1. On 7 November 2024, the Tribunal sent the Applicant a letter by email advising him that the application fee was outstanding. Another letter was sent to him by email on 16 December 2024. It included the following content:

I am writing to you about your application for review of a decision which we received on 6 November 2024. We wrote to you on 7 November 2024 to tell you that an application fee must be paid before we can start the review.

We can dismiss an application if a fee is not paid within 6 weeks after the application is lodged.

If we do not hear from you within 14 days of the date of this letter, your application may be dismissed.

1. On 30 January 2025, the Applicant sent an email to the Tribunal. It included the following:

I am writing to express my concern that I may not be receiving all correspondence from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Recently, I received communication from the Child Support Agency (CSA) indicating that I may be required to take certain actions in the matters I presently have with the CSA.I respectfully do not rely solely on their statements and would like to verify any relevant information directly with the AAT.

Currently, I am unable to confirm this information through my emails. Is there a case management portal, similar to ComCourts, that provides comprehensive access to my case details and updates? I have found the AAT portal to be quite limited in the information it offers.

If no such portal is available, I am happy to create a new email address dedicated specifically to communications regarding these issues, should the AAT be willing to accommodate this approach.

Finally, if there are any payments I need to make or actions I must take, I would appreciate it if you could advise me directly.

Thank you for your understanding and attention to this matter. Please let me know if there are additional steps I should take to ensure I remain informed and compliant.

It appears that no response was provided to the Applicant. I note he had other matters before the Tribunal in January 2025 and his email did not refer to any particular application number. The email address he used applied to first review applications (including first review child support applications) to the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal. This application is not a first review application. My enquiries reveal this email address was still 'live" until May 2025. I also note the Applicant had paid an application fee in respect of a previous application (2024/5755) which is to be heard in the near future.

1. By "order" dated 24 March 2025, this application was dismissed because the Applicant had not paid the application fee. A notice of this decision was sent to him on 25 March 2025.
2. the Applicant promptly responded by email asking how to appeal this decision. It seems there was no difficulty receiving Tribunal emails at that stage. Subsequently, on 4 April 2025, he applied for reinstatement. His email included:

in response to your email I again request reinstatement of this matter,

1. To be advised if there were any outstanding payments,

2. If there were any other matters that required my attendance,

3. That I did not appear to be receiving all tribunal notices; and

4. Whether there was a case management tool where I could review the progress of my matters.

Whilst I appreciate this email may have been overlooked, I respectfully request reinstatement of this matter.

I now understand that there is a payment outstanding and am prepared to pay this amount immediately.

The reference in the email to "again" requesting reinstatement is unclear. In any event, the Applicant's reinstatement application was made without delay.

1. On 25 August 2025, the Tribunal sent the Applicant an email in these terms:

I refer to the above-mentioned matter and the reinstatement application made on 4 April 2025. Please be advised that the reinstatement issue has been referred to a member for consideration. Any written submission to be considered by the Tribunal member in support of your reinstatement application must be filed by 4:00 pm on Friday 29 August 2025.

To date, there has been nothing further received from the Applicant. Nor has anything been received from the Respondent on the reinstatement issue.

1. Where, as here, an application has been dismissed under section 98 of the Act due to the application fee payable having not been paid within time (six weeks), the possibility of reinstatement is provided for in section 102 of the Act:

(1) This section applies if the Tribunal dismisses an application.

Note: An application may be dismissed in specified circumstances (see sections 20, 84 and 96 to 101). In addition, an application is taken to have been dismissed if the applicant withdraws it (see section 95).

(2) If the Tribunal considers that the application was dismissed in error, the Tribunal may on its own initiative reinstate the application and make such orders as appear to the Tribunal to be appropriate in the circumstances.

(3) Despite subsection (2), the Tribunal must not reinstate an application under subsection (2) if the application was dismissed under section 96 (Tribunal may dismiss application if parties consent).

(4) Despite subsection (2), if more than 28 days have passed since an application was dismissed, the Tribunal must not reinstate the application under subsection (2) unless the Tribunal is satisfied that special circumstances justify reinstating the application.

