1. The Tribunal hearing was held over multiple days on 11 August, 12 August, 13 August and 9 September 2025. The Respondent appeared in person and gave evidence on affirmation and the Tribunal also heard evidence from AP, who also appeared in person and gave evidence on affirmation. A representative for the Applicant appeared at the hearing in person.
2. In addition to the oral evidence and submissions made at the hearing, the Tribunal had the following documents before it, copies of which were also provided to all of the parties to the review:

(i) Bundle of "T" documents T1 to T194;

(ii) Bundle of supplementary T documents ST1 to ST69;

(iii) Provided by the Applicants: historical and current home and postal addresses for the Respondent and AP, summary of bank statements and AP's emailed response to this, tables of unexplained deposits for the Respondent and AP, with a response for the Respondent's information, and a call record dated 22 October 2015;

(iv) The Applicants' Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions.

1. The Applicants submit that the AAT at first review erred in finding that the Respondent and AP were not members of a couple, for social security purposes, in the period from 30 November 2015 to 3 June 2020. The Applicants do not dispute the AAT's finding that the Respondent and AP were partnered from 4 June 2020. The Applicants submit that, as a result of being a member of a couple with AP throughout the period under review, there are debts due to the Commonwealth, as had been affirmed by the authorised review officer, and that these debts are recoverable by the Commonwealth.
2. Given the scope of the authorised review officer and AAT first review decisions before it, and the submissions made by the Applicants as to their reasons for seeking a review of the first review decision, the Tribunal considered that the legal issues in this matter are:

(i) Whether the Respondent was partnered with AP from 30 November 2015; > > (ii) Whether the Respondent's parenting payment should have been cancelled on 14 December 2021; > > (iii) Whether the Respondent owes debts to the Commonwealth for overpayment of parenting payment; > > (iv) Whether the Respondent owes debts to the Commonwealth for overpayment of family tax benefit for periods covering 12 April 2017 to 30 June 2021; > > (v) Whether the Respondent owes a child care benefit debt for the period 3 July 2017 to 1 July 2018; > > (vi) Whether the Respondent owes a covid supplement debt for the period 27 April 2020 to 13 April 2021; > > (vii) Whether the Respondent owes an economic support payment debt for a payment made on 2 April 2020; and > > (viii) If there are debts, whether there is any reason the debts should not be recovered by the Commonwealth.

Whether the Respondent was partnered with AP between November 2015 and March 2022

1. A person's rate of social security and family assistance payments is affected by a range of factors, including whether they are partnered (a "member of a couple") or are single.
2. Section 3 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) (the Family Assistance Act) provides that a "member of a couple" has the same meaning as in the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (the Social Security Act).
3. Subsection 4(2) of the Social Security Act provides that:

(2) Subject to subsection (3), a person is a member of a couple for the purposes of this Act if:

(a) the person is legally married to another person and is not, in the Secretary's opinion (formed as mentioned in subsection (3)), living separately and apart from the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis; or

(i) a relationship between the person and another person (whether of the same sex or a different sex) is registered under a law of a State or Territory prescribed for the purposes of section 2E of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 as a kind of relationship prescribed for the purposes of that section;

(ii) the person is not, in the Secretary's opinion (formed as mentioned in subsection (3)), living separately and apart from the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis; or

(i) the person has a relationship with another person, whether of the same sex or a different sex (in this paragraph called the partner);

(ii) the person is not legally married to the partner;

(iii) the relationship between the person and the partner is, in the Secretary's opinion (formed as mentioned in subsections (3) and (3A)), a de facto relationship;

(iv) both the person and the partner are over the age of consent applicable in the State or Territory in which they live;

(v) the person and the partner are not within a prohibited relationship.

1. Subsection 4(3) of the Social Security Act then states that:

(3) In forming an opinion about the relationship between 2 people for the purposes of paragraph (2)(a), subparagraph (2)(aa)(ii) or subparagraph (2)(b)(iii), the Secretary is to have regard to all the circumstances of the relationship including, in particular, the following matters:

(a) the financial aspects of the relationship, including:

(i) any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets and any joint liabilities; and

(ii) any significant pooling of financial resources especially in relation to major financial commitments; and

(iii) any legal obligations owed by one person in respect of the other person; and

(iv) the basis of any sharing of day-to-day household expenses;

(i) any joint responsibility for providing care or support of children; and

(iii) the basis on which responsibility for housework is distributed;

(c) the social aspects of the relationship, including:

(i) whether the people hold themselves out as married to, or in a de facto relationship with, each other; and

(ii) the assessment of friends and regular associates of the people about the nature of their relationship; and

(iii) the basis on which the people make plans for, or engage in, joint social activities;

(e) the nature of the people's commitment to each other, including:

(ii) the nature of any companionship and emotional support that the people provide to each other; and

(iii) whether the people consider that the relationship is likely to continue indefinitely; and

(iv) whether the people see their relationship as a marriage-like relationship or a de facto relationship.

1. Subsection 4(3A) of the Social Security Act states that the Secretary must not form the opinion that the relationship between a person and his or her partner is a de facto relationship if the person is living separately and apart from the partner on a permanent or indefinite basis.
2. In Staunton-Smith v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1991] FCA 513; (1991) 32 FCR 164, the Federal Court stated (at 20) that:[1]

It is not suggested that this list is exhaustive nor will each of these subjects fall to be considered in every case. It must also be emphasised that a particular answer to a single subject will rarely, if ever, supply a final solution. The responsibility of the fact-finding tribunal is to have regard to all the material facts of each case, treating the matters listed above only as indicators. The Tribunal will make its determination whether a particular man and woman are or are not living separately and apart only after assessing the totality of the evidence and other material that is before it.

1. In Pelka v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2006] FCA 735; (2006) 151 FCR 546, the Federal Court noted that (at 46):

Having regard to the current provisions of s 4(3) and the approaches discussed in the earlier authorities mentioned, a decision-maker concerned with whether an unmarried person is in a marriage-like relationship with another person of the opposite sex:

1. Must have regard to their interpersonal relationship as a whole not limited by the factors listed in s 4(3).

(e) the nature of the people's commitment to each other.

3. In having regard to the preceding five matters, must have regard to all factors relevant to each and, in particular, must have regard to the factors listed under each heading in s 4(3).

4. Must specifically consider the total picture of the relationship created by all of these factors bearing in mind that consideration must be given to those which weigh against a marriage-like relationship and those which weigh in favour of it.

5. Must undertake the preceding consideration bearing in mind that a marriage-like relationship is not disclosed solely by any one of the following matters:

1. Subsection 4(6) then states that a person is not a member of a couple if a determination under section 24 is in force in relation to the person. Subsection 24(2) of the Social Security Act provides that:

(a) a person has a relationship with another person, whether of the same sex or a different sex (the partner); and

(b) the person is not legally married to the partner; and

(c) the relationship between the person and the partner is a de facto relationship; and

(d) the Secretary is satisfied that the person should, for a special reason in the particular case, not be treated as a member of a couple;

the Secretary may determine, in writing, that the person is not to be treated as a member of a couple for the purposes of this Act.

1. In Re Boscolo v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 106, the Federal Court noted (at [18]-[20]) that:

.....The core of the requirement for "special circumstances" or "special reasons" is that there be something unusual or different to take the matter the subject of the discretion out of the ordinary course - Minister for Community Services and Health v Chee Keong Thoo [1988] FCA 54; (1988) 78 ALR 307 at 324 (Burchett J). But that does not require that the case be extremely unusual, uncommon or exceptional - Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hodgson [1992] FCA 338; (1992) 108 ALR 322. In Beadle (supra) the Full Court, having concluded that the term "special" was sufficiently well understood not to require a judicial gloss said the matter was one for the decision-maker, in that case the Director-General of Social Security.

The decision-making process under s 24 is notionally in two stages. First, is the assessment whether there is a special reason in the particular case for which the Secretary is satisfied that the person the subject of his discretion should not be treated as a member of a couple. There follows the determination that the person is not to be treated as a member of a couple. The latter determination involves the exercise of discretion although as a practical matter assessment and determination will tend to be rolled up as one decision.

It is of importance in the present case to note that s 24 requires the decision-maker to focus on the position of one person, not the couple, and to assess whether that person should for a special reason not be treated as a member of the couple. It is possible that in the case of two married persons in receipt of different benefits, each paid at a married rate, one person might not be treated as a member of the couple while the other might continue to be so treated.

1. In Re Kazmierczak and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1084, the Federal Court stated (at [37]-[42]):

I agree generally with what French J said in Boscolo v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 106; (1999) 90 FCR 531 (Boscolo) at [18], that the core of the requirement for "special reasons" under s 24(1) is that there be something unusual and different to take the matter the subject of the discretion out of the ordinary course. But that does not require that the case be extremely unusual, uncommon or exceptional. I also agree with the observation of French J, at [18], that the word "special" is in essence "instrumental", a direction to the decision-maker that the discretion it constrains is not lightly to be enlivened.

The decision of French J in Boscolo was referred to in the decision of the AAT in Lada. It was also referred to in the recent decision of the AAT in Re Holt and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2010] AATA 143 (Holt), where the senior member, Professor RM Creyke, was at pains to emphasise that caution must be exercised in the interpretation and application of the "special reasons" discretion. At [30], the senior member emphasised that particular caution should be taken about importing a requirement mentioned in the Guide to Social Security Law that a "special reason must be outside the couple's or individual's control and cannot be changed". Senior Member Creyke, at [32], also emphasised that the expression must be interpreted in context consistent with the scope and purpose of the Act and in that regard referred to the statement made in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Social Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No 4) 1991 which states (at 17):

there is justification in paying a higher rate to an unpartnered person than to a member of a couple if both members of the couple are living together. This justification is based on the premise that the unpartnered person does not enjoy the same economies of shared living costs as does the member of a couple in those circumstances. If the economies of scale are not available to the member of the couple because he or she is living apart from his or her partner because, for example, of the illness of one or both members of the couple, then each would face similar living costs as an unpartnered person.

I generally agree with these further observations of the Senior Member.

In Holt, Senior Member Creyke went on to consider the relevant provisions of the Guide and the case law that has dealt with the capacity of persons such as the applicant and his wife to pool resources for their mutual benefit. At [48], the Senior Member identified the issue as being whether, for practical reasons, they could not reasonably be expected to enjoy the pooling of resources that usually occurs in a marital relationship. A number of decisions of the AAT, including Holt and Lada show that circumstances will arise from time-to-time as a result of which the s 24 "special reasons" discretion should be exercised in favour of the pension holder, on the basis that for practical reasons the income enjoyed by the pension holder's partner is not available for pooling.

