JUDGMENT OF: The Honourable President Justice Dolphin

At first instance the applicant was found to be an unreliable witness and decisions to reject her two claims, pursuant to the Return to Work Act 2014, for injuries to her right wrist and to her neck and lower back were confirmed (the rejected claims judgment) - Further, the applicant was found to have acted unreasonably in bringing her proceedings and was not awarded her costs and was ordered to pay the respondent's costs (the costs judgment) - No appeal at the time against the rejected claims judgment - Appeal instituted against the costs judgment only - That appeal subsequently dismissed for want of prosecution - Applicant becomes self-represented - Over four years after the relevant events, the applicant files two Application for Directions, 1. to reopen the dismissed appeal and 2. to extend time to file appeals against the rejected claims judgment and the costs judgment - Duty of a court to assist a self-represented litigant - Principles regarding delay in litigation and extending time - Applicant bears a heavy onus - Appeals under the Return to Work Act 2014 limited to questions of law. Held: The applicant's proceedings lack substance, are unmeritorious and the grounds of appeal do not disclose any question of law - The two Applications for Directions are misconceived and are lacking in substance and are dismissed pursuant to s 41 of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014.

Ng v South Australia Police [2020] SAET 63

Ng v South Australia Police [2020] SAET 89

Maurici v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2022] SAET 69 Draoui v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2023] SAET 42

Ulowski v Miller (1968) SASR 277

Harradine v Chief Executive of the Department for Education [2020] SAET 38

Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 67; (2014) 314 ALR 84

De L v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services (No 2) [1997] HCA 14; (1997) 190 CLR 207

South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission v Workers Compensation Tribunal & Anor [2009] SASC 213

A series of litigation and now self-represented

1. It is proper for a court to guide a self-represented person in their litigation. Despite the guidance I gave to Phyllis Ng, she was unable to focus on the issues to be determined. Although I repeatedly threw her a life raft; she just kept swimming away.
2. For years now, Ms Ng has been engaged in a series of litigation with her former employer, South Australia Police. Whilst she formerly had various lawyers acting on her behalf, she is now self-represented.
3. Ms Ng's dealings with SAPOL have previously been explained by my colleague, Deputy President Judge Rossi. I will not repeat that history here. Suffice it to say, she was employed as a project officer and that during that employment she claimed work-related injuries pursuant to the Return to Work Act 2014.
4. The issue for determination in this judgment is whether Ms Ng should be allowed to appeal against two judgments of Rossi DPJ.

Ms Ng was an unreliable witness, was unsuccessful and was ordered to pay costs

1. In Ng v South Australia Police [2020] SAET 63, Rossi DPJ found that Ms Ng was an unreliable witness and confirmed the decisions to reject her two workers compensation claims for injuries to her right wrist and to her neck and lower back: case numbers 2970/2016 & 5064/2026. That rejected claims judgment was delivered on 21 April 2020. At that time, Ms Ng was represented by solicitors and counsel.
2. In Ng v South Australia Police [2020] SAET 89, Rossi DPJ found that Ms Ng had acted unreasonably in instituting the above two sets of proceedings and as such ordered that she not be entitled to an award of costs under s 106(1) of the RTW Act. Further, that pursuant to s 106(3)(c) of that Act, she was to pay the legal costs of SAPOL. That costs judgment was delivered on 19 May 2020. At that time, Ms Ng was represented by solicitors and counsel.

1. At some time after the delivery of the above decisions, Ms Ng dispensed with the services of her legal team. She sought advice from another law firm.
2. On 2 June 2020, a Notice of Appeal was filed in the Registry seeking to overturn the costs judgment only: case number ET-20-02385. That form was completed by, and lodged by, a lawyer at that new law firm.
3. The grounds of appeal set out were that Rossi DPJ failed to exercise his discretion to award costs to Ms Ng. And, that his Honour should have advised Ms Ng that he was inclined to make an adverse costs order against her, before he made that order, so that she could have obtained independent legal advice.
4. In her two applications Ms Ng makes many criticisms of her former legal representatives. Those legal practitioners are anonymised as lawyer 1, counsel and lawyer 2. There is also another lawyer involved, although never instructed, anonymised as lawyer 3.

1. At the time the costs appeal was filed by lawyer 2, the then Practice Direction 29 required that for an appeal to be listed, an Outline of Argument had to be filed by the appellant within two calendar months of the filing of the appeal. If the appellant did not file such an outline within four calendar months, PD 29 required that the appeal be dismissed for want of prosecution.
2. PD 29 was introduced because of the then substantial increase in the number of appeals to the Full Bench and the limited judicial resources available to hear them. The issue being that a system of 'triaging' was necessary to list appeals having regard to their importance and relative priority.[1]
3. As an Outline of Argument was not filed within that four month requirement, on 13 October 2020, Ms Ng's appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution in accordance with PD 29.[2] No outline has since been filed.

