[2021] AATA 1143
General information, not legal advice.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
2021-05-05
Original judgment source is linked above.
NTTH and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2021] AATA 1143 (5 May 2021)
And Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the delegate of the Respondent dated 5 February 2021. In its place, under section 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the Tribunal substitutes a decision that the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's Class BS Subclass 801 partner visa be revoked under section 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958.
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MIGRATION - applicant is a citizen of the Republic of Albania - applicant held Class BS Subclass 801 Partner visa - visa cancelled under s 501(3A) of Migration Act - applicant invited to make representations as to whether mandatory cancellation of visa should be revoked - representations made - delegate decided not to revoke mandatory cancellation of visa - delegate applied Ministerial Direction No. 79 - new Ministerial Direction now in place - no accrued rights - Ministerial Direction No. 90 applied - primary considerations - protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct - whether the conduct constituted family violence - the best interests of minor children in Australia - expectations of the Australian community - other considerations - international non-refoulement obligations - extent of impediments if removed - impact on victims - links to the Australian community including strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia and impact on Australian business interests - additional claim relating to diligence of legal representation during submissions on sentencing not relevant to Tribunal's task - weighing of considerations in Ministerial Direction cumulatively in this particular case - decision under review set aside and new decision substituted
DFTD v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 859
Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1166; (2016) 153 ALD 337
Harrison and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Re [2009] AATA 47; (2009) 106 ALD 666
Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 48
Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46; (1996) 184 CLR 501
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor [1982] FCA 99; (1982) 63 FLR 441
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT [1999] FCA 1197
R v Peirce [1996] VicRp 64; [1996] 2 VR 215
Albania Country Focus; European Asylum Support Office (November 2016)
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (as later amended)
Migration Act 1958 - Direction under section 499 - Direction No. 75 - Refusal of protection visas relying on section 36(1C) and section 36(2C)(b) (Direction made 6 September 2017, commenced 7 September 2017)
Migration Act 1958 - Direction under section 499 - Direction No. 90 - Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (Direction made 8 March 2021, commenced 15 April 2021)
Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants, Volume 1 - Final Report and Recommendations; Victorian Government Printer (November 2020)
The Kanun in present day Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro; International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (2004)
If a visa is mandatorily cancelled, what is the next step?
(a) the person has made representations as invited to; and
(b) the Minister is satisfied either that the person passes the character test, as defined in section 501 of the Act, or, under section 501CA(b)(ii) of the Act, that the Minister is satisfied that there is 'another reason' why the visa cancellation decision should be revoked.
What is the matter for the Tribunal to decide?
The preferable conclusion is that s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) requires the Minister to examine the factors for and against revoking the cancellation. If satisfied, following an assessment and an evaluation of those factors, that the cancellation should be revoked, the Minister is obliged to act on that view. There is a single, not a two stage, process and the Minister does not have a residual discretion to refuse to revoke the cancellation if satisfied that it should be revoked. In this instance the Minister acted in accordance with that construction of the section. He did not apply the wrong test.
4. The current version of the Direction is entitled "Direction No. 65". That is the version the Tribunal applied in making its decision. The applicant's contention is that the Tribunal should have applied the former version of the Direction, which is entitled "Direction No. 55". In reliance on Esber v Commonwealth [1992] HCA 20; 174 CLR 430, he contends he had a right to a decision by the Tribunal on review that applied Direction No. 55 as the Direction which was in force at the time he made his application to the Tribunal in February 2013.
5. The focus of argument before this Court was on the characterisation of the Directions as either legislative or administrative in nature. In our opinion, the real issue is the application of s 7(2)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and whether the applicant had acquired or accrued a right under Direction No. 55, upon which the terms of s 7(2)(c) could operate.
6. For the reasons set out below, we do not consider the applicant accrued or acquired any right under Direction No. 55, and therefore we would dismiss the application.
(a) is not constrained to consider only the material before the original decision-maker and may consider fresh material; and
(b) should apply the law and policy in place at the time it makes its decision. The Tribunal therefore considered, and will refer to, Direction No. 90 in these reasons.
