1. On 7 August 2025, Troy Nitsopoulos (for convenience, 'TN'), and Jaclina Bojadzievska (for convenience, 'JB') pleaded guilty before a judge in the County Court to trafficking[1] and possessing[2] drugs of dependence, and to the related summary offence of dealing with property reasonably suspected of being the proceeds of crime.[3]
2. Following pleas in mitigation, on 22 August 2025 the judge sentenced TN to a total effective sentence of two years and two months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months; and sentenced JB to a total effective sentence of one year and 11 months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 13 months.
3. It is convenient to set out the charges to which TN and JB pleaded guilty, and the sentences imposed on them, in tabular form:

Dealing with property reasonably suspected of being proceeds of crime [$36,100 cash]

Dealing with property reasonably suspected of being proceeds of crime [a Porsche Macan]

1. Both TN and JB seek leave to appeal on the basis that the individual sentences, total effective sentence and non-parole period are manifestly excessive. JB additionally seeks leave to appeal on a ground that contends that she was denied procedural fairness.
2. In each case we would refuse leave to appeal. Our reasons follow.

1. TN, aged 48 years, and JB, aged 47, were in an intimate relationship, and shared an apartment in St Kilda Road, Melbourne. TN is also the registered owner of an apartment in New Street, Brighton.
2. On 1 February 2024, police executed search warrants at the St Kilda Road apartment. The front door was opened by JB, and TN was located in a bedroom. When police located three zip lock bags containing a brown crystal substance on the dining room table the two were arrested.
3. Police located the following items on the dining room table:
   • three zip lock bags containing MDMA;
   • one vacuum-sealed bag containing cocaine;
   • one zip lock bag containing cocaine;
   • two small zip lock bags within another zip lock bag, containing cocaine;
   • five small zip lock bags within a larger zip lock bag, containing ketamine;
   • four zip lock bags containing a brown crystal substance, believed to be MDMA;
   • four blister packs of tablets within a zip lock bag within a black bag, containing diazepam;
   • ten blister packs within a zip lock bag in a red bag, containing diazepam; and
   • five $50 notes in a black wallet (part of TN related summary offence).
4. On a side table in the living room police located the following:
   • one vacuum sealed bag containing two blocks of cocaine in a zip lock bag;
   • multiple zip lock bags containing ketamine in a brown leather box;
   • one zip lock bag containing cocaine in a black bag;
   • one zip lock bag containing ketamine in the black bag;
   • one zip lock bag in the black bag, which contained a number of other zip lock bags containing MDMA;
   • one vacuum-sealed bag containing a zip lock bag containing cocaine;
   • one vacuum sealed bag containing cocaine;
   • one zip lock bag in the black bag containing MDMA;
   • one green sealed packet of methylphenidate (Ritalin) in the black bag;
   • one zip lock bag containing ketamine;
   • one zip lock bag in the black bag, containing a white envelope containing MDMA;
   • one blister pack of five tablets of diazepam in the black bag;
   • one zip lock bag within a red bag, containing MDMA;
   • two pill bottles containing Aspen Dexamphetamine in the red bag;
   • one zip lock bag in the red bag containing MDMA;
   • one green sealed packet containing methylphenidate (Ritalin); and
   • two blister packs containing 19 tablets of diazepam in the red bag.
5. Underneath the side table in the living room was a Louis Vuitton branded bag in which the following items were located:
   • one clear plastic container containing creatine;
   • one zip lock bag in a Gucci sunglasses case containing ketamine;
   • one zip lock bag containing MDMA;
   • one zip lock bag containing MDMA;
   • one zip lock bag containing MDMA;
   • one zip lock bag within another zip lock bag, containing MDMA;
   • one zip lock bag containing MDMA; and
   • one zip lock bag containing MDMA.
6. On top of the coffee table in the living room police found $30,850 in cash (part of TN related summary offence).
7. In the laundry, police found cannabis weighing 6.9 grams in a toiletry bag.
8. Police located the following in the bedroom:
   • one zip lock bag in a Tiffany box in the desk, containing cocaine;
   • one zip lock bag in the safe containing creatine; and
   • one Gucci box on the desk containing $5,000 in cash (part of TN related summary offence).
9. In the apartment, police also located paraphernalia associated with drug trafficking, including a vacuum sealer, packets of envelopes, empty deal bags and empty capsule tablets. A mobile telephone belonging to JB contained messages between 12 December 2023 and 17 January 2024 relating to her sale of drugs to clients. TN had two mobile telephones, with the Signal encryption application installed. Both contained messages from TN between 30 August 2023 and 14 January 2024 offering drugs for sale to purchasers.
10. The total quantity of drugs seized in the St Kilda Road apartment was:
    • MDMA: 102.1 grams mixed weight, 70.34 grams pure weight (charge 1);
    • cocaine: 315.2 grams mixed weight, 99 grams pure weight (charge 3);
    • ketamine: 134.8 grams mixed, 81 grams pure weight (charge 4);
    • amphetamine: 28.5 grams (charge 5);
    • cannabis: 6.9 grams (part of charge 5);
    • diazepam: 138 tablets (part of charge 5);
    • methylphenidate: less than 5 grams (part of charge 5); and
    • MDA: 1.9 grams (part of charge 5).
11. Later that day, police executed a search warrant at the New Street premises. Police found four zip lock bags containing 111.4 grams of MDMA with a 76 per cent purity (i.e. 84.66 grams pure) (charge 2).
12. Police then returned to the St Kilda Road premises and executed warrants at the underground car park. They seized a Porsche Macan, registered to JB (JB related summary offence).
13. When interviewed by police, TN and JB both provided 'no comment'.

