'of little consequence' whether the asserted similarities were said to provide an 'underlying unity' or a common 'modus operandi' or a 'pattern of conduct'.
In relation to tendency evidence, it remains necessary to identify and assess the strength of the features of the acts relied upon as supporting tendency reasoning. Odgers, in his Uniform Evidence Law in Victoria sets out a list of features which include the following:
(i) the number of occasions upon which the particular conduct relied upon is said to have occurred;
(iii) the degree of similarity between the conduct on those occasions;
(iv) the degree of similarity of the circumstances in which that conduct took place;
As to the last matter, it has been suggested that tendency evidence may have greater probative value in proving conduct than in identifying an offender.
Consideration of tendency and coincidence evidence in disciplinary matters in the Tribunal
The Tribunal must act fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case in all proceedings.
(b) is not bound by the rules of evidence or any practices or procedures applicable to courts of record, except to the extent that it adopts those rules, practices or procedures;
(c) may inform itself on any matter as it sees fit;
(d) must conduct each proceeding with as little formality and technicality, and determine each proceeding with as much speed, as the requirements of this Act and the enabling enactment and a proper consideration of the matters before it permit.
(3) Subject to this Act, the regulations and the rules, the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure.
This is a case where identification of the person who allegedly did an act is not in dispute. The issue is whether the act complained of was done. Where this is the issue proof of the commission of an act on a particular person may become more certain if other witnesses testify that a similar act has been committed on them. Provided the complaints of the similar acts are made by witnesses who are truly independent of the complainant whose testimony is in issue, in the sense that collaboration between the complainant and the other witnesses and the possibility that the other witnesses' complaints are the product of suggestibility following the witnesses becoming aware of the complainant's complaint can be ruled out, it is unlikely that the various independent accounts are a coincidence. There may be some cases where other possible explanations consistent with innocence may need consideration, as in the present case where the effects of medication upon perception is an issue. If it can be excluded, the basic proposition stated above operates. The strength of the inference will depend on the facts of the particular case. The number of complaints is not of itself critical. One similar allegation containing the same peculiar feature or features may have considerable weight in supporting a complainant's evidence. On the other hand where acts alleged do not contain any particularly unusual features but are similar, the fact that there are a number of allegations from different persons may assist in drawing an inference that the act with which the court or tribunal is concerned occurred to the required standard of proof. There is no doubt a spectrum of circumstances which require consideration on a case by case basis between those two positions.
Ultimately the question is whether the inference that the act complained of was committed upon the complainant can be properly drawn having due regard to the standard of proof applicable to the kind of case before the court or tribunal. Where credibility of a complainant's evidence is in issue the fact that complaints of similar acts have been made by other persons can provide strong support of the complainant's evidence in the absence of any factors diminishing the strength of the inference logically available from the fact that they were made independently of and unaffected by the complainant's own account.
Evidence in this case which is cross-applicable
... The allegation that such acts were committed is, sadly, unremarkable. It is a commonplace in sexual offending of this kind, and cannot be said to distinguish the applicant's offending from that of any other such offender. The position might have been different if the evidence had disclosed surrounding circumstances which could be seen to be distinctive and which were common to the accounts given by the various complainants. But, as the table [produced by the defence] illustrates, there are no such circumstances. The same is true of those sexual acts which only complainants C and F allege. There is no distinctive feature which can be seen to recur. There is no 'pattern'.
All that is left, accordingly, is what is said to be a distinctive progression - from masturbation to oral sex and, in the cases of C and F, to anal sex. Once again, we were not persuaded that there was anything about this sequence which would distinguish the present allegations against the applicant from like allegations against other sex offenders.[84]
References to contacting patients outside the Unit
RELIABILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE THREE COMPLAINANTS
Dates and sequence of matters alleged in allegations 1.2 and 1.3
Complainant 1 was a patient allocated to Mr Singh on 23, 25 and 26 August. On 24 August, he was rostered on in HDU. As stated, HDU is adjacent to IPU2. It is under the same roof and shares the same nurses' station, but the doors between the two are locked, given that HDU is a locked ward, unlike IPU2.
Allegation 1.4 - exit interview incident - analysis
(a) stated that he had Complainant 1's mobile telephone number, and that he would take it home with him so that he could contact her;
(b) attempted to touch Complainant 1's tongue piecing, requesting, repeatedly, that she stick out her tongue so that he could touch the piercing;
(c) told her that he was going to tell his girlfriend to pierce her tongue because 'he loved it so much'; and
I am unaware of whether she had or has her tongue pierced. I did not have any conversation with her at any time about her tongue piercing. I did not touch her tongue.[113]
Mr Singh adhered to this position in cross examination.[114]
6.1 Mr Singh had taken her to the treatment room to perform routine vital sign measurement and, while they were there, he touched her breasts and kissed her;
6.2 Mr Singh and [Complainant 2] were in her bathroom and Mr Singh pulled his pants down and attempted to get Complainant 2 to put her face level with his groin;
6.3 Mr Singh went into [Complainant 2's] bedroom and put his hand down her top and felt her breasts while she was asleep.