(1) Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to enter and/or remain in Australia. Being able to come to or remain in Australia is a privilege Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding, will respect important institutions, such as Australia's law enforcement framework, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.
(2) Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or to forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia.
(3) The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they engage in conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, that raises serious character concerns. This expectation of the Australian community applies regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.
(4) Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by visa applicants or those holding a limited stay visa, or by other non-citizens who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time. However, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.
(5) Decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case. In some circumstances, the nature of the non-citizen's conduct, or the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation. In particular, the inherent nature of certain conduct such as family violence and the other types of conduct or suspected conduct mentioned in paragraph 8.4(2) (Expectations of the Australian Community) is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient in some circumstances, even if the non-citizen does not pose a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.
(1) protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;
(2) whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence;
(3) the best interests of minor children in Australia; and
(d) Links to the Australian community, including (i) strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia and (ii) impact on Australian business interests.
Primary Consideration: Protection of the Australian community (paragraph 8.1)
The nature and seriousness of the conduct (paragraph 8.1.1)
An accused is entitled to plead guilty to an offence with which he is charged and, if he does so, the plea will constitute an admission of all the essential elements of the offence. Of course, if the trial judge forms the view that the evidence does not support the charge or that for any other reason the charge is not supportable, he should advise the accused to withdraw his plea and plead not guilty. But he cannot compel an accused to do so and if the accused refuses, the plea must be considered final, subject only to the discretion of the judge to grant leave to change the plea to one of not guilty at any time before the matter is disposed of by sentence or otherwise.
The manner in which the Tribunal satisfies itself is determined by s 33 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). Under that provision, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate. But where the decision to be reached depends upon there having been a sentence that satisfies s 201(c) of the Act, it is not open to the Tribunal to engage in any enquiry which would impugn the sentence. Accordingly, at least the essential facts found by a sentencing judge in the course of his or her deliberations concerning sentence and upon which the sentence is based must be accepted by the Tribunal. The most obvious example of such a fact is a finding as to the circumstances of the commission of the offence. The starting point for consideration by the Tribunal in relation to sentence, when concerned with the question of an order under section 200 of the Act, must be the findings made by the judge in imposing the sentence that satisfies the statutory description of a sentence of imprisonment for a period of not less than one year.
There are good policy reasons why such a principle should prevail. It could only undermine the criminal process for an administrative decision to be based on considerations inconsistent with the conviction or sentence imposed.
Counsel for the respondent submitted that, so long as the decision-maker accepts the fact of the sentence, it is open to the person sentenced to challenge any finding of fact made by the sentencing judge in the course of imposing that sentence. We reject the submission and, as explained later, we do not understand Davies J to have gone so far in Beckner.
Wood J found that it was the respondent who inflicted a stab wound to the heart that was a direct cause of the death of the Deceased. His Honour considered that the jury, having rejected the respondent's statement from the dock must, by their verdict, be taken to have accepted the evidence of two police officers. His Honour considered that the jury verdict in that regard was entirely understandable. He went on to say:
"To kill a man in his own flat, in the brutal and cowardly way which occurred in this case, is a matter which can only attract the abhorrence of the community. It is the kind of offence for which there must be not only personal punishment and retribution, but also a substantial element of general deterrence."
It was on the basis of these findings made by his Honour that the sentence was imposed. It is a matter of speculation as to what sentence Wood J would have imposed had he found different facts. It may be that his Honour would still have sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for a period of not less than one year. Be that as it may, the basis upon which he imposed the sentence that satisfied the requirements of s 201(c) of the Act is impugned by the reasoning of the Tribunal.
To impugn the sentencing process in that way is bad as a matter of public policy. It is improbable that the legislature intended that an administrative tribunal with wide investigatorial powers, not bound by the rules of evidence and free to inform itself from any source, should review the essential factual bases of a conviction and of the resulting sentence. The policy must be that a conviction, and a sentence imposed as a result of a conviction, are matters for the criminal law and its procedures. If a sentence, like a conviction, is otherwise than in accordance with law, a right of appeal is available to remedy any miscarriage of justice. If new or fresh evidence comes to hand, again criminal procedures can be availed of.