The case law canvassed by Senior Member Creyke in Holt's case confirms, in my view correctly, that there is a particular focus under the Act on the practical ability of the resources of the partner being available for pooling with the resources of the person holding the pension. This fundamentally derives from s 1064-A2 of the Act which provides that where two people are members of a couple, they will be treated as pooling their resources (income and assets) and sharing them on a 50/50 basis.

It stands to reason that if for some legal or other practical reason the partner member of the couple cannot be treated as sharing income and assets then there is a ground for exercising the discretion under s 24 so as not to treat the holder of the pension as a member of a couple who are capable of sharing resources. In that regard, in effect, the s 1064-A2 expectation that there will be pooling is negatived.

1. The Social Security Guide at Point 2.2.5.40 sets out the Department's policy guideline for exercise of the discretion under section 24 of the Social Security Act. In respect of a couple's inability to pool resources - discussed in the case law above - the Guide notes that:

In general, an income support payment is paid at a partnered rate where a person is a member of a couple in recognition that a couple living together typically pool resources and therefore have lower living costs in comparison to 2 single people living separately. Where a couple is unable to pool resources, it may result in extra expenditure causing financial difficulty, which would make it unfair to treat the person as partnered.

If there are practical or legal reasons a couple cannot share income and assets, then there MAY be grounds for exercising the discretion under section 24 provisions.

Generally, section 24 would NOT be appropriate where:

• a couple is able to pool resources but chooses not to do so, or
• if one or both members of a couple has access to other sources of support and either has not explored or realised the support or choose not to access it.

Note: Section 24 does NOT generally apply if the couple is living together overseas. In assessing couples living together overseas, the decision maker must be satisfied that the information provided is a special situation to warrant the application of section 24. It is important to consider whether the couple is able to benefit from pooling of resources.

For the purposes of section 24, financial difficulty is often considered including:

• if there is an inability to provide accommodation and the basic necessities of life
• if the couple is without adequate means of support, and
• if there is income or readily available funds from other sources.

Consideration should be given to the couple's overall financial situation, compared to their necessary expenditure. All sources of readily available funds and/or income are to be taken into account, as well as any in-kind support received.

1. In addition to an inability to pool resources, the Guide further notes that relationships where there is family violence may also give rise to exercise of the discretion in section 24 of the Social Security Act:

The presence of family and/or domestic violence in a relationship may indicate that a person is not a member of a couple under the 5 factors (2.2.5.30).

However, there may be situations where section 24 should be applied due to a person's particular circumstances. In general, the application of section 24 should only be considered in circumstances where:

• the person who is experiencing family and/or domestic identifies as partnered, or
• a member of a couple assessment has resulted in finding the 2 people are a couple, but due to the existence of family and/or domestic violence both members of the couple should be treated as single.

When a person experiencing family and/or domestic violence is not subject to the partnered income and asset test and is paid a higher rate, it could enable them to leave a situation they would not have been able to otherwise.

1. The Tribunal is not bound by the commentary in the Guide but will generally follow the Department's policy unless there are cogent reasons for not doing so (Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 639-645).

Background: Events between October 2014 and August 2015

1. The Tribunal accepted that the Respondent and AP met while AP was in prison, on or around 6 October 2014, where the Respondent visited to see her brother who was also incarcerated at the time. Records provided by the prison stated that the Respondent and AP had had 860 phone calls from the time they met to the end of December 2014 and that the Respondent had visited AP on 23 occasions in prison. The Respondent did not dispute the accuracy of the information provided by the prison, describing to the Tribunal that she and AP had probably been wanting to get to know one another, that the maximum phone call time allowed had been 10 or 12 minutes and that the visits had occurred on both weekdays and weekends, and that she had also been going to see her brother.
2. The Respondent updated her Facebook profile in October 2014 to being in a new relationship as of that month. When this profile was put to the Respondent at the hearing, she stated that "if it's there, it's there". AP had also updated his Facebook profile on the same date, to reflect he was in a relationship. When this was put to the Respondent at hearing, she stated in response that they had not had internet and access to social media in prison.
3. The information provided by the prison further reflected that the Respondent and AP had made a further 1,210 phone calls with each other between 1 January 2015 and 7 July 2015, and that the Respondent had visited the prison on a further 69 occasions between January 2015 and August 2015. The Respondent did not dispute this information, stating that August 2015 had been just before AP was released and that she had visited every weekend, including taking her children with her perhaps once and taking AP's children in also.
4. The Tribunal also accepted that the Respondent made seven transfers to AP's bank account while he was in custody, in amounts totalling $195. The Respondent told the Tribunal that these amounts would have been for AP to make phone calls to her.
5. Prior to his release, a parole suitability assessment was undertaken for AP on 18 July 2015. During the assessment, AP advised the assessor that he was "now in a de facto relationship" with the Respondent, that they had met in 2014 while he was incarcerated and that they had been in a relationship for nine months. AP advised the assessor that they had a good supportive relationship and the Respondent would be residing with him upon release. The Respondent is reported to have advised the assessor that: "confirmed with this service that she has been in a relationship with [AP] since October 2014, and is now residing with his parents at his proposed residence. She reported that she has not lived with [AP] and they have not had a relationship in the community". The proposed household arrangements for AP's release on parole were described as including his parents, the Respondent, the Respondent's two children and AP's daughter.
6. While the Respondent agreed the above record was correct and that she had given the information as described, she stated that she had not been living at the property in question after AP's release.
7. Prior to AP's release from prison, the Respondent wrote a letter to the Adult Parole Board to support his application for parole. A copy of the letter was before the Tribunal and read, in relevant part:

I am writing to you regarding the upcoming parole hearing of my partner [AP]. [AP] and I have been in a relationship for just over 9 months. We met while he was incarcerated through my brother. We are religiously married. We plan to get engaged once he is released on parole. I am currently living at his parents' house with my two children whom have taken to him very well. Since meeting [AP] I have visited every weekend. I take in his children every Sunday and my kids every opportunity I get. [AP] has four children to past relationships. I, his ex-wife and children all have a great relationship. His ex wife [name redacted] has just moved back to [city] so the kids will be close to their father upon his release.

I am imploring you to favorably consider his release as I can assure you he has addressed his past behaviour and I am certain that he will do his best upon his release. If he is granted parole I am prepared to give him all the support he needs including guidance, encouragement, love, accountability and financial support. I am 100% committed to doing what I can to ensure my partner stays on a straight and narrow road so we can start our future together out of prison.

1. When the letter was put to her at the hearing, the Respondent stated that she remembered writing the letter and her reference to being AP's partner was because he needed a letter of support. As to whether the contents of the letter were true, the Respondent stated yes, that's what she wrote, although she doesn't remember writing all of it. She then stated no, not everything was true; she and AP's ex-wife did not get along; and she had stayed at his house before to help with his children and the plan they had was that she would move in with him when he was released. As to her indication in the letter that she and AP had been religiously married, the Respondent stated that she thinks it was a few words that were said, which classed it as a temporary marriage for "sexual stuff" and it was not a formal thing. As to the indication that they intended to be engaged, the Respondent stated that that's what AP had told her his intention was. As to the intentions expressed in the final paragraph, the Respondent stated that that was the plan.
2. The Tribunal accepted that AP was released from prison on 26 August 2015.