General considerations relating to complaint 2
Alleged embellishment and inconsistent accounts by Mr Singh
16/9/10 20.30 AdditPM Nursing Notes 1/1 PT c/o of palpations once, writer checked Vital signs stable RP-132/81, P-92, Sats - 100%, R.18. Attention seeking behaviour evident, inappropriate of writer, showing her back 'tatoo' on right shoulder, redirection given, was on personal space to writer, firm limits setting given, good affect, nil further episode of inappropriate behaviour.[121]
Conclusion as to alleged embellishment and inconsistent accounts by Mr Singh
Rimpy said to me 'poke out your tongue'. I poked my tongue out, mucking around. That day and the day before, we had been talking about my tongue ring as I had asked him for something to clean it with. I tend to play with it a lot. Earlier that day while Rimpy was doing my ECG, he mentioned that he liked my tongue ring and that he was thinking about telling his girlfriend, or someone, to get one.[131] [our emphasis][132]
I vaguely recall that she asked me whether I liked her tongue ring. She told me that it was new. I think I said something like 'yes, it's cool'.[134]
Allegation 2.4 - the first bedroom allegations
Allegation 2.7 - waking Complainant 2 up in the bedroom
[Ms Michael-Xavier] entered the corridor and said she saw Rimpy coming out of [Complainant 3's] room. When questioned further, she stated that the door was half-way closed and that Rimpy was coming out. She said she couldn't see [Complainant 3]. Ramya was asked whether Rimpy could have been just standing outside the room. She restated that she clearly saw him coming out of the room.
At walkthrough Ramya demonstrated what she saw by stepping out of the patient's room with the door half-closed.
Consideration of allegations made by Complaint 3
professional misconduct, of a registered health practitioner, includes -
(a) unprofessional conduct by the practitioner that amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and
(b) more than one instance of unprofessional conduct that, when considered together, amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and
(c) conduct of the practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner's profession or not, that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.
unprofessional conduct, of a registered health practitioner, means professional conduct that is of a lesser standard than that which might reasonably be expected of the health practitioner by the public or the practitioner's professional peers, and includes -
The definition then lists eight types of conduct which may amount to unprofessional conduct, none of which are relevant here. The relevant part of the definition in this case is that described in the general words of the preamble to the definition, set out above.
[1] Medical Admission Form for Complainant 1 (Exhibit R-6).
[13] Progress Notes (Tribunal Book pages 63 - 97); Medical Admission, Discharge and Medication Forms (Exhibit R-7); and Clinical Risk Reviews (Exhibit R-5).
[14] Nursing Admission and Discharge Form (Exhibit R-7).
[23] The medication chart for 16 September 2010 (Exhibit R-7, pages 9 and 10) shows Mr Singh as having given Complainant 2 her medication, but does not indicate what time it was given. The three medications were recommended to be given at 20.00, 20.00 and 18.00 hours respectively. Also, Mr Singh said he was running late with his medication round that evening. He said in his police interview he gave Complainant 2 her medication at about 8.15 pm.
[24] Second witness statement of Paul Leyden, attachment PSL 3A.
[26] Tribunal Book page 229 (paragraph 17).
[31] Respondent's police interview transcript (Exhibit R-14) page 27.
[39] Tribunal Book pages 149-150, 192-3.
[40] Tribunal Book pages 156-158, 199-201.
[43] Tribunal Book pages 147-8 and 287-9.
[44] Tribunal Book pages 168-9 and 292-3.
[53] All questions of law arising in this case have been determined by the presiding member, who is a legal practitioner - s 107 of the VCAT Act.
[54] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361 per Sir Owen Dixon.
[56] Medical Board of Australia v Naim [2013] VCAT 329 at [53]. See also NON v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 [73]-[74] (per Redlich and Harper JJA and Kirton AJA), and Psychology Board of Australia v Megchelen [2013] VCAT 328 at [62].
[57] [2013] VSCA 305 at [33].
[58] [2013] VSCA 305 at [37].
[59] Only first names are used on the patient allocation sheets.
[61] Although we do find, below, that his note taking was inadequate, in relation to the things he said Complainant 2 did on 16 September 2010.
[62] The term 'cross-applicable' is used rather than 'cross-admissible', given that the Evidence Act, provisions which make evidence inadmissible do not apply to VCAT.