The taking of such a course by the Tribunal has, in my respectful opinion, the effect both of going behind the conviction and setting it at nought. In my opinion it was not open to the respondent to lead evidence for the purpose of showing that he was a principal in the second degree rather than in the first. Certainly it was not open to the Tribunal to treat him as convicted on the basis of that conduct rather than upon the basis of conduct which made him a principal in the first degree. To proceed as it did involved it in an error of law.
I do not believe that such a conclusion is greatly restrictive of the Tribunal's difficult and important function in deportation cases. If the view I have proposed prevails, the Tribunal remains entitled, indeed bound, to examine for itself what was involved in the entirety of the conduct of the applicant before it. This examination will include the receiving of evidence to put the Tribunal in a position to weigh and to make its own assessment of the seriousness of the conduct which has led to the conviction. Nevertheless, I concede that the view I favour may in some cases have an inhibiting effect on the Tribunal. It may also create a degree of difficulty for it because it will need to determine whether particular evidence sheds light on the way conduct on the part of an applicant for review should properly be viewed or whether its real effect, if accepted, would be to go behind the conviction. It will be necessary for the Tribunal to be aware at all times of the purpose for which it receives (or has received) the evidence and for which it uses the evidence. If the evidence in question is in truth evidence which involves the applicant in seeking to go behind the conviction or to have the conviction set at nought, it ought to be put aside; otherwise it will need to be weighed along with all other evidence for the purpose of deciding whether to remit the matter to the Minister for reconsideration in accordance with the Tribunal's recommendation.
The risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct (paragraph 8.1.2)
Primary consideration: Family violence committed by the non-citizen (paragraph 8.2)
Primary consideration: Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision (paragraph 8.3)
Primary consideration: Expectations of the Australian Community (paragraph 8.4)
The Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia. Where a non-citizen has engaged in serious conduct in breach of this expectation, or where there is an unacceptable risk that they may do so, the Australian community, as a norm, expects the Government to not allow such a non-citizen to enter or remain in Australia.
In addition, visa cancellation or refusal, or non-revocation of the mandatory cancellation of a visa, may be appropriate simply because of the nature of the character concerns or offences is such that the Australian community would expect that the person should not be granted or continue to hold a visa. In particular, the Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they raise serious character concerns through conduct, in Australia, of the following kind:
...
The content of the expectation
It is necessary to give content to the deemed expectation of the Australian community in a way that is capable of being afforded weight as a primary consideration in a particular case. In the particular case, the Australian community will either expect the visa to be refused, or it will not. In light of what is said above, the present enquiry does not concern what the Australian community expects in fact (assuming such expectations could be objectively ascertained), but rather concerns what the government has deemed the community's expectations to be. The content of the deemed expectation is to be discerned by construing cl. 11.3 itself.
The clause expresses two expectations, the first concerning norms of conduct to be expected of non-citizens, as expressed in the opening sentence:
The Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia.
This statement is a reflection of the rule of law as it applies to citizens and non-citizens alike. It is an expectation that will not have been met in respect of a visa applicant who cannot pass the character test in s 501(6) of the Act and so must, of its nature, weigh against the refusal of a visa in all cases to which the Direction applies.
The second expectation is more difficult to interpret. It is expressed in the second and third sentences of the clause as follows:
Where a non-citizen has breached, or where there is an unacceptable risk that they will breach this trust or where the non-citizen has been convicted of offences in Australia or elsewhere, it may be appropriate to refuse the visa application of such a person. Visa refusal may be appropriate simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences are such that the Australian community would expect that the person should not be granted a visa.
This part of the clause is concerned with the consequences that should befall a non-citizen who has fallen foul of the first expectation. It should be understood as expressing an expectation about the outcome of the exercise of the power conferred by s 501(1) of the Act in respect of the particular person whose circumstances are under consideration.
