1. At the time the DPO was issued in March 2024, the Applicant had accrued a debt of $26,024.58, comprising $24,446.49 in child support arrears and $1,578.09 in accumulated penalties. He had paid no child support at any time since the Agency became responsible for collection. His position had been, and continues to be, that he refused to make any payment until there was a satisfactory assessment (in his view) of the mother's financial position in particular. He considered his assessed child support liability to be excessive. Given this, and the steps he was taking to contest the assessments, he considered the making of the DPO to be disproportionate and wrong.

1. On 29 July 2025, a hearing by video commenced. Prior to this date, the Applicant had indicated he wished to call his two daughters to give evidence. He confirmed this at the start of the hearing. I noted that section 98A of the Collection Act prohibited a non-adult child of the parents giving oral evidence to the Tribunal in review proceedings which related to the child. The DPO decisions under review related directly to the Applicant, and not the children. However, I considered there to be sound policy reasons why the section 98A approach should also apply in this case. I determined not to hear from the children.
2. It then became apparent that the Applicant had not been aware that a deal of supplementary documentation had been filed by the Respondent Registrar. This material had been emailed to him but it seemed he had overlooked it. I stood the matter down for a period to give the Applicant a chance to peruse the material. Upon resumption, the Applicant indicated there was too much for him to be able to properly consider it in the time available. In the result, despite the Applicant having had the material and thus an opportunity to consider it before the hearing, I granted an adjournment of the hearing until 7 October 2025 to afford him sufficient time to properly prepare.
3. The Applicant subsequently renewed his request for his eldest daughter to give evidence, either by way of written statement or orally. He did so by email. In response, the Registrar pointed to subsection 98A of the Collection Act and observed the prohibition did not apply to this case, since this is not a first review matter as defined in section 4. The Registrar also referred to paragraph 4.4 of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Child Support) Practice Direction 2024 which does not permit a child to be present during a hearing. This would mean, if leave was given for the child to give a written statement, she could not be questioned on it.
4. I considered the Tribunal's Child Support Practice Direction does not apply in these proceedings: see the note to paragraph 1.12 relating to decisions covered by this Practice Direction. It excludes decisions under section 72T of the Collection Act, which is the provision which permits a person to apply to the Tribunal for review of decisions under sections 72I, 72L and 72M of the Collection Act. The decisions not to revoke or vary the DPO before me were decisions under section 72I. The result is that Administrative Review Tribunal (Common Procedures) Practice Direction 2024 applies here. It is silent on the issue of a child giving evidence.
5. I had previously declined to permit the child to give oral evidence. In my view, similar and significant policy reasons weighed against permitting written evidence instead. The potential perception of a child siding with one parent, which might be construed as being against the other parent, weighed heavily against permitting evidence from the child in any form. Further, there was no apparent reason why the Applicant could not give evidence himself as to the claimed impact of the DPO on the children. Accordingly, I also declined to permit written evidence from the child.
6. The substantive hearing proceeded on 7 October 2025.

1. At hearing, the Applicant's primary issue concerned what he sees as the excessive and unfair child support assessments. The Applicant acknowledged that, in the Agency's view, he has accrued a significant level of debt which he was legally obliged to pay. However, he disagreed with this view and it is clear enough he does not really accept the debt is lawfully owing. His view of the underlying child support assessment is that his income, up to May 2025, is considerably overstated whereas the mother's income and resources are significantly understated. He contended there had been no proper merits review of these issues and he referred to "clear evidence" his position on the assessments would prevail in due course. His contention is that, on a proper consideration of the merits, he would not be assessed as liable to pay any child support for the period from August 2022 to May 2025. He submitted he had no capacity to pay the debt in full in any event.
2. The Applicant also expressed concern that, were he to make any child support payments and his position eventually succeeded, the mother would have to repay him and he wanted to avoid such a potentially difficult situation. He referred to a lengthy history of litigation which had largely been driven by the mother in his view. He did not wish to prolong potential further litigation or proceedings in order to recover monies which might be overpaid to her.
3. The Applicant also submitted that the making of and continuation of the DPO was not in the best interests of the children. The dynamics between the parents had been on manageable terms until the DPO came into existence. Since then, things have deteriorated and there has been a noticeable and adverse impact on both children. The Applicant gave evidence that the children both disagreed with the DPO. I note there is also evidence to support the contention that the Applicant's mental health has been adversely affected by the DPO and its continuing effect.
4. The Applicant contested any view he was a flight risk so that the DPO was necessary because he might flee the country. I note the Registrar does not make such a submission before me in any event.
5. Overall, the Applicant contends the continuation of the DPO is disproportionate in his case. He relies on his disagreement with the assessments, the adverse impact on the children and the upset to the family dynamics which he considers not to be in the children's best interests. He seeks revocation of the DPO or, in the alternative, variation so as to allow him to travel overseas without the impact of the current prohibition. He accepts this would effectively render the DPO of no practical effect. He gave evidence of having made up to five Departure Authorisation Certificate (DAC) applications which had been refused and considered this potential avenue for gaining permission to travel overseas would not assist him in future.