Party may apply for reinstatement if application dismissed in error

(5) A party to the proceeding in relation to the application may apply to the Tribunal for reinstatement of the application on the grounds of error within 28 days after the party receives notice that the application is dismissed (or such longer period as the Tribunal, in special circumstances, allows).

(6) If a party applies under subsection (5) and the Tribunal considers that the application was dismissed in error, the Tribunal may reinstate the application and make such orders as appear to the Tribunal to be appropriate in the circumstances.

Here, subsections 102(5) and (6) are relevant. Absent the Applicant's reinstatement application on 4 April 2025, subsections 102(2) and (4) would have permitted me to reinstate if I took the view his application was dismissed in error, provided I considered there were special circumstances which justified reinstatement. Subsections 102(7) to (9) deal with dismissals under sections 95, 99 and 100 and have no application in this case.

1. In JTBJ and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2025] ARTA 464, the President of the Tribunal, Kyrou P, considered the meaning to be attributed to the word "error" in subsections 102(5 and (6) of the Act. The President said, at [42] - [47]:

42. The reasoning of the Full Court in Goldie for its conclusion that the errors to which s 42A(10) of the AAT Act referred were not confined to administrative errors applies equally to the errors to which subs 102(5) and (6) of the ART Act refer. Further, in accordance with Goldie, those provisions are not confined to errors on the part of the ART. Although there are no express limitations on the scope of the errors falling within subs 102(5) and (6), Goldie identified two limitations arising from the context of the provisions which apply in the case of dismissal of an application for review. The limitations are as follows:

(a) Section 102(1) of the ART Act makes it clear that subs 102(5) and (6) apply only where an application for review has been dismissed. This means that those provisions do not apply where an order is made under s 105 of the ART Act after the ART considers the merits of the application either at a substantive hearing or without holding a hearing in accordance with s 106. That is because such an order does not include dismissal of the application for review.

(b) The act of dismissal was attended with error, that is, the error induced the dismissal.

43. In Goldie, the Full Court unanimously stated that s 42A(10) of the AAT Act applied only to 'default dismissals'. Carr J used the expressions 'default jurisdiction', 'default decision', 'error in dismissing an application summarily' and 'summarily dismissed by the Tribunal' interchangeably to encapsulate dismissals which were not preceded by 'consideration of whether there were even any prima facie merits in the application.' The underlying principle to be taken from these observations for the purposes of subs 102(5) and (6) of the ART Act is that these provisions do not apply to dismissals which were preceded by a hearing being conducted at which the applicant appeared and presented their case on the issues being considered at that hearing.

44. It is not unusual for a respondent to an application for review to challenge the ART's jurisdiction in relation to that application. Often, such a challenge is identified as a preliminary issue and is listed for an interlocutory hearing before a member at which the applicant is afforded the opportunity to participate. In such a case, if, following the interlocutory hearing, the member makes a decision that there is no jurisdiction, dismisses the application on that basis and gives reasons for that decision, the applicant could not seek reinstatement of the application under s 102(5) and (6) of the ART Act on the ground that the decision contains an error. That is because, as the applicant participated in the hearing and had an opportunity to present their case on whether the ART had jurisdiction, the dismissal in such a case cannot be described as a 'default decision' or a 'summary dismissal'. The appropriate remedy in such a case is an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia under s 172 of the ART Act. An important recent case falling in this category is Baumgarten and eSafety Commissioner [2025] ARTA 59.

45. The Bhardwaj principle summarised at [37] above is a general law principle which does not depend on statutory provisions such as s 102(5) and (6) of the ART Act. Whilst an error of the type falling within the Bhardwaj principle may also potentially fall within subs 102(5) and (6), that principle operates independently of those provisions. Consistent with the obiter observation of Carr J in Goldie, when the Bhardwaj principle is engaged, it should be applied according to its terms without any reliance on s 102(5) and (6).49

46. It is not possible to comprehensively set out the types of errors that may fall within s 102(5) and (6) of the ART Act. By way of example only, the following errors have been held (expressly or by implication) to fall, or can be regarded as clearly falling, within the predecessor provision of s 102(5) and (6), namely s 42A(10) of the AAT Act:

(a) Where an application for review is dismissed due to a significant procedural error, such as:

(i) a dismissal without notice to the parties when the statutory provision relied upon required notice to the parties; or

(ii) a dismissal on the basis that particular information was not included in the application for review where that information is not necessary for the validity of the application for review.

