Nevin v Nevin-Large [2026] NSWSC 1009 | Case summary | Zoe

NSWNSWSC

Nevin v Nevin-Large

[2026] NSWSC 1009

Supreme Court of NSW|2026-08-24|Before: Bennett J

View on NSW Caselaw

At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2026-08-24

Before

Bennett J

Catchwords

SUCCESSION — Family provision — Sexual abuse and physical abuse allegations — Where plaintiff adult daughter of deceased from his first marriage — Where plaintiff was removed from her mother’s care at about age 9 and custody awarded to deceased — Where plaintiff lived with deceased, step-mother and two half siblings until aged 18 — Where plaintiff alleges deceased sexually and physically assaulted her between ages 4 to 18 — Where plaintiff left home at 18 following alleged abuse incident —Where plaintiff had no contact with deceased for approximately 34 years before his death following leaving home — Where deceased denied allegations of abuse — Where family did not believe plaintiff — Whether it is proper and appropriate to make findings regarding alleged abuse — Whether the alleged abuse is important and relevant to the facts in dispute SUCCESSION — Family provision — Claim by adult daughter — Modest estate — Plaintiff received no provision in the will — Where estate was left entirely to defendant, second daughter of the deceased — Where plaintiff has significant health issues allegedly caused by deceased — Where plaintiff has limited savings but owns property — Where defendant provided care for deceased — Where defendant has limited savings and assets — Whether the deceased fulfilled his moral obligations towards the plaintiff — Whether adequate provision for proper maintenance, education or advancement in life made for plaintiff — Whether an order for further provision ought be made given competing circumstances of defendant — Whether a condition should be imposed on order for provision

Catchwords

SUCCESSION — Family provision — Sexual abuse and physical abuse allegations — Where plaintiff adult daughter of deceased from his first marriage — Where plaintiff was removed from her mother’s care at about age 9 and custody awarded to deceased — Where plaintiff lived with deceased, step-mother and two half siblings until aged 18 — Where plaintiff alleges deceased sexually and physically assaulted her between ages 4 to 18 — Where plaintiff left home at 18 following alleged abuse incident —Where plaintiff had no contact with deceased for approximately 34 years before his death following leaving home — Where deceased denied allegations of abuse — Where family did not believe plaintiff — Whether it is proper and appropriate to make findings regarding alleged abuse — Whether the alleged abuse is important and relevant to the facts in dispute SUCCESSION — Family provision — Claim by adult daughter — Modest estate — Plaintiff received no provision in the will — Where estate was left entirely to defendant, second daughter of the deceased — Where plaintiff has significant health issues allegedly caused by deceased — Where plaintiff has limited savings but owns property — Where defendant provided care for deceased — Where defendant has limited savings and assets — Whether the deceased fulfilled his moral obligations towards the plaintiff — Whether adequate provision for proper maintenance, education or advancement in life made for plaintiff — Whether an order for further provision ought be made given competing circumstances of defendant — Whether a condition should be imposed on order for provision

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Medium Neutral Citation: Nevin v Nevin-Large [2026] NSWSC 1009

Hearing dates: 2, 3 and 4 March 2026

Date of orders: 24 August 2026

Decision date: 24 August 2026

Jurisdiction: Equity

Before: Bennett J

Decision: Lump sum of $125,000 awarded to plaintiff, see [591]

Catchwords: SUCCESSION — Family provision — Sexual abuse and physical abuse allegations — Where plaintiff adult daughter of deceased from his first marriage — Where plaintiff was removed from her mother’s care at about age 9 and custody awarded to deceased — Where plaintiff lived with deceased, step-mother and two half siblings until aged 18 — Where plaintiff alleges deceased sexually and physically assaulted her between ages 4 to 18 — Where plaintiff left home at 18 following alleged abuse incident —Where plaintiff had no contact with deceased for approximately 34 years before his death following leaving home — Where deceased denied allegations of abuse — Where family did not believe plaintiff — Whether it is proper and appropriate to make findings regarding alleged abuse — Whether the alleged abuse is important and relevant to the facts in dispute SUCCESSION — Family provision — Claim by adult daughter — Modest estate — Plaintiff received no provision in the will — Where estate was left entirely to defendant, second daughter of the deceased — Where plaintiff has significant health issues allegedly caused by deceased — Where plaintiff has limited savings but owns property — Where defendant provided care for deceased — Where defendant has limited savings and assets — Whether the deceased fulfilled his moral obligations towards the plaintiff — Whether adequate provision for proper maintenance, education or advancement in life made for plaintiff — Whether an order for further provision ought be made given competing circumstances of defendant — Whether a condition should be imposed on order for provision

Cases Cited: AA v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle (2026) 427 ALR 67; [2026] HCA 2
Anasson v Phillips (Unreported, Young J, 4 March 1988)
Baldwin v Favre [2025] NSWSC 345
Blendell v Blendell; Blendell v Blendell [2020] NSWCA 154
Bowers v Bowers [2020] NSWSC 109
Bradley v Irvine; Irvine v Irvine [2024] NSWSC 727
Clayton v Clayton [2023] NSWSC 399
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v TH [2023] NSWCCA 81
DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26
Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22
Fuda v Dawes (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 492
Gardiner v Wong (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 644
GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 280 CLR 442; [2023] HCA 32
Goodman v Windeyer (1980) 144 CLR 490
Green v Jones [2025] NSWSC 293
Hartnett v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Wilcannia-Forbes (2026) 119 NSWLR 105; [2026] NSWCA 35
Howitt as Executor of the estate of the late Margaret Norma Howitt v Bosschieter [2025] NSWCA 179
Hudson v Colliers International (NSW) Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 88
In the matter of Hoju Jobs Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 302
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Kawicki v Trustees of the Marist Brothers [2026] NSWSC 289
Leary v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2017] NSWSC 1113
Levinge v Director of Custodial Services (1987) 9 NSWLR 546
Limberger v Limberger; Oakman v Limberger [2021] NSWSC 474
Ling v Pang [2023] NSWCA 112
Luxton v Ishihara [2026] NSWSC 943
Maria Oliveira by her tutor Ivo De Oliveira v John Antonio Oliveira [2023] NSWSC 1130
Mills v Dodds [2025] NSWSC 396
Page v Page [2016] NSWSC 1218
Page v Page [2017] NSWCA 141; (2017) 16 ASTLR 331
Pilatos v Whillier [2025] NSWSC 1221
Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544; [1915] HCA 14
Pronesti v Napoli (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 856
R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56
Reeves v Reeves (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 386
Salmon v Osmond [2015] NSWCA 42; (2015) 14 ASTLR 442
SAP v SAD1 [2025] NSWSC 138
Slack v Rogan; Palffy v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253; [2013] NSWSC 522
Smith v Johnson [2015] NSWCA 297; (2015) 14 ASTLR 175
Staal v Cox [2026] NSWSC 944
State of New South Wales v Stanley [2007] NSWCA 330
Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) 99 NSWLR 687; [2019] NSWCA 114
Toppi v Toppi (No 3) [2025] NSWSC 733
Tsakirios v State of New South Wales [2026] NSWCA 132
Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315
Watton v MacTaggart [2020] NSWSC 1233
Williamson v Williamson [2011] NSWSC 228

In or about 1985, the deceased and the family moved from the Marrickville home to a home in Earlwood (the Earlwood home).
Deanne left the Earlwood home in around 1989 at the age of 18. From this time, Deanne ceased contact with the deceased. Deanne gives as the reason for leaving home, and ceasing contact with the deceased, that she was sexually and physically abused by the deceased from the age of 4 to the age of 18.
In these reasons I will refer to the allegations made by Deanne against the deceased of sexual and physical abuse together as the abuse allegations. Where it is necessary to distinguish between the types of allegations, I will refer to the “sexual abuse allegations” or the “physical abuse allegations”.
Deanne and Suzanne each recall that Deanne told Suzanne of the sexual abuse allegations sometime after Deanne left the Earlwood home. Suzanne told the Court that she did not believe the allegations made by Deanne at the time. She said that she would not have left Kristie and Garth in the deceased’s care if she had (TR P197 L14-23).
Kristie also became aware of the sexual abuse allegations sometime after Deanne left home (TR P164 L43-48). In her affidavit evidence, Kristie says she found out from her parents about “the serious allegations of sexual abuse at the hands of my father” following an argument between Deanne and the deceased that happened whilst Kristie, Suzanne and Garth were on a trip to Jindabyne. This argument occurred in 1988 or 1989, and is a significant anchor point regarding the timeline of the evidence, in that Deanne says it was the trigger for her to leave home. The timing and significance of the “Jindabyne” incident is addressed below. In her oral evidence Kristie said it was Suzanne who told her, and reiterated this disclosure happened “[n]ot long after Jindabyne” (TR P167 L4-15). Kristie told this Court that she believed her father when he said he did not assault Deanne, (TR P171 L14-24), and that she did not believe Deanne (TR 172 L26-31), from which I infer that Kristie did not believe the allegations made by Deanne at the time Kristie became aware of them. Kristie explained that she could not believe something she did not see (TR P171 L18-20).
In giving affidavit evidence as to the strength of her belief that the deceased did not sexually abuse Deanne, Kristie stated she had a step-daughter who, at 8 years of age, came to live at the Earlwood home with Kristie and her family, including the deceased. Kristie said she “did not believe my father posed any risk to [my step-daughter] whatsoever”.
Suzanne and Kristie gave evidence that the deceased also became aware of the sexual abuse allegations at around the time they did, and that he “emphatically” denied those allegations. Kristie told the Court that she believed her father in his denials (TR P171 L22-24, P176 L11-15).
Suzanne gave evidence that she discussed the allegations with the deceased on a number of occasions, and challenged him about Deanne’s version of events, but that ultimately, she “believed that Deanne was being untruthful”.
Of course, whether or not Suzanne and Kristie believed Deanne (or believed the deceased in his emphatic denial for that matter) is not directly relevant to the real issues to be determined in these proceedings. Those beliefs are most relevant as a part of the contextual background of family relationships as they stood at the time and as they continued to break down over the decades since (TR P170 L48ff).

For her part, Kristie moved out of the Earlwood home when she was aged around 18, which I infer was in about 1998. In around 2007, she and her then husband Gareth Mitchell returned to live in the Earlwood home, with the deceased and Suzanne, before they all moved into rental accommodation whilst renovations of the Earlwood home were being undertaken. Kristie and the family then moved back into the Earlwood home in 2010, shortly before the birth of Kristie’s second child. Kristie continued to live there until the property was sold in September 2024 (see below).
Around 2007, there appeared to have been a breakdown in the relationship of Suzanne and the deceased, at least from the perspective of Kristie.
Kristie stated that in about 2006-2007, when she and Gareth were living in Queensland, she was contacted by Suzanne, who told her “I can’t deal with your father. He's driving me mad. I want to leave him, but he’s my responsibility now. You have to come and help me look after him”. Kristie said she was aware her parents had a “toxic” relationship, and that in all of the circumstances, she felt she had no choice but to return to Sydney.
Upon returning to Sydney, Kristie said the deceased pressed the idea that they should renovate the Earlwood home so as to make it large enough for all of the family. That is, for the deceased, Suzanne, Kristie, Gareth, and Kristie and Gareth’s (first) child. It was in this context that Kristie said she and Gareth sold their property in Queensland, moved back to Sydney, and put the $300,000 net sale proceeds of their property towards renting a storage unit for their furniture, renting accommodation for them and their family, as well as Kristie’s parents, to live in pending the renovation, and towards the renovation cost itself. It was at around this time that Kristie became a 14% owner of the Earlwood home. There was some level of dispute about how Kristie’s 14% ownership came about and the extent to which she contributed to the estate of the deceased (TR P158-164). I will return to this issue below when I consider Kristie’s competing circumstances.
From around 2007-2008, Kristie said that she did not consider her parents to be married, but rather, separated under the same roof. Kristie states that Suzanne took steps to record the separation with both Centrelink and Medicare.
Consistent with Kristie’s evidence, Deanne said that “[o]n or around 2009 Sue and the deceased separated. To the best of my knowledge at the time of the deceased’s death they were estranged but not divorced”. Deanne did not say how it is she came to this understanding.
For her part, Suzanne makes no reference to any separation or estrangement with the deceased. In her affidavit in support of her own family provision claim, she stated: “I am [the deceased’s] spouse. I was married to [the deceased] at the time of his death”.
Of course, the evidence of Suzanne on this issue is not inconsistent with the evidence of Kristie and Deanne.
Whilst the nature of Suzanne and the deceased’s relationship has no direct relevance to Deanne’s claim for family provision, it may be relevant to Kristie’s competing claim. In this, amongst other things, it may go towards explaining why Kristie moved back home and why she was called upon to support the deceased in his later years whilst he was still married to Suzanne.
In relation to Kristie’s other relationships, Kristie gave evidence that Gareth had mental health struggles, and that in 2014 Kristie and Gareth separated, following which Gareth moved out of the Earlwood home. Kristie and her children remained living there with her parents.
Kristie re-partnered, and following her engagement to Melissa Large, Melissa moved into the Earlwood home with her own two children. This move was said to have occurred in 2016. I infer that, at this point, the members of the household comprised the deceased, Suzanne, Kristie and her two children, and Melissa and her two children. They resided there together until the property was sold in September 2024.
Kristie’s evidence set out in the above two paragraphs does not appear to be in dispute.
There was little contact between Kristie and Deanne from the time Deanne left home. Some thirty-four years later, in early 2023, Kristie contacted Deanne on Facebook. Kristie said she wanted to reach out to see if it was possible to have a family relationship. Kristie indicated that she remained in contact with Deanne until April of 2024, when she was informed by her solicitor that “Deanne was planning to contest [her] father’s Will”. Deanne confirmed this to be the case.