1. Five further pieces of information round out the necessary background to this case.
2. First, no appeal was ever filed by lawyer 1, lawyer 2, lawyer 3 or Ms Ng personally against the rejected claims judgment of 21 April 2020.
3. Second, at all relevant times, the period within which to file an appeal against a decision of a Presidential member was, and is, 28 days from the date of the relevant orders.
4. Third, as an aside, there is no longer any requirement in the South Australian Employment Tribunal Practice Directions to file an Outline of Argument for the appeal to be listed. Appeals are now listed for a directions hearing whereat relevant orders are made.
5. Fourth, six weeks after filing the Notice of Appeal, on 13 July 2020 lawyer 2 filed a Notice in the Registry advising that he ceased to act for Ms Ng. At that time, Ms Ng still had three months to file her outline before the dismissal requirements of PD 29 would be operable.
6. Fifth, on or about 3 January 2023, Ms Ng's employment with SAPOL was terminated. She has brought separate proceedings in relation to that, where she is representing herself.

Ms Ng's two Applications for Directions of 31 January 2025

1. Reopen the closed appeal
2. In her first Application for Directions, Ms Ng seeks to set aside the order of 13 October 2020, which dismissed her appeal against the costs judgment of 19 May 2020 for want of prosecution. If that order was to be set aside, the costs judgment appeal would be reinstated as it was prior to its dismissal. Of course, her present application was made well over four years after the relevant events.
   1. Extension of time to appeal
3. In her second Application for Directions, Ms Ng seeks an order granting an extension of time within which to file an appeal against the rejected claims judgment of 21 April 2020, and against the costs judgment of 19 May 2020. Attached to that application was a draft Notice of Appeal. Whilst in that notice Ms Ng states that both the rejected claims judgment and the costs judgment would be the subject of her appeal, the grounds of appeal set out there are identical to the grounds listed by lawyer 2 in the initial appeal notice of 2 June 2020. That is, the grounds only relate to the costs judgment and not to the rejected claims judgment. As above, her application was made well over four years after the relevant events.
4. To support her Applications for Directions Ms Ng has filed a great many documents. She relied on affidavits of her evidence and two sets of written submissions with many annexures. She also tendered medical evidence as well as a flow chart of her grounds of appeal and the consequences. All the documents relied upon in writing this judgment are listed in the attached schedule.
5. The issue for determination is whether Ms Ng has provided a sufficient explanation for the court to exercise its discretion to reopen her closed appeal and to extend time to allow her to file a further appeal. The particular circumstances of this case must be examined and considered in light of the interests of justice.

1. Unfortunately for her, much of what Ms Ng said in her written submissions and in her oral address was irrelevant to the issues to be decided. In prolix fashion, her passion was directed at relitigating the issues determined by Rossi DPJ, rather than focussing on the reasons why her earlier in-time appeal should be reinstated and the reasons why time should be extended to allow her to file new appeals. Her arguments were heavy on legal aphorisms but light on cogent content.
2. Given the Court's duty to a self-represented litigant, I provided assistance to Ms Ng to understand what information she should present regarding her two Applications for Directions. I did so through the directions hearings interlocutory stage, and during the hearing proper. At the first directions hearing of 27 February 2025, I provided to her for her consideration two previous judgments of this Court which dealt with similar issues as in her case.[3]
3. With regards to those judgments, in order to ensure that she had read and understood them, in the formal hearing on 26 November 2025 I adjourned the proceedings for a period of time to allow that to happen.[4] Despite my many attempts to guide her attention to the issues relevant to the orders she sought in her two applications, Ms Ng persisted with her 'grounds of appeal' which set out her grievances with the events and outcomes before Rossi DPJ.

1. Only those aspects of Ms Ng's affidavit evidence that relate to the issues to be determined on the two Applications for Directions, will be set out below. Most of what she said in those documents was irrelevant to such issues.
2. In her affidavit of 31 January 2025, Ms Ng addressed the dismissal of her appeal against the costs judgment on 13 October 2020. She said that because she had not been given an opportunity to be heard, before that dismissal, she had been denied natural justice and procedural fairness.[5]
3. Also, she asserted that Rossi DPJ had made errors in that he had: failed to consider matters or considered highly irrelevant matters; made contradictory findings; and displayed apprehended bias. She also said she was not competent at the time she gave evidence.[6]
4. In her affidavit of 7 October 2025, Ms Ng said that lawyer 2 had not prepared an Outline of Argument for her on the appeal against the costs judgment. Also, that she was not aware that an outline had to be filed within four months of the filing of her appeal: she only became aware of the need for that after her appeal was dismissed.[7]