1. JB, aged 47, grew up in a stable home, and obtained a degree in marketing. She met TN in 2010, and they lived as partners from 2017. Although she had a good work history, she stopped work because of the pandemic, a sinus infection - possibly linked to cocaine use - and drug dependency. She recommenced work in 2022 until July 2023. After release on bail, she obtained a short contract in marketing, then worked as a marketing manager in a hospitality management company.
2. By early 2024, JB was addicted, consuming about two grams of cocaine daily. Her drug use had become worse because of ongoing stress, including the impact of her nasal infection, her father's decline and passing in 2022, and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. After being granted bail on 2 February 2024, JB claimed to have ceased cocaine use. In May 2024, she started seeing a drug counsellor, Maria Hutchison, who provided a report dated 11 July 2025. Ms Hutchison reported that JB commenced an 18-week outpatient program involving weekly counselling and online meetings for six weeks, then fortnightly counselling for eight weeks, and then monthly counselling for the months following. JB undertook weekly drug screens covering May 2024 to July 2025, which consistently indicated a lack of drugs in her system.
3. A clinical neuropsychologist, Dr Linda Borg, assessed JB and provided a report dated 12 May 2025. Dr Borg stated that JB has no significant cognitive decline since a head impact in a motor vehicle collision in 1997. Any cognitive consequence was described as 'modest'. There was no basis to conclude that any neurocognitive disorder contributed to JB's offending. JB was considered to have sound planning skills with no evidence of impulsivity.

1. TN, aged 48, is the eldest of three children. He was raised in a stable environment, albeit he experienced some bullying at high school. After completing secondary education, he did a course in accounting. He worked in responsible roles at Telstra between the ages of 23 and 31, before owning and operating a clothing store for three years. Subsequently, he went into real estate and property development. Following his arrest, he developed online gaming software as a start-up business which is apparently successful, employing several staff.
2. At age 30, when TN was working in real estate a colleague introduced him to methamphetamine, and he developed a drug habit. By his 40s, he was using significant levels of cocaine, together with MDMA and ketamine. In about 2017, after commencing an intimate relationship with JB, he continued to use drugs with her until their arrest, when his drug use ceased. Thereafter, he replaced drug use with drinking and vaping intensely. Although he attended Alcoholics Anonymous three times, he struggled with the 'absoluteness' of the program and did not continue.
3. A consultant psychologist, Luke Armstrong, reported that TN has a high average intellect and a stable personality. While he met the diagnostic criteria for a 'stimulant use disorder' leading up to his arrest, it is now in remission. Mr Armstrong considered that TN will continue to need clinical oversight until he has been free of drugs for three years.
4. Nadia Barbagallo, a counsellor and addiction specialist, in a report dated 1 August 2025, counselled TN weekly from mid-May until October 2025, then either fortnightly or monthly up to the date of sentence. She reported that TN returned 18 negative urine drug screening results, and considered that he 'is at low risk of relapsing and is in the maintenance phase of treatment where he demonstrates the ability to manage life stressors without resorting to drug use'.