The hearing took place over three days on 2 to 4 March 2026. Mr M Heath appeared for Deanne and provided written submissions (PWS) in support of Deanne’s application, together with speaking notes on closing (PSN). Mr A Stevens and Mr A Chhabra appeared for Kristie and provided written submissions (DWS) on her behalf. Both parties made further oral submissions on closing.
By way of the procedural context to Deanne’s application, Suzanne had commenced her own family provision proceedings by Summons dated 13 September 2024 (Suzanne’s proceedings).
In the course of conducting case management of these proceedings and Suzanne’s proceedings, on 29 May 2025, Kunc J made orders that evidence in one set of proceedings was to be evidence in the other (29.05.25 TR P6-7) (the Shared Evidence order). At the time, counsel for Kristie explained to the Court that such an order was necessary so that Deanne’s evidence, particularly that about the sexual abuse allegations, could be put to Suzanne for Suzanne to respond to (29.05.25 TR P4 L6-10).
The Shared Evidence order appears to have been made on the assumption that both sets of proceedings were to be heard together (29.05.25 TR P3 L28-34). The orders listing the matters together for final hearing were made on 27 August 2025.
Suzanne’s proceedings were resolved with orders made by the Court on 20 February 2026 by way of a lump sum provision of $80,000, with no order as to her costs with the intent that she bear her own costs. Deanne consented to these orders being made (DWS [16]).
Suzanne’s affidavit evidence was read by Kristie in Deanne’s proceedings.
There was an Affidavit of Service filed in the proceedings which set out the names of persons that had been identified as being, or potentially being, eligible persons. Those persons were Kristie, Garth, Deanne, Suzanne, Kristie’s children, Melissa and her children, and Gareth. The affidavit gave evidence that each of the persons listed, if not already a party to the proceedings, were served by Express Post with a Notice of Claim to their residential address. The parents (or sole legal guardian) of persons who were minors were served on behalf of the minors. There was no dispute about this process.

The deceased left previous wills dated 2 August 2000 and 24 January 2019, each of which appointed Suzanne as executor and sole beneficiary.
The Will, being the last will of the deceased dated 7 October 2021, appointed Kristie as executor and sole beneficiary.
The deceased had been diagnosed with cognitive impairment in 2015 and was further diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease in 2017. Notwithstanding having a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease when he made the Will, there has been no allegation that the deceased did not have testamentary capacity at the time.
A grant of probate was made to Kristie on 28 February 2024.
As set out in the Inventory of Property annexed to the grant of probate, the deceased’s only assets at the time of his death were a motor vehicle valued at $4,000 and his 43% share of the Earlwood home. The total estimated value of the Earlwood home was said to be $2,250,000, so the 43% share was estimated to be $967,500. The total estimated value of the deceased’s estate at that point was thus $971,500.
The Earlwood home was sold for $2,400,000 by contract exchanged on 14 August 2024. On settlement, and once all outgoings were paid, including $379,374.68 to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, which I have assumed to be the discharge of the mortgage, the following amounts were identified as being payable:
Kristie (14% surplus): $248,071.29;
Suzanne (43% surplus): $761,933.23; and
Estate of the deceased (43% surplus): $761,933.23.
Kristie says the Commonwealth Bank of Australia mortgage was jointly acquired by the deceased, Suzanne and Kristie primarily for the purpose of renovation of the Earlwood home.
As provided in Kristie’s Updating Administrator’s affidavit dated 11 February 2026, the Trust Account Statement from the solicitors for Kristie recorded that $754,125.40 was held on trust for the deceased’s estate. Kristie estimated that the “distributable balance” of the estate was $745,131.84, as the estate was still liable to pay further probate costs of $8,993.56 to the solicitors for Kristie.
The settlement of Suzanne’s proceedings produced two liabilities of the deceased’s estate that are certain: $80,000 for provision for Suzanne, and Kristie’s costs associated with Suzanne’s proceedings, on the indemnity basis. Each of these orders was consented to by Deanne.
The costs of the parties in these proceedings is a less certain issue.
On the issue of costs, Kristie’s costs estimate for both sets of proceedings (that is, Deanne’s proceedings and Suzanne’s proceedings) up to and including the hearing was between $115,000 and $146,000 on the indemnity basis.
Deanne’s costs estimated up until and including the hearing was between $100,000 and $110,000 on the ordinary basis, and between $130,174.85 to $137,674.85 on the indemnity basis.
In Luxton v Ishihara [2026] NSWSC 943 at [49]-[55] I summarised the principles governing consideration of potential costs orders on the net distributable estate. Without reproducing those paragraphs in this judgment, I will apply those same principles here. Relevantly, I note that a Court considering a claim for family provision will need to take a cautious approach when making assumptions about the impact of costs orders on net distributable estate, as well as in the context of considering family provision orders per se, as in most cases there will be material uncertainties when anticipating the likely outcome as to costs: Howitt as Executor of the estate of the late Margaret Norma Howitt v Bosschieter [2025] NSWCA 179 (at [115], Free JA, Ward P and Kirk JA agreeing). Further costs principles are discussed from [579] below.
I observe that with a starting “distributable balance” of $745,131.84, less Suzanne’s lump sum ($80,000), less Kristie’s costs (for both Suzanne and these proceedings) on the indemnity basis (the lesser sum, of $115,000), less Deanne’s costs on the ordinary basis, should she be successful (lesser sum, $100,000), the actual sum in residue could conceivably be around $450,131.84.
However, I note there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding costs in these proceedings, arising from (without limitation) the overlapping nature of Deanne and Suzanne’s proceedings, the relatively last-minute settlement of Suzanne’s proceedings, and a question of whether Kristie as executor was acting in essentially her own interests. Given this and having regard to the relevant cautions and other uncertainties in relation to the costs of the parties, I propose to proceed on the basis that the available net distributable estate, out of which a family provision order may be made, is in the order of $665,131.84. This is calculated from the “distributable balance” from the executor’s updating affidavit, less the $80,000 payment to Suzanne. I note that this amount does not include Kristie’s costs of the defence of Suzanne’s proceedings, as there is no evidence before the Court as to what those costs are, nor does it take into account the estimates of costs that have been provided by the parties in these proceedings.

An application for a family provision order is made under Part 3.2 of the Act. Such applications must be made not later than 12 months after the date of the death of the deceased person, unless the Court otherwise orders on sufficient cause being shown or the parties to the proceedings consent to the application being made out of time (s 58).
In these reasons, a reference to a provision of a statute will be to the Act, unless otherwise indicated.
Only eligible persons may apply for a family provision order, as defined in s 57 (Division 1 of Part 3.2). One class of eligible person is a child of the deceased person (s 57(1)(c)).
In order for an applicant for a family provision order to succeed, they must satisfy the Court that, at the time when the Court is considering the application, adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of the applicant has not been made by the will of the deceased (s 59(1)(c)). If the Court is relevantly satisfied, the Court may (or may not) make such order for provision out of the estate of the deceased person as the Court thinks ought to be made for the maintenance, education or advancement in the life of the applicant, having regard to the facts known to the Court at the time the order is made (s 59(2)).
In considering these two questions, the Court may have regard to the matters set out in s 60(2). Those matters include family relationships, personal circumstances of the applicant and others, the nature and extent of the deceased’s estate, and the testamentary intentions of the deceased.
The legal principles to be applied when a Court comes to consider an application for family provision are not in dispute (see Luxton at [33]-[36]).
The concepts of “adequate” and “proper” embedded in s 59(1)(c) must be understood as relative to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, as well as the current social conditions and community standards. Of this, the High Court in Goodman v Windeyer (1980) 144 CLR 490, (per Gibbs J) stated (at 502):

When a family provision claim is made by an “adult child” of a deceased person, there are a number of legal principles, framed in the context of community expectations or standards, that provide guidance. Those principles were referred to in Limberger v Limberger; Oakman v Limberger [2021] NSWSC 474 at [473]-[474] (per Hallen J), have been cited repeatedly since, and include the following:
Ordinarily, the community expects parents to raise and educate their children to the very best of their ability while they remain children; probably to assist them with a tertiary education, where that is feasible; and, where funds allow, to provide them with a start in life — such as a deposit on a home, although it might well take a different form. The community does not expect a parent, in ordinary circumstances, to provide an unencumbered house, or to set their children up in a position where they can acquire a house unencumbered, although in particular cases, where assets permit and the relationship between the parties is such as to justify it, there might be such an obligation.
The community does not expect a parent to look after his or her children for the rest of the child’s life and into retirement, especially when there is someone else, such as a spouse, who has a prime obligation to do so. Plainly, if an adult child remains a dependent of a parent, the community usually expects the parent to make provision to fulfil that ongoing dependency after death. But where a child, even an adult child, falls on hard times and where there are assets available, then the community may expect parents to provide a buffer against contingencies; and where a child has been unable to accumulate superannuation or make other provision for their retirement, something to assist in retirement where otherwise they would be left destitute.
The adult child’s lack of reserves to meet demands, particularly of ill health, which become more likely with advancing years, is a relevant consideration. Likewise, the need for financial security and a fund to protect against the ordinary vicissitudes of life are relevant. In addition, if the applicant is unable to earn, or has a limited means of earning, an income, this could give rise to an increased call on the estate of the deceased.