1. The Tribunal accepted the Respondent's evidence that, one week after AP was released from prison, they applied for a joint bank account and the purpose of this had been because the people monitoring AP's parole wanted to see their relationship was continuing. She did not think the account had been used, but just that it had been opened.
2. The Applicants had provided the Tribunal, and the Respondent and AP, summaries of transactions it submits occurred between various bank accounts held by the Respondent and AP. When asked whether she recalled finance exchanges with AP, the Respondent stated she didn't recall.
3. The Respondent was asked about four transactions into her account between 29 September 2015 and 29 December 2015 totalling $750. These referenced AP's name and, variously, the Respondent's child, "love u", "me no love u" and "mummy me love". The Respondent stated she had no recollection of the payments but accepted they had been made. She stated she had "no idea" of the reasons for the particular references in the transactions.
4. The Respondent was asked about two transactions from AP's account to her account on 12 October 2015 and 13 October 2015, totalling $605 and references to "eBay". The Respondent stated that it would have been when AP was selling stuff through eBay, that she had let him use her account and it was not a big deal, as she had let her sister do this too.
5. The Respondent was asked whether AP had deposited $22,742 to the Respondent during 2016 and she disagreed with this assertion made by the Applicants.
6. The Respondent was taken to a summary of payments made by AP to the Respondent. These included payments to one of the Respondent's bank accounts between 16 June 2016 and 23 November 2016 (21 transactions) totalling $17,922, with references to SF's name and one of his aliases and to "love u", "me love you" and "luvu". When asked about the transactions, the Respondent stated she guesses she received these. Another table prepared by the Applicant outlined deposits to another of the Respondent's bank accounts from AP between 18 January 2016 and 27 July 2016 totalling $4,820, also referencing "me no love you", "love you" and similar comments. When asked about the transactions, the Respondent did not dispute the payments had been made to her.
7. The Respondent was also asked about two transfers from her account to AP's account, totalling $3,000, made on 6 January 2016 and 28 January 2016, referencing "rent" and "two of you". The Respondent stated that she has no idea about the rent deposit and the "two of you" comment didn't make sense either.
8. The Respondent was taken to a summary of transfers from her account to AP's account between 11 February 2016 and 6 April 2016 (six transactions) totalling $18,748.31. Each transfer referenced "pay". When asked about the transactions, the Respondent stated she has "zero idea". When the Applicants suggested that SF may have been taking her earnings, the Respondent stated yes, potentially, if the dates match up with the day care work she did, but she had no recollection of transferring her pay to AP.
9. The Respondent was taken to a summary of payments made from her bank accounts to AP between 18 February 2016 and 22 December 2016 (eight transactions) totalling $3,278. The transactions referenced "me no love u", the Respondent and her children's names and "rent". When asked about the transactions, the Respondent stated she assumes they weren't on good terms and he was still taking her money from daycare. She was unable to explain the reference to rent. When asked whether she had been aware that AP had been receiving large sums to his own bank accounts during 2016, she stated no.
10. In response to the Applicants' observation that during 2016, the Respondent and AP had been living generally together, were pooling resources and AP was helping the Respondent out with her two children, the Respondent stated she disagreed with their perception of the living arrangements; she agreed AP had been helping out with her children; and she doesn't remember any financial gain to the relationship. She stated she agreed she may have been on and off in a de facto relationship, but this was not consistent.
11. The Respondent had completed an income tax return for the 2015/16 financial year in which she declared business income of $31,953, TAC payments of $13,958 and parenting payment (single) of $15,220. When taken to this document during the hearing, the Respondent stated that she has never gone somewhere and done a tax return, and she assumes that AP completed this on her behalf. She has never lodged a tax return for herself.
12. The Respondent was taken to a summary of payments made from her account to AP's accounts between 4 January 2017 and 21 December 2017 (13 transactions) totalling $7,790. The transactions referenced "rent", "poo", "car", "love you", "me no love you", "jerk", "Layby" "bday lunch" and AP's name. When asked about the reasons for the transactions, the Respondent stated she had no idea. As to why AP had been paying her sums for rent, she stated she doesn't know. The Applicants noted during the hearing that an amount of $3,100 had also been paid to the Respondent from, the Applicant asserted, AP. While not disputing the amount had come from AP, the Respondent stated that she had paid it back. She disputed that the sums moving between the accounts were evidence of a member of a couple relationship. She stated she was not aware that AP had received deposits totalling $101,532 into one of his accounts (held in a variation to his name) during 2017.
13. Prior to the hearing, the Respondent had been provided a summary of bank deposits that had been made to and from her account and had been asked to comment on the purpose of each of the deposits. She was taken to her responses during the hearing and, in particular, to deposits made to one of her accounts during 2017 that were described as "TAC insurance". The explanation that had been provided in the document was "From car accident". When asked about the deposits, the Respondent stated she had not completed the form and AP had. She described other deposits as being from AP and as being movements between her two accounts, on the basis she had had savings for her children.
14. The Respondent was taken to a summary of deposits into one of her other accounts, which contained six deposits between 6 September 2016 and 30 December 2017, of amounts between $1,100 and $7,000, and totalling $16,350. The explanation that had been given for the person who had made each of the deposits was "don't remember". The Respondent did not respond to the Applicants' observation that most people receiving Centrelink payments did not have that amount of money to deposit. In response to the Applicants' comment that the amounts were income, the Respondent stated that she couldn't determine whether someone put money into her accounts or whether they were transfers and she was unaware that deposits were treated as income.
15. The Respondent was taken to a summary of deposits into AP's account, where corresponding withdrawals had been made from one of her accounts. The transfers were made between 19 March 2018 and 29 October 2018 and totalled $2,775. The Respondent did not dispute the transfers had been made. When asked about references in the transfers to "Bad husband", "Evil", "Lover", "Good bye" and "Rent", the Respondent stated that they were on poor terms at that stage and the nice references she assumes were during good stages. When asked about the "husband" reference, she stated he was potentially at that time but it was very up and down. She was unable to explain the "goodbye" and "rent" references.
16. The Respondent was taken to a summary of deposits into another of AP's accounts, where corresponding withdrawals had been made from one of her accounts. Five transfers had been made between 4 November 2018 and 20 December 2018, with references of "Bday" and "Car", totalling $1,800. The Respondent accepted they had been from her, but stated she wasn't sure what they related to.
17. The Respondent was also taken to a summary of deposits to one of AP's accounts from her account during 2018, totalling $800 and referencing "rent" and "poo" and stated she didn't know what they related to.
18. The Applicants submitted at the hearing that, during 2018, AP had received deposits totalling $407,608 into his accounts during 2018. When this was put to the Respondent, she stated she didn't know and wasn't aware he was receiving the money. As to her own unexplained deposits into one of her accounts during 2018, being amounts totalling $27,070.32 in ten transactions between 19 January 2018 and 30 October 2018, the Respondent stated she couldn't explain because there wasn't enough information. She agreed that some related to purchasing a car.
19. The Respondent was taken to a summary of deposits made to AP's account in 2019 with corresponding withdrawals from the Respondent's accounts. The amounts were transferred between 3 January 2019 and 20 June 2019 and totalled $19,230 and the reference in many of the transactions was "car". When taken to the transactions, the Respondent stated she didn't know about the payments and didn't have any memory of transferring money to AP's bank account.
20. The Respondent was taken to a summary of deposits into an account made into a varied name of AP. The summary set out transactions made between 2016 and 2020 and showed tens of thousands of dollars being deposited into the account. The Respondent did not dispute that the account was AP's account. She was unable to comment on the deposits that had been made. As to deposits that appeared to relate to income from employment, she stated she wasn't aware he was earning a wage and, as far as she's concerned, he hasn't worked. In response to the Applicants' observation that it was hard to understand she would be unaware of such volumes of money being controlled by AP, the Respondent stated that she had never had access to AP's accounts and it was never a topic of discussion unless it was about her money; his money was not up for discussion.
21. The Respondent was asked about unexplained deposits into her accounts during 2019. She was unable to explain a deposit of $1,500 made on 14 January 2019 or a deposit of $16,293.49 made on 27 May 2019. Another deposit of $1,451.99 made on 18 September 2019 referenced "CCS payment" and the Tribunal accepted the Respondent's evidence that this appeared to relate to a child care subsidy payment made by Centrelink.
22. The Respondent was taken to a summary of deposits into AP's account with corresponding withdrawals from her accounts, made between 31 December 2019 and 16 July 2020 and totalling $3,800. The transactions referenced "Ford ranger" and the Respondent stated she thought the amounts were for a car she bought. When asked whether AP had given her money for the car, she stated that she could have purchased the car for him, or he could have assisted.
23. The Respondent was also taken to a summary of transactions into an account the Applicants submit was one of AP's accounts. During 2020, amounts had been paid into the account between 13 January 2020 and 23 October 2020, including an amount of $3,000 appearing to be from AP's sister and an amount of $616,447.79 described as settlement funds. The Respondent stated that she was made aware of a large sum to AP's account, that he had taken out a loan on his parents' house and had gambled around $550,000.
24. The Respondent was asked about unexplained deposits into her own account in 2020, made between 14 February 2020 and 21 September 2020 and totalling $5,440. The Respondent stated that she assumed they were transfers between different accounts she had. She stated that she knows how to save, scrimps when she can and doesn't gamble or waste money. She disputed that any of the money was from AP and stated that she hadn't had any financial gain from him. When asked about any cash payments from AP, she stated that he had not given her cash.

1. The evidence before the Tribunal about the residential addresses of the Respondent and AP from August 2015, when AP was released from prison, was contradictory and somewhat unclear.
2. The Tribunal accepted that, at the time he was released from prison, AP's family resided at an address with two houses on it (Address 1). AP advised the Adult Parole Board he would be residing there upon release and the Respondent represented to the Adult Parol Board that she was residing there with her children. The Respondent changed her address with Centrelink to Address 1 two days prior to AP being released from jail. She was asked about her reasons for having done this at the hearing and stated that there would have been an intention for her to move there, but AP's ex-wife was living there with his parents when he was released, and because of that she hadn't moved in. The Respondent gave evidence of having picked AP up from prison and going back to Address 1 with him, and not being aware his ex-wife was at the property until they were at the house.
3. The Department of Justice and Community Safety made home visits to Address 1 on 15 September 2015 and 25 January 2016. The report of the visits noted that there were two separate properties and that the Respondent and AP were residing in one of the properties with AP's parents, the Respondent's children and AP's daughter.
4. The Respondent provided a rent certificate to Centrelink on 4 November 2015 for a property at another address (Address 2). The rent certificate stated the Respondent was residing at the property with a female and that her landlord was a varied name of AP, with an address at Address 1. The Respondent was asked about the rent certificate at the hearing and stated she had been living at the property with her sister-in-law. She asserted she had not moved into Address 1.
5. The Tribunal had great difficulty accepting the evidence of the Respondent that she had resided at Address 2 for a period of time, on the basis that AP was not her landlord at the property and it is implausible that she would be unable to provide the correct landlord's details if she was in a genuine rental arrangement at the property. Having considered the evidence before it about the property, the Tribunal does not accept that the Respondent resided at Address 2 in or around November 2015 for a period of time, with another female, under a rental agreement. The Tribunal considers it most likely that the Respondent and AP were residing at Address 1 after AP's release from prison, as represented to the Adult Parole Board prior to his release and as observed in post-release visits by Corrections staff.
6. The Respondent advised Centrelink on 10 March 2016 that she had been living at another address (Address 3) since 30 November 2015 and that she was not sharing the property. There was evidence in the documents that the Respondent had entered a residential tenancy bond for the property as of December 2015.
7. Evidence was presented to the Tribunal by the Applicants, regarding contact between Centrelink and the agent who had managed the lease for the property at Address 3. The agent reported having had contact with both the Respondent and AP and advised the property had been vacated on 22 June 2016. The record of the email from the agent noted that:

The tenant in 2016 tried to take our company for compensation due to someone breaking into his home apparently but was not granted any compensation.

I have attached a photo of some items left behind by the tenant and the goods left behind request.

I also found a photo of a box from Ebay with his name and address on it.

I apologise that I wasn't able to provide any more information, we had some incompetent staff at the time that must have lost the file.