1. Ms Ng's nine pages of written submissions were arranged in eight numbered headings: Introduction; Failure by Legal Representative; Procedural Irregularities by SAET; Timeline of Events; Judge's Statement on Reconsideration; Reputational Harm and Contradictory Evidence; Explanation for Delay in Seeking Reinstatement; SAPOL's Attempt to Enforce Costs Order; and Request. Most of what she said in her written submissions is irrelevant to her two Applications for Directions.
2. Attached to her written submissions were 18 separate appendices, containing emails, lawyers' documents and other associated documents.
3. On the topic of Failure by Legal Representative, Ms Ng said that lawyer 2, failed to inform her of the requirements to submit an Outline of Argument for the costs appeal before he ceased acting for her on 13 July 2020. She said she was not informed of the consequences of failing to file such a document. She set out her views on the Australian Solicitors; Conduct Rules 2015 and on the Common Law duty of care. She concluded saying that she should not suffer through the professional negligence of her then lawyer.
4. Under the heading of Procedural irregularities by SAET, Ms Ng complained of alleged anomalies by the South Australian Employment Tribunal which included: failing to act fairly and justly; failing to be procedurally transparent; and breaching the hearing rule by not allowing her to be heard before her appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.
5. When explaining the Timeline of Events, Ms Ng relied on appendix 2 of her written submissions, being her email to the Registry of 1 June 2020. In that email she said that after Rossi DPJ had ruled that she was a dishonest and unreliable witness, she had spoken to lawyer 1 who advised her not to appeal as very hefty legal costs would be incurred, including paying SAPOL's legal costs. She said that on that advice, she did not appeal. Thereafter, she said that she engaged lawyer 2 and on 2 June 2020 the costs appeal document was filed.
6. However, she said on 25 June 2020 she 'declined to pay the amount of $5,000.00' to lawyer 2's firm. Then, she confirmed that on 13 July 2020, lawyer 2 ceased acting on her behalf and filed the required notice in the Registry.
7. Ms Ng's submissions under the heading Judge's Statement on Reconsideration are complaints and grievances with the factual findings of Rossi DPJ. Her paragraphs on Reputational Harm and Contradictory Evidence recount her previous dealings with SAPOL and her view that her evidence was honest and trustworthy. Her paragraphs on SAPOL's Attempt to Enforce Costs Order explain that she doesn't believe she should pay SAPOL's costs in the amount of $40,435.30, whilst she is 'seeking reinstatement of the [costs judgment] appeal'. The heading Request asks that that appeal be reinstated and that she be granted an extension of time to file an appeal against the rejected claims judgment.
8. Under the heading of Explanation for Delay in Seeking Reinstatement, Ms Ng engaged, fleetingly, with the issues to be determined in these proceedings. There she stated that at the time of the delivery of the two judgments of Rossi PDJ - April and May 2020 - Australia was in the early suppression stage of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time her appeal was dismissed in October 2020, Australia was still suffering from the effects of that pandemic. She said at that time she faced significant uncertainty and stress. She said she did not understand that reinstatement was possible or how to pursue it.
9. In attempting to explain her lack of understanding, at appendix 7 of her written submissions, Ms Ng relied upon a series of emails between herself and lawyer 3. Those emails being after her appeal had been dismissed for want of prosecution on 13 October 2020.
10. In an email of 26 October 2020, lawyer 3 said to Ms Ng:

I do not think that this is something we can help you with.

I think you will have great difficulty appealing the decision.

If you think that there was bad advice given on the part of your previous lawyers, I suggest you make a claim through the Law Society of South Australia Legal Practitioners Conduct Committee.[8]

1. In a subsequent email of 27 October 2020, lawyer 3 said to Ms Ng:

1. I have had a brief look at the decision of Judge Rossi. I cannot see an error of law.
2. The judge found you to be unreliable.
3. Why is your previous lawyer and barrister not advising you?
4. Why did you allow the appeal to go out of time? That is difficult to remedy.

1. Most of the rest of her written submissions on her reasons for the delay addressed irrelevant considerations around the termination for her employment from SAPOL on 3 January 2023. That being two and a half years after the judgments of Rossi DPJ.
2. However, concluding her written submissions on delay, Ms Ng said the delay in her seeking the reinstatement of her appeal was 'due to genuine legal and personal constraints' and was 'due to the extreme conditions of COVID-19 pandemic.' She said she had always acted promptly and in good faith.[10]

1. The ten pages of Ms Ng's reply written submissions (responding to the respondent's written submissions of 3 November 2025) were in similar fashion to her original written submissions. There, she reiterated her grievances against the lawyers, the Tribunal and with Rossi DPJ's judgment. Little of what she had to say was relevant to her two Applications for Directions. However, on the topic of why an Outline of Argument was not filed within four months of her appeal, she said:

This outcome was not the result of any failure on my part but was rather a combination of professional negligence by my former legal representative and procedural irregularities within the Tribunal itself.[11]

1. Further on in her reply written submissions, Ms Ng repeated her arguments about the COVID-19 pandemic, saying that 'it was impossible' for her to advance her appeal (or reinstatement thereof) because of the stay at home mandate, the closure of offices and that 'legal aids were not available.' During the COVID-19 pandemic, Ms Ng said she couldn't find any lawyer or obtain legal advice.[12]

1. Ms Ng's oral submissions were unhelpful to the issues to be decided on her two Application for Directions; she commenced her oral address with the following:

President, this appeal turns on two points. The tribunal's causation finding was made without evidence, and the court's decision, which the respondent is seeking 40,000, flowed directly from that flawed finding. The tribunal said my back and neck pain began in July 2015 from a private car trip. Fresh evidence proves that trip actually occurred on 21 January 2016, not July 2015. Medical imaging shows degeneration only on 29 March 2016 X-rays. And further X-rays taken two months later on 26 May 2016, show more issues with my cervical spine. ... [13]