Deanne read and relied on nine affidavits:
six affirmed by her dated 11 September 2024 (Deanne’s 2024 affidavit), 9 April 2025, 26 May 2025; 17 June 2025, 9 July 2025; and 12 February 2026; and
three affirmed by her solicitors, one by Terri Anderson dated 11 September 2024 and two by Sarah Kate Abrahams dated 28 May 2025 and 19 February 2026.
Kristie read and relied on 13 affidavits:
eight sworn by her dated 5 November 2024 (administrator’s affidavit), 5 November 2024 (financial, material and other circumstances), 5 November 2024 (reply to Deanne), 5 November 2024 (reply to Suzanne), 19 August 2025, 11 February 2026 (updating administrator’s affidavit), 11 February 2026 (updating affidavit) and 17 February 2026;
three sworn by her solicitor Emily Leigh Lane dated 5 November 2024 (costs up to and including mediation), 5 November 2024 (affidavit of service), and 17 February 2026 (updated costs of the proceedings); and
two sworn by Suzanne, dated 21 October 2024 and 23 February 2026.
I note, regarding Suzanne’s affidavits, that her primary affidavit dated 21 October 2024 was filed in relation to Suzanne’s proceedings, before the Shared Evidence order was made. Accordingly, Suzanne, at that point, would not properly have had access to Deanne’s 2024 affidavit and would not have had the opportunity to provide any reply to the abuse allegations or otherwise in relation to her own conduct.
Noting again the Shared Evidence order was made in part so that Deanne’s evidence could be put to Suzanne for Suzanne to respond to, Suzanne did not put on any evidence in reply to Deanne's 2024 affidavit whilst her own proceedings were on foot.
On 24 February 2026, Kristie filed (without leave) an affidavit of Suzanne dated 23 February 2026 in reply to Deanne’s 2024 affidavit. In her written submissions provided before the commencement of the hearing, and dated 26 February 2026, Kristie sought leave to rely on Suzanne’s 23 February 2026 affidavit. Kristie also stated that “[a]n affidavit explaining the delay in obtaining this affidavit is to be provided” (DWS [1]).
On the first day of the hearing, I granted Kristie the leave she sought to rely on Suzanne’s 23 February 2026 affidavit, and it was marked as Exhibit 13. No affidavit explaining the delay was provided. Whilst counsel for the plaintiff did not seek to be heard against the leave I proposed to grant, he sought leave for the plaintiff to provide reply evidence viva voce, which I also granted (TR P23 L43-49).
Each of Deanne, Kristie and Suzanne were required for cross-examination and gave oral evidence in these proceedings.

I am of the view this account minimises the extent of Suzanne’s own role in the volatility of the household and in relation to Deanne, and the extent to which there was physical contact by way of “pushing and shoving” involving the deceased, Suzanne and Deanne. I therefore give low weight to Suzanne’s description of life at home.
As between the deceased and Suzanne, Kristie says she recalls “regular and heated arguments between them”; that having observed so many arguments between them during her upbringing that she viewed their relationship as “quite toxic”; and that growing up in her parents’ home she considered their relationship as being “consistently hostile”. I include this evidence here to provide further context to the family dynamics within Deanne’s second household, at least from the perspective of Kristie. To the extent that Suzanne paints a different picture of their life at home, I give her evidence on this low weight.
Having regard to all accounts, I find that that the household lived in by Deanne during the ages of 10 to 18, was volatile and included heated arguments and shouting and pushing and shoving, at least between the deceased, Suzanne, and Deanne, and that the household was a very uncomfortable place to be. Specifically in relation to the deceased, he had a fiery (TR P186 L49) and quick (TR P187 L19) temper and was a “volatile person” (TR 168 L49-50). I do not consider that there can be any serious dispute about this. I consider that this general dynamic of the household provides the context in which I am to consider the abuse allegations.
I will refer to the general dynamic of both the first and second households as being “volatile”. When I make this reference, I am also referring to the broader aspects of the general dynamic of both of the households Deanne shared with the deceased, as I have found above.
Having said this, I bear in mind that the focus of these proceedings is on the relationship between Deanne and the deceased, and that Suzanne’s role for the purposes of the issues before the Court, is more by way of context.

Deanne gives evidence of those counselling sessions in her affidavit, where she says she was in year 11 at school at the time, and recalls that the sessions took place in Parramatta, consistent with the letterhead of the above letter. Deanne also recalled that Suzanne and the deceased attended a psychologist appointment and waited for her in the waiting room.
Suzanne also recalls attending counselling sessions with the deceased and Deanne in 1987 when Deanne was in year 11, however stated the counselling was a part of “Relationships Australia” (TR P184 L35-36), which she said she initiated (TR P185 L8).
Suzanne also initially said she had participated in counselling at “Unifam” (TR P185 L28-29), however later in cross-examination stated that the counselling she attended with Deanne was not in Parramatta and that she was not aware of whether Relationships Australia has changed its name to Unifam. Suzanne then confirmed that her evidence was that the counselling session she attended was in Stanmore with Relationships Australia, that the session could have been after 1988, and that the Counselling Service document was not referring to the counselling that Suzanne had been referring to (TR P185-186).
It will be seen that the evidence of Deanne is consistent with the terms of the Counselling Services document, being that the sessions took place in 1987, in Parramatta. Suzanne’s evidence is inconsistent with that document to the extent there is no evidence that Deanne and Suzanne (and perhaps the deceased) attended two sets of counselling sessions at around that time, one being in Parramatta and the other in Stanmore. On this issue, I find the evidence of Suzanne to be inconsistent and vague and changeable. I note that Suzanne recounts she underwent counselling herself at times about the abuse allegations, as well as counselling with the deceased in relation to their marriage (TR P190 L37-38). I consider it possible Suzanne is confused about what counselling sessions took place for whom, and when, and where.
I find that Deanne undertook counselling sessions in 1987 when she was aged 16 and in year 11 at school. The 1987 counselling sessions took place under the auspices of the Uniting Church at Parramatta. Those sessions dealt with the problems Deanne was having with the deceased and how the deceased treated her.
This is the first “anchor point” referred to by Kristie.
I do not need to make any findings in relation to the extent of the participation of Suzanne and the deceased in those sessions, or in their own session at the same time. Suffice to say there is no evidence that Suzanne was told at this time (ie, 1987) of the allegations of abuse.

Deanne gave evidence that she lived at the Earlwood home until she was 18 years of age and that she left home following an argument in or around 1989. She also says that in 1989 she obtained her first full-time job. Having regard to Deanne being in year 11 in 1987, I infer that in 1988 Deanne was in year 12 and that it was her last year of high school. This inference is consistent with Deanne’s evidence of commencing full time-work in 1989.
Elsewhere Deanne says that in or around 1988 (as opposed to 1989), when she was 18 years old, that an incident took place when she was at home alone with the deceased, at a time when Suzanne had taken Deanne’s siblings on a trip to the snow. I will refer to what happened whilst Suzanne and the siblings were at the snow as the “1989 incident”, though, as noted at [18], this was also sometimes referred to by the witnesses as the “Jindabyne” or the “snow” incident. Deanne says that after the 1989 incident, she left the Earlwood home in her car to stay with her maternal grandmother, Margaret. The 1989 incident was said to be the trigger for Deanne leaving home.
Suzanne’s recollection was that the trip to Jindabyne took place in 1990. Suzanne believed that it would have been in approximately August or September of that year. Suzanne and the two children had left on the Monday morning and then retuned on the following Friday afternoon. Suzanne said that Deanne had moved out by the time she and her two children had returned home.
Suzanne also says that two days after their return from Jindabyne she saw Deanne at Harpers Pharmacy in Earlwood, where Deanne was then working. She said she asked what had happened with the deceased, and that Deanne responded, “We had a big argument. I can’t get along with him. I’m going to stay with Margaret”.
In her oral evidence, and when asked about the conversation, putatively at Harpers Pharmacy, Deanne said that she recalled a conversation in similar terms with Suzanne, however that she did not think it was at Harpers, but rather, that it took place at the Commonwealth Bank in Earlwood, where she worked at the time (TR P31 L32-49, P32 L1-15).
Kristie recalls hearing that an argument between Deanne and the deceased had taken place when she and Suzanne and Garth were on a trip to Jindabyne. She said that the next time she saw Deanne after that argument was on her 10th birthday, which would have been in December 1989.
I have already referred to a time in or around 1992 when Deanne was required to provide evidence of her independence from the deceased, and to that end, obtained a number of Statutory Declarations and letters of support from people who knew her, and apparently also knew of her lack of contact with the deceased. At that time, on 26 May 1992, Deanne herself provided a Statutory Declaration, in the following terms:

Deanne was taken to Suzanne’s affidavit evidence in relation to the St George Hospital meeting. Deanne acknowledged she had seen a counsellor at St George (TR P35 L36-47) and that she recalled “Michelle” attending, but that Michelle did not attend the meeting itself (TR P37 L29-43). Deanne said she “sort of” remembered making the disclosures set out by Suzanne, and added that she disclosed to Suzanne that, when she or the deceased would be in the bath, the deceased used to make her masturbate him and that he would ejaculate at times (TR P38 L18-35).
Having regard to the two St George documents, together with the affidavit evidence of both Deanne and Suzanne, I am of the view that both Deanne and Suzanne are wrong in relation to the year that the St George Hospital meeting took place, however am of the view that their evidence as to their recollections of what happened at the meeting was largely accurate in so far as each of them go (see extensive cross-examination of Deanne in relation to this date: TR P60-70).
Given that both the Requests for Service document and the Social Work Record refer to Deanne’s wish to discuss the issue of telling her step-mother about the abuse, including discussing pros and cons, I infer that Deanne’s contact with Suzanne to request that she attend a meeting with her occurred sometime soon after the 5 January 1994 session.
In relation to when the St George Hospital meeting then took place, Suzanne says that, when she was contacted by Deanne to attend, the meeting was to take place in “a week’s time”.
It would appear, and I so find, that Deanne had at least three points of contact with St George Hospital. The first appears to be a call from Deanne to the St George Sexual Assault Service on 29 December 1993 that resulted in the Requests for Service document. The second appears to be an appointment for Deanne with Ms Green on 5 January 1994, which resulted in the Social Work Record. The third appears to be the St George Hospital meeting, which took place about a week or so after 5 January 1994 (assuming Deanne contacted Suzanne soon after the 5 January 1994 appointment), which was attended by Deanne and Ms Green, and for a part, Suzanne also. There does not appear to be a document to record this meeting or what was discussed, however each of Deanne and Suzanne give an account of what they recall from that meeting.

Deanne’s reply to the objections comprised: “The words “as a result of her childhood abuse” are not read other that as a history s 136”.
At the commencement of the hearing, I heard submissions from counsel for Kristie, who essentially submitted that strict proof of Deanne’s mental health conditions was required in line with Practice Note SC EQ 7 [38.6], in that “[i]f my friend’s attempting to use a letter without qualification of specialised knowledge to support the proposition that there is a causal connection, then that needs to be properly provided by way of evidence …” (TR P10 4-7).
The 2024 Psychology Report is addressed to “To Whom it may Concern”, and concludes with the offer, “Please contact me if I can be of any further assistance”. Notwithstanding Kristie being on notice that Deanne was going to seek to rely on the report from the time of the service of Deanne’s 2024 affidavit, and the offer by the psychologist made in the text of the report itself, I observe that Kristie did not require that the psychologist be available for cross-examination.
Following further submissions, I ultimately admitted the whole of the 2024 Psychology Report as I was satisfied that Deanne’s tendering and proposed use of the document came within the terms of Practice Note SC EQ 7 at [38.6], in circumstances where I considered that Kristie had not given Deanne “reasonable notice” that strict proof was required, as required by the Practice Note. The only limitation imposed (per s 136 of the Evidence Act) on the use of the report was for the words, “as a result of her childhood abuse”, where the use of those words was limited to Deanne’s history (as suggested by counsel for Deanne) (TR P9-12).
In the event, Deanne was not taken to or otherwise cross-examined on the content of the 2024 Psychology Report. Nor did Kristie make submissions squarely addressing the contents of the 2024 Psychology Report.
Whilst the 2024 Psychology Report does not form a part of the four anchor points relied on by Kristie, I will set out the details of the report here, given it forms an independent record of what it is that Deanne has told a health professional about her history in more recent years, together with more recent health professional evidence as to the status of Deanne’s mental health. Given there was no cross-examination in relation to the report, nor submissions made in relation to it, I do not consider there to be any serious dispute that the report records a history as told to the psychologist by Deanne, nor that the opinions expressed by the psychologist were those of the psychologist.
The 2024 Psychology Report provides as follows (noting the limitation referred to at [226]-[229]):