1. The Respondent was taken to the email during the hearing and stated there were times when AP was present, he helped her get the lease there and she was helping him with parole, so to a certain extent he needed to paint that picture. In response to the reference to "the tenant" and "his home", the Respondent stated she recalls the house being broken into but doesn't recall AP attempting to get compensation.
2. In addition to the above information, the Tribunal was also provided copies of text messages from the agent to a mobile number that the Tribunal accepted was AP's number (on the basis of its correlation with other documents in which he had provided the number in question, including Centrelink claim forms). In a text message dated 16 June, the agent noted that rent was overdue and requested payment. The response from AP was "I'm vacating buy tomorrow" and then "so u want money". When taken to this email exchange, the Respondent stated that she had left because she was robbed. As to whether she was out of the property prior to 16 June 2016, she stated she didn't know. As to who was paying rent, she stated it had been her. As to why an agent would be texting AP rather than herself, she stated he knew someone who worked for the agency.
3. The Tribunal finds from the above evidence that the Respondent and AP were residing at the Address 3 property from November 2015 to June 2016. AP spoke to the agent about the home having been broken into and was using the property for deliveries. The Tribunal was satisfied from this evidence that AP was at the property on at least a part-time basis and, given this finding, did not accept the Respondent's evidence that she was residing at the property with only her children. The Tribunal notes that these findings are complicated by AP's ongoing use of the Address 1 address and a post office box after this time, and the lack of cohesion between leases signed by the Respondent and addresses notified to Centrelink.
4. The Tribunal accepted that the Respondent moved into Address 4 after leaving Address 3, in or around June 2016. The Respondent changed her address with VicRoads to Address 4 from 15 July 2016 and, in May 2016 and August 2016, AP advised Corrections he was residing with the Respondent at both Address 3 and Address 4. When taken to the information about AP, the Respondent stated that AP needed permission to stay anywhere other than Address 1 and he potentially could have said that; he could have been residing there or just staying there for the night. When asked whether AP's representation was correct, the Respondent then stated no, he had resided for the whole parole period at Address 1; what he told them and the actual situation was very different.
5. AP had advised Corrections that the relationship had broken down as of December 2016 and he was residing at Address 1 in a converted garage. When asked about this, the Respondent stated she could not pinpoint any date, because the relationship was up and down. When asked whether there was a period that AP had returned to Address 1, the Respondent stated that there was never a situation where AP was living with her full-time, and so she disagrees with the statement that he moved back to Address 1.
6. AP advised Corrections on 11 January 2017 that he had reunited with the Respondent and was living between Address 1 and Address 4. When taken to this evidence, the Respondent stated that he was staying there every now and then. She disagreed that he was residing with her at Address 4.
7. The Tribunal accepted the Applicants' submissions that the Respondent and AP had left Address 4 by June 2017, on the basis that the new owners had provided information to Centrelink that they had purchased the property on 2 June 2017 and the new owners were residing there from that date. The new owner had confirmed he had received mail in the Respondent's surname and for a male with a name of a similar ethnicity to AP's. The Respondent agreed she was no longer at Address 4 by July 2017. She asserted she had not returned to Address 1, but rather was residing at an address in another suburb with a friend. As to her use of Address 4 for Centrelink purposes in August 2017, she stated that she had no idea. As to why she had never advised Centrelink of the address in the other suburb she was claiming to have lived in, she stated that she hadn't updated her details; her friend was charging rent to her. The Tribunal had difficulty accepting that, in circumstances where the Respondent was paying rent for a property, she would not have advised Centrelink and would not have sought rent assistance.
8. The Tribunal noted that, when asked for details of the landlord for the other property, the Respondent stated she didn't have his contact number any more. A letter had been prepared by the landlord in question stating that a verbal arrangement had been in place for $260 per week, and that the Respondent had stayed there between July 2017 through to late 2020. The contents of the letter by the claimed landlord were not tested in evidence at the hearing.
9. An individual with AP's varied name purchased a property at Address 5 on 13 February 2019. When asked whether that individual was AP, the Respondent stated she had no idea and was told his brother had purchased the property. She asserted she had not moved into the property with AP until 2020. When asked about her continued use of Address 4 as of 2019, the Respondent agreed she had not lived there for several years by then.
10. Given the Respondent's continued use of Address 4 some two years after she had left the property, and given the Respondent's failure to advise Centrelink she was residing at an address in another location and was paying rent at that address, the Tribunal found it most likely that the Respondent and AP returned to reside at AP's family home at Address 1 for a period of time between mid-2017 and February 2019 and that the Respondent was residing with AP at the Address 5 address from February 2019 onwards.
11. The Respondent's mother had prepared a letter for the Respondent, stating that the Respondent and her children periodically come to visit her at her home, that she usually stays one to three days per week, but sometimes she may not see the Respondent for a month so there was no regular format. The Respondent's mother stated that that had been going on for approximately six or seven years. When taken to this letter at the hearing, the Respondent agreed her children were at childcare and primary school Monday to Friday and that she had not been going to her mother's every weekend. The Tribunal did not consider the letter prepared by the Respondent's mother provided compelling or persuasive evidence that the Respondent had not been living at the above addresses during the period under review. The Tribunal notes that the Respondent's mother was not called as a witness at the Tribunal hearing.
12. The Tribunal further notes that the above findings are complicated by the Respondent and AP's use of Address 1 for billing purposes for bank statements, the use of PO boxes for Centrelink correspondence at various points, and the continued use by the Respondent of Address 4 for some two years after her arrangement for the property ended. These circumstances lead the Tribunal to conclude that the Respondent and AP had not been forthcoming with Centrelink, in the period under review, about where they were residing. The Tribunal notes the Applicants' submissions about the deliberate nature of this, to represent themselves as not partnered for social security purposes in order to access single rates of payments of various social security and family assistance payments.

1. As noted above, the Respondent and AP had both updated their Facebook accounts in October 2014 to represent that they were each in a relationship. In August 2016, AP had updated his Facebook profile picture to a photo of himself and the Respondent. The Respondent's mother had commented on the post, about the photo being her darling baby and her partner, and when asked about this, the Respondent stated she has never denied that she and AP were in a relationship. She agreed that her mother saw AP as her partner based on the comment and stated she was surprised, because her mother never liked him.
2. In March 2017, the Respondent had updated her profile photo on Facebook to a photo of herself and AP, with their heads close together. The Respondent's mother had commented that it was a nice picture of them. When taken to the photo, and in response to an observation by the Applicants that she and AP looked like members of a couple, the Respondent stated no, and that all photos had been about AP's ex-wife, to get a rise out of her.
3. In September 2017, the Respondent posted on Facebook that she and AP were excited to announce they were having a baby girl. In response to the Applicants' observation that the post had been two days after the Respondent had contacted Centrelink to inquire about parenting payment (single), the Respondent stated yes, she had made the post and that just because she was having a kid with someone, doesn't mean anything.
4. In May 2018, the Respondent posted a photo to her Facebook account of herself, AP and a number of children. When asked about the representation in the photo, the Respondent stated it had been based on the day, not her pregnancy or birth.
5. The Respondent gave birth to AP's biological children in February 2018 and July 2020. The Tribunal was provided records kept by the hospital, which reflect that the Respondent advised the hospital in July 2020 that her partner was working long hours away from home. When asked about this representation to the hospital, the Respondent stated that she didn't want to look like a single mother and she was unsure why she had said he was working away from home. When asked about the representation that AP was her partner, the Respondent stated that she can't agree or disagree if they were at that time or not; she doesn't know the times they were or weren't together. She would say that the period preceding the birth they were still on rocky terms.
6. The hospital records further reflect that on another occasion in July 2020, the Respondent advised the hospital that she had three children, that her husband was working for insurance and was often away, and that she would like to ensure care was organised for the children and her husband was able to attend the birth as she had had a "precip" birth the last times. When taken to this record, the Respondent stated AP had not been working in insurance. As to her reference to a "husband" she stated yes, she was telling them whatever she wanted and didn't want to appear as a single mother of four children. The Respondent stated that she had wanted to be induced and agreed the record was reflecting that she wanted her husband to be there in time.
7. The Respondent stated that AP had been at the birth in July 2020. As to a patient registration form completed for the hospital that reflected AP as her "husband/male partner", the Respondent stated he was potentially that at the time, she is not sure. As to the address reflected in the record, being Address 5, the Respondent stated she had not been living there at that time, not until late 2020. As to why she had given that address to the hospital, she stated it was a mailing issue and she didn't want anything to come to the other address she had been residing at. She stated she had not been living Address 5 with AP.

1. The Tribunal accepted the evidence of the Respondent and AP that they had a sexual relationship between 2015 and 2022. The Tribunal noted that the Respondent had given birth to two children during this period, who are AP's biological children. The Respondent gave evidence that, in or around June 2017, she had a relationship with another person who was abusive. She referred in her closing submissions at the hearing to both herself and AP having had sexual relationships with other people during the period being reviewed by the Tribunal.

