Issue 2: whether by applying Binetter the Tribunal was exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth
133 This issue was raised by question 3(d) of the amended notice of appeal and the s 39B application.
134 As will be seen, the applicant relied on British Imperial Oil in support of her contention that, in a case such as hers, the interpretation given in Binetter to s 14ZZK of the Administration Act meant that the Tribunal was required to exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, contrary to the Constitution. Put another way, the applicant's submission was that the effect of s 14ZZK, as construed in Binetter, was to confer federal judicial power on a body other than a court created under and in accordance with Chapter III of the Constitution.
135 The applicant's reliance on British Imperial Oil was misplaced. It is correct to say, as the applicant does, that the High Court held in that case that the powers conferred on the Board of Appeal by the 1922 Act were part of the judicial powers of the Commonwealth and, as such, those powers could not be conferred on the Board of Appeal, because the Board was not a court created by the Parliament under Chapter III of the Constitution. The powers conferred on the Board of Appeal were, however, materially different from the powers now conferred on the Tribunal.
136 The 1922 Act created a Board of Appeal to hear and decide cases as prescribed or referred to it by the Commissioner under that Act. In British Imperial Oil, Isaacs J described (at 436) the powers conferred on the Board of Appeal in the following terms:
Then sec. 44, which is extremely important in this connection, says: - "(1) A Board of Appeal shall have power to hear such cases as are prescribed, or are referred to it by the Commissioner under this Act. (2) The provisions of section fifty-one, fifty-two, and fifty-three of this Act shall apply, so far as applicable, to references by the Commissioner to the Board as if those references were appeals." "References" are thus placed, as far as they can be, in precisely the same position as "appeals" so far as the Board's duty and powers are concerned; and this compels us to examine the provisions as to appeals. Turning then to sec. 50, dealing with "appeals," it provides by sub-sec. 4 that a taxpayer dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner may, by the method stated, require the Commissioner to forward his case, where the objection does not raise questions of law only, to (1) the High Court or (2) a Supreme Court or (3) a Board of Appeal. Pausing there for a moment, it is quite evident that judicial power is thereby conferred on the Board, because the power invested in the High Court is necessarily judicial (In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts [(1921) 29 C.L.R. 257, at p. 264.]) and it is the identical power given by sec. 50 to the Supreme Court and the Board. The power thus given is one of ascertaining and determining whether and how far the rights and duties independently enacted have been accurately declared by the Commissioner, and not for the purpose of superseding his discretionary judgment to create a constitutive element of liability.
137 As this passage shows, the 1922 Act was held to confer federal judicial power on the Board of Appeal contrary to s 71 of the Constitution because the Board of Appeal's duty and powers with respect to references to it were identical to the duty and powers of a State Supreme Court and the High Court with respect to taxation appeals. Since the 1922 Act drew no distinction between the duty and powers of the High Court, a State Supreme Court and the Board of Appeal, and the High Court and a Supreme Court necessarily had the duty and powers to ascertain and determine whether and how far statutory rights and duties had been "accurately declared by the Commissioner", then the 1922 Act was construed to confer the same duty and powers on the Board. The latter conferral of power was contrary to s 71 of the Constitution, since the Board of Appeal was not a court constituted under Chapter III of the Constitution, and capable of having federal judicial power vested in it.
138 Following British Imperial Oil, the legislature amended the 1922 Act to constitute a Board of Review with different duties and powers to the former Board of Appeal. The High Court and subsequently the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council heard another constitutional challenge, this time with respect to the provisions constituting the Board of Review. The High Court held that these new provisions did not purport to confer federal judicial power on the Board of Review: see Munro. In that case, Isaacs J stated (at 172):
In September 1925 the Commonwealth Parliament drastically altered the [1922] Act so as to conform to the law as explained in [British Imperial Oil], and created a new Board - a Board of Review - on a totally different basis.
139 Isaacs J went on to say (at 175):
The difference in point of status and nature of function between the new Board of Review and the original Board of Appeal is the difference between daylight and dark. ... In the former legislation the Board of Appeal was linked up in character with the High Court and the Supreme Court of the State, and an appeal on law points was given to this Court in its appellate jurisdiction. That was an unmistakable and an inseparable indication that the Board of Appeal was intended by Parliament to exercise "judicial power". ... But there are many functions which ... are consistent with either strict judicial or executive action. ... If consistent with either strictly judicial or executive action, the matter must be examined further.
140 Isaacs J examined the relevant provisions, observing (at 181-183) that:
It appears to me impossible to construe the word "appeal" in secs. 12, 18 and 19 of the amending Act otherwise than as giving merely the right of applying to this Court to exercise ordinary judicial power in original jurisdiction. ...