I note Deanne’s submission that those children who become targets for child sexual abuse are typically those who are isolated, vulnerable, and dependant. I accept that Deanne was isolated, vulnerable, and dependant, and as such, may be considered to be a "target". Certainly, the evidence of Suzanne supports this finding.
I have already noted Deanne’s evidence that in about 1980 she came to be "removed" from her biological mother's care (when she was about 9 years of age).
Suzanne expands on this evidence, and says that in 1980 she recalled receiving a phone call from Deanne from a payphone, saying that: Deanne had had an argument with Dianne; Dianne had punched her twice while Deanne was in the shower; Deanne’s face hit the tap; Dianne had then pushed a cupboard in front of Deanne’s bedroom door to prevent Deanne from leaving; Deanne had climbed out of the window and found a payphone in the street to call.
Suzanne says that the deceased immediately collected Deanne from Dulwich Hill and brought her back to the Marrickville home. Through processes associated with DCJ, the deceased and Suzanne were subsequently awarded full custody of Deanne.
Deanne did not challenge Suzanne’s account of how she came to be removed from the care of her biological mother and came to live under the same roof as the deceased again at the age of 9.
I am of the view that Suzanne’s account illustrates the extent to which Deanne may be considered to have been an isolated, vulnerable and dependent child.
I have already referred to Suzanne and Kristie’s lack of belief in Deanne’s allegations of the sexual abuse, and that one of the reasons for the lack of belief is that Kristie was not the victim of sexual abuse perpetrated by the deceased. Consistent with this, Kristie gave evidence that the deceased “never touched or otherwise interacted with me inappropriately on any occasion throughout my life” and that she had “never been abused” by him., I am of the view that the lack of evidence of sexual abuse of Kristie does not assist me to any great extent with my fact finding in relation to whether Deanne was sexually abused by the deceased.
In contrast to Deanne, I do not think that Kristie, as another child in Deanne’s second household shared with the deceased, could be considered a typical “target”. Kristie did not have the start in life that Deanne did. In this, I do not consider Kristie to have been isolated or vulnerable or to have been a typical “target”. It was not submitted she was. For the whole of Kristie’s childhood, until she left home at 18 years of age, Kristie had lived in a home with both of her biological parents. She says she was not sexually abused by the deceased and further told the Court that for her part she trusted the deceased and that she saw him as a “fierce protector of his family” (TR P176 L13-15). I infer from Kristie’s own evidence that Kristie was not isolated, or vulnerable, and positively, that she had a father she felt she could trust and that she felt protected by.
Kristie was obviously dependant, as any child may be considered dependant, but not dependant in the way the evidence discloses that Deanne had been. For example, in fleeing the physical violence of her biological mother at the age of 9, by escaping out a window and finding a payphone to call for help, Deanne was dependent upon the deceased to come quickly and pick her up as she was then without a home. She was more fundamentally dependant on the deceased and her step-mother, to take her in, and to then take over her care.

In the above exchange counsel did not challenge my assumption, an assumption that may be inferred, that the St George Hospital disclosure may be regarded as a “complaint”. I state this noting the purpose (or at least one purpose) for which Kristie proposed to use evidence of a putative “lack of complaint” was that it would “[go] to issues of reliability and credibility” (TR P232 L23).
The St George Hospital disclosure, or complaint, took place when Deanne was 22 years of age. This complaint was made some four years after Deanne left home, in the context of which it was recorded that Deanne feared rejection/disbelief from her step-mother. I am of the view it may safely be inferred that the reason, or at least one of the reasons, that Deanne had not made any disclosure or complaint to her step-mother earlier than this was a fear of rejection and of not being believed.
Thus, on the issue of complaint, I find that the first time that Deanne complained of, or otherwise disclosed, the allegations of child sexual abuse to a person external to the family was to Ms Green when Deanne was 22 years of age, some four years after the abuse was said to have ceased. This finding is based upon what I referred to in the course of the hearing as “the most solid evidence”.
A partial disclosure was made to Suzanne as a part of the 1993: Tarago semi-disclosure. There is no dispute about this.
I will add there is also some evidence that Deanne disclosed her allegations of child sexual abuse to the counsellor in 1987 when she as 16 years of age, however I consider this evidence weaker. I note that Deanne did not make any submissions relying on this evidence (that is, the reference to this having occurred in the Social Work Record), nor did counsel for Kristie cross-examine on the apparent 1987 disclosure.
In relation to helpful assistance to the Court, counsel for Kristie referred to provisions of the CPA, in particular subdivision 3 of part 5, being directions to jury and consent, noting it dealt with conduct and complaint, but further noting uncertainty as to whether these provisions may be imported as a matter of judicial knowledge (TR P233 L7-19). It will be recalled it was the provisions from part 5 of the CPA that Campbell J referred to in Kawicki (see [104]).
Returning to the issue of any “bright line” as to expectations on the issue of complaint, or lack thereof, I have regard to what the majority in GLJ (per Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Jagot JJ) stated in relation to child sexual and other abuse and complaint in the “new world” (at [29]) (emphasis added):

I consider I am able to have regard to the High Court’s reference to the Second Reading Speech referred to above, and accept, as a part of judicial notice, or otherwise, that due to the injuries inflicted on them by their abusers, survivors of sexual and other child abuse often take decades to understand and act on the harm arising from the abuse.
I have found that Deanne made a disclosure in relation to her claim of child sexual abuse (and physical abuse) at least as early as the age of 22, being some four years after Deanne claims the abuse ceased. To the extent Kristie submitted that Deanne’s “lack of complaint” sounded in “issues of reliability and credibility”, I reject that submission.
To the contrary, Deanne made her complaint as early as four years after the abuse had ceased, and in the face of fears of disbelief and rejection by her step-mother. Contrary to the submissions of Kristie in relation to Deanne’s putative “lack of complaint”, I find that the St George Hospital disclosure (or “complaint”) militates strongly in favour of Deanne in relation to both her reliability and credibility.
In making this finding, to the requisite standard, I have had regard to the cross-examination of Deanne that put to her that she never made a police report about any of the sexual abuse; that she never made a report to the police about the physical abuse; and she did not tell her aunts about the allegations against her father. Deanne agreed with these propositions (TR P57-59, 71-73).
In re-examination on this issue, Deanne explained the reason she did not go to the police about the sexual and physical abuse. Deanne told the Court that she had nowhere to live. She said she had already been taken off her mum by the DCJ (also referred to as DOCS or FACS) and she had been put into that home. She said she felt she just had to get through it.
As a matter of ordinary human experience, I accept Deanne’s evidence on this issue as a complete explanation of why she did not make her disclosure any sooner than she did.

In closing submissions, Kristie did not engage with the specific findings of fact sought by the plaintiff, in that Kristie did not address, if I was satisfied that factual findings ought to be made about the alleged abuse, whether the alleged instances and patterns of abuse each occurred. Instead, Kristie made broad submissions that the Court could not be satisfied physical or sexual abuse occurred.
I note that it is not necessary for a judge to refer to every piece of evidence nor every argument made, particularly where it is an irrelevant dispute or peripheral to the real issues in dispute: DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26 at [33]; Tsakirios v State of New South Wales [2026] NSWCA 132 at [160]-[166]. I have largely addressed Kristie submissions, particularly at [247]-[269], and any submissions unaddressed I did not view as materially relevant or otherwise requiring resolving. I do consider it is appropriate, however, to address the factual findings as sought by Deanne, as each finding is relevant to the issues discussed at [96].
I reiterate that Kristie did not submit that Deanne had made false allegations of abuse. I understand Kristie’s submissions are twofold. Firstly, Kristie’s position is that the Court could not be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the abuse occurred (TR P221 L22-26; TR P226 L12-15), however, the Court should note that Deanne believes the abuse occurred, Deanne’s lack of contact with the deceased was motivated by that belief, and that it is not possible to attribute blame for the breakdown in the relationship between Deanne and the deceased (DWS [7]). Secondly, Kristie submits that, even if there is a positive finding the abuse occurred, Deanne will need to establish a causal connection between the conduct of the deceased, the harm suffered, and Deanne’s needs (DWS [9]), and such a causal connection will not be possible for the Court to find (DWS [10]).
Of the findings sought in relation to the Causal Connection and current circumstances, I propose to consider those issues, to the extent I consider them relevant, when I consider Deanne’s circumstances and the s 60(2) matters below.
In relation to the findings sought regarding Counselling, I have already made the findings I propose to make on those topics, as set out above in Facts: Events not seriously in dispute. I note that the findings I have made therein are broadly in conformity with the findings sought by Deanne. I do not consider that there is any serious dispute in relation to those findings.
In undertaking fact finding in relation to these serious allegations, I have regard to the principles set out above, including those referred to in Hartnett and Kawicki. Factual findings of the nature sought in these proceedings must be found to a “requisite standard”. That is, they must be proven to the “reasonable satisfaction” of the Court, where the Court is required to achieve an “actual persuasion” before a fact may be found.
When I consider the evidence before the Court and make the factual findings, I will thus consider whether I have been satisfied to this “requisite standard”, or not.
I will now consider the issue of factual findings in relation to Deanne’s claims of sexual and physical abuse.

I accept Deanne's explanation of her evidence on this. In Deanne’s 2024 affidavit, she clearly set out the nature of the sexual abuse she says took place between the ages of 4 and 15. Deanne recalls patterns of sexual abuse: the deceased would repeatedly say effusive words of love, such as “I love you, I love you, I love you, the problem is I just love you too much” (at [28]); the deceased would get into the bath with Deanne, or tell her to get into the bath with him, and in the bath the deceased would make her masturbate him to ejaculation (at [29]-[30]); the deceased would walk in on Deanne in the shower or while using the toilet; if Deanne was unwell, the deceased would take every opportunity to touch her (at [36]). Deanne also recalls specific instances of sexual abuse, such as the incident in the car in Cardigan Lane where the deceased exposed himself to her and sat her on top of him (at [31]-[34], and at TR P76 L22-30) (I refer to the “Cardigan Lane incident” below); and that multiple times, when she had thrush, the deceased would apply cream to her vagina and then would perform oral sex on her (at [39]).
Deanne says that at the age of 15 there was an altercation with the deceased, which she says changed the nature of their relationship, and she says that the sexual abuse that had been occurring up until that time ceased. I refer to this as “the knife incident” below. However, when she was 18, the 1989 incident occurred. I am of the view there can be no doubt that the nature of the 1989 incident was sexual, which I will describe in greater detail below at “e”. I am of the view that it was not misleading for Deanne to include the 1989 incident in her broader description of the sexual abuse perpetrated upon her by the deceased, being from the age of 4 to 18.
In summary, Deanne’s evidence is that she was sexually abused from the age of 4 to 15, and then at the age of 18 there was a further incident of sexual abuse, being the 1989 incident, after which she left home. Even though the sexual abuse paused at 15, Deanne says that the physical abuse of being hit and pushed by the deceased continued until she left home.

In her 2024 affidavit Deanne states that in around 1975, when she was 4 years old, that a friend of the deceased’s, who I will refer to as Mr X, came to their home with his 8-year-old son. Deanne said that when she and the son were hiding under her bed, that the son exposed his genitals to her. She said the deceased came into the room, observed them under the bed, and was very angry with her. Deanne says that from that date, the deceased did not allow her to have friends in her room or to have her bedroom door closed, and was very strict and controlling of her. She says it was following this episode that the deceased began to sexually abuse her.
The deceased was married to Dianne when this event happened, and Kristie not yet born, so there is no evidence from Suzanne nor Kristie on this episode.
By way of reply to Deanne’s evidence on this incident, Kristie recalled numerous later get togethers at their family home with Mr X, whom Kristie always viewed as a close friend of the deceased. She said she never heard the deceased talk about the incident.
The only evidence therefore before the Court on which to consider this issue is Deanne’s recollection of the event over 50 years after it happened. Understandably, there is no direct documentary evidence to support Deanne’s memory on this, but also, and perhaps more importantly, there is no later document that contains an account of Deanne making a disclosure of it, even if that disclosure took place years later. It would seem that the 2024 affidavit is the first document the Court has before it setting out what Deanne says happened.
Given the age of Deanne when the incident is said to have occurred, the length of time since then, together with the lack of documented disclosure of the event in the years following, I have not been able to achieve an actual persuasion that Mr X’s son exposed himself to Deanne when she was 4 years of age and that the deceased reacted as Deanne stated, and so I decline to make this finding as sought. This being so, I am unable to make any finding that this incident was the trigger for subsequent events.
Having said this, as will be seen, I have accepted Deanne’s evidence that the sexual abuse took place between the ages of 4 and 18, notwithstanding a lack of an identified trigger for the subsequent events.
I note the allegation in relation to Mr X’s son is essentially unchallenged and uncontradicted. However, relying on the principles set out above, there is no rule of law that I must accept the unchallenged but uncorroborated account provided by Deanne.