1. The judge commenced his reasons for sentence by summarising the offending.
2. Next, the judge noted that TN and JB were committed, without contest, on 3 October 2024. There had been delays while they waited for the drugs to be analysed before offering to plead guilty. At a case conference in the County Court on 13 March 2025 they then both agreed to plead guilty to charges to which they had largely offered to plead the previous October. The judge accepted that, while the guilty pleas did not come at the earliest possible stage, the pleas were 'reasonably early'. Further, the judge found that the guilty pleas demonstrate an 'acceptance of responsibility and [their] willingness to assist the course of justice'. There were 'real benefits to the community in avoiding the cost and inconvenience to all involved of a trial'. The judge also accepted that the pleas reflect remorse 'to a degree'.
3. Having then outlined TN's and JB's personal circumstances, the judge expressed the view that the objective gravity of their trafficking was 'in the high-moderate range'. They trafficked 'multiple different drugs' in 'significant' quantities. The judge noted that the quantity of MDMA in charge 1 was 70 per cent of a prescribed commercial quantity pure; the MDMA in charge 2 was 87 per cent of a commercial quantity pure; the cocaine in charge 3 was 40 per cent of a commercial quantity pure; and the ketamine in charge 4 was 81 per cent of a commercial quantity pure; and observed that 'this was not isolated offending'.
4. The judge found that TN's and JB's moral culpability was 'high'. He said:

You both accepted, as the prosecutor submitted, that you were both responsible for all the drugs found at your St Kilda Road home. You were not alleged, nor do you submit you were, acting at the behest or direction of others, neither were you mere street dealers or couriers. Given your own habits on which you relied during your pleas, I find that you knew the kinds and quantities of drugs you possessed and were trafficking.

I find your motive for trafficking was significantly for profit, albeit you also used some of the drugs. I do not find that your trafficking was made less serious by your addiction. You both commenced using drugs as adults, having had good upbringings, achieved high level education, obtained good jobs and held down positions of responsibility consistent with your abilities. I do not find that you suffered any significant impairment to your decision-making or judgment such as to reduce in any significant way the gravity of your offending or your blameworthiness for it.

...

Trafficking drugs such as these causes great harm to our community, it imposes great costs on those who become addicted and those around them. The community also pays a great cost in dealing with the consequences of trafficking. So, general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment are central sentencing purposes in this context.

1. In arriving at appropriate sentences, the judge said that he had not given significant weight to community protection, and specific deterrence had attracted 'a very moderate degree of weight'. The principle of totality dictated that there be substantial concurrency between sentences on each charge to reflect that the trafficking 'was effectively a single operation', albeit the fact that TN and JB trafficked multiple drugs 'does make [their] total offending more serious'. There was no unfair delay that mitigated sentence, but the judge noted that it provided efforts towards rehabilitation, which were 'significant'. The judge said he regarded their 'common offences to be engaged in jointly', so that he would sentence them 'on par with each other on those charges'.
2. The judge noted that counsel for each of TN and JB had submitted that a community correction order ('CCO') was the appropriate sentence, but said that he had concluded 'that only a term of imprisonment adequately meets the relevant sentencing requirements'. Finally, he observed that both had 'good prospects of rehabilitation', and that he had 'aimed to reflect this in the total sentence and the proportion of that sentence to be served before you may be released'.

1. In our view, JB's first ground lacks substance.
2. After opening the fact of the case, the prosecutor informed the judge that the prosecution's submission in the case of TN was that 'a combination sentence would be within the appropriate ranges of sentencing'; that is, a sentence of imprisonment of up to one year's duration, coupled with a CCO.[4] He also indicated that, depending on 'a successful assessment', JB might be in 'a slightly different situation' (which we take to be an indication that a CCO without any associated period of imprisonment might be open).
3. At the point when the prosecutor made these observations, defence counsel had not delivered their pleas in mitigation for their respective clients. The judge responded by observing that the prosecution's concession of a CCO being 'within the range'

doesn't bind me and the parties ought not assume in this case that I accept those submissions from the Crown.

1. At the conclusion of the plea made by counsel on JB's behalf, there was the following exchange:

[COUNSEL]: ... The evidence of Ms Hutchison perhaps unsurprisingly is that [JB] would benefit from further treatment. It's been 17 months. It's a significant period but the reality of addition is that it takes a long time to overcome if one can ever truly overcome it. [JB] is well and truly on that path and in my submission, the sentencing objectives don't require that progress to be interrupted by a term of imprisonment and I acknowledge the very fair concession by the prosecution that ... a straight Community Corrections order is within the sentencing range. Your Honour of course isn't bound by that but it's a fairly significant concession from the Director in my submission.