1. That opening, and more, did not address the issues to be decided in her two Applications for Directions
2. What followed was much courtroom time taken up with Ms Ng putting her case. Had her submissions been put by a legal practitioner, I would have stopped the address. However, as she was representing herself, and is not legally trained, I allowed her to fully explain herself. In doing that, she continually, and wrongly, concentrated on her many separate grounds of appeal. At several points through her address, I attempted to guide her focus onto the issues relevant to her two Applications for Directions.[14] Those attempts were unsuccessful.
3. Without adequate explanation, throughout her oral submissions Ms Ng repeatedly said that her trial was 'procedurally unfair' and that Rossi DPJ's judgements were 'legally unsustainable'.
4. Rather than paraphrase all her oral submissions, it is sufficient to set out the transcript of her summary of those arguments so that the text and context of her case as argued is exposed:

In summary, my grounds of appeal are (1) misstated causation. Tribunal wrongly attributed injury to a July 2015 car trip. Fresh evidence, advocates, leave records, emails, proves the trip occurred in January 2016. Alibi that the car trip did not occur in 2015. Finding made without evidence equals error of law. (2) medical imaging evidence. On 29 - I beg your pardon, President. On 29 March 2016, X-ray taken show degeneration only. On 26 of May 2016, which is two months later, the X-ray shows inflammation, new aggravation. Imaging proof injury arose in 2016, not 2015.

Number 3. Employer's own report. 2009 workstation noncompliance caused injury, which was resolved. Employee refused standing desk in 2016 despite GP and Dr Kent's recommendation. Shows pattern of workplace causation and aggravation. Number 4. Separate injury. May 2016, wrist pain caused by repetitive mouse use. July 2016, back and neck pain, workstation strain. Separate injuries, each compensable independently. (5) procedural work unfairness. Employee in not known psychological condition, adjustment disorder, major depression.

Tribunal relied on reconstructed memory questioning. Credibly defining unsafe. Number 6, credibility ruling and corroboration requirement. Tribunal viewed me as unreliable and would not believe me unless corroborated. Blanket refusal to accept testimony is procedurally unfair and legally unsustainable. Inconsistencies arose from practitioner notes not deliberate falsehood. Number 7, misstatement of quote, uncontested closed court evidence. Employer's lawyer claimed Brisbane trip's timing in May/June 2015 was uncontested. Fresh evidence proved trip was in January 2016. And that claim of the injury being caused by Brisbane trip has been contested throughout. Tribunal relied on misstatement and that is an error of law.

Number 8, mischaracterisation of medical history. Employer's lawyer claimed testimony car trip discomfort lasted two to three days was inconsistent with medical notes showing 12 months of pain. GP's - Dr Kotera's consultation in late March and physio and chiropractor notes reflected May to June workplace aggravation. Tribunal conflated separate episodes, mischaracterised medical history and wrongly found dishonesty. So the point earlier about the GP, Kotera, the consultation records, the work - all the medical records from the end of June - end of March, all the way to - all the way to July. They are all pertaining to the workplace aggravation.

Misinterpretation of Dr Kent's report is number 9. Dr. Kent's report incorrectly stated that I said pain was caused by car trip. I request a factual correction. Dr Kent misinterpreted this as an attempt to influence his opinion. Tribunal ruled applicant sought to improperly change expert opinion. In fact, request was legitimate correction of error, not misconduct. Tribunal's ruling lacked proper foundation and was an error of law.

Number 10, credibility finding based on demeanour. Tribunal wrote that applicant unreliable because of, "her demeanour as a witness". Demeanour is a subjective and unsafe basis for rejecting testimony. Tribunal ignored applicant's psychological condition, which may affect presentation under stress. Finding was procedurally unfair and legally unsustainable. And on the cost order, the cost decision flowed directly from causation and credibility findings, disproportionate and unjust given errors of law and procedural unfairness.

Number 12, the ongoing consequences. The dishonesty ruling relied upon by employer to terminate my employment, effectively ending my career, and magnifies injustice of tribunal's flawed findings. President, these grounds show the tribunal's findings were made without evidence, contradicted by fresh records, and reached through an unfair process. Misstated causation, mischaracterised medical history, misinterpretation of Dr Kent's report, and reliance on demeanour led directly to a dishonesty finding, termination of my career, and a 40,000 cost order. I respectfully ask that the review be granted, the causation and dishonesty findings set aside, and the cost order overturned. The dishonesty finding was unsafe, and once it falls, the termination and cost order must also fall. Thank you, President.[15]

1. As can be seen, in that summary Ms Ng did not address the issues to be decided on her two Applications for Directions.

Was there a medical reason why Ms Ng could not to advance her case at the relevant time?