In relation to independent documents that might cast light on this allegation, I note that the Social Work Record records that at that time (January 1994, when Deanne was aged 22), Deanne reported that the sexual abuse began when she was 4 and lasted until she was 18 years, and that, relevantly, the sexual abuse included oral sex and digital penetration.
In cross-examination it was put to Deanne that in none of her six affidavits did she allege that there had been digital penetration by the deceased. To this, after clarifying “is digital with a finger?”, Deanne said “Well, that’s putting cream on me is digital penetration. That’s one example of it” (TR P46 L31-35).
It is because of this evidence that I have included the evidence of digital penetration at the time of the thrush cream application, together with reference to the licking, and oral sex, and refer to this evidence together as the oral sex disclosures.
Having regard to the oral sex disclosures, it seems there can be no dispute that, at the very least, at the St George Hospital meeting when Deanne was aged 22, she told Suzanne that the deceased had applied thrush cream to her (I infer it was applied to her vagina), and that the deceased would lick her vulva when doing this.
There is also no dispute that Deanne told Ms Green as part of the St George Hospital disclosure that the deceased had engaged in oral sex with her, as well as digital penetration.
Having regard to the evidence before me, I am satisfied to the requisite standard that Deanne made the oral sex disclosures to both Ms Green, as part of the St George Hospital disclosure, and to Suzanne at the St George Hospital meeting. The oral sex disclosures included allegations that the deceased had applied thrush cream to Deanne’s vagina, I infer with his finger, and had digitally penetrated her vagina. He also licked her vagina/vulva while and/or after he had done this, which I infer is the act to which Deanne refers when she says the deceased performed oral sex on her.
Having been satisfied to the requisite standard that Deanne made the oral sex disclosures as a part of the St George Hospital disclosure, I am also satisfied, to the requisite standard, that the reason that Deanne made the oral sex disclosures was because the deceased had in fact performed oral sex on her, and digitally penetrated her, consistent with the oral sex disclosures. My reasons for finding this are as follows.
Firstly, it was Suzanne’s uncontested evidence that Deanne had had “thrush issues” as a child. Deanne also told the Court “I used to get a lot of thrush, so there was always sort of a opportunity there” (TR P76 L19-20). For this reason, I accept that a parent might well administer any medication and thus an “opportunity” to sexually abuse is provided.
Secondly, some four years after she left home, at the age of 22, Deanne told both Suzanne and Ms Green that the deceased performed oral sex upon her as a child. That Deanne told these things to Suzanne when she was 22 is consistent with Suzanne’s own evidence. Each of Suzanne and the Social Work Record corroborates Deanne’s evidence on this. This corroborative evidence also goes to reinforce Deanne’s reliability and credibility more generally.
Thirdly, I consider the evidence of the oral sex disclosures when she was about 22 years of age to be of the same nature as those disclosures she again independently deposed to in her 2024 affidavit. In this, Deanne’s evidence has been consistent across time.
Fourthly, Deanne was cross-examined on her evidence on this issue. Deanne’s accounts of the sexual abuse allegations, including of the thrush cream and digital penetration, were not shaken or otherwise diminished by cross-examination.
Fifthly, I am of the view that the most inherently probable reason that Deanne made the oral sex disclosures to Suzanne and Ms Green when she was 22 years of age, and why, independently of those records, she included the allegations in her 2024 affidavit, is because the allegations were true.
The further reasons I give for achieving an actual persuasion will also apply to other factual findings I make wherein I have been satisfied to the requisite standard.
Firstly, in her closing submissions, and otherwise, Kristie did not offer any plausible explanation has to why Deanne might have believed the allegations if they were not true.
Kristie submitted the Court should “note that the plaintiff believes the abuse occurred (DWS [7](a)). Beyond this, Kristie did not engage with the critical question that submission raised, being, why would Deanne believe such a thing? I am satisfied that the evidence supports a finding that the reason that Deanne believed the sexual abuse occurred is because it did occur.
Secondly, each of Deanne’s first and second households where she lived as a child were places of conflict and were volatile, and the deceased himself was volatile. Given this context, I am of the view that it is not inherently improbable that in such households there would be reduced scrutiny of the nature of the relationship between the deceased and Deanne, and of the nature of the contact between them.
It was uncontested that Deanne’s second household, at least, was an uncomfortable place to be. I am of the view this dynamic is consistent with the findings I have made. The findings are also consistent with my earlier acceptance of the submission that Deanne was isolated and vulnerable, and as such was the type of child who might become a target of child sexual abuse.
Thirdly, I saw and heard Deanne give her evidence, including under challenging (but not improper) cross-examination. Even though I have already commented that there were times when Deanne’s recall of dates was against the independent record, I am of the view that her accounts of events were cogent, sufficiently detailed, and consistent. I formed this view having considered Deanne’s evidence under cross-examination in the context of the oral evidence of Suzanne and Kristie, as well as all the other evidence before the Court.
Fourthly, in making the finding that the oral sex and digital penetration occurred, as I have, I have had regard to matters that I considered weighed against making the finding. For example, it was Deanne's evidence that the oral sex occurred on multiple occasions throughout the ages of 4 to 15 years old. Beyond this, there is little specificity as to dates. Notwithstanding this, I am satisfied that the level of specificity as to what occurred, together with the consistency of her account from the age of 22 up to the making of the 2024 affidavit, is highly probative and supports my satisfaction that the oral sex referred to in the oral sex disclosures occurred.
I am also mindful in making this finding that the deceased is not available to give evidence. For this reason, I have taken care to scrutinise all evidence very carefully (per GLJ at [61]).
Lastly, I am also mindful that Suzanne and Kristie both gave evidence that during the deceased’s lifetime he denied the allegations of sexual abuse (see [20]-[21] above). In closing submissions counsel for Kristie raised the issue of the deceased’s denials, wherein I asked, “… how much weight do I give the fact he denied it? Wouldn’t he deny it? Isn’t that entirely consistent or not consistent?” (TR P226 L39-47). To this counsel responded, “Denying an act of wrongdoing does not lend credence to whether the wrongdoing occurred” (TR P226 L49-50) and concluded “denying that the wrongdoing occurred can still be relied on. Perhaps as a matter of weight” (TR P227 L3-5).
I consider the fact of the deceased’s denials, which I accept occurred, to be a neutral factor. On the one hand, I accept that if the deceased had not perpetrated the sexual abuse that he would deny it. On the other hand, however, I also accept that a denial on the part of the deceased would still be consistent with the deceased having perpetrated the sexual abuse. I do not think this evidence assists me in assessing whether the sexual abuse occurred as Deanne says it did.

Given this exchange, I accept the submission of counsel for Deanne that Deanne, in answering the question, appeared to have forgotten that she had already included evidence of the Cardigan Lane incident in Deanne’s 2024 affidavit, and I accept the account given in the witness box is consistent with the account given in Deanne’s 2024 affidavit (TR P207 L11-19).
Having regard to the Cardigan Lane incident, I have achieved an actual persuasion and am satisfied that it took place to the requisite standard. That is, that Deanne was about 9 years of age when the Cardigan Lane incident occurred, in a laneway at the back of her aunt’s house. The deceased and Deanne were in the car, and the deceased undid his pants and exposed his penis to Deanne and talked to her about the “birds and the bees”. At the request of the deceased, Deanne sat on top of the deceased.
My reasons for being satisfied to the requisite standard that the Cardigan Lane incident took place are as follows.
Firstly, Deanne appears to have recalled detail of the incident itself, including where it took place. The likelihood that the incident took place is increased by Deanne’s apparent independent recall of the incident in the witness box, where she did not recall that she has already included the incident in her 2024 affidavit. I accept the submission of counsel for Deanne that this further recall in the witness box lends cogency to this evidence (TR P 207 L11-19).
Secondly, the terms in which Deanne has recounted the incident appear to have been made with care and caution. That is, she explicitly stated that she could not remember what happened after she got on top of the deceased in the car seat, and thus she could not recall whether there had been penetration or not.
Thirdly, Deanne was not challenged in cross-examination about the details of the Cardigan Lane incident, and it was not referred to in Kristie’s closing submissions. Having said this, I bear in mind I am not obliged to accept evidence that is essentially unchallenged.
Additionally to these reasons, in achieving the requisite standard of satisfaction in relation to the Cardigan Lane incident, I also rely on the reasons set out above in relation to the oral sex finding (at [316]-[324]), namely and in brief: that no plausible (or any) reason was provided as to why Deanne might have believed this, or disclosed this, if it had not been true; its occurrence was not inherently improbable given the dynamic of the household in which Deanne lived, including that Deanne was the type of child that may have been a target; and that whilst sometimes Deanne’s recollection of dates was inconsistent with independent documents, her accounts of events were cogent, sufficiently detailed, and consistent.
In weighing the evidence and making findings, I also had regard to factors that weighed against making a finding, or that otherwise highlighted the need to scrutinise all of the evidence very carefully, such as the deceased not being available to give evidence; and the deceased denied perpetrating the abuse (see [321]-[324]).

Of Suzanne’s evidence that one of the bathrooms of Deanne’s second household did not have a door on it, Deanne submitted that this evidence supports the submission that the deceased had an opportunity to do the acts that Deanne alleges and supports the likelihood of the events Deanne described as having occurred (TR P207 L32-33).
Kristie did not make any closing submissions in relation to the deceased entering the bathroom when Deanne was there, nor in relation to the significance, or not, of the fact that one of the homes did not have a bathroom door at all.
Having regard to the alleged Bathroom incidents, I have achieved an actual persuasion and am satisfied that they took place to the requisite standard. That is, that the between the ages of 4 and 15, the deceased would walk into the bathroom when Deanne was in the shower and using the toilet. When in the bath, there were times when the deceased would get into the bath with Deanne, or else tell her to get into the bath with him. Whilst in the bath the deceased would make her masturbate him to ejaculation.
My reasons for being satisfied to the requisite standard that the Bathroom incidents took place are as follows.
Firstly, and by way of context and opportunity, it was the unchallenged evidence of Kristie that it was “normal” in their family for the deceased (and her brother) to walk into the bathroom when she was using it, for example, when she was using the toilet.
Secondly, also by way of context and opportunity, it was the unchallenged evidence of Suzanne that, for the Earlwood home, the bathroom did not have a door at all. Suzanne said that, due to some usage inconvenience, they took the door off. Whilst Suzanne did not give the impression she thought that not having a door to the bathroom was unusual, based upon ordinary human experience, I am of the view that it is unusual. Further, I accept that it provides a backdrop of opportunity in a household where child sexual abuse is alleged to have taken place.
Thirdly, the Social Work Report records the St George Hospital disclosures, which include that “touching” and “masturbation” took place, although the bathroom context of some of the masturbation was not set out in that document.
Fourthly, the evidence of Suzanne was that at the time of the St George Hospital meeting Deanne told her that the deceased would ask her to scratch his back, and that he would wash her inappropriately in the bathtub. Suzanne states that Deanne said that this occurred when Deanne was aged 4 to 5. I reject this evidence in relation to Deanne’s age at the time of the alleged inappropriate touching and accept the evidence of Deanne that this occurred over 11 years and between the ages of 4 and 15. I prefer the evidence of Deanne on this for the reasons stated elsewhere, including that the evidence of Deanne is cogent, sufficiently detailed, and consistent.
Fifthly, the evidence of Deanne provided under cross-examination was that she told Suzanne at the time of the St George Hospital meeting that there were times when the deceased was in the bath, or she was, and the deceased would make her “masturbate him, and he would ejaculate at times”.
Additionally to these reasons, in achieving the requisite standard of satisfaction in relation to the Bathroom incidents, I also rely on the reasons set out above in relation to the oral sex finding (at ([316]-[324]), namely and in brief: that no plausible (or any) reason was provided as to why Deanne might have believed this, or disclosed this, if it had not been true; its occurrence was not inherently improbable given the dynamic of the household in which Deanne lived, including that Deanne was the type of child that may have been a target; and that whilst sometimes Deanne’s recall of dates was inconsistent with independent documents, her accounts of events were cogent, sufficiently detailed, and consistent.
In weighing the evidence and making findings, I also had regard to factors that weighed against making a finding, or that otherwise highlighted the need to scrutinise all of the evidence very carefully, such as the deceased not being available to give evidence and the deceased having denied perpetrating the abuse (see [321]-[324]).