There is some language in amended sec. 51 which perhaps calls for some attention. I refer to sub.-sec. 6, which says: "The Commissioner or a taxpayer may appeal to the High Court from any decision of the Board under this section, which, in the opinion of the High Court, involves a question of law". ...
Once we conclude that the word "appeal" in sub-sec. 6 of sec. 51 ... has reference to original jurisdiction, it follows necessarily that the Board was not intended by Parliament to exercise judicial power at all in the constitutional sense. In this vital respect the present legislation differs toto caelo from the prior enactment under which the British Imperial Oil Co.'s Case was decided ...
[T]he general intention is apparent to transform the old Board of Appeal, declared by the Court to have a judicial character de facto, into a Board of Review having a true administrative character and affording ... a practical means of reconsidering business matters without the intricacies, delay and expense of legal proceedings. The Courts were reserved for matters involving legal questions.
...
Instead of the Board being given the powers and functions of the Court, it is given "the powers and functions of the Commissioner in making assessments, determinations and decisions under this Act." …
141 The Privy Council agreed: see Shell at 541-545. The Privy Council observed (at 544-545):
Their Lordships are of [the] opinion that it is not impossible under the Australian Constitution for Parliament to provide that the fixing of assessments shall rest with an administrative officer, subject to review, if the taxpayer prefers, either by another administrative body, or by a Court strictly so called, or, to put it more briefly, to say to the taxpayer "If you want to have the assessment reviewed judicially, go to the Court; if you want to have it reviewed by business men, go to the Board of Review."
...
The Board of Review appears to be in the nature of administrative machinery to which the taxpayer can resort at his option in order to have his contentions reconsidered. An administrative tribunal may act judicially, but still remain an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so-called. Mere externals do not make a direction to an administrative officer by an ad hoc tribunal an exercise by a Court of judicial power. Their Lordships find themselves in agreement with Isaacs J., where he says [(1926) 38 CLR, at p.175]: - "There are many functions which are either inconsistent with strict judicial action ... or are consistent with either strict judicial or executive action. ... If consistent with either strictly judicial or executive action, the matter must be examined further" [(1926) 38 CLR, at p.178]. "The decisions of the Board of Review may very appropriately be designated ... 'administrative awards', but they are by no means of the character of decisions of the Judicature of the Commonwealth."
142 It is well-established today that there are functions, which, when performed by a court, constitute the exercise of judicial power but, when performed by some other body, do not, as Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ observed in Brandy at 267, with reference to Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills [1991] HCA 58; 173 CLR 167. In Precision Data, the High Court said, at 189:
… although the finding of facts and the making of value judgments, even the formation of an opinion as to the legal rights and obligations of parties, are common ingredients in the exercise of judicial power, they may also be elements in the exercise of administrative and legislative power. Again, functions which are ordinary ingredients in the exercise of administrative or legislative power can, in some circumstances, be elements in the exercise of what is truly judicial power.
It follows that functions may be classified as either judicial or administrative according to the way in which they are to be exercised. So, if the ultimate decision may be determined not merely by the application of legal principles to ascertained facts but by considerations of policy also, then the determination does not proceed from an exercise of judicial power. That is not to suggest that considerations of policy do not play a role, sometimes a decisive role, in the shaping of legal principles.
(Footnotes omitted)
143 Under the amending legislation introduced after British Imperial Oil, the newly created Board of Review was held to exercise administrative power, and not judicial power, bearing in mind that:
(a) it was named a Board of Review, and not a Board of Appeal
(b) the powers of the new Board of Review were assimilated to those of the Commissioner, and not those of the courts;
(c) the decisions of the Board of Review were mostly deemed to be those of the Commissioner;
(d) the Commissioner and the taxpayer were able to appeal to a court on a question of law;
(e) appeals from the Board of Review lay to a court in its original, rather than its appellate, jurisdiction; and
(f) the evident legislative intention was to create an administrative body to give practical reconsideration to taxation matters without the complexity, expense and delay of legal proceedings.
See Munro at 181-183; and Shell at 541-545.
