1. Section 72 of the ADA indicates the consequences upon reviewing the rejection or dismissal of a complaint.
2. With regard to the review of rejection of a complaint, if I am satisfied that the ADC made the correct decision in rejecting the complaint, the complaint lapses. Section 72 also provides that if on reviewing the rejection of the complaint I am not satisfied that the ADC made the correct decision, I am to refer the complaint back to the ADC for investigation.
3. It is clear that my powers to review the rejection of this complaint are also governed by the Tribunal's review jurisdiction under the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (the TASCAT Act), refer to s 74(1) and s 75(3).
4. The law relating to the Tribunal's role in determining the review of a rejection and dismissal of a complaint pursuant to s 72 of the ADA, has been authoritatively stated by the Supreme Court to be a comprehensive merits review. This review process is not confined to the material which was before the ADC - see Porter J in the State of Tasmania v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal and Ors [2009] TASSC 48 at [27]- [29].
5. Of particular relevance at [47] of this decision, Porter J stated:

Thus, when s 72 speaks of the Tribunal being satisfied or not that the Commissioner "made a correct decision", it means that the question is whether the decision was the correct one on the material before the Tribunal. The extent of such material is to be governed by relevance. That is the interpretation which accords with the remedial nature of the legislation and which better promotes its objects.

6. This is consistent with s 75(5) of the TASCAT Act which states:

Subject to subsections (4), (5), (6) and (7) and the provisions of a relevant Act, if a reviewable decision, to which an application for review made to the Tribunal relates, is a decision in relation to an Act, or regulations or an instrument made under an Act, that is not an Act to which subsection (2) applies, the review by the Tribunal of the reviewable decision is to be by way of a rehearing of the matter to which the reviewable decision relates.

1. The first basis of the rejection of complainant's complaint by the ADC was pursuant to s 65(1)(b) of the ADA which indicated that the complainant's complaint did not relate to discrimination or prohibited conduct.
2. As was stated by Deputy President Grueber in Elliot v Hobart City Council [2024] TASCAT 203 at [26]:

The phrase "does not relate to discrimination", s 64(1)(b) requires consideration of whether the matters complained of might amount to discrimination under the Act. The focus of s 64(1)(b) is on the complainant's case. It involves consideration of whether the complaint displays an insufficient connection to discrimination rather than a determination of whether discrimination has or has not occurred. It cannot mean a final determination that the conduct complained of amounts in fact and in law to discrimination. That is a matter for the Tribunal on inquiry. The functions of the Commissioner are listed in s 6 of the Act. They include to investigate and seek to resolve complaints, but not to conduct an inquiry.

3. The ADC found that there was no less favourable treatment of the complainant, there being no nexus between the complainant's attributes and the respondents' conduct complained of.
4. Although the ADC stated that as the complaint had been rejected on the basis of s 64(1)(b) and although the ADC's decision did not turn on the application of s 24 of the Act, for completeness sake, reference to that exception was also made by the ADC.
5. Section 24 of the ADA states:

24. Actions required by law > > A person may discriminate against another person if it is reasonably necessary to comply with -

(a) Any law of this State or the Commonwealth; or

(b) Any order of a Commission, Court or Tribunal.

1. The ADC stated that on the information before it there was no evidence that the respondents had gone outside the bounds of the Family Court of Australia order of 31 May 2024 in advising the complainant of the intended and expected communication arrangements between the complainant and the respondents. The ADC further stated that it appeared that if it were found that NQ was discriminated against by the respondents in their compliance with the Family Court of Australia order, that exception pursuant to s 24(a) of the ADA completely answered the complainant's complaint, rendering it obviously hopeless or untenable.
2. In making these comments, the ADC relied upon the decision of Delaney v Liberal Party of Australia (Tas) [2008] TASADT 2 at [26]- [29].

1. The respondents in their written submissions have asserted that the complainant's "Defamation Concerns Notice" of 24 May 2024, and significant of the contents of the complainant's affidavit of 23 June 2025, which was provided with his written submissions subsequent to his review application being referred to the Tribunal, is irrelevant to this review process and should either be excluded from my consideration, or given little weight.
2. It is clear from Porter J's decision in the State of Tasmania v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal & Others (supra) that the extent to which material not before the ADC but subsequently put before the Tribunal is to be governed by relevance.
3. Having reviewed this material, I consider it to have some relevance to this review application, but only on the basis indicated by the complainant, of it giving some context to the circumstances leading to the respondents' letter to him of 24 June 2024. Save for this consideration, it is otherwise of little relevance in this review process, and consequently I give it little weight.

1. The ADC's rejection of the complainant's complaint on the basis that it did not relate to discrimination or prohibited conduct was because of its finding that there was no evidence provided by the complainant that there was a nexus between the respondents' complained of behaviours in providing him with the letter of 24 June 2024, and the complainant's asserted attributes of marital status, relationship status, or parental status.
2. Even considering the additional materials provided by the complainant during the Tribunal proceedings, I am not persuaded that the ADC made an incorrect decision in this finding.
3. I accept the respondents' submissions that within the complainant's submissions he has clarified the basis of his discrimination complaint to be of three ways. First in his submissions he has noted:

[NC's] letter of 24 June 2024 was intended to restrict my participation in [P]'s education and to exclude me as a parent. I received it only because I am a divorced parent, who is subject to court orders.

4. Secondly and thirdly, the complainant has submitted that he received less favourable treatment, stating that "authorised communications" and "general communications" were not undertaken.
5. With regard to the first basis of alleged discrimination, the ADC and the respondent's solicitors have relied upon the reasoning in authoritative cases dealing with the requirement for the complainant to provide evidence of a nexus or connection between the complained of conduct, and his claimed attributes.
6. In Cassidy v Rotor-Lift Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] TASADT 8, the Tribunal stated at [48]:

As was discussed in Drummond v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2008] VCAT 2630 every person possesses some attributes as defined in s16. At [57] of that decision, Deputy President McNamara said: > > "Most people in one form or another possess most of the attributes. It is a frequent experience in this List that people who feel they have been unjustly dealt with whether in employment or other contexts identify what they see as unfair treatment and their possession of one or more attributes leaping to the allegation then that they have been the victims of direct discrimination. If this mode of argument were acceptable every instance of unfair dismissal for instance would also be an instance of direct discrimination because every unjustly or allegedly unjustly dismissed employee possesses certain attributes."

7. In Costello v Tasmania Police [2012] TASADT 9, the Tribunal stated at [37]:

This claim of discrimination fits into the category dealt with the Tribunal in Von Stalheim v KPMG ( 2003) TASADT 12. The complainant asserts that he possesses certain attributes. In this case those relate to his sexual orientation and disabilities. He is, essentially, dissatisfied with his treatment at the hands of the respondent. He has formed the view that the basis of the respondent's conduct and decision making in his regard is based upon those attributes. At base he asks that an inference should be drawn that the Act has been transgressed because of the existence of an attribute and his dissatisfaction with the respondent's action and decisions. There is no evidence to support that conclusion that there is any link between the two. The purpose of an inquiry is not to give the complainant an opportunity to "fish" for evidence that might provide the required nexus.

8. Applying these principles, I agree with the ADC that there was no evidence before the ADC of any nexus or connection between the conduct of the respondents and the complainant's asserted attributes. The ADC clearly and correctly recognised that the Family Court of Australia order of 31 May 2024 acted as authority to all schools attended by NQ's son, and that it was appropriate for the respondents to write that letter to NQ on 24 June 2024.
9. The letter on its face does no more than set out and clarify communication arrangements which would be expected following an order of this nature.
10. Having considered the complainant's "Defamations Concerns Notice" of 24 May 2025, in all of the circumstances, the respondents' letter to the complainant of 24 June 2024 was appropriate.
11. In an email to the Tribunal dated 3 April 2025 the complainant stated:

The OADC made a significant administrative error in formulating my complaint. My follow-ups to [NC] (cc The Secretaries of DECYP and DPAC) of 25th July 2025 and 3rd October 2025 were part of my complaint. The failure of the Tasmanian Government to respond to those communications is part of the less favourable treatment I allege.

12. Even accepting that there was no response from the respondents to the complainant's emails of 25 July 2025 and 3 October 2025, there is no evidence that the respondents' lack of response to the complainant was because of his claimed attributes.
13. In his email of 25 July 2024 the complainant asserts that the respondents had not responded to him in "a timely manner", as indicated in the final paragraph in the respondent's letter of 24 June 2024.
14. It appears the complainant's assertion is that by 25 July 2025 there had been no response at all to his email to NC at the email address advised to him, which he had sent on 24 June 2024 at 16:18, being shortly after he had received the respondents' letter bearing that date. Within the complainant's email of 16:18 on 24 June 2024 he concludes by saying "I strongly suggest you rescind these purported instructions, immediately. Let me know when you've decided to do that".
15. Clearly, by 25 July 2024 the respondents had not made such a decision.
16. The complainant's email of 25 July 2024 was not responded to by the respondents before the complainant's email of 3 October 2024.
17. Although inviting a response from the respondents, the complainant based this requirement on statements he made in his email of 25 July 2024 regarding the effect of the respondents' letter to him of 24 June 2024.
18. The following within his email of 25 July 2024 is of particular relevance:

19. You have no legal to insist I communicate with my son's school in this highly restrictive manner?
20. That your communication is likely in breach of State and Federal laws (eg Anti-Discrimination State Service Act etc)?; and that
21. Wilfully breaching State and Federal laws may cause you to be investigated and disciplined?

As I'm sure you do know, the House is currently conducting an inquiry into bullying in schools. I feel confident Ms E and the other members will be interested in your correspondence. > > Perhaps you would like to respond to my email of the 24th and to the questions above? (my emphasis)

22. Again, the assertions in that correspondence were clearly not agreed to by the respondents. Referencing the Family Court of Australia orders of 31 May 2024 it is unsurprising that there was no response to the complainant.
23. There is no evidence of less favourable treatment because of the respondents' behaviours in not responding to the complainant's emails as he asserted they should have.
24. By 24 June 2024, the Family Court of Australia order was in place, having been made on 31 May 2024. There had clearly been issues as between the complainant and the respondents prior to the complainant's child commencing at his new school on 24 June 2024 and that this clearly was the reason for the respondents' letter.
25. With regard to the other two bases of the complainant's assertion that he was discriminated against by the respondents, the complainant makes much of his own concerns about not approaching the school subsequent to receipt of the respondents' letter of 24 June 2024. The complainant asserts that this letter was intended to restrict his participation in his son's education and to exclude him as a parent.
26. I agree with the respondents' submissions that the complainant was not restricted by the contents of this letter as he asserts. Paragraph 24 of the Family Court of Australia order of 31 May 2024 clearly indicates that these orders act as authority to all schools to provide to each of the parents all information and documentation "sought by them" in relation to the matters outlined in that paragraph. On the evidence, neither this order, nor the respondents' letter of 24 June 2024 provides automatic access to this information.
27. Significant of the complainant's evidence related to him not seeking material, but when he did so, there was clear evidence that this material was provided to him. The clearest example of this is his email request on 18 September 2024 for a copy of the school newsletter. This was provided to him in response to that request on 24 September 2024.
28. With regard to the complainant's allegations of victimisation, I do not consider that the ADC, on the evidence before it, nor considering all of the evidence before me, made an incorrect decision to reject this aspect of the complainant's complaint on the basis that it that there was no evidence of any of the respondents' behaviours being because of the protected conduct provisions of s 18 of the ADA.
29. The ADC correctly stated the law when it referenced the decision of Lucy Orchard v Frayne Higgins [2020] TASADT 11.
30. On all the evidence, I agree that the complainant has not demonstrated any detriment by his receipt of the letter of 24 June 2024, nor by his references in his correspondence of 24 June 2024 to pursuing an anti-discrimination complaint.
31. With regard to the ADC's reference to s 24 of the ADA, the ADC was again in my view correct in its referencing of this provision and its relevance to the complainant's complaint, even if a finding of discriminatory conduct was able to be made against the respondents.
32. The Family Court of Australia order of 31 May 2024 was clearly made pursuant to the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975, this clearly being a law of the Commonwealth.
33. On any assessment, it was reasonably necessary for the respondents to comply with this order when its terms are considered and on the evidence, I agree that the s 24 exemption would be capable of completely answering the complainant's complaint even if discrimination were established by him against the respondents.
34. On the authority of Delaney v Liberal Party of Australia (Tas) (supra), this would render the complainant's complaint obviously hopeless and untenable.
35. I find that the ADC made the correct decision in rejecting the complainant's compliant, and that pursuant to s 72(1) of the ADA, the complaint lapses.

1. The complainant's complaint lapses pursuant to s 72(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998.