Some of the cross-examination of Deanne focused on whether the altercation that formed a part of the 1989 incident had resulted in injuries that were visible to others, such as persons at her workplace (TR P41-43, 47-50, 55-56), as Deanne had set out in her 2024 affidavit. As will be seen, Kristie said she did not notice any injuries.
Whilst I propose to make a finding in relation to the 1989 incident, I do not consider it necessary to include consideration of any putative injuries resulting from any altercation. It was not suggested by Deanne that the existence of any putative injuries, as opposed to the other aspects of the 1989 incident, were the trigger for her leaving home as she did.
Deanne was also cross-examined about the 1989 incident itself. In particular, Deanne was asked questions about the differences in her evidence between her 2024 affidavit and the further evidence she gave to “clarify” in the Reply.
I observe that there are four elements to Deanne’s evidence on this: firstly, that the deceased called for her; secondly, what she saw and heard in relation to the deceased’s putative act of masturbation; thirdly, the altercation that followed; and fourthly, the post altercation injuries. As already explained, I set the fourth element to one side.
The cross-examination of Deanne in relation to this incident appeared to focus on the second element, being what Deanne saw and heard in relation to the deceased’s masturbation.
It was put to Deanne that in the 2024 affidavit, she had made no mention of being able to hear the act [of masturbation]. Deanne accepted that proposition (TR P51 L50 – P52 L1-20). It was then put to Deanne that in the Reply affidavit, that she made no mention of seeing him masturbating. To this Deanne responded, “… I guess so. I – probably meant the same thing to me” (TR P52 L4-7). Objection was taken to that question, noting Deanne’s evidence in the 2024 affidavit that “I could see that he was under a white sheet and visibly aroused”. It was then put to Deanne, that “To hear and see meant the same thing to you. Is that what you’re asking the Court to believe?” (TR P52 L9-10). In re-examination Deanne confirmed that she “definitely saw him”. She said that she “could see the movement under the sheet” (TR P76 L1-10).
I am of the view that the cross-examination of Deanne on the second element went nowhere. I accept Deanne’s evidence on this issue as set out in each affidavit, which I consider to be cogent and consistent. In particular, I note that Deanne’s Reply affidavit was said to be by way of clarification and was given with reference to Deanne’s 2024 affidavit evidence that had been replied to by Kristie. In this, I do not consider that her evidence in the two affidavits were “competing versions” of the same event.
For example, Deanne stated in the 2024 affidavit that she saw the deceased under a white sheet and that he was visibly aroused. By way of clarification in the Reply affidavit, Deanne stated that she could hear him masturbating (I note Deanne was not asked about what she heard for her to conclude the deceased was masturbating). I do not consider that evidence of hearing the deceased masturbating (whatever she heard) is inconsistent with evidence of also seeing that the deceased was visibly aroused. What Deanne said in the Reply affidavit was additive to what she said in the 2024 affidavit, which is clear from her stating her intention “to clarify”, and no doubt to extend. In this, I would not have expected Deanne to necessarily repeat the same evidence she had set out in the 2024 affidavit.
Deanne was also cross-examined on the first element, being the deceased calling out to her (TR P54-55), however I am of the view that no inconsistencies or other difficulties in her evidence were exposed. Deanne told the Court it was the first time the deceased had “actually made it sexual”, in that it was the first time Deanne had heard the deceased say “I’m horny” and that he wanted her to “finish him off”, and that she was just in shock (TR P54 L8-15). I am of the view that Deanne’s evidence on this issue remained unimpeached following cross-examination.
Deanne was not cross-examined on the third element, being the altercation itself (as opposed to the post-altercation injuries).
Suzanne also gave evidence in relation to the 1989 incident. Suzanne thought the incident had taken place in 1990, and like Kristie, recalled that she, Kristie and Garth had been away for the week at a school excursion at Jindabyne. Suzanne said that on their return at the end of the week the deceased collected herself and Kristie and Garth from the school. Suzanne said that Deanne was not at home when they arrived home and did not come home that night. When Deanne did not come home as expected, Suzanne said she asked the deceased where Deanne was, and Suzanne said she was told “‘She refused to take me to hospital on Thursday like we planned. We had a big argument’”. Of this, Suzanne stated “I was not surprised that the deceased and Deanne had argued. This was a common occurrence and nothing about it sounded unusual to me”.
Whilst the Social Work Report does not appear to contain specific allegations in relation to the 1989 incident, it does document that at that time, Deanne’s disclosures in relation to the conduct of the deceased included masturbation and inappropriate language.
Having regard to Deanne’s allegations in relation to the 1989 incident, I have achieved an actual persuasion and am satisfied that it took place to the requisite standard, in the terms of the three elements that Deanne described. That is, that the deceased and Deanne were home alone together, the remainder of the family being away. One evening, when the deceased was in his bedroom, he called out to Deanne for her to help him, and that he said that he was “horny”. I am of the view this was inappropriate language of a sexual nature. This is the first element of the incident.
Whilst it is not clear as to whether Deanne actually entered the bedroom, from where she stood Deanne came to believe the deceased was masturbating, as Deanne could see the movement under the sheet. Deanne heard the deceased ask her for help and tell her he was horny. What Deanne saw and heard in relation to the deceased’s act of masturbation is the second element.
I am also of the view that the third element, being the altercation that followed the second element, is also made out. That is, that Deanne “lost it” and started yelling at the deceased and objecting to his proposal, that the deceased eventually got up, and that a physical altercation ensued, including hitting and grabbing.
It was following this altercation that Deanne left the Earlwood home.
My reasons for being satisfied to the requisite standard that the 1989 incident took place are as follows.
Firstly, by way of context and opportunity, the deceased and Deanne were alone in the home, with the remainder of the family away for the week.
Secondly, there is documentary support for Deanne’s recollections, in that the Social Work Report records that when Deanne was aged 22, she made a complaint about the conduct of the deceased which included masturbation and inappropriate language. The 2024 Psychology Report also contained a record of what Deanne is likely to have told the psychologist in the context of their sessions, which I consider to be wholly consistent with the evidence Deanne has given in this Court. The terms of the 2024 Psychology Report itself indicate that Deanne had commenced her sessions with the psychologist in “late 2021”, meaning that what the psychologist reported from the “initial session” occurred well before the death of the deceased (14 September 2023) and thus well before any litigation.
Thirdly, the accounts of the 1989 incident given in Deanne’s affidavit evidence, and under cross-examination were cogent, sufficiently detailed, and consistent.
Fourthly, I accept Deanne’s evidence that the nature of the 1989 incident was shocking to her, in that this was the first time the deceased had asked her for help as he was horny. I accept that it was the 1989 incident that was the trigger for Deanne to leave home, forever. I am of the view that, as a matter of logic and inherent likelihood, that if something shocking happened at this time that had not happened before, it would be capable of triggering Deanne to leave home. The shocking nature of the 1989 incident explains why Deanne left home then, and not before, and not later.
Of the “argument” the deceased said had triggered Deanne’s departure, Suzanne said that the deceased told her that Deanne had refused to take him to the hospital as they had planned. Suzanne said that arguments were common and that nothing about it sounded unusual. Noting it was undisputed that this argument was the trigger for Deanne to leave home and never return, Suzanne did not address what I consider to be a fundamental anomaly in her evidence. That anomaly, in my view, is that a common or usual argument would not explain Deanne’s permanent departure.
It was Kristie’s evidence that she understood a heated argument had taken place between the deceased and Deanne whilst they were away in Jindabyne, and that she didn’t then see Deanne until her 10th birthday. Kristie said the deceased told her the argument arose because Deanne refused to accompany the deceased to take his truck to the mechanic.
Whilst Kristie clearly accepted the deceased’s explanation of the trigger for Deanne leaving home, I do not consider the reason given by the deceased explains why Deanne left home, to never return. Kristie has given other evidence of the regular heated arguments in their household, and I am of the view there is nothing in the explanation given to Kristie that takes it out of the ordinary (for that household), nor that would justify Deanne leaving home and severing contact.
Further, as will have been seen, the explanation given to Kristie by the deceased as to the basis of the argument was different to the explanation that was given by the deceased to Suzanne. In this, either the deceased was only telling the truth to one of Kristie or Suzanne, or else he lied to them both, and it is Deanne’s account of the basis of the argument that is the true one.
As a matter of logic and inherent probabilities, I am of the view that the elements of the 1989 incident as stated by Deanne provide the most cogent and persuasive explanation of why she left home on that day. The explanation the deceased gave Kristie about the lift to the mechanic, or that he gave Suzanne about the lift to the hospital, does not ring true. There is nothing in either explanation that would set that argument apart from any other argument, nor that could explain why Deanne left home, forever.
Additionally to these reasons, in achieving the requisite standard of satisfaction in relation to the 1989 incident, I also rely on the reasons set out above in relation to the oral sex finding (at [316]-[324]), namely and in brief: that no plausible (or any) reason was provided as to why Deanne might have believed this, or disclosed this, if it had not been true; its occurrence was not inherently improbable given the dynamic of the household in which Deanne lived, including that Deanne was the type of child (or person) that may have been a target; and that whilst sometimes Deanne’s recall of dates was inconsistent with independent documents, her accounts of events were cogent, sufficiently detailed, and consistent.
In weighing the evidence and making findings, I also had regard to factors that weighed against making a finding, or that otherwise highlighted the need to scrutinise all of the evidence very carefully, such as the deceased not being available to give evidence; and the deceased denied perpetrating the abuse (see [321]-[324]).

Deanne is a child of the deceased. Excepting for one year when she was about 8 or 9, Deanne spent the whole of her childhood under the same roof as the deceased.
Deanne was the subject of sexual abuse throughout large parts of her childhood, between the ages of 4 and 18. It was the deceased that perpetrated that sexual abuse.
Deanne’s first household with the deceased was a place of arguments and conflict and physical violence between the parents.
Deanne’s second household with the deceased was volatile with heated arguments and fights, and where everyone had a temper. It was an uncomfortable place to be. Specifically in relation to the deceased, he had a temper and was a volatile person, and he would have heated arguments with members of the household involving shouting and pushing and shoving, including in relation to Deanne.
Deanne left home at the age of 18, following the 1989 incident, which was an incident of sexual and physical abuse of Deanne. She left home that evening, never returned, and severed contact with the deceased. Deanne’s relationship with the rest of her family was largely severed then also.
Deanne submits the reason she ceased contact with the deceased was the sexual and physical abuse over the ages of 4 to 18, with Deanne’s leaving the home triggered by the 1989 incident (see PWS [45]). I accept the reasons provided by Deanne as a complete explanation as to any “lack of contact”.
Following Deanne leaving home and ceasing contact with the deceased, Suzanne and Kristie came to find out about the allegations of sexual abuse made by Deanne. Suzanne and Kristie did not believe Deanne then, and do not believe her now.
I note that from early 2023, Kristie and Deanne made efforts to rekindle a family relationship. Kristie recalls semi-regular contact and invites to holidays between her and Deanne, though notes this renewed relationship was damaged by the commencement of these proceedings.
I am of the view that the disbelief in Deanne’s allegations explains why Deanne lost contact with the whole of the family, as opposed to just the deceased. In this, not only was Deanne deprived of the potential support that a parent (ie, the deceased) might well have provided their child even after becoming an adult and leaving home, but she was additionally deprived of the support that the remainder of the family might have provided in those subsequent years.