144 The position of the Tribunal is not identical to the Board of Review; indeed some differences have already been noted: see [117] above. There are, however, a number of considerations that, in my opinion, lead to the clear conclusion that the Tribunal exercises administrative, and not judicial, power. These considerations include that:
(a) the Tribunal is named the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and specifically described as an administrative tribunal;
(b) the Tribunal may exercise all the powers and discretions conferred on the Commissioner (AAT Act, s 43(1));
(c) if a matter involves the exercise of a discretion (for example, where remission of a penalty is sought) the Tribunal has the power to substitute its own decision if it considers the Commissioner's decision is not the preferable one (AAT Act, s 43(1));
(d) a decision made by the Tribunal in substitution for a decision of the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a decision of the Commissioner (AAT Act, s 43(6));
(e) the Commissioner or the taxpayer (or other party to the Tribunal proceeding) may appeal to the Federal Court from the decision of the Tribunal on a question of law (AAT Act, s 44(1));
(f) the hearing and determination of any such appeal from the Tribunal is an exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court, rather than its appellate jurisdiction (AAT Act, s 44(3)-(10); Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 19); and
(g) the clear legislative intention is to confer power on an administrative body to review certain decisions of the Commissioner efficiently and without the complexity and expense of legal proceedings: see AAT Act, s 2A; Administration Act, s 14ZZK.
This list of considerations is not exhaustive.
145 Furthermore, the modifications to the AAT Act brought about by Division 4 of Part IVC of the Administration Act, in proceedings for the review of objection decisions and extension of time refusal decisions, do not militate against this conclusion. I accept that, as the Commissioner submitted, the reference in s 14ZZL(1) of the Administration Act to the decision of the Tribunal becoming "final" is to be construed by reference to s 14ZZL(2), which indicates that the "finality" in question is referable to the expiry of the appeal period and serves the interests of good administration by providing an end point for the administrative disputation and thus certainty about the administrative position. The same rationale informs provisions limiting the time in which administrative (or judicial) review can be sought. The decisions of the Tribunal remain at all times subject to review in the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution. As this case demonstrates, they are also subject to judicial review pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act and appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act.
146 Not every binding and authoritative determination of a dispute constitutes the exercise of judicial power: see Brandy at 268. An administrative decision may also answer that description; and the "finality" for which s 14ZZL provides does not give rise to the problem identified in Brandy. In that case, the relevant legislation provided that a determination of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission was not binding and conclusive, although it could be enforced as if it was an order of the Federal Court on its registration and the expiry of the applicable period for filing a review application in the Court. The finality involved in that legislation was the enforceability of an administrative determination as an order of the Court. This enforceability was critical to the High Court's decision that there was an exercise of judicial power: Brandy at 268-270; see also 263-264. No similar problem exists in the present case.
147 I would reject the applicant's argument that, if the effect of s 14ZZK of the Administration Act is as interpreted in Binetter, then the Tribunal is exercising federal judicial power. If s 14ZZK is interpreted as the Court in Binetter says it should be, it does not follow that the Tribunal is exercising federal judicial power when reviewing an objection decision arising from an assessment amended in reliance on item 5 of the table in s 170(1) of the 1936 Act. The Full Court in Binetter emphasised that there was a difference between the powers exercisable by the Tribunal on such a review and the powers exercisable by the Court on judicial review or an appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act. In particular, the Court explained in Binetter at [93] that:
In cases where the amendment power depends on the formation of an opinion by the Commissioner of fraud or evasion, the difference between merits review by the Tribunal and an appeal to the Court is that the Tribunal re-considers whether, on the evidence before it, there was an avoidance of tax due to fraud or evasion, whereas the Court will only interfere with the Commissioner's exercise of the amendment power if the Commissioner did not form the requisite opinion or the Commissioner's opinion that there was fraud or evasion is vitiated by some error of law ...
The entirety of this passage is set out at [107] above.
148 The Tribunal did not, following Binetter, "s[it] in judgment on the validity and correctness" of the Commissioner's fraud and evasion opinion, as the applicant claimed. Rather, the Tribunal was required to re-examine the matter for itself, having regard to the evidence before it at the time it came to make its decision. In this respect, the Tribunal's task in the present case was no different from the task of the Tribunal in most other kinds of review: see Shi at [37]-[38] (Kirby J), [99] (Hayne and Heydon JJ), [143] (Kiefel J) (with whom Crennan J agreed on this point at [117]). If the taxpayer shows that there was no fraud or evasion, the taxpayer will succeed in showing that the amended assessment is excessive for the purposes of s 14ZZK(b)(i). This follows from the High Court's decision in McAndrew: see 271 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Webb JJ), 274 (Kitto J) and 282 (Taylor J). If the taxpayer does not show that there was no fraud or evasion (and there is no other relevant ground to contest the objection decision), then the taxpayer will not succeed in showing that the amended assessment is excessive. If raised by the taxpayer (cf: s 14ZZK(a)), the question whether there was fraud or evasion is reviewed by the Tribunal in the same way as any other constituent element of the taxpayer's liability challenged by the taxpayer on the review. Any opinion formed or decision made in substitution for that of the Commissioner will operate as if made by the Commissioner. The applicant's claim that the interpretation given to s 14ZZK in Binetter involves the Tribunal exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth must fail.