1. The power to revoke or vary a DPO is found in section 72I of the Collection Act, which relevantly provides:

Revocation and variation of departure prohibition orders

(1) The Registrar must revoke a departure prohibition order in respect of a person if:

(a) the person no longer has a child support liability or carer liability; or

(b) the person has a child support liability or carer liability, but arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar have been made for the liability to be wholly discharged; or

(c) the person has a child support liability or carer liability, but the Registrar is satisfied that the liability is completely irrecoverable.

(3) The Registrar may also, at the Registrar's discretion, revoke or vary a departure prohibition order in respect of a person if the Registrar considers it desirable to do so.

This is not a case where mandatory revocation under subsection 72I(1) has any potential application. The Applicant has a current and significant child support liability. He has made no payments and has demonstrated he is not prepared to make arrangements to pay his debt. His own position that his income should be assessed at $100,000 per annum indicates he has some capacity to pay. There is no suggestion that his child support liability is otherwise irrecoverable.

1. The essence of the Applicant's case is directed to seeking a favourable exercise of discretion under subsection 72I(3) of the Collection Act. In this respect, I accept the Applicant is not a flight risk and, were he permitted to travel overseas, he would return to his and his children's well-established lives in Australia. However, this is only one factor to be considered; it does not mean the DPO should be revoked or varied.
2. Much of the Applicant's case amounts to an attack on the decision to issue the DPO itself. As noted above, I am not reviewing that decision. However, if I took the view there was some fundamental error in the making of the DPO decision, I consider I would be entitled to take that into account in reviewing the decision not to revoke the DPO. The material before me does not indicate any such fundamental error. Having regard to the factors detailed in section 72D of the Collection Act, it was plainly open to the Registrar to issue the DPO.
3. It is important for the Applicant to understand that I am not, on these applications, conducting a review, in any way, of the underlying child support assessments. In this respect, I agree with the AAT's observations in O'Neill and Child Support Registrar [2010] AATA 545 at [16]- [18] that, in the context of review decisions not to revoke or vary a DPO, the existing child support assessments which underpin the Applicant's debt are to be regarded as final.
4. When the mother applied for the Agency collection of child support in 2022 (or registration of the maintenance liability in the language of section 25 of the Collection Act), the effect was that amounts of child support due but not paid became debts owing to the Commonwealth: see subsection 30(1) of the Collection Act. If child support payments were made, the Agency would then transfer these funds to the mother.
5. As he was entitled to do, the Applicant has challenged the basis of the assessments before the AAT and this Tribunal and taken proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court. To date, each of his challenges has failed. It is difficult then to understand how he can sensibly claim "clear evidence" his position on the assessments will ultimately prevail.
6. It follows that I give no weight to the Applicant's contentions about the level of the child support assessments.
7. The Applicant relies on his contention the DPO has adversely affected his children and the interactions between the parents. I am prepared to accept there has been some impact in this context. However, it seems to me this is likely to largely be attributable to the conduct and responses of the parents in the context of the DPO. I also take into account that it is the parents who have the primary duty to ensure the best interests of the children.
8. The Applicant maintains he has no capacity to pay the whole of the debt in any event. I note his evidence of a number of unsuccessful DAC applications. I infer he had sufficient funds to undertake overseas travel if permitted. His level of debt has increased because he has failed to make any child support payments over the last three years or more. Whilst it may well be that the Applicant is unable to make full payment immediately, I am satisfied he had, and continues to have, capacity to make payments towards satisfaction of the debt.