I note the Court in TH was considering a situation where “the form of trauma may not be self-evident on the facts”, in which case it was still considered that there was a substantial risk of emotional harm arising in the future.
Having regard to these authorities, I am of the view that this Court is entitled, given a sufficient evidentiary basis, to decide, by inference or otherwise, whether any sexual or other abuse of Deanne in her early life caused her physical and psychological harm.
I have already made findings in relation to the sexual abuse of Deanne between the ages of 4 and 18. Consistent with what the Court found in Baldwin, and what the Court said in Gavel, I am satisfied that the sexual abuse perpetrated upon Deanne by the deceased has caused significant and deleterious effects and has given rise to harm. The harm I refer to is the harm articulated in the St George Hospital Disclosure and the 2024 Psychology Report, as summarised at [426]-[429]. I have achieved that requisite satisfaction on the basis of inferences that I have drawn adopting the approach of Baldwin, but also having regard to the more direct evidence on this, which includes the evidence of Deanne herself, and the evidence of the independent documents. The existence of reports of psychological harm as “the effects” of the abuse at the time of the St George Hospital disclosure in 1993 (ie, of “anger, shame, fear, disgust – lack of trust, body issues & sexuality as issues for her”) corroborate and support the later findings of harm more recently articulated in the 2024 Psychology Report and by Deanne herself in these proceedings.
I observe that Ms Green and Ms Esser recorded mental and physical symptoms that they have linked with what Deanne reported in relation to the sexual and physical abuse. I have accepted that the sexual abuse took place, and I accept that the harm identified in those documents has been the consequence. As a part of this, I have accepted that the nature of the harm that has resulted is as set out by Ms Green and Ms Esser and otherwise reported by Deanne. Whilst I was not requisitely satisfied about all instances of physical abuse, in particular regarding the 1986 incident, I am satisfied of the veracity of these reports regarding how the entirety of Deanne’s volatile childhood causes her ongoing harm.
To the extent that each of Ms Green and Ms Esser’s opinions on the issue of causal link is based on reports to them by Deanne as to her belief, I propose to adopt the approach taken by McHugh JA in Baldwin, in the context of the authorities cited above, and find that the abuse resulted in the harm described based on inferences available.
In relation to the harm caused, I accept the submission of Deanne that the resultant harm to her mental and physical health has in turn resulted in a loss of employment, relationship opportunities and of being able to fulfill her potential (PWS [48]-[51]). I accept, as a matter of ordinary human experience and the inherent probabilities of life, that the significant psychological and mental health detriments set out in the reports of Ms Green and Ms Esser, are likely to have been associated with a detriment in employment and relationship opportunities. In all of this analysis (at [424]-[442]), I have not relied on that part of the 2024 Psychology Report that was subject to the s 136 limitation (see [226]-[229]).
As the significant mental and physical conditions suffered by Deanne were caused, at least in part, by the deceased, I am satisfied that this significantly increases the moral obligation owed by the deceased to Deanne. Consistent with the timeline of these reports, I accept Deanne has been experiencing significant ongoing mental harm as a result of the abuse that took place since at least 1993 which has continued to the present day.

In terms of assets, Deanne is the owner of a property in Bellevue Road, Figtree (the Bellevue Road property). In Deanne’s 2024 affidavit she estimated the Bellevue Road property was valued at between $700,000 and $800,000 and said it was run down and required significant repairs due to mould, rain damage and asbestos. In stating this she relied on two appraisals from August 2024 which stated a fair market price for the property would be from $700,000 to $750,000 and from $750,000 to $800,000. The Bellevue Road property is also burdened by a mortgage in an amount of $115,615.10 as at 11 June 2025. Averaging Deanne’s 2024 valuation of the property at $750,000, this leaves an equity in the property of about $634,384.90.
Kristie submitted that the value of the Bellevue Road property is likely to be higher than the amount cited by Deanne, and relied on two documents. The first was a kerbside market appraisal obtained on Saturday, 28 February 2026 (ie, the Saturday before the commencement of the hearing on Monday, and apparently only served on Deanne on the first day of the hearing: TR P266 L26-27)), which stated that a “fair current market analysis of the property based on comparable sales would be $980,000, $1,050,000”. The second document was a Home Loan Application form for the purchase of Deanne’s second property, approved on 16 April 2025. This application valued the Bellevue Road property at $990,000.
During cross-examination, Deanne noted that the agents providing the 2024 appraisals walked through her property and thus factored in the storm damage to the property (TR P77 L38-P78 L9).
Given Deanne’s estimates were provided in 2024, even without the benefit of the 28 February 2026 kerbside appraisal, I accept that the Bellevue Road property is likely to have increased in value. Counsel for Kristie submitted I ought to find that the current estimated value of the property is $990,000, being the estimate from the loan document and within the range of the kerbside appraisal (TR P261 L31-32). If this were to be the case, subtracting the current mortgage, Deanne would have an equity in the property of about $874,384.90. I accept that these submissions made by Kristie are fairly made and find accordingly. I particularly note that the Home Loan Application estimate was provided by Deanne to the Commonwealth Bank in late 2024. Notwithstanding this, I accept that the more recent appraisals may not have had regard to any storm damage that only a walk through the property would have detected. I consider, however, that I am unable to make any determination as to the extent that any estimate ought to be reduced as a result of any storm damage.
Deanne also owns a property in Karbo Street, Figtree (the Karbo Street property), with an estimated value of $835,000, though the basis of this estimate was not provided. The Karbo Street property is burdened by a mortgage in an amount of $890,994.76, leaving an equity in the property of about minus $55,994.76. As Kristie properly observes (at DWS [89](b)), the mortgage value exceeds the estimated property value.
Once the values of the two properties are added together, and the value of the mortgages subtracted, Deanne currently holds an estimated $818,390.14 in combined equity.
In relation to the properties, Deanne gives evidence that the Bellevue Road property is her current place of residence. She said she purchased the Karbo Street property in June 2025 (ie, after commencing these proceedings), however that she did not obtain a building report before purchasing the property. Deanne says that after settlement she got a plumber and an electrician to inspect the property to see what repairs were required, and discovered that the copper wiring, electrical and plumbing had been damaged to the extent that there was no water connection from the mains to the house, no electricity, no gas, and the infrastructure in the house was damaged making the house unliveable.
Of the Karbo Street property, Deanne gave evidence that she obtained a bridging loan to finance her fixing the bathrooms and kitchen in the Bellevue Road property, and her plan was then to sell the Bellevue Road property and move to Karbo Street. Deanne explains that she is currently paying two mortgages and says she will be unable to continue doing so for much longer.
Deanne does not have any cash savings of any significance. At the time of the hearing, Deanne had a total of $345.81 in various bank accounts, and owed a total of $7,428.08 from credit card debts.
Deanne told the Court that she owned a car with an estimated value of $20,000 to $30,000; a caravan with an estimated value of $30,000; and furniture with an estimated value of $1000.
Deanne does not have any superannuation.

Deanne’s estimates of her monthly expenses varied significantly in her evidence. Attached to Deanne’s 2024 affidavit was a schedule of her monthly expenses, which amounted to $4,935.50 per month. In her updating affidavit dated 12 February 2026, the amount for Deanne’s monthly expenses was estimated to be $12,193.
Of the actual expenses claimed within these estimates between 2024 and 2026, medical went from $1,795 to $3,055; gas from $45 to $300; electricity from $170 to $250; rates from $153.50 to $400; water from $60 to $140; insurances stayed about the same (although the 2026 reference was said to be for 8 insurances as opposed to 6); food minimum from $450 to $600; petrol stayed the same; mobile from $19 to $25; Internet from $89 to $93; lawn mowing from $99 to $480, noting the 2026 claim was for the two properties as opposed to just one. The 2026 expenses also included repayment of the mortgage on the Kabo Street property, and reflected that the mortgage repayment on the Bellevue Road property increased.
Whilst it can be seen that some of these claimed expenses will, as expected, have increased somewhat given the passing of time (for example, the increased internet and mobile expenses), the increases of some expenses are significant, such as the medical expenses.
As already discussed, Deanne’s documentary support of her claim was in part incomplete, which was well exposed by the cross-examination of Deanne. To illustrate the incomplete nature of Deanne’s documents, Kristie tendered an aide memoir schedule of all of Deanne’s pharmacy and medical costs for the period 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025, as collated from documents produced under a Notice to Produce. The total was $3,147.47 spent over a 6-month period. Deanne’s basis for her monthly medical expenses of $3,055 was not supported by detailed documentation.
Given the significant disparity between the expenses estimated by Deanne between 2024 and 2026, and given that I consider Deanne has provided an incomplete evidentiary basis for the updated estimates, I do not propose to give the updated estimates any significant weight. Counsel for Deanne appeared to concede the difficulties with the level of detail in Deanne’s documentary evidence (TR P219 L17-22).
Having said that, I accept that, as a matter of judicial notice, that there will have been some increases in cost-of-living expenses over that time. I also note that between the 2024 and 2026 estimates, Deanne had purchased a second property, being the Karbo Street property, and so accept that this will have increased Deanne’s expenses, at the very least in relation to loan repayments. In this, Deanne’s 2024 monthly “Mortgage” estimate was said to be $760 per month (I infer for just the Bellevue Road property), with the 2026 estimates being $1,000 (for Bellevue Road) and $4,600 (a bridging loan for Karbo Street).
Notwithstanding the difficulties with Deanne’s evidence, it is clear Deanne’s monthly expenditure, even taking the 2024 estimate, exceeds her income.

Most broadly, Deanne submitted that there “can’t be any doubt” that “there was a moral obligation to make provision for Deanne” (TR P217 L48-49). Deanne also submits that there is enough money in the estate for both provision for herself and Kristie (TR P217 L38-43).
Regarding Deanne’s circumstances and what provision may have been “proper” for her maintenance, education and advancement in life, Deanne submitted that given her age and present circumstances, Deanne has little likelihood for future meaningful work. Deanne also notes she has no superannuation. Regarding the abuse, Deanne submits that it “deprived her of the proper fulfilment of her life and that she still suffers the effect [of] that abuse and, therefore, these matters are relevant to her present need” (PWS [53]).
Regarding Kristie’s competing circumstances, Deanne submitted Kristie is younger and has an increased work capacity which she wishes to take advantage of, and that she has a working partner (TR P218 L1-4). Deanne also submitted that Kristie had the longstanding benefit of an interest in the Earlwood property as provided for in the deceased’s lifetime (TR P217 L25-36).
In her submissions (PSN [19]), Deanne refers to an open offer she made on 30 April 2025 (the Open offer), a copy of which was in evidence. At that point in time, the distributable estate was said to be $712,781.84. This sum appears to have already excluded Kristie’s costs. In that letter Deanne offered to settle the proceedings for a sum of $340,000, plus her costs as agreed or assessed, which was said to represent 47.7% of the net distributable estate.
It appears that Deanne maintains her claim for $340,000 in these proceedings. In her closing submissions, Deanne has submitted that the sum of $340,000 could be divided into broad categories, being: a lump sum for superannuation and a lump sum for contingencies, such as fixing up her proposed new house and associated matters that can account for her daughter (PSN [20]).