(b) Where an application for review is dismissed on the basis that the applicant consented to the dismissal, when in fact:

(ii) the applicant communicated consent (including by requesting that the proceeding be withdrawn) in circumstances that objectively demonstrate that, at the time of the communication, the applicant so misunderstood the nature and consequences of that consent that it was not a true consent. This principle would not be engaged, for example, where the ART or a representative of the applicant explained to the applicant the effect of a consent to dismissal or a request for withdrawal, or where the applicant simply changes their mind about whether to continue with the proceeding.

(c) Where an application for review is dismissed on the basis that the applicant did not appear at a Tribunal case event, and:

(ii) a notice of the case event was not received by the applicant and in the circumstances could not be deemed to have been delivered to the applicant; or

(iii) a notice of the case event was received by the applicant but was defective (such as where the wrong date for the case event was specified).

47. Insofar as the parties' submissions contended for a wider meaning of 'error' than I have outlined above, I have not accepted them. The ART's statutory objective in s 9 of the ART Act requires the Tribunal to resolve applications quickly. Where the ART Act intends to confer on the ART power to provide a second review on the merits, it does so expressly. Subsections 102(5) and (6) do not provide for a second review on the merits. Consistent with the observations of the Full Court in Goldie, the term 'error' should not be construed so widely as to confer what would amount in substance to a right to an additional review on the merits.

1. This is not a case where there has been any consideration of the merits of the substantive application by the Tribunal. Consistent with the President's observations in JTBJ, the question here reduces to whether the dismissal decision was "attended with error, that is, the error induced the dismissal". In his email of 30 January 2025, the Applicant suggested he may not have been receiving all Tribunal correspondence. He also asked for direct advice of any payments he needed to make. It would plainly have been preferable for the Applicant to have been given a response to this email. However, the lack of a response is not an end of the matter.
2. The Applicant had indicated a preference for communication by email. By virtue of paragraph 14A(1)(a) of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999, he is taken to have received Tribunal emails when they were capable of being retrieved at his nominated email address. In addition, section 2.24 of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Common Procedures) Practice Direction 2024 applies here so that the Applicant is taken to have been given such email communications at the time the emails were sent. His suggestion of possible problems receiving Tribunal emails is insufficient to oust the effect of such deeming provisions. Accordingly, I proceed on that basis he was given, and he received, the Tribunal emails dated 7 November 2024 and 16 December 2024 which informed him of the outstanding application fee.
3. In the circumstances, I find the Applicant was informed in the online application form he completed and lodged on 6 November 2024 of the requirement to pay the application fee and the prospect of dismissal of his application if the fee was not paid within six weeks. He was reminded by emails on 7 November 2024 and 16 December 2024 about the outstanding application fee. He was also reminded of the prospect of dismissal of his application if the fee was not paid within six weeks. I note he had paid an application fee in respect of a previous application he made in 2024; he was not ignorant of the requirement. In those circumstances, I do not consider there was any obligation on Tribunal staff to yet again advise him of the need to pay the application fee.
4. Ultimately, I do not consider the decision to dismiss this application for failure to pay the requisite application fee can be said to have been attended with error. The fee had, in fact, not been paid within six weeks of the application lodged on 6 November 2024. It was plainly open to exercise the power to dismiss in section 98 of the Act in the circumstances. The Applicant's offer to make prompt payment of the fee in his email of 4 April 2025 does not affect the validity of the dismissal decision.
5. In the result, since I am not satisfied the dismissal decision here was made in error, it is not open to order reinstatement. Accordingly, the application to reinstate this application is refused.

1. The Tribunal refuses to reinstate this application.