1. Before the judgments of Rossi DPJ in April and May 2020, Ms Ng was treated by Dr Hans Van den Bos, Psychiatrist. A bundle of his medical notes and letters was tendered into evidence by Ms Ng. As such, she waived any doctor / patient privilege attached to the information in those documents.
2. In a consultation note of 22 February 2020 - shortly before she gave evidence in March 2020 - Dr Van den Bos recorded that Ms Ng's mental state had improved and that she had increased her hours of work. He said there was no evidence of psychotic features.[16]
3. In a consultation note of 5 May 2020 - after the rejected claims judgment, but before the costs judgment - Dr Van den Bos recorded that Ms Ng's mental state had deteriorated. He said she was anxious and somewhat depressed, although her behaviour was appropriate and there was no evidence of psychotic features.[17]
4. In a consultation note of 19 May 2020 - the same day as the costs judgment - Dr Van den Bos recorded that Ms Ng was now working 3½ days per week; that she was functioning well; and that she feels more confident. As previously, he again said there was no evidence of psychotic features.[18] Similar information was contained in a letter to Ms Ng's general practitioner of the same day.[19]
5. In a letter to a rehabilitation provider less than two weeks later, on 31 May 2020, Dr Van den Bos recorded a 'sudden change in direction' by Ms Ng with regards to her return to work status . He said she now wished to commence 'higher duties' on a full-time basis as from 25 May 2020.[20]
6. Ms Ng's relationship with Dr Van den Bos was dramatically ended due to her 'sudden change in direction'. In a letter to her of 2 June 2020, Dr Van den Bos set out where his recollection of relevant events differed from Ms Ng's. He concluded by saying:

From my perspective you have attempted to manipulate me and I find myself now in a rather difficult position by your portrayal of the facts in a different way.

In view of the above and the dishonest way you have treated me, I am of the opinion that any therapeutic alliance between us has been destroyed and as a result I consider it impossible to continue my involvement in your care. I have cancelled your appointment with me later on today and instructed my assistant not to arrange any further appointments with you.[21]

1. Dr Van den Bos' involvement in Ms Ng's treatment thereby ended.

1. Ms Ng also tendered into evidence a medical report from Dr Colin Field, Clinical Neuropsychologist dated 25 July 2025. Dr Field said that he examined Ms Ng on three occasions - 1 May 2025, 5 June 2025 and 24 July 2025.[22] Of course, such examinations are some five years after the relevant events in 2020.
2. In his report Dr Field acknowledged that Ms Ng wished to appeal Rossi DPJ's judgments 'essentially on medical grounds'. He recorded that:

She states that about the time of the Hearing in 2020 she was not in a position to defend herself properly due to issues of anxiety disorder with major depression.[23]

1. In his summary and review, Dr Field noted that at the time of the hearing before Rossi DPJ in March 2020, it was 'written up' that Ms Ng had a major depression and was on medication. He also noted that from December 2019 to May 2020, Dr Van den Bos had documented significant mood disturbances with active treatment and medication.[24]
2. As for his opinion, Dr Field said:

One can only speculate as to her level of cognition at the time of the Hearing of March 2020; on clinical grounds one would strongly suspect that given the well documented presence of significant of mood disorder (depression and anxiety) at around the time of the subject Hearings, that there may well have been significant cognitive inefficiencies present at the time, and as such these may well have contributed to Ms Ng's stated inability to respond consistently and clearly to questions posed to her, especially over long sessions without rest breaks.

I can make no more specific comments regarding Ms Ng's likely neuropsychological presentation as of March 2020 apart from the observations made above.[25]

1. Unhelpfully, Dr Field's opinion is directed at Ms Ng's capacity as at the time of hearings before Rossi DPJ in March 2020, and not at her capacity after his Honour's judgment of April and May and through to October that year. It is that latter time period that is relevant, as it is then that Ms Ng should have made the necessary decisions to advance her proceedings.

Legal principles on delay and whether closed proceedings should be reopened

1. The seminal authority in civil law on how a court should deal with delay in litigation is Ulowski v Miller. There, Chief Justice Bray stressed the discretionary nature of the task, emphasising that a judicial officer should not be fettered by any absolute or inflexible rules. However, as a guide, he identified five paramount matters for consideration: the length of the delay; the explanation for the delay, the hardship to the plaintiff if the action is dismissed and the cause of action left statute barred; the prejudice to the defendant if the action is allowed to proceed notwithstanding the delay; and, the conduct of the defendant in the litigation.[26]
2. In the 2022 case of Maurici v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia, and in the subsequent 2023 case of Draoui v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia[27] I had occasion to consider the relevant authorities on the issue of reopening already resolved RTW Act proceedings or extending time to allow for an appeal. Both Mr Maurici and Mr Draoui were self-represented litigants, hence why I provided copies of those cases to Ms Ng for her consideration.
3. The principles that can be distilled from those cases are:

• 66.1 The applicant should be without fault or neglect and as such bears a heavy onus to show that the proceedings should be reopened.

• 66.2 The applicant will need to demonstrate an extraordinary, unusual or atypical situation, or one beyond the contemplation of the legislature. As such, a compelling case may fail not for want of substance, but for lack of enough substance.