The nature of the people's commitment to each other

1. Prior to his release from custody, AP had represented to the Adult Parole Board that he was intending to marry the Respondent upon release. When asked about this statement, the Respondent stated that's what AP had told her his intention was.
2. The Respondent had represented to the Adult Parole Board that she and AP had been religiously married, by the time her letter in support of AP was prepared. When asked about this, the Respondent stated that there had been a few words said and it was classed as a temporary marriage, sexual stuff, not a formal thing. The Respondent described the relationship to the Tribunal as on and off, with AP promising to get married but with no detailed time line.
3. The Respondent gave birth to a child in February 2018, who was given AP's surname. When asked about this, the Respondent stated that traditionally children are given their father's surname and it was not reflective of AP being her partner. When asked about the child's middle name, the Respondent stated that AP had said she had to have that as her middle name.
4. The Respondent and AP have a second child who was born in July 2020. The Respondent gave evidence that AP had attended the birth. The Tribunal accepted the Respondent and AP's second child was also given AP's surname.
5. The Respondent had given evidence at the AAT first review hearing that she accepted she had been a member of a couple with AP from 4 June 2020, being the date of birth of their second child. When asked about this evidence at the hearing, the Respondent stated that if that's what she said, she would accept that, but that the date "doesn't ring a bell".
6. The Respondent provided a "Relationship Details" form to Centrelink on 20 October 2021, in which she stated she was not partnered with AP; described the relationship as "co-parenting" and "sexual"; that they did not own property and all of the expenses at the house were for herself and the children and were covered by her; they have no joint accounts, don't have access to each other's accounts and don't have joint debts. The Respondent stated in the form that she pays for the phone/internet, electricity, gas and food; they don't have joint insurance policies and have not nominated each other in wills, superannuation or life insurance; don't share a bedroom; and she does the washing. In response to the question as to whether relatives, friends or regular associates considered them to be partnered, the Respondent ticked "yes" and stated that: social media, never felt the need to change the relationship status, other than that, no. The Respondent stated that she and AP shared family occasions, Australian holidays such as Christmas and Easter, and that they had a sexual relationship. In response to a question as to how long they intended to share accommodation, the Respondent stated they didn't live together, AP sleeps over occasionally. She stated that they provided support to one another if sick and help with the children was offered, but did not provide support in a personal crisis, with money matters or family disputes. The Respondent stated that her relationship with AP differed from a married, registered or de facto relationship because they had sexual relations with other people, there was no financial support and they didn't live together.
7. When the above information was put to the Respondent at the hearing, the Applicants submitted that the information was false, on the basis that she had accepted she had been a member of a couple with AP from June 2020. The Respondent asked, in response, why was it false and stated it was correct. She disagreed that the information supported that she was in a relationship with AP at the time. As to whether her representation in the form about shared expenses was incorrect, she stated she disagreed.
8. The Tribunal accepted from the Respondent's evidence that AP had proposed to her in 2021 and they had been married in either December 2021 or February 2022 (the Tribunal noted that the Respondent gave evidence at the hearing that they had been married in February 2022 and that this differed to the evidence reported to have been provided to the first review Tribunal that the marriage had occurred in December 2021). The Tribunal accepted the Respondent's evidence that she had converted to another religion before marrying AP. She was unclear as to where the marriage had taken place, stating when asked that it was a "person who signs paperwork" and referring to AP's empty promises.
9. The Tribunal noted that the Respondent had provided details to Centrelink in August 2024, stating she had been separated from AP since 22 March 2023. The Tribunal also noted that both parties described the relationship as on and off. The Respondent gave evidence that she didn't feel the relationship was consistent for a long enough period to advise Centrelink, and didn't feel that there was a long period of stability. Both parties had been sleeping with other people. When asked about any application for a divorce, the Respondent stated that there is no real reason for this, perhaps laziness.
10. The Respondent submitted that, while she is now separated from AP, she is not sure when it occurred. They have not formally divorced, it's "just a piece of paper", but her view is that it is a final separation. The Respondent gave evidence of remaining AP's carer and receiving carer payment for the care she is providing to AP. The Tribunal noted that material provided by AP indicated that AP had changed his surname to the Respondent's, which the Respondent confirmed.
11. When asked whether there was anything else she wanted to tell the Tribunal about the relationship, the Respondent stated it has been very on and off, very rocky, that AP has made ample promises, enough to make her stay interested. She stated she understands there has been money in and out of the accounts, but there was never financial gain. As to any reasons they should not be considered to have been a member of a couple for social security purposes, the Respondent stated she had called on multiple occasions about when she needed to declare her relationship, but she didn't feel the relationship was consistent enough, or stable for an ongoing amount of time. It was pure laziness and she should have changed it. They were sleeping with other people on and off throughout the relationship.
12. The Respondent stated that, when they were married AP sent off the paperwork, but it was him making empty promises. She was promised they would be married religiously, but she thinks he married her to change his last name and doesn't think it was what she thought it was. She confirmed she had converted to AP's religion a bit before they were married and that she had chosen to do that. She confirmed that AP has now changed his family name to her name.
13. The Respondent submitted in closing submissions that her representation to the hospital that AP was her "husband" and working in insurance is evidence that she would lie about her circumstances, and that this was about how she felt about her situation, as a single mother of four children. She describes herself as insecure, loyal, forgiving and reliable, which are all qualities a narcissist looks for in a victim. She had genuinely believed in the relationship at the start, and she disregarded red flags. She has not denied there has been an on-off relationship, but she genuinely believed she was not doing anything wrong and rang Centrelink many times, and was always told that financial reliance and living together full-time were the relevant factors. She described the relationship as having been one of love bombing and coercive control and she believes that AP lied and was manipulative.

1. The Tribunal had before it a number of "tip-offs" made anonymously to Centrelink about the Respondent's relationship with AP. The Tribunal noted that the tip-offs contained a level of detail in them, that was suggestive of the person having a reasonable level of knowledge of the Respondent's circumstances. The Respondent herself suggested they may have been from a male who the Tribunal understood was a former partner. However, in the absence of any clear evidence as to the identity of the individuals who had provided the information, their motivation for doing so, or their level of knowledge of the Respondent's circumstances, the Tribunal placed little weight on the contents of the tip-offs in this matter.
2. The Tribunal was also provided information about several contacts made with Centrelink about a "person permitted to enquire". The Applicants submitted that the contacts were made by AP and that they evidence that the Respondent and AP were members of a couple. The Tribunal did not accept these submissions, on the basis that individuals selected as persons permitted to enquire with Centrelink have a range of relationships with Centrelink recipients, not necessarily a marriage-like one. The Tribunal did not consider that the evidence presented with respect to the "person permitted to enquire" for the Respondent's Centrelink account added any weight to the range of other information before the Tribunal.
3. The Tribunal heard evidence from AP at the hearings, about his relationship with the Respondent. The Tribunal has had regard to this evidence where the evidence in question was put to the Respondent for her comment.
4. Finally, the Tribunal notes that it had extensive evidence before it, being some 8,000 pages of documentary evidence and oral evidence provided by the Respondent and AP over multiple hearing days. The Applicants have made extensive written submissions to the Tribunal, commenting on a range of matters contained in the documentary evidence. The Tribunal has ultimately relied, in making a decision in this matter, on the matters put to the Respondent at the Tribunal hearing, that she was provided an opportunity to view documents relating to the questions put to her and to provide comments on.

Findings of the Tribunal about the relationship between the Respondent and AP

1. The Tribunal considered that the Respondent gave plausible evidence about the circumstances in which she had met AP and their level of contact while he was in custody. The documentary evidence indicates a significant level of contact between the Respondent and AP while AP was in custody, a representation of themselves as partnered on social media by October 2014, and representations to prison services by the Respondent as being religiously married and intending to be engaged upon AP's release from prison. AP, similarly, represented them as de facto in a parole assessment and the Adult Parole Board was advised that the Respondent was living with AP's parents at Address 1 prior to his release. The representations made by both the Respondent and AP, for the purposes of AP's parole, is strongly suggestive of the presence of a de facto relationship.
2. The Tribunal accepted that, within a week of AP's release from custody, the Respondent and AP opened a joint bank account. From 29 September 2015 onwards, there were significant amounts transferred from the Respondent to AP, and from AP to the Respondent. The Tribunal noted that several of the accounts in question were in a varied name to AP's name. The Tribunal found that the accounts in the varied name were accounts held by AP, on the basis of the use of common addresses attached to the accounts, the movement from the accounts in question to the Respondent's account and the Respondent not asserting at any stage during the lengthy hearing that AP was not the holder of any of the accounts discussed with her at the hearing. The Tribunal noted that many of the transactions between the Respondent and AP's accounts referenced "love you" and related variations, and referred to the parties as lovers and husband. The Respondent was unable to explain many of the transactions that had occurred and the Tribunal had difficulty understanding the reasons for this, within the context of the Respondent's claimed reliance on social security and family assistance payments over this period. The Tribunal finds that there was significant sharing of financial resources between the Respondent and AP and that this supports the presence of a de facto relationship between them.
3. As noted above, the living arrangements for the Respondent and AP were unclear and, at points, contradictory. The Applicants assert that this was a deliberate attempt by the Respondent and AP to present themselves as not in a relationship, and as living separately, to Centrelink so that they were both able to access payments at a single rate of payment. Also as noted above, the Tribunal considers that the Respondent and AP were residing in AP's family address at Address 1 from the time he was released from custody and that they shared the premises at Address 3 from November 2015 to June 2016, Address 4 until mid-2017 and then it is likely that they returned to Address 1 for a period of time. The Tribunal has also found that the Respondent was then residing with AP at a property he purchased in February 2019.
4. The Respondent and AP have both asserted that their living arrangements were part-time. The Applicants have urged the Tribunal to follow the approach of the AAT in Haddara and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2023] AATA 2314, where the Tribunal had accepted that (at [40]-[42] and [44]):[3]

While the Tribunal accepts that during the relevant period there were extended periods of physical separation where Ms Haddara and the Applicant lived apart in circumstances of some animus, it does not accept that this separation necessarily compels a conclusion that Ms Haddara and the Applicant had ceased to be in a de facto relationship during those times.

.... It is also significant that the Applicant did not seek to establish himself in any permanent accommodation when excluded from Ms Haddara's house, but chose to sleep rough living predominantly in his car, often outside Ms Haddara's house or in the general area....

The Court recognised in Melvin v Secretary, Department of Social Security that where a couple live together from time to time, it is not determinative of the question whether they are living separately or apart. The Court noted that:

There is both a physical and mental element involved and the mental element is independent of whether the parties lived in the same house.

The High Court in Fairbairn v Radecki considered the question of whether a de facto relationship had broken down in the context of s 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The Court recognised that the question of whether a de facto or married relationship had broken down is not simply a matter of whether the parties had ceased to live at the same property. The Court recognised that a couple may live under the same roof and yet be separated or may be in a couple relationship even where they live at different locations.

1. The Tribunal was not persuaded that the Respondent and AP were residing apart for significant periods between late 2015 and March 2022. The Tribunal considers it more likely that they were residing together, supporting each other's children at various points, and were sharing a household where they were raising their own two biological children. There were various transfers between them in the 2016, 2017 and 2018 calendar years which were described as "rent", which further supports the inference drawn by the Tribunal that they were sharing premises but otherwise representing themselves at different addresses to Centrelink and, on occasions, to other institutions such as banks. Noting the comments of the AAT in Haddara, above, the Tribunal finds that any part-time living arrangements between the Respondent and AP were not indicative that their relationship had broken down on a permanent basis or that they did not remain committed to one another, as evidenced by other factors the Tribunal is required to consider in this matter.
2. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent and AP represented themselves on social media from October 2014 onwards as in a relationship and subsequently as excited to expand their family by welcoming a baby together. Comments made by the Respondent's mother suggest that she viewed them as partnered. The Respondent represented herself as partnered with AP to the hospital she gave birth in twice. The Tribunal was not persuaded that the Respondent represented herself as partnered because of a concern as to how she would be perceived by the hospital staff, but rather considered that she represented herself in that way because she considered herself partnered with AP at the time. The Tribunal finds that the way the Respondent and AP have represented themselves on social media and to the hospital where the Respondent gave birth is strongly suggestive of the presence of a de facto relationship.
3. The Tribunal accepts that the Respondent and AP have had a sexual relationship in the period under review. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that the Respondent and AP may have had sexual relationships with other people during this time, but did not accept that that was indicative that their relationship had broken down permanently.
4. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent and AP have two biological children together, born in February 2018 and July 2020 and that both children were given AP's family name. They were married in either December 2021 or February 2022 and the Respondent converted to AP's religion prior to the marriage. Subsequent to the marriage, AP commenced using the Respondent's family name. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent and AP's biological children, their marriage, the Respondent's religious conversion and AP's use of the Respondent's family name all strongly suggest a level of commitment that is demonstrative that they were members of a couple.
5. The Respondent described, at various points in the hearing, difficulties in her relationship with AP. She described the relationship as on and off, and as characterised by coercive control, although did not provide details or examples of this to the Tribunal. The Applicants have noted the comments of the AAT in Haddara, where the AAT stated (at [59]) as follows:

The fact that the parties experienced difficulties in their relationship at times does not preclude a finding that a couple relationship existed. The Tribunal is not required to be satisfied that the relationship was happy or socially conventional. It does not require that there was a total commitment to a couple relationship by both parties at all times. It does not require a finding that there was a romantic relationship. The task for the Tribunal is to assess the true nature and character of the relationship between the parties having regard to the matters and factors specified in s 4(3) of the Act by weighing up the factors which point in favour of a de facto relationship and those that point against it.

1. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that the relationship between the Respondent and AP was perceived by the Respondent to be on and off at times, and that it was not always a happy relationship. However, having weighed up all of the evidence before it, the Tribunal considers that the evidence overwhelmingly supports the presence of a "member of a couple" relationship between the Respondent and AP from November 2015 onwards. The Tribunal accepted that this was initially by way of a de facto relationship and, subsequently and at the time they were married, as a married relationship.
2. As to whether a determination should be made under section 24 of the Social Security Act, the Tribunal finds that there has been substantial financial support provided by the Respondent to AP and from AP to the Respondent. As there has been substantial pooling of resources, the Tribunal declines to make a section 24 determination on the basis of any financial reasons.
3. The Social Security Guide sets out that a section 24 determination may also be made in situations of family violence. The Respondent described during the hearing having had her earnings from employment intercepted by AP (although was unclear as to how this had occurred in practice) and to him having exercised a degree of coercive control over her. She did not provide details or examples of the presence of family violence, or coercive control and, based on the evidence before it, the Tribunal was not persuaded that there was a level of family violence such that the discretion in section 24 should be exercised.
4. Having weighed up all of the above evidence, the Tribunal finds that the Respondent was partnered with AP for social security purposes and, for this reason, the first review decision on this issue is set aside and the Tribunal substitutes its decision that the Respondent and AP were members of a couple from 30 November 2015.

1. The Applicants submit that the Respondent's parenting payment should have been cancelled from 30 November 2015 under section 94 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) (the Social Security Administration Act) on the basis that she did not comply with notices sent to her under section 68 of the Social Security Administration Act.
2. Subsection 68(2) of the Social Security Administration Act provides that:

(2) The Secretary may give a person to whom this subsection applies a notice that requires the person to do any or all of the following:

(i) a specified event or change of circumstances occurs; or

(ii) the person becomes aware that a specified event or change of circumstances is likely to occur;

(b) give the Department one or more statements about a matter that might affect the payment to the person of the social security payment;

(c) give the Department one or more statements about a matter that might affect the operation, or prospective operation, of Part 3B in relation to the person.

1. The Respondent was sent a notice dated 19 October 2015 headed "Your Parenting Payment", which set out her payment from 9 October 2016 and then rate of regular payment from 28 October 2015. Under the heading "What you must tell us", the notice provided the following information, in relevant part:

You must tell us within 14 days (28 days if residing outside Australia) if any of the changes listed below happen or are likely to happen to you. If you get a fortnightly Reporting and Income Statement, report your earnings or changes in circumstances on your reporting day.

This is an information notice given under social security law.

Income: Your gross income changes. Changes mean your income starts, stops, recommences or amounts vary. Gross income includes, but is not limited to:

• - Earnings: Employment income; if you voluntarily salary sacrifice earnings into a superannuation fund; paid leave such as annual, long service or sick leave, sick or accident insurance; or commissions, director's fees and non-cash fringe benefits from your employer. You receive income from Family Day Care, baby-sitting or receive income from sales work (for example, party-plan or catalogue sales).
• - Business: Net profit from sole trader or business operation, private company or trust that you control; director's fees, dividends and distributions; or any new involvement or changes to your involvement in a business, company or trust.
• - Pensions and annuities: An income stream from an allocated lifetime or term pensions and annuities, defined benefit pensions or income streams or pensions from other countries.
• - Other income: Income from rent, boarders or lodgers, lump sum payments, other regular payments, regular gifts or allowances, other government payments, matured life insurance policies, fringe benefits or any other income from any source (including income from other countries).

Household: Tell us if you marry; are in or commence a registered or de facto relationship (either opposite or same sex); reconcile with a former partner or start living with someone as their partner; have a baby or have a child come into your care, start to share the care of the child, change the amount of time the child spends living with you or if an immediate family member dies.

1. Subsection 94(1) of the Social Security Administration Act then provides for consequences to a person's receipt of a social security payment where they have not complied with a section 68 notice. This provision states as follows:

(1) Subject to subsection (2), if:

(a) a person who is receiving a social security payment is given a notice under subsection 68(2); and

(b) the notice requires the person to inform the Department of the occurrence of an event or change of circumstances within a specified period (the notification period); and

(c) the event or change of circumstances occurs; and

(d) the person does not inform the Department of the occurrence of the event or change of circumstances within the notification period in accordance with the notice; and

(e) because of the occurrence of the event or change of circumstances:

(i) the person ceases to be qualified for the social security payment; or

(ii) the social security payment ceases to be payable to the person;

the social security payment is cancelled, by force of this subsection, on the day on which the event or change of circumstances occurs.

1. The Tribunal found that the above notice, dated 19 October 2015, was issued under subsection 68(2) of the Social Security Administration Act. The requirement in the notice included a requirement for the Respondent to advise if she was in a de facto relationship. The Tribunal is satisfied that, at the time the notice was issued to the Respondent, she was in a de facto relationship with AP.
2. The Tribunal finds, on the evidence before it, that the Respondent did not advise Centrelink that she was a member of a couple with AP until 16 December 2021, being the date that her parenting payment (single) was cancelled and she lodged a claim for parenting payment (partnered). She therefore did not comply with the requirement in the notice to notify within 14 days that she was in a de facto relationship.
3. The Tribunal is satisfied that, because of the de facto relationship, parenting payment ceased to be payable to the Respondent on the basis of her level of combined earnings. In so finding, the Tribunal notes that it is not satisfied the payment ceased to be payable because the Respondent was no longer qualified for parenting payment altogether (noting that the qualification requirements are the same, but the rate of payment is calculated differently for a partnered person compared to a single person).
4. In these circumstances, the payment is cancelled by force of subsection 94 on the day on which the event occurs. The Tribunal accepted that the correct date is 30 November 2015, being the date on which AP's income meant that parenting payment was no longer payable to the Respondent.
5. For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that the Respondent's parenting payment is to be cancelled from 30 November 2015.

1. As the Tribunal has found, above that the Respondent's parenting payment was cancelled from 30 November 2015, she was not qualified to receive one-off payments between 30 November 2015 and 6 April 2016. The Tribunal accepted from the information presented by the Applicants that the payments totalled $927.79.
2. The Applicants submit that there is a second parenting payment debt in the amount of $100,061.44 for the period 25 April 2017 to 30 March 2022. The Tribunal has found that the Respondent was partnered with AP in this period. In these circumstances, section 503 of the Social Security Administration Act provides that the Respondent's rate of parenting payment was to be calculated using the Benefit PP (Partnered) Rate Calculator in section 1068B of the Social Security Act. The rate calculated under section 1068B is affected by the person's partner's income and by whether the person's partner is receiving a social security payment.
3. AP received deposits into his bank accounts totalling $1,967,484.45 between 26 April 2016 and 27 January 2021. Some of the accounts were in AP's name and some were in aliases that the Respondent did not dispute were AP's accounts. Both the Respondent and AP were invited to comment on various transactions into the accounts and neither could explain any of the amounts put to them at hearing. The Tribunal noted, in particular, the references in transactions to a trade industry and noted the Respondent's assertions that she had not been aware AP was working in the period under review; AP similarly asserted that the transactions in question had not been income from employment.
4. Subsection 1073(1) of the Social Security Act provides for the treatment of amounts received by a person in calculating their rate of payment and states that:

(1) Subject to points 1067G - H5 to 1067G - H20 (inclusive), 1067L - D5 to 1067L - D16 (inclusive), 1068 - G7AF to 1068 - G7AR (inclusive), 1068A - E2 to 1068A - E12 (inclusive) and 1068B - D7 to 1068B - D18 (inclusive), if a person receives, whether before or after the commencement of this section, an amount that:

(a) is not income within the meaning of Division 1B or 1C of this Part; and

(i) income in the form of periodic payments; or

(ii) ordinary income from remunerative work undertaken by the person; or

(iii) an exempt lump sum.

the person is, for the purposes of this Act, taken to receive one fifty-second of that amount as ordinary income of the person during each week in the 12 months commencing on the day on which the person becomes entitled to receive that amount.

1. Based on the oral evidence of the Respondent and AP at the hearing - being that neither party was able to provide any level of detail about the significant transactions into AP's accounts and AP's assertions that the amounts did not relate to income from employment - the Tribunal finds that the amounts paid into AP's various bank accounts were not amounts as described in paragraphs 1073(1)(a) or (b) and, in these circumstances, AP was taken to have received one fifty-second of each amount during each week in the 12 months commencing on the day on which he became entitled to receive that amount.
2. The Tribunal notes that this approach is in line with similar approaches taken by the AAT in Nassimi and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2015] AATA 423, where the AAT stated (at [10]-[15]):[4]

In the present case significant amounts of money were deposited to the Applicant's bank accounts during the debt period.

The Applicant gave a number of explanations for the deposits...

In view of the wide definition and the available evidence, the deposits in the Applicant's bank account justify a conclusion that they were for his own use and benefit because they were under his control. It is therefore necessary to consider the evidence to determine whether it indicates that the deposits were not for his own use or benefit.

The evidence does not satisfy me that the monies in question were not for his own use or benefit. There are substantial discrepancies in the Applicant's evidence and much of his material is uncorroborated, as outlined by the SSAT at [22] and [28] - [30] of their reasons. He did not produce any reliable independent evidence to the Respondent to substantiate his "explanations".

At the hearing before me no additional significant evidence was produced by the Applicant to substantiate his submissions, with the exception of the sums said to have been advanced by his wife's mother to establish her daughter when she moved to Australia, together with a payment from the inheritance and several other transfers referred to in paragraph [31] of the SSAT decision. I accept these amounts were not income for the purposes of s 8 of the Act.

As to the balance of the payments, the Applicant has not persuaded this Tribunal on the available evidence that his assertions as to the source and purpose of the deposits sought to be accepted in view of the lack of specificity and insufficiency of independent supporting evidence.