Before proceeding further it must be emphasised that cl 11.3 does not purport to preclude the decision-maker from reaching his or her own view as to whether the non-citizen should or should not be granted a visa, as the decision-maker must necessarily do. The question that arises on this appeal is not whether the decision-maker is precluded from doing so, but whether the decision-maker's own assessment of the appropriate outcome is relevant to the task of identifying the content of the expectations of the Australian community under cl. 11.3 of the Direction. The clause implicitly recognises that the decision-maker's assessment as to whether or not a visa should be granted may differ from the expectations of the Australian community, as the government has deemed those expectations to be.
I have accepted the Minister's submission that cl. 11.3 is intended to give effect to the principle that the Minister may make a statement of the government's views about the expectations of the Australian community, which statement may be acted on by the person conferred with the power in a particular case, as recognised in Uelese. In my view, the task of the decision-maker is to identify what is the 'government's view' about community expectations in the particular case, to 'have due regard' to that view and to 'generally' afford that view more weight than other non-primary considerations in accordance with cl. 8(4). The phrase 'may be appropriate' does not permit the decision-maker to equate the expectations of the Australian community (as expressed in cl. 11.3) with the decision-maker's own view as to the preferable outcome in the ultimate exercise of the discretion. To construe cl. 11.3 in that way would be to ignore the fact that the clause is intended to express a consideration that is capable of being given more weight relative to 'other considerations' in the exercise of the discretion, as cl 8(4) of the Direction generally requires. The primary judge was correct to say that importing into cl. 11.3 all countervailing factors bearing on the ultimate decision would render cl. 8(4) of the Direction unworkable...
To summarise, as expressed in Direction 65_, the Australian community has only three relevant expectations:_
(1) non-citizens will obey Australian laws when in Australia;
(2) it may be appropriate to refuse a visa application where a non-citizen has breached, or where there is an unacceptable risk that they will breach, the expectation that they will obey the law or where they have been convicted of offences in Australia or elsewhere;
(3) in a particular case, the refusal of the visa may be appropriate simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences is such that they should not be granted a visa.
Understood in this way, community expectations are simply, and informally, expressed as follows: "If you break the law that will be held against you, the more serious the breach the more it will be held against you, and it may even be decisive..."
International non-refoulement obligations (paragraph 9.1)
The blood-feud phenomenon in Albania dates back centuries to the customary law Kanun of Lek Dukagjuin, a code regulating communal life as well as private matters. During the reign of Enver Hoxha, the blood feud was outlawed and harshly punished. However, the collapse of the regime in early 1990s, combined with the absence of a functioning state, especially in the remote northern areas, left space for the revival of revenge killings.
According to the Code, if a man is deeply affronted, his family has the right to kill the person who has insulted him. However, by doing this, the family will become a target for revenge on the part of the victim's family. The victim's closest male relative is obliged to kill the murderer of his family member. The pattern of reprisal killings thus formed has been passed on for generations of families.
Extent of impediments if removed (paragraph 9.2)
Links to the Australian community (paragraph 9.4)
The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia (paragraph 9.4.1)
Impact on Australian business interests (paragraph 9.4.2)
Previous legal representation by Ms Nicola Gobbo
We acknowledge that it is not generally the Tribunal's role to review the conduct of criminal proceedings in a revocation request. However, the current situation is unique and state and federal prosecutors have been reviewing similar cases following the Royal Commission's report. [NTTH's] 2008 conviction forms a large part of [NTTH's] criminal history and occurred during this period of time. We submit that, [NTTH's] matter may not have been represented by competent counsel and a different sentence may have been imposed had he received effective representation.
I take into account the hardship you have suffered and the deprived background as set out by Ms Gobbo in her eloquent plea.
I certify that the preceding 246 (two hundred and forty six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member D. J. Morris
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(1982) 63 FLR 441
(1996) 184 CLR 501