• 66.3 The power of the court to reopen closed proceedings is discretionary. The court must be satisfied that the interests of justice so requires it. Such an order is to be used sparingly, rarely, with great caution and having regard to the public interest of the principle of finality of litigation.

• 66.4 Legislation and rules provide the power to extend time to file an appeal. That power is discretionary and is to be exercised judicially, in the interests of justice: as the justice of the case may require.

• 66.5 Judicial resources are to be utilised properly and efficaciously. Even if there is little prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to other litigants wishing to use judicial resources is a relevant consideration.

• 66.6 Legislative objects require that applications are processed and resolved as quickly as possible while achieving just outcomes. Costs of the litigation are to be kept to a minimum insofar as is just and appropriate. Adversarial contests are to be reduced to the greatest possible extent. In light of those objects, inconvenience to the respondent is a relevant consideration.

• 66.7 Appeals under the RTW Act are limited to a question of law. A mere complaint about a wrong factual finding may not be an error of law. Failure to identify a question of law may be a significant reason why an appeal should not be allowed to proceed.

• 66.8 The interests of justice require that unmeritorious proceedings should be ended as soon as possible with the least expenditure of judicial resources. Allowing an appeal that is devoid of merit to proceed would also be detrimental to other litigants waiting for their proceedings to be heard.[28]