9. In his material, the Applicant refers to AAT and Federal Court decisions in support of his applications. Pattenden v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1590 involved an application challenging the issuance of a DPO by the Commissioner of Taxation. The Court considered, inter alia, issues of delegation. Importantly, whilst the responsible delegate had approved a DPO on the basis a particular amount was owed, a subordinate, unauthorised officer included a different sum when the DPO issued. This was sufficient for the Court to allow the application to revoke the DPO. There was also evidence that Mr Pattenden was prepared to meaningfully engage with the ATO in respect of the debt. The Court was satisfied he was not a flight risk such as to impede recovery (he had relocated to New Zealand which had little impact on the prospect of recovery). Here, I am not reviewing the decision to issue the DPO. Nor is there any evidence that the Applicant has been prepared to discuss or engage with the Agency in terms of making child support payments. I do not consider Pattenden assists the Applicant's case before me.
10. In Kenyon and Child Support Registrar [2012] AATA 714, the AAT decided to revoke a DPO. Mr Kenyon had a significant child support liability and an "appalling" payment history. His only income was the age pension and he and his wife wished to relocate to an overseas country where it was cheaper to live than in Australia. His debt was being paid by modest deductions from his fortnightly pension payments. The AAT was satisfied the Mr Kenyon had no other income and that was unlikely to change. It also found he had no greater capacity to pay his debt. Provisional on it being confirmed that his pension payments would continue if he moved overseas, so that ongoing deductions could continue, the AAT determined it was desirable to revoke the DPO in the particular circumstances of the case. In my view, Kenyon bears little relation to the case before me. Here, the Applicant is not reliant on Centrelink payments. I am satisfied he has capacity to make payments towards his debt. To date, he has refused to do so.
11. I note that Courts have described a DPO as a "form of security" for the debt, albeit not in a legal proprietary sense, as well as an "incentive" to encourage payment: see Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCA 43 at [291] and Onder & Child Support Registrar and Sari (No. 2) [2011] FMCAfam 430 at [91] respectively. In Whittaker, at [317], the Court observed that making a DPO was part of a wide-ranging scheme designed to further the principal objects in section 3 of the Collection Act. The principal objects include that children receive financial support that their parents are liable to provide and that periodic child support is paid on a regular and timely basis.
12. An updated section 116(1) certificate shows the Applicant's child support arrears as at 6 October 2025 amount to $40,622.98. His total debt owing is $47,992.27, including $7,369.29 in penalties. In this context, I do not accept the Applicant's submission that the continuation of the DPO is a disproportionate response in his case. I agree with the Registrar's submission that, if the DPO was to be revoked, there would then be no incentive at all for him to contemplate paying the debt. Whilst the Applicant has been steadfast in his refusal to pay to date, that does not mean he may not change his attitude in the future. The potential "incentive" aspect of the DPO's existence continues to have relevance.
13. I accept that the current prohibition on the Applicant travelling overseas is a significant infringement upon him. Having regard to the principal objects of the Collection Act referred to above, I am not persuaded that it desirable to revoke the DPO. I note the Applicant's contention that its continuation operates to make him even more determined not to pay but I do not consider this factor assists his case.
14. In relation to his claim for variation, the Applicant effectively seeks something akin to a permanent stay of the DPO. The Collection Act includes provisions which might enable the Applicant to travel overseas for a discrete period should he successfully apply for a DAC in respect of such travel. Of course, there are specific requirements he would have to meet in this context: see section 72L of the Collection Act. I do not consider it would be a proper exercise of discretion to accede to the Applicant's case for variation. To do so would be to circumvent the provisions Parliament has seen fit to make in respect of permission to travel overseas whilst a DPO is in force.
15. I note the Child Support Guide indicates the power to vary a DPO should only be exercised to correct an error on its face; it should not be varied to allow departure from Australia. This approach has been accepted previously by the AAT: see Confidential and Child Support Registrar [2013] AATA 81. In the interests of consistency of decision-making, I also adopt this approach. The Applicant has not suggested there is any such error, nor is any such error apparent to me.
16. For these reasons, I am satisfied that both decisions before me, to refuse to revoke the DPO and to refuse to vary it, should be affirmed.