HIS HONOUR: I understand and I indicated what I thought at the beginning and you've addressed every point that you could, thank you.

1. Following the pleas, the judge ordered that both JB and TN be assessed for their suitability for CCOs. A Community Corrections Officer deemed both to be suitable.
2. Ultimately, the judge rejected the notion in each case that a CCO was a suitable sentence. In his sentencing reasons, he said:

Your counsel each submitted that a community correction order, was an appropriate sentence, although your counsel [TN] accepted that such an order may well need to commence after some time in custody. The prosecutor submitted as much.

I made it clear during the hearing that I did not necessarily accept those submissions or concessions in light of the gravity of the offending in all the circumstances. I, nevertheless, had you both assessed for community correction orders to have the benefit of that assessment material [exhibited].

1. In this Court, counsel for JB submitted that at no point during the plea hearing, or at any time before imposing sentence, did the sentencing judge give any indication that he disagreed, or might have disagreed, with the prosecution concession that a CCO was 'within range', or indicate that he was contemplating a term of immediate imprisonment. At the conclusion of the plea hearing, the judge ordered that JB be assessed for a CCO, but did not say anything to indicate that he might not impose a straight CCO if the assessment was a favourable one. JB's counsel submitted that the judge's finding that a 'straight' CCO was outside the appropriate sentencing range was seriously adverse to JB. In those circumstances, it was incumbent on the judge to 'telegraph' to JB that he was minded to make that finding. Fairness dictated that JB be given an opportunity to address the issue. Counsel submitted that opportunity needed to be 'sufficient to permit [JB] to adduce evidence or make submissions rebutting the potential adverse finding and to address matters which are not already obvious'.[5] That did not occur in this case. The sentencing discretion miscarried as a result.
2. We would reject the contention that JB was denied procedural fairness.
3. When the prosecutor made the concession relied upon by JB, the judge made it clear that he was not bound by it, and that the parties ought not assume that he would accept it. Thereafter, JB's counsel made a plea in which the relevant factors bearing on the imposition of sentence were fully canvassed. At the end of her plea, JB's counsel returned to the concession which she described as 'fairly significant'. Observing that counsel had 'addressed every point that [she] could', the judge then reminded counsel of what he had observed at the outset: that he was not bound by the concession, and the parties should not assume that he would act on it. In other words, the judge informed counsel that it should not be assumed that he would impose a CCO without a custodial component. There was thus no denial of procedural fairness.[6] Leave to appeal should be refused on the first proposed ground.
4. But even had we considered that there had been a denial of procedural fairness in the manner contended for, we would still have refused leave to appeal, since there is no reasonable prospect that this Court would impose a less severe sentence.[7] In our opinion, the sentence imposed on JB was lenient.

1. Contending that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive, counsel for TN submitted that the sentencing range for the offending allowed for the imposition of a lengthy and onerous CCO at one end, and the imposition of a term of imprisonment combined with a CCO at the other. Prosecuting counsel had submitted that the appropriate sentence was a 'combination sentence' of imprisonment and a CCO, but the sentencing judge concluded that only a term of imprisonment would adequately meet the relevant sentencing requirements. In so far as that conclusion meant that only a term of imprisonment with a head sentence and non-parole period was appropriate it was erroneous. TN's counsel submitted that, while serious, the offending was not so serious as to require the imposition of a head sentence and non-parole period. Furthermore, TN was able to call in aid of a number of factors in mitigation of penalty, including: an early guilty plea; previous good character; sustained rehabilitation for the duration of his time on bail (in excess of 18 months); and excellent prospects for rehabilitation. In those circumstances, the joint position of the parties before the sentencing judge - that a sentence of imprisonment in combination with a CCO was open - was correct. It follows that individual sentences in excess of 12 months, and a total effective sentence in excess of 24 months, is unreasonable and plainly unjust. Both 'individually and collectively' the sentences are manifestly excessive.
2. JB's counsel submitted that JB's offending 'fell short of the upper end of [the] spectrum of serious for this type of offending'. There was a powerful constellation of mitigating factors, including: JB's early plea of guilty (which the sentencing judge found reflected a degree of remorse); her prior good character and lack of relevant criminal history; her excellent rehabilitative gains over 17-months on bail (including evidence of sustained formal rehabilitation and abstinence from drug use); and her 'good' prospects of rehabilitation. Relying on those mitigating factors, JB had submitted to the sentencing judge that a CCO could meet all the relevant sentencing objectives, and the prosecution made the 'considered' concession that a 'straight' CCO was within range. Acknowledging that manifest excess 'is a conclusion that ordinarily does not admit of much elaboration or sustained argument, since excess is, or is not, plainly apparent, and a sentence is, or is not, unreasonable or plainly unjust',[8] counsel submitted that the sentence imposed on JB in the circumstances are manifestly excessive.
3. The approach that this Court must adopt to a complaint that a sentence is manifestly excessive was, as JB's counsel acknowledged, set out in Leimonitis:[9]