1. With the above legal principles in mind, I turn to the consideration of the issues to be determined.

The clear difficulties Ms Ng has in finding success

1. The length of Ms Ng's delaying is a relevant consideration. Notwithstanding the advice she received from lawyer 1 and counsel and lawyer 2, it is noted that Ms Ng last received advice from lawyer 3 in October 2020. Thereafter, she delayed in filing her Applications for Directions not four days, not four weeks, not even four months, but more than four years. Delay of that length is excessive. It cannot be said that she is without fault for delaying so long.
2. Also, with the length of the delay in mind, it is significant that Ms Ng appeared to have made an informed decision to not appeal the rejected claims judgment in 2020, within the stipulated 28 days. In her email to the Registry of 1 June 2020 Ms Ng said that she had acted on lawyer 1's advice that if she were to appeal, she would incur very hefty legal costs, including paying SAPOL's legal costs.
3. Further assumptions - that Ms Ng made a conscious decision to not appeal the rejected claims judgment - can be found in the lack of action in that regard by lawyer 2 and lawyer 3.
4. The grounds of appeal, set out by lawyer 2 in the Notice of Appeal of 2 June 2020, is a relevant consideration. Those grounds only related to the costs judgment and not to the rejected claims judgment. The first ground complained that Rossi DPJ did not exercise his discretion to make an award of costs to Ms Ng. Other than that meagre assertion, no particulars were provided. For example, it is not said how the discretion to make a costs order had miscarried. The first ground does not give rise to a question of law regarding the exercise of judicial discretion in accordance with the principles in the House v The King.[29]
5. The second ground set out by lawyer 2 complained that Rossi DPJ should have advised Ms Ng that a costs order may be made against her and should have advised her to seek independent representation. There are two problems with that ground. First, there was no requirement for his Honour to give such a warning or advice. Second, the fundamental difficulty is that at the relevant time Ms Ng was legally represented by lawyer 1 and counsel. When his Honour said in the rejected claims judgment that he would 'hear from the parties as to the appropriate cost order to be made'[30] he was entitled to assume that Ms Ng would have received full and frank advice from her legal team about all aspects relating to her costs situation, including whether independent legal advice was preferrable. As such, there was no denial of natural justice or procedural fairness; and, accordingly, the second ground of appeal does not give rise to a question of law.
6. As Ms Ng merely repeated grounds one and two, as above, in her draft Notice of Appeal attached to her extension of time Application for Directions, the same adverse issues infect that document. As such, again, no question of law is identified.
7. Apropos of all that, pleaded as they were, the grounds of appeal in the Notices of Appeal lacked substance, were without merit and were always doomed to fail.
8. On the topic of why no Outline of Argument was filed on her costs appeal - which resulted in its dismissal on 13 October 2020 - Ms Ng blamed the incompetence and negligence of lawyer 2. That lawyer was not called to give evidence. On the information provided by Ms Ng, it cannot be established that lawyer 2 was either incompetent or negligent in not filing the outline. Lawyer 2 filed the appeal on 2 June 2020. In accordance with PD 29, two months were allowed for the outline to be filed; therefore, by 2 August 2020. Lawyer 2 ceased acting before that date on 13 July 2020. It is not known whether lawyer 2 was in the process of drafting the outline and was on track to file it before 2 August 2020.
9. As is evident, when lawyer 2 ceased acting there was still time for Ms Ng to comply with PD 29 and file the outline by 2 August 2020, or at least before the expiry of four months in October 2020. Had she filed any document purporting to be an Outline of Argument, then the Registry would have processed the appeal and subsequently a directions hearing would have been listed. No doubt at that hearing the deficiencies of the grounds of appeal and perhaps the outline would have been raised. And, if so, Ms Ng would have been given an opportunity to rectify such defects. The fact that she filed nothing at all - failed to take any positive steps - demonstrates neglect on her behalf.
10. Indeed, the positive steps she did in fact undertake - the filing of the two Applications for Directions on 31 January 2025 - were a very significant amount of time after the relevant events in 2020: over four years.
11. Ms Ng also complains about the arbitrary nature of PD 29; that she had not been given an opportunity to be heard before the dismissal of her appeal; that she had been denied natural justice and procedural fairness. That submission fails to appreciate the ability of a court to control its own processes.
12. The South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014 and the South Australian Employment Tribunal Rules have always provided a power to the President to give directions about the practices and procedures to be followed. It is of significance that the purpose of PD 29 was to protect and control the limited judicial resources of the Tribunal, in response to the then substantial increase in the number of appeals filed. Ms Ng was not denied natural justice or procedural fairness when she, like every other appellant at the time, was required to file an outline before her appeal would be listed. As she did not do so, her appeal was dismissed in accordance with a lawfully issued direction.
13. No appeal was ever filed by lawyer 1 or lawyer 2 against the rejected claims judgment. I take it that Ms Ng also makes allegations of incompetence and negligence against those lawyers for not doing so. Such allegations are mere assertions and have not been properly set out. The competence of a legal practitioner is the purview of the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner.
14. Ms Ng's claimed difficulties due to the COVID-19 pandemic ring hollow and are not made out. Whilst some disruption to her ability to take positive steps during that difficult time may be accepted, she still had many months within which to prosecute her appeal and/or to file new appeals. During the whole time of the pandemic this Tribunal its Registry and its judicial processes all continued to function. Any positive steps taken by Ms Ng then - such as filing the outline on her appeal or filing an Application for Directions seeking an extension of time to file an appeal against the rejected claims judgment - would have been processed in the ordinary course and given judicial consideration.
15. What also tells against her is that once the extreme effects of the COVID-19 pandemic had dissipated, Ms Ng still did not take any positive steps. It was not until January 2025, many years afterwards, that she acted and filed her Applications for Directions.
16. The topic of her mental capacity in 2020 was unsatisfactorily addressed by Ms Ng. Dr Van den Bos' evidence does not support her argument that she was mentally incapable of making the necessary legal decisions at the time. Dr Field did not see her in 2020, only examining her five years later in 2025. Although he said that at the time it was 'written up' that Ms Ng had a major depression and was on medication, that of itself does not demonstrate that she lacked the necessary legal capacity. Further much more detailed and forensic evidence is needed to establish such a fact. That evidence has not been presented here. The best it gets for Ms Ng in that regard is Dr Field's speculation that she may well have had significant cognitive inefficiencies at the time. Such a view is not enough to establish legal incapacity, especially when made five years after the event.
17. A further problem arising in the opinion of Dr Field, is that he focuses on the time that Ms Ng was giving evidence in March 2020, and not on the period at and after the April and May 2020 judgments of Rossi DPJ, when Ms Ng should have taken positive steps to appeal those decisions.
18. And, in that regard, it is to be noted that there appears to have been no concerns raised in March 2020 as to Ms Ng's capacity to give evidence or to receive advice and provide instructions to her legal team.
19. Accordingly, on the topic of her legal / mental capacity at any relevant time Ms Ng's claims lack substance and are without merit. Further, such claims do not raise a question of law.
20. Next are Ms Ng's many complaints about the fact finding by Rossi DPJ. It is to be understood that Ms Ng is bound to the way her case was argued at the hearing. There, she was represented by lawyer 1 and by counsel. No doubt forensic decisions were made as to what evidence to call, what questions should have been asked of the witnesses and what submissions should be made about the evidence. An appeal limited to a question of law is not a forum for her to impugn findings of fact made in consequence of those forensic decisions. Also, it is not a forum to introduce fresh evidence.
21. Whilst it is a well established principle that the question of whether there is any evidence of a particular fact will be a question of law, it does not follow that once the fact has been found by a judicial officer that an open challenge can be made to it on an appeal limited to a question of law. If there is evidence of a particular fact, the question whether that evidence should have been accepted in whole or in part, or ought to be accepted as sufficient to establish the fact, is a question of fact and not a question of law.[31]
22. Also, when a court which has exclusive jurisdiction to determine facts at hearing and determination decides that it does not accept the evidence tendered to establish a particular fact, its decision, apart from the exceptional case will be conclusive.[32] That is the case here.
23. Further, the onus is on an appellant to properly articulate the question of law. A ground of appeal which claims that there was no evidence of a particular fact or that it was not open to find that fact, constitutes a futile attempt to convert a question of fact into a question of law by inverting the onus of proof.[33]
24. In similar vein, Ms Ng alleges that Rossi DPJ engaged in contradictory fact finding. Under proper scrutiny that is simply not the case.
25. Ms Ng also made the claim that Rossi DPJ displayed apprehended bias. No application for his Honour to recuse himself was made by Ms Ng's legal team before, during or after the hearing of her case. This claim seems to be part of Ms Ng's scattergun of legal concepts thrown about in aid of her two Applications for Directions. The claim is unsubstantiated and is without merit.
26. To round out her criticisms, no procedural irregularities can be identified by Registry or other staff. Such claims are unsubstantiated and are without merit.
27. With all the difficulties with Ms Ng's case now explained, it is evident that she has failed to shift her heavy onus. The arguments she has raised on her two Applications for Directions are lacking in substance, without any merit and do not disclose any question of law to be considered on appeal. The hardship that she will experience by being unsuccessful, must be balanced against the prejudice to the respondent and against the need for finality in litigation. The proper use of limited judicial resources is another critical factor, as are the demands of other litigants wishing to use those resources. It is in the interests of justice that Ms Ng's litigation over the judgments of Rossi DPJ be ended now.
28. Accordingly, I find that her two Applications for Directions are misconceived and are lacking in substance and a such they should be dismissed.

1. The orders that will be made to dispose of these proceedings are:
   1. Pursuant to s 41(1)(a) & (2) of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014, the applicant's Application for Directions dated 31 January 2025, seeking an order to reopen Appeal case number ET-20-02385, is dismissed as it is misconceived and is lacking in substance.
   2. Pursuant to s 41(1)(a) & (2) of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014, the applicant's Application for Directions dated 31 January 2025, seeking extensions of time within which to appeal the judgments of 21 April 2020 and 19 May 2020, is dismissed as it is misconceived and is lacking in substance.
   3. Pursuant to s 41(4) of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014, the applicant cannot bring any further proceedings of the same kind in relations to the same subject matter, without leave of a Presidential member.
   4. If the respondent seeks an order for its costs, pursuant to s 106(3) of the Return to Work Act 2014, the request for such an order is to be made within seven days.

31 January 2025 Application for Directions - reopen.

31 January 2025 Application for Directions - extension of time.

26 August 2025 Affidavit of Phyllis Ng, with Appendices I to II.

17 September 2025 Affidavit of Phyllis Ng, with Appendices I to III.

18 September 2025 (Applicant's) Written Submission in Support of Reinstatement of Appeal filed 2nd June 2020 and Request for Time Extension for Appeal, with Appendices 1 to 18.

7 October 2025 Affidavit of Phyllis Ng, with Appendices A to D.

17 November 2025 (Applicant's) Reply to response from respondent filed 3 November 2025 with regards to Reinstatement of Appeal filed 2 June 2020 and Request for Time Extension for Appeal filed 31 January 2025, with 11-page attachment.

A2 Bundle of medical notes from Dr Hans Van den Bos.

A4 Flowchart of grounds of appeal and consequences.

[1] South Australian Employment Tribunal Practice Direvction No 29 - Appeals to the Full Bench, November 2017.

[2] South Australian Employment Tribunal Orders 13 October 2020.

[3] Maurici v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2022] SAET 69 & Draoui v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2023] SAET 42. Those authorities along with others were in the Respondent's Book of Authorities which was also provided to Ms Ng.

[5] Affidavit of Phyllis Ng 31 January 2025 [3].

[7] Affidavit of Phyllis Ng 7 October 2025 [1] & [2].

[8] (Applicant's) Written Submission in Support of Reinstatement of Appeal filed 2nd June 2020 and Request for Time Extension for Appeal, 18 September pp 8-9 and Appendix 7.

[10] Applicant's Written Submissions, 18 September 2025 p 9.

[11] (Applicant's) Reply to response from respondent filed 3 November 2025 with regards to Reinstatement of Appeal filed 2 June 2020 and Request for Time Extension for Appeal filed 31 January 2025, 17 November 2025 p 1.

[16] Exhibit A2 - Bundle of medical notes from Dr Hans Van den Bos, Consultation notes p 5 of 23.

[19] Ibid Dr Van den Bos Letter 19 May 2020.

[20] Ibid Dr Van den Bos Letter 31 May 2020.

[21] Ibid Dr Van den Bos letter 2 June 2020.

[22] Exhibit A1 report of Dr Colin Field 25 July 2025.

[26] Ulowski v Miller (1968) SASR 277 at 280, Mitchell and Walters JJ concurring.

[27] Maurici v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2022] SAET 69; Draoui v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2023] SAET 42.

[28] Maurici v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2022] SAET 69 [70]-[71], [79]-[80], [82], [84]-[88], [109], [111], [114]-[115], [123]-[125] & [136]. Also, Harradine v Chief Executive of the Department for Education [2020] SAET 38 [123]; Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 67; (2014) 314 ALR 84 [13]-[15]; De L v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services (No 2) [1997] HCA 14; (1997) 190 CLR 207; Draoui v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2023] SAET 42 [95]-[96]. And South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014 ss 8, 26I and 61; South Australian Employment Tribunal Rules 2024 rr 7 and 8(1)(b); Return to Work Act 2014 s 3; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 s 48(1); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 South Australia r 186.1(2)(b).

[29] House v The King (1936) CLR 499.

[30] Ng v South Australia Police [2020] SAET 63 [108.1].

[31] South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission v Workers Compensation Tribunal & Anor [2009] SASC 213 [52].