[63] See J Pizer, Victorian Administrative Law, 1-2068-9. See Francis-Wright v VCAT [2001] VSC 35; (2001) 17 VAR 306 at 317; Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria v Saddick [2010] VCAT 36 at [44]; Medical Board of Australia v Perry [2013] VCAT 2016. See also Jacra Nominees Pty Ltd v Surf Coast SC [2007] VCAT 1190 at [37]; Golem v Transport Accident Commission (No 1) (2002) 19 VAR 265, [2002] VCAT 319 at [9(iv)]: 'The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence or any practices or procedures applicable to courts of record - see Section 98(1)(b). However, the rules of evidence are not lightly to be discarded. It seems to me that this is particularly so in a situation such as the present case, where an adversarial approach is being adopted by experienced counsel'.
[64] See PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] VSCA 88 at [9]- [10].
[65] Robinson v Goodman [2013] FCA 893 at [10]. This was a sexual harassment case brought by a female employee against an individual employer, alleging particular acts by him. It was brought under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
[67] In PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions68 [2010] VSCA 88 at [8] the Court of Appeal endorsed the approach in Papamitrou, saying that pre-Evidence Act learning on this issue is instructive.
[69] RHB v The Queen [2011] VSCA 295 at [17] (per Nettle JA, with whom Harper JA agreed).
[70] [2010] VSCA 88 at [8].
[71] PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] VSCA 88 at [9].
[73] PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] VSCA 88 at [11] and [12].
[74] [2014] VSCA 121 at [166].
[75] R v Papamitrou [2004] VSCA 12; (2004) 7 VR 375 at [40].
[77] Albeit sometimes constituted by a judge, sitting as a Tribunal member.
[78] 2013 VSCA 374 at [67].
[80] Court of Appeal Queensland 15 August 1997, unreported.
[81] [2010] VSCA 26 at [40].
[83] The allegations at 2.5 of kissing on Complainant 2's bra, near her left breast, and on her cleavage, after moving her bra, are not included in this consideration, since we have determined there are sufficient doubts about allegation 2.5 for it not to be proved on the Brigginshaw standard.
[85] It is also noted that the correctness of PNJ [in rejecting such evidence] was doubted by the Court of Appeal in RHB v The Queen [2011] VSCA 295 at [17] (per Nettle JA, with whom Harper JA agreed).
[86] These being frequently used terms in tendency and coincidence cases, referred to with approval in Reeves v The Queen [2013] VSCA 311 at [53], [56] and Velkoski v The Queen [2014] VSCA 121 at [133].
[87] [2010] VSCA 135 per Nettle and Harper JJA and Hansen AJA at [29]-[37].
[88] Excluding the acts in allegations 1.2, 1.3 and 2.3(f), for the reasons stated below in relation to those particular allegations.
[89] The allegation by Complainant 2 that Mr Singh asked for her mobile telephone number and upon receiving it entered it into his telephone has not been included as an instance of similar evidence because for reasons described below, we have determined that we cannot be satisfied to the requisite standard that the incident which included this alleged conduct in fact occurred as charged.
[90] PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] VSCA 88 at [24]-[29].
[91] SPA v The Queen [2011] VSCA 306 11; Velkoski v The Queen [2014] VSCA 121 at [173].
[96] In saying this, the Tribunal is conscious that under the criminal law, there is no onus on an accused to demonstrate why the complainants would fabricate allegations against him: Palmer v The Queen [1998] HCA 2; (1998) 193 CLR 1.
[97] Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1 at [22]; R v Rhia (2000) VSCA 135 at [15]; Bishop v The Queen [3013] VSCA 273 at [36].
[100] Exhibit A-3 (Admission Form) page 1.
[106] Tribunal Book pages 30 and 33; Transcript pages 45, 54 , 57.
[110] See for example the Progress Note dated 26 August 2010 (Tribunal Book page 51) stating 'she has a good appetite and feels she has benefited from being in the ward'.
[129] Transcript page 117, Tribunal Book page 224.
[132] The only reference to the ECG incident which Complainant 2 made in her 23 September 2010 statement to the police was the last sentence in this quotation.
[139] This change was made in Complainant 2's witness statement of 23 July 2013. She said the kissing went for less than a minute rather than 'a few minutes'.
[141] Of course, it might be said that Mr Singh had plenty of time to delete the number from his contacts before the police interview. On the other hand, it might also be that sophisticated forensic testing might nevertheless uncover such a deleted entry. We received no evidence about these matters, however.
[143] Tribunal Book 313; Transcript pages 297-8.
[157] Omarjee v Medical Board of Victoria, per Hayne J, 7 December 1992, unreported, at page 21.
Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia
Singh
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(1992) 67 ALJR 170
(2004) 7 VR 375
(1998) 193 CLR 1
(1999) 198 CLR 1