As has been observed more than once, manifest excess is a conclusion which does not depend upon the attribution of identified specific error. Moreover, it is a conclusion that ordinarily does not admit of much elaboration or sustained argument,[10] since excess is, or is not, plainly apparent, and a sentence is, or is not, unreasonable or plainly unjust. The sentence may be excessive because the wrong type of sentence has been imposed, or because the sentence imposed is manifestly too long.[11] A judge of an appellate court will approach the task of assessing whether a sentence is manifestly (as opposed to simply arguably) excessive in much the same way that a sentencing judge approaches the imposition of sentence at first instance; that is, by instinctively synthesising all relevant factors in order to determine whether he or she considers the impugned sentence to be just and appropriate.[12] But it is not enough for appellate intervention to be warranted that the judges of the appellate court regard the impugned sentence as stern, or that they would not themselves have passed the same sentence. Intervention is justified only if the sentence is wholly outside the range of those open in the sound exercise of discretion.[13]

1. Paying due regard to all relevant features - the circumstances of TN and JB and those of the offending, and those features going in mitigation and aggravation - we have been unable to conclude that either sentence imposed is manifestly excessive. Indeed, if anything, the sentences are very moderate, if not lenient.
2. It might be acknowledged that both TN and JB were of previous good character, and have good prospects of rehabilitation. It might also be acknowledged in that regard that both had taken steps following the detection of their offending to address their drug addiction and abuse. Their early pleas of guilty were also worthy of weight in the manner recognised by the sentencing judge.
3. Against those matters, TN's and JB's moral culpability was high. Theirs was a moderately sophisticated operation, involving in TN's case - bearing in mind theirs was a joint criminal enterprise - mobile telephone encryption. They were not mere 'street dealers'. They had a range of different kinds of drugs available with which to service their clients, the quantities detected being in some cases not far short of the relevant commercial quantities. Although their drug addiction might have been a partial motivation for their joint offending, it is also clear that they were operating a drug-selling business which had as one of its central purposes profit and financial gain. And nothing in the nature of their addiction was shown to have impaired their decision-making appreciably, or affected their moral blameworthiness to any meaningful extent. In those circumstances, general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment all needed to be given weight in the sentences imposed on them.
4. In our view, as we have said, the sentences are moderate, if not lenient. Save to say that it is something about which we would need a deal of persuasion, we do not pause to consider whether the prosecution's concession that a straight CCO in JB's case, and a combination sentence in TN's case, were within range, was properly made. The sentences imposed were open to the judge in the sound exercise of discretion.
5. Leave to appeal must be refused in each case on the grounds that contend that the sentences are manifestly excessive.

[1] Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981, s 71AC(1). The maximum penalty is 15 years' imprisonment.

[2] Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981, s 73(1). The maximum penalty is 5 years' imprisonment.

[3] Crimes Act 1958, s 195. The maximum penalty is 2 years' imprisonment.

[4] See Sentencing Act 1991, s 44.

[5] Ucar v Nylex Industrial Products Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 181; (2007) 17 VR 492, 508-9.

[6] See Jojic v The Queen [2017] VSCA 77, [24] (Osborn JA, Priest JA and Kidd AJA agreeing).

[7] Criminal Procedure Act 2009, s 280(1).

[8] Leimonitis v The Queen [2018] VSCA 198, [32] (Priest JA, Weinberg JA agreeing) ('Leimonitis').

[10] R v Kenny (Unreported, 2 October 1978, Vic, CCA); Noa v R [2013] VSCA 4 , [12] (Priest JA); Allen v R [2013] VSCA 44; (2013) 36 VR 565, 573 [51]-[52] (Priest JA).

[11] Dinsdale v R [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321, 325-6 [6] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J).

[13] Lowndes v R [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665, 671-672 [15] [Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ].