"On those facts it is a serious offence because of the number and nature of the wounds that occurred. To the extent that there are any mitigating factors it is that you were probably to some extent under the influence of alcohol and at that stage in an emotional rage."

At the time of committing the offence the applicant was some 43 years of age. His prior record before committing this offence was not particularly serious, but the learned Judge noted that the applicant had been convicted of serious sexual offences involving his daughters, for which he had been sentenced to a total of 15 years' imprisonment eligibility for parole. The learned Judge went on to say:

"Now, in fixing the appropriate sentence today I can't fail but have regard to the fact that you are going to be imprisoned for a long time and for that reason the term of imprisonment that otherwise would have been imposed will be reduced. In my view, having regard to the seriousness of this present offence, ordinarily you could have expected to be sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, but having regard to the principle of totality and the fact that you are already serving a long term I am going to reduce that term to 2 years' imprisonment. That term of imprisonment is to be cumulative on your existing term and you are to be eligible for parole. So you have got another 2 years on top and you are eligible for parole."

The application for leave to appeal against sentence is made on the following grounds:

"(1) the sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances;

(2) the learned trial Judge failed to attach sufficient regard to the totality principle given the fact that the applicant is serving 12 years and 9 months' imprisonment for other unrelated offences;

(3) the Court failed to take into account the accused's otherwise previous good record, an absence of convictions for violence, the provocation offered by the complainant, and the presence of alcohol."

As previously noted, the sentence he was in fact serving was one of imprisonment for 15 years. The application for an extension of time was not filed until 20 April 1998; that is to say, almost a year out of time. There is no explanation for the delay in the papers and the circumstances are such that even taking into account the fact that the applicant was, at one stage, unrepresented the application for an extension of time could only now be granted, as the applicant's counsel concedes, if it were demonstrated that there was a substantial miscarriage of justice involved in the sentencing process.

In my opinion it is clear from the papers that the sentence which was imposed was entirely appropriate and the grounds of appeal are completely devoid of any merit whatsoever. In those circumstances I consider that the application should be refused.