Regarding s 60(2)(a), as the parent of Deanne, the deceased was obliged to care for Deanne and to provide for her to the extent his estate allowed. However, Deanne was not in contact with the deceased for many years before his death, and thus, there was little relationship of love, companionship and support between Deanne and the deceased near the time of his death.
However, I am of the view this weighs only minimally against a finding that adequate provision was not made for Deanne, given that her lack of contact with the deceased is well-explained. Similarly, Deanne’s lack of contribution to the estate of the deceased, per s 60(2)(h), is well accounted for, and weighs only minimally against Deanne. I have already been satisfied regarding s 60(2)(m) that the reasons provided by Deanne regarding her lack of contact with the deceased adequately explain her conduct.
Regarding s 60(2)(b), the deceased also owes obligations and responsibilities to Deanne for causing serious ongoing mental and physical harm to her as a result of his abuse. This militates greatly in favour of finding that adequate provision was not made for Deanne.
I am of the view that the deceased also owed obligations and responsibilities to Kristie. I do not consider this factor militates against a finding that adequate provision was not made for Deanne, noting that testators typically owe obligations to more than one person, and noting also the strength of the deceased's obligation to Deanne.
Regarding s 60(2)(j), I am of the opinion that the testamentary intentions of the deceased ought to be given some weight, however not considerable weight, as there is no evidence the deceased considered Deanne and any moral or other duty he might have to make some provision for her. In this, overall, I do not consider that the deceased's testamentary intentions militate against a finding that adequate provision was not made for Deanne.
I therefore consider that the deceased had a moral duty to make some provision for Deanne, as a parent; and this moral duty was enhanced by the harm he caused her by way of sexual and physical abuse from the ages of 4 to 18.

That the deceased made no provision for Deanne militates in favour of finding that the provision made was inadequate: s 60(2)(i).
I consider the fact that Deanne was not being maintained by the deceased at the time of his death to be a neutral factor: s 60(2)(k).
Regarding s 60(2)(d), I am of the view that Deanne has established financial need, and that this is a factor that militates towards a finding that adequate provision was not made for Deanne. Through the benefit of an earlier inheritance, Deanne has largely paid off the mortgage on the Bellevue Road property, which is her home with her daughter. Other than this however, Deanne’s financial circumstances appear relatively dire: she is not able to work (it was not suggested to Deanne that she could work, or would be able to work, in the foreseeable future), in part due to her age (s 60(2)(g)); lives on a Centrelink pension; supports a child (s 60(2)(e)); has no savings; has no superannuation; has significant mental and physical health issues (s 60(2)(f)); and there is no one liable to support her (s 60(2)(l)).
Significantly, Deanne also owns the Karbo Street property, which is uninhabitable, and for which Deanne is currently liable for significant repayments of a bridging loan, which Deanne says is not sustainable. I am of the view that it militates in favour of making an order for provision.
Regarding Kristie’s submission that Deanne is in a “financial mess of her own making” for which the deceased does not have an obligation to remedy, I am of the view that the "mess" or "pickle" that Deanne finds herself in may be best characterised as Deanne having fallen on hard times. I do not consider that acceptance that a poor decision has been made on the part of an applicant is necessarily a bar to an order for provision (although it may be in some cases), in particular in the context of the complexity of Deanne’s background and current circumstances which I have associated with the hard times.
I have considered that Kristie has a strong competing claim, which includes financial need, and that Kristie contributed to the welfare of the deceased. At the same time as this, I accept the submissions of Deanne that Kristie has an increased work capacity, wants to take advantage of that capacity, that she has a working partner, and that she is younger than Deanne;
I am of the view Kristie's financial circumstances are not a factor that militate against a finding that adequate provision was not made for Deanne, as I consider Deanne's own claim to be very strong. Again, I view that this consideration will impact upon the amount of provision that ought to be made.
I therefore consider that no provision was made for Deanne, at all, in the context of her clear financial need. That need includes an acceptance that Deanne may not be able to obtain meaningful work in the future to increase her assets and income over time, and recognises a future need for mental health support.

I do not accept this submission. In terms of Deanne’s financial circumstances, I have already found that the Court has before it a broad outline, as well as an identification and articulation of Deanne’s needs, as described above. Regarding provision, Deanne had submitted that the provision sought of $340,000 would allow for a sum to go towards superannuation and a sum towards contingencies.
Kristie has made a stinging criticism of Deanne in relation to Deanne’s “financial mess of her own making”. Those criticisms do not recognise Deanne’s responsible use of her inheritance from her paternal grandmother towards paying off the mortgage on her current residence, which is why she now has considerable equity in her home. There is no evidence that the inheritance was squandered or otherwise misused. I note that no submissions were made by Kristie to that effect. I also note that a large source of Deanne’s financial woes is the storm damage to the Bellevue Road property, and I do not accept that is a mess of Deanne’s own making (see TR P78-81).
I do recognise however, that any sum provided to Deanne may also go toward Deanne extracting herself from her “financial mess” or “pickle”. I consider that this would be a legitimate and perhaps beneficial use of any funds. In her evidence Deanne said that she was currently paying two mortgages and that she “will be unable to continue doing so for much longer”. I infer from this evidence (although my conclusions do not rely on this) that Deanne understands she may need to sell one or both of her properties and perhaps purchase a property that she can then realistically maintain from her limited resources.
I am also of the view that Kristie’s competing claim is strong. I view that the deceased had a strong moral obligation to Kristie, who provided ongoing care to the deceased for approximately 10 years, with limited support from the rest of her family.
In weighing Kristie and Deanne’s financial circumstances, both have expenditure which exceeds their income and are currently living beyond their means. For Kristie, her monthly expenditure is roughly $5,000 in excess of her household’s income; for Deanne, taking her 2024 expenses, her monthly expenditure is $1,378.46 in excess of her income, though I note I have accepted that there would have been some increase in this with the increase in cost-of-living expenses, and so much ignores the Karbo Street property. I also accept that Kristie does have a greater earning capacity than Deanne, as she is younger and has less health issues.
The key distinction in the financial positions of Kristie and Deanne, however, is that Kristie does not own any property. This is why any provision for Deanne must be limited and must leave sufficient funds to go towards Kristie’s purchase of a property, and allowing for Kristie to have reasonable equity in it. So much is consistent with the principle referred to in Limberger at [473] that, where feasible, the community ordinarily expects parents to provide a start in life for their adult child such as a deposit on a home (noting however, that these principles were in relation to claimants, as opposed to the competing claims of beneficiaries).
It is for this reason that I do not consider that the suggested sum of $340,000 for provision for Deanne is an order that “ought” to be made.
Whilst understanding Kristie’s primary position was that Deanne’s application was to be dismissed, when invited to make a submission in the alternative, counsel for Kristie submitted it would be $50,000 to $75,000 (TR 266 L1-3).
I consider this amount to be closer, relative to Deanne’s submission, to the range of order that the Court ought to consider making, however given Deanne’s particular circumstances, consider this range too low. I consider that an order for provision of a lump sum of $125,000 is the order the Court ought to make, being a further $50,000 beyond the range suggested by Kristie. I note this is not far from the range proposed by Kristie, albeit in the alternative. This amount would allow for a small sum to go towards superannuation and a small sum towards contingencies for Deanne. Importantly, it could also go towards extracting Deanne from her financial “pickle”, at least in part. By this I mean, without being prescriptive, that those funds could be used to repair one or both properties ready for sale.
I bear in mind that the notion of provision making an allowance for contingencies has not been confined to large estates.
Whilst I accept that, even excluding the Karbo property, Deanne’s liabilities exceed $125,000, I consider that Deanne’s needs must be balanced against the size of the estate and Kristie’s strong competing claim. Due to the modest size of the estate, and the strong competing claim of Kristie, the extent of the provision I ought to make will be less than what might have been ordered had there been a larger estate.
An order for $125,000 represents around 18.7% of the distributable estate ($665,131.84). Once determination of costs for Deanne and Suzanne’s proceedings takes place, the actual sum in residue of the estate (without knowing at this stage) could be around $450,131.84, where $125,000 would represent 27.7% of that figure. That would still leave Kristie with $325,131.84 in residue to go towards the purchase of her own home, which she estimates to be in the range of $430,000 and $540,000. To the extent Kristie purchases a property in this range, with a mortgage, that mortgage could be paid out once Melissa’s interest in the movable life estate becomes available.

In closing submissions, Kristie submitted that there was “concern about the plaintiff being a spendthrift” (TR P260 L24-25) and said that if the Court were minded to make an order for provision, that the Court should consider whether or not to attach any conditions (TR P260 L29-30). In support of this submission, Kristie relied on what was said by the Court in Leary v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2017] NSWSC 1113 (per Ward CJ in Eq) and Bowers v Bowers [2020] NSWSC 109 (per Hallen J).
I consider that both of these cases are distinguishable from the issues currently before the Court. I do not propose to impose a condition on the order for provision I propose to make.
In Leary, the significance of the potential to “squander” was considered in the context of the Court’s consideration of the jurisdictional question in s 59(1)(c), which contained many fact sensitive issues which have not arisen in the current proceedings (at [99]-[103]). Additionally, I note that the context of the jurisdictional issue arising was a “recently professed gambling addiction” (at [104]), in the broader context of the applicant being homeless, and where he had suffered from long term psychiatric illness (at [19]).
Perhaps more relevant to the submission made by Kristie in relation to the attachment of a condition to any family provision order are the circumstances in Bowers, where the Court imposed a condition on a part of a lump sum, being on $550,000 of a $750,000 order for provision. The nature of the restrictive condition was that the applicant was to spend no less than that amount to purchase accommodation, and to pay any stamp duty and legal costs payable on the contract for, or in respect of, the property that is purchased (at [289]).
I also consider the facts of Bowers are distinguishable from the circumstances of Deanne. In Bowers the applicant had been suffering from various forms of mental illness for many years, including: depressive disorder, for which he had been prescribed anti-depressant and anti-psychotic medication and mood stabilisers; recurrent mood disorder, for which he was taking a number of medications, including lithium and escitalopram; bipolar affective disorder; “severe Schizophrenic illness”, a diagnosis that was later converted to “chronic depressive state”, a condition which was said to be helped by the prescription of a small dose of lithium carbonate added to a combination of antidepressants (at [158]-[160]).
Importantly, the Court in Bowers indicated that considerable time and energy of the parties had been spent on the issue of whether the applicant could handle money (at [169]-[179]), and accordingly, the Court set out law relevant to “when an applicant may dissipate the provision made” (at [180]-[187]). Suffice to note that I do not consider that Kristie devoted much time and energy to this issue in the course of these proceedings, further noting that no submission in relation to a condition (in the alternative) was raised in DWS.
This is one reason I do not propose to impose any condition on the order for provision I propose to make. That is, I do not consider that Deanne was fairly on notice that such an application was to be made.
More importantly however, I do not consider that the magnitude of the very serious psychiatric illnesses suffered by the applicant in Bowers is comparable to the mental health issues experienced by Deanne in these proceedings. Of course, there is no doubt that Deanne has been challenged by, and continues to be challenged by, mental health issues. Those mental health issues have been relied on by Deanne as being a consequence of the abuse she suffered as a child as perpetrated by the deceased, as well as forming a part of the basis of her needs, going forward.
However, I am not satisfied that there is any proper evidentiary basis for the Court to conclude that Deanne is a “spendthrift”, as submitted, or that she would otherwise “squander” any provision that she might obtain through these proceedings.
On the whole of the evidence before the Court, I accept that Deanne has made a major financial decision that has left her in a “mess” or “pickle”. However, I am of the view that that Deanne’s decision-making stands in the context of the whole of her adult life, where she has been required to get by without the assistance or support of parents or siblings, who might have otherwise supported her, and in the context of the mental health issues that had arisen following a traumatic childhood. I also note that Deanne has apparently responsibly used the proceeds of an inheritance to largely pay off the mortgage on her current home, with there being no evidence (or submission) that that inheritance was other than responsibly used. That Deanne currently has a stable homelife, and manages to care for and support her child, I consider to her credit, notwithstanding her sole source of income is a Centrelink pension.
In the whole of the circumstances, I consider the imposition of a condition is not warranted, and that such a condition would otherwise be “demeaning and controlling” (see Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) 99 NSWLR 687; [2019] NSWCA 114 at [114] per Brereton JA, in relation to provision in a will that had been made to a widow). I am of the view that Deanne ought to be allowed independence and self-determination in relation to any provision provided by this Court, which I consider to be in accordance with current community standards. I consider independence and self-determination is the default position when making provision for an adult living in the community, albeit a person with mental health issues for which she receives mental health support. Kristie made no submissions on the issue of community expectations, one way or the other.

As I discussed in Gardiner v Wong (