1. Similarly, in Taleb and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2020] AATA 3451, the AAT observed that (at [46]-[47]):[5]

When one considers the numerous bank deposits frequently made in large sums as recorded in the bank statements, it appears that Mr Taleb was running his taxi business at a scale that has not been accurately reflected in his tax returns to the ATO, noting that in some years, Mr Taleb has claimed that he only received a net income of less than $10,000 per annum from this business after expenses, upon which he was raising a very large family and paying off a mortgage on his home. The Tribunal also notes the significant number of hours during which Mr Taleb was "logged" as having worked a shift in his taxi as indicated in the taxi shift reports provided by the Taxi Services Commission. The Tribunal is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that those monies (comprising the unexplained bank deposits) were derived as cash payments made to Mr Taleb through his taxi business or by some other means which he has not disclosed to the Centrelink, the Secretary or the Tribunal.

The Tribunal finds that those bank deposits remain unexplained and as such, they are to be counted as "income" and therefore factors into the calculation of Mr and Mrs Taleb's social security entitlements.

1. The Tribunal accepts, based on the evidence of the Respondent and AP about amounts paid into AP's bank accounts, that there was an overpayment to the Respondent of parenting payment totalling $100,061.44 for the period 25 April 2017 to 30 March 2022 based on her combined income.
2. Subsection 1223(1) of the Social Security Act provides that an overpayment of a social security payment is a debt due to the Commonwealth and is taken to arise when the person obtained the benefit of the payment. The Tribunal finds that the amounts of $927.79 and $100,061.44 are debts due to the Commonwealth under section 1223 of the Social Security Act.

1. Schedule 3 to the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) (the Family Assistance Act) states that, for the purposes of family tax benefit and schoolkids bonus, where a person is a member of a couple, their adjusted taxable income for an income year includes the adjusted taxable income for that year of their partner. The Tribunal has found that the Respondent was partnered with AP during the 2016/17, 2017/18, 2018/19, 2019/20 and 2020/21 financial years. AP's adjusted taxable income was relevant to the Respondent's annual rate of family tax benefit in these years.
2. The Applicants have sought that the family tax benefit debts be remitted for recalculation on the basis that the Secretary had made differing findings as to the correct debt amounts since the authorised review officer's decisions and the debts will be impacted by the Tribunal's findings about the Respondent and AP's social security debts. The Tribunal considered this an appropriate approach in the circumstances of this particular case. Any recalculated overpayments for the 2016/17, 2017/18, 2018/19, 2019/20 and 2020/21 financial years are debts due to the Commonwealth under section 71 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) (the Family Assistance Administration Act).
3. The Applicants have noted that the Respondent was paid a newborn upfront payment of $540 on 28 March 2018 and submit that this is a debt due to the Commonwealth as the Respondent's rate of family tax benefit was nil at the relevant time. The Applicants have, however, sought recalculation of the family tax benefit debt for the 2017/18 financial year and, given this and until the recalculation is undertaken, the Tribunal cannot be satisfied that the Respondent did not have any entitlement to family tax benefit as of 28 March 2018. This debt is also sent back for recalculation and any overpayment is a debt due to the Commonwealth under section 71 of the Family Assistance Administration Act.

1. At the time the Respondent received child care benefit, in the 2017/18 financial year, Schedule 2 to the Family Assistance Act provided the method to calculate the amount of benefit payable and required, in part, consideration of whether a person or their partner was receiving a social security benefit or pension.
2. The Applicants submit that, due to there being periods where the Respondent and AP were not qualified for a social security payment, a child care benefit debt arose due to the Respondent's combined adjusted taxable income impacting her rate of child care benefit. The Tribunal accepted these submissions and accepted that, in the period 3 July 2017 to 1 July 2018, the Respondent was overpaid child care benefit totalling $10,692.18.
3. At the time the overpayment accrued, section 71C of the Family Assistance Administration Act provided that where an amount had been paid by way of child care benefit and the received amount was greater than the correct amount, the overpayment is a debt due to the Commonwealth. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent owes a debt of $10,692.18 under section 71C (as it was at the relevant time) of the Family Assistance Administration Act.

1. The Applicants submit that there was an overpayment of covid supplement to the Respondent for the period 27 April 2020 to 13 April 2021, on the basis that she had no entitlement to parenting payment for that period and was therefore not eligible for covid supplement.
2. The Tribunal accepted covid supplement was introduced by the Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Act 2020 (Cth) (the Covid Response Act), which provided at subsection 501(1) that where a person was receiving parenting payment, their rate of parenting payment was to be increased by the amount of the covid supplement, beginning on 27 April 2020.
3. The Tribunal accepted that, due to parenting payment not being payable to the Respondent between 27 April 2020 and 13 April 2021, she was not qualified for covid supplement payments made to her in this period. The Tribunal accepted the Respondent was paid covid supplement totalling $9,250 between 27 April 2020 and 13 April 2021 and that this amount is also a debt due to the Commonwealth under section 1223 of the Social Security Act.

1. The Covid Response Act also provided for an economic support payment under subsection 304(1) in circumstances where, in relevant part, a person was receiving parenting payment. The Respondent was paid an economic support payment by Centrelink on 2 April 2020. As parenting payment was not payable to her at that date, due to her combined income, she was not qualified for the economic support payment paid to her. The Tribunal finds that this amount, being $750, is also a debt due to the Commonwealth under section 1223 of the Social Security Act.

1. The discretion to write off a debt for a period of time is contained in sections 1236 of the Social Security Act and section 95 of the Family Assistance Administration Act. These provisions allows for write off of a debt where:

(a) The debt is irrecoverable at law; or

(b) The debtor has no capacity to repay the debt; or

(c) The debtor's whereabouts are unknown after all reasonable efforts have been made to locate the debtor; or

(d) It is not cost effective for the Commonwealth to take action to recover the debt

1. The debts are recoverable at law, the Respondent's whereabouts are known and the Tribunal considers it is cost effective for the Commonwealth to take action to recover the debts, given the amounts involved.
2. A debtor is taken to have the capacity to repay a debt unless recovery by means of withholding from payments would result in the debtor being in severe financial hardship. The Applicants submit that the Respondent is receiving carer payment, carer allowance and family tax benefit, and has demonstrated a capacity to previously repay a debt raised by Centrelink. The Respondent stated that she has paid a previous debt, but referred in her oral submissions to Australia being in a current financial crisis with respect to food, house and fuel costs.
3. On the evidence before it, and in the absence of any clear evidence as to the Respondent's current income and level of necessary expenses, the Tribunal was not persuaded that the Respondent has no capacity to repay the debts.
4. The Tribunal concluded that none of the debts are able to be written off for a period of time.

1. Section 1237A of the Social Security Act provides for waiver of a debt where the debt has been caused by sole administrative error by the Commonwealth and the debtor received the payments in good faith.
2. Section 97 of the Family Assistance Administration Act provides the same requirements, in addition to requiring that there would be severe financial hardship to the Respondent if the debts were not waived.
3. The Respondent asserted at the Tribunal hearing that she had contacted Centrelink on numerous occasions to inquire about her relationship status and had repeatedly been advised that a member of a couple would be determined by financial interdependence and residing together on a full-time basis. The Tribunal noted that there were no records of any of the claimed contacts in the documents provided by the Applicants.
4. In addition to the above evidence given by the Respondent, the Tribunal had regard to the following evidence in considering whether administrative error has caused any of the debts in this matter.
5. The Respondent was asked during the hearing about Centrelink notices that had been sent to her throughout the debt period. When asked about notices sent to her in late 2015, she agreed she had been sent notices, but stated that she and AP had phoned Centrelink and been advised that the two factors used to define a relationship were living together and financial dependence.
6. The Respondent agreed she had been in a motor vehicle accident in April 2016 and had received TAC payments for a year, at which point she had stopped running a business. She was taken to a record of contact made on 7 April 2016, in which she is recorded as having stated that both children had left her care to live with AP. When asked about the record of contact, the Respondent stated that AP was helping her look after the children, she is pretty sure for school drop offs, and she thinks he got her to phone Centrelink for extra money. The Respondent stated that the children definitely were not residing with AP, as she never had a situation when the children were not living with her. When asked about the representation made in the phone call, the Respondent stated that she has no recollection of making a call to say her children had left her care and had never said the children were not in her care, and that was Centrelink's interpretation.
7. The Respondent was asked whether, given the TAC payments, she was aware she wouldn't have continued to receive social security payments, to which she stated she was definitely aware of that. When asked whether she agreed that she had allowed AP to take over the Centrelink payments and had said something incorrect to Centrelink, she stated no, she has never benefitted financially from AP; he was receiving parenting payment and shouldn't have been receiving it. As to whether the two of them had agreed that should happen, the Respondent stated she has no idea. As to why she hadn't rung Centrelink on 7 April 2016 to advise of the TAC payments, she stated she can't answer that, has no idea, and it was about her believing whatever story AP told her and he was doing it to gain financially. As to whether she had been complicit because of her romantic feelings, she stated never; he was helping her look after the children, but they weren't residing with him. As to why she had let that happen, she stated that she doesn't agree she told Centrelink she had relinquished care of the children, she is just going to agree that AP said to tell them that.
8. AP received family tax benefit for the Respondent's two children from 7 April 2016. When asked about this arrangement, the Respondent confirmed her earlier evidence that her two children had always been residing with her.
9. The Respondent was taken to a record of a conversation on 2 October 2017, which reflected that the Respondent had contacted by phone to advise one of her children had re-entered her care from 26 September 2017. When taken to the record, the Respondent stated she had never said the child was not in her care. When asked about the timing of the call, which coincided with her TAC payments ceasing, the Respondent stated she has no idea.
10. The Respondent provided a Newborn Child Declaration to Centrelink by form dated 25 February 2018. When taken to the form, which answered no to the question "Do you have a partner?", the Respondent stated this had not been a false statement.
11. The Respondent made a claim for carer allowance and carer payment on 13 July 2018. In the claim form, she stated her relationship status was "Never married or lived with a partner". She gave her address as Address 4 and, when the Applicant observed she had not been there at that time, the Respondent agreed that was correct and that she had provided a false address. As to why she had provided a false address, she stated she had never changed it. She agreed that the end of the form had asked her to confirm the accuracy of the information and that she had not been giving Centrelink an accurate picture.
12. Following the birth of her second child with AP in July 2020, the Respondent provided a Newborn Child Declaration form to Centrelink on 13 August 2020. In the form she used Address 4 (which she had left as of mid-2017). When asked why she had used this address, she stated she had no idea. In response to the Applicants' assertion that the use of the address was so the Respondent could claim parenting payment (single) and wanted to look like she was living at a different address to AP, the Respondent stated she didn't have an answer to that. In the form, the Respondent had stated no to the question, "Do you have a partner?" When asked about this representation on the form, the Respondent stated that this was according to the date she gave a court.
13. The Respondent agreed she had received family tax benefit in the 2019/20 financial year. In response to the observation that she hadn't reported a partner, she stated not consistently, no.
14. The Respondent agreed she had used Address 4 again for a crisis payment claim on 14 February 2021, stating she didn't update her address. She contacted Centrelink on 24 September 2021 to update her address to Address 5 from 28 July 2021 and, when asked whether this had been truthful, stated she doesn't really recall. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal considers that the Respondent had been at Address 5 since February 2019.
15. The Respondent was taken to a record of contact between herself and a fraud investigator which had occurred on 28 September 2021. The record of contact reflects the Respondent as advising she had been at Address 4 until a month prior to the conversation and had been living there alone with her children. The Respondent agreed she had had provided false information to the fraud investigator and accepted the information was incorrect. When asked about her representation that, at the time of the conversation, she was residing with her parents and not paying any rent, she stated that she was going to her parents to get away, but couldn't stay there the whole time because her children were attending school. She confirmed she was not living there.
16. The Respondent told the fraud investigator that her boyfriend (referencing an alias used by AP) was the father of her two youngest children, she had never lived with him and they had not supported each other financially. When taken to this record, the Respondent stated that she agreed she had never lived with him full-time, and she was surprised how much money had gone back and forth as he was not supporting her. As to her indication to the investigator, when asked to spell his name, that she could not do so and couldn't provide his date of birth, the Respondent stated that she was declining to do so.
17. The Respondent provided an accommodation details form to Centrelink on 20 October 2021 in which she stated she had moved into Address 5 in October 2020. She stated in the form that she didn't have a partner and, when asked whether this was incorrect, stated she is inclined to say it was a lie.
18. The Respondent's parenting payment (single) was cancelled on 16 December 2021 and she submitted a claim for parenting payment (partnered) on the same date, advising that she was living at Address 5 and that she was in a de facto relationship with a relationship date of 16 December 2021, but they were unable to live together until 25 February 2022 due to "respite / care". When taken to the claim form at hearing, the Respondent stated she had no memory of advising the relationship had commenced on 16 December 2021, but feels like she did this because her other payment was cancelled and she was putting in the date she completed the form. When asked about the respite / care arrangement indicated in the form, she stated she was not sure, AP has been a carer for one of his children, but she is not 100% sure that he was requiring care.
19. Taking into account the above evidence, the Tribunal found that the debts in this case were not caused by sole administrative error by Centrelink. The Applicant's failure to advise Centrelink that she was partnered with AP meant that Centrelink did not have complete information about her circumstances to determine the correct rate of the various payments she received. The Applicant and AP's failure to advise of the amounts being received by AP, and the Respondent's incorrect representation to Centrelink about where she was residing, also meant that Centrelink did not have necessary information to determine the Respondent's correct rates of payment.
20. Numerous letters were sent to the Respondent during the debt periods and these were discussed with her at the hearing. Her consistent response regarding the notices was that she had not read or engaged with any of the information Centrelink was sending to her.
21. In circumstances where the Respondent was being sent notices by Centrelink which set out her reporting obligations, where she did not read any of the notices sent to her, where she did not advise of her correct relationship status or correct address, and where she and AP did not advise of the significant transactions being made into AP's bank account that were assessable in terms of the Respondent's rates of payment, administrative error has not caused (or even necessarily contributed to) any of the debts in this matter. The social security debts are unable to be waived under section 1237A of the Social Security Act. The family assistance debts are unable to be waived under section 97 of the Family Assistance Administration Act.

1. Section 1237AAD of the Social Security Act provides for discretionary waiver of a debt in the following circumstances:

The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that:

(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:

(i) making a false statement or a false representation; or

(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act, the Administration Act or the 1947 Act; and

(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and

(c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.

1. Section 101 of the Family Assistance Administration Act provides the equivalent provisions with respect to discretionary waiver of family assistance debts, but refers to a failure or omission to comply with a provision of the family assistance law.
2. In Wall and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2010] AATA 740 (at [28]-[29]) the AAT stated that:[6]

In Taylor's Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd v Roper [1951] WN 383 at 385, Devlin J considered the meaning of "knowledge" and found that actual knowledge can be inferred form the evidence and the nature of the acts done. Further, in RCA Corporation v Customs Cleared Sales Pty Ltd (1978) 19 ALR 123 at 125, the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court of New South Wales said:

In inferring knowledge, a court is entitled to approach the matter in two stages; where opportunities for knowledge on the part of the particular person are proved and there is nothing to indicate that there are obstacles to the particular person acquiring the relevant knowledge, there is some evidence from which the court can conclude that such a person has the knowledge. However, this conclusion may be easily overturned by a denial on his part of the knowledge which the court accepts, or by a demonstration that he is properly excused from giving evidence of his actual knowledge.

Following the decision in RCA Corporation, it is open to the Tribunal to infer that a person had actual knowledge of their obligations under the Act where there were opportunities for them to gain that knowledge and where there were no obstacles to them acquiring the knowledge. In the present case, the respondent sent letters to the Applicant notifying him of his obligations under the Act.

1. As noted above, the Respondent was sent a number of notices between 2015 and 2022 which set out her notification requirements, required her to advise if she was in a de facto relationship and set out a definition of "income" relevant to determining her rates of payment.
2. In addition, the Tribunal noted that subsection 66A(1) of the Social Security Administration Act provides a general obligation on a person who has made a claim for a social security payment, which has either been granted or not yet determined, to advise of any event or change of circumstances that might affect the payment within 14 days of the event or change occurring. This obligation - for example, to advise of combined income that impacts a rate of payment - existed aside from the obligations imposed on the specific notices sent to the Respondent. The Tribunal noted that an equivalent provision exists under section 25 of the Family Assistance Administration Act, with respect to notification of matters affecting a person's rate of family tax benefit.
3. The Tribunal has found that the Respondent and AP were partnered between November 2015 and March 2022. The Tribunal did not accept the Respondent's assertions that she had contacted Centrelink on several occasions to discuss her relationship. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent was receiving parenting payment (single) while residing with AP, while they were both representing to the wider community on social media that they were partnered, throughout the births of their children in February 2018 and July 2020 and while they were supporting each other financially through a large range of transactions between their accounts. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent knew she was partnered with AP and, given her evidence of contacting Centrelink to check her relationship status, that she knew she was required to advise Centrelink if she was partnered because of the potential impact to her payments. The Tribunal finds that, in failing or omitting to advise Centrelink of her relationship between November 2015 and December 2021, the Respondent failed to comply with sections 66A of the Social Security Administration Act and 25 of the Family Assistance Administration Act, and that this failure or omission was done knowingly.
4. The Respondent provided a rent certificate to Centrelink on 4 November 2015 in which she represented that AP, in the name of one of his aliases, was her landlord at Address 2. The Tribunal has found, above, that the Respondent was not residing at Address 2 and finds that AP was not her landlord at Address 2. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent provided a false statement to Centrelink in the rent certificate and that, because she knew the information in the rent certificate was incorrect, the false statement was made knowingly.
5. The Respondent contacted Centrelink on 7 April 2016 to advise that her children had left her care and were in AP's care. The Respondent asserted she had not provided any such information to Centrelink. The Tribunal did not accept this assertion, on the basis that the Tribunal has no reasonable grounds to find that the record made by a Centrelink customer service officer was inaccurate and on the basis that AP proceeded to be paid family tax benefit without contacting to advise that this was incorrect. The Respondent was clear in her evidence at the hearing that her children had never been out of her care. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent provided a false statement to Centrelink on 7 April 2016 about the care arrangements for her children and that this false statement was made knowingly, on the basis that the Respondent knew her children remained in her care at the time the statement was made.
6. The Respondent was investigated in respect of the alleged overpayments by a fraud investigator, at which time she advised she had only just moved from Address 4 and that AP was her boyfriend and she was unable to spell his name or provide his birthdate. The Respondent acknowledged at the hearing that this information had been incorrect. The Tribunal finds that, in her discussions with a fraud investigator, the Respondent provided a false statement or representation and that this was done knowingly.
7. Having regard to the evidence given by AP at the hearing, the Tribunal has found that AP made false representations to Centrelink that his marital status was divorced and/or separated and that he was aware he was required to declare significant amounts being received into his bank accounts as income to Centrelink.
8. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent's debts have arisen, at least partly, from the Respondent and another person knowingly providing false statements and representations to Centrelink and knowingly failing or omitting to comply with provisions of the relevant legislation. Given this finding, the social security debts are unable to be waived under section 1237AAD of the Social Security Act and the family assistance debts are unable to be waived under section 101 of the Family Assistance Administration Act.
9. No other provisions relating to non-recovery of debts, as set out in Part 5.4 of the Social Security Act, are relevant to the Respondent's circumstances. The Respondent's debts are all recoverable by the Commonwealth.

• The Respondent was a member of a couple between 30 November 2015 and 30 March 2022;
• The Respondent's parenting payment (single) was correctly cancelled from 14 December 2021;
• The Respondent owes debts to the Commonwealth for overpayment of parenting payment of $927.79 in the period 30 November 2015 to 6 April 2016 and $100,061.44 in the period 25 April 2017 to 30 March 2022;
• Overpayments of family tax benefit for the period 12 April 2017 to 20 June 2017, and for the 2017/18, 2018/19, 2019/2020 and 2020/21 financial years, and a newborn upfront payment paid on 28 March 2018, are to be recalculated by the Applicants and any amounts recalculated are debts owed to the Commonwealth by the Respondent;
• The Respondent owes a debt to the Commonwealth for overpayment of child care benefit of $10,692.18 for the period 3 July 2017 to 1 July 2018;
• The Respondent owes a debt to the Commonwealth for overpayment of covid supplement of $9,250 for the period 27 April 2020 to 13 April 2021;
• The Respondent owes a debt to the Commonwealth for overpayment of an economic support payment paid on 2 April 2020; and
• The debts are all recoverable by the Commonwealth.

[3] Cited in Applicants' SFIC at paragraph 6.14.

[4] Cited in Applicant's SFIC at paragraph 8.28.

[5] Cited in Applicant's SFIC at paragraph 8.29.

[6] Cited in Applicant's SFIC at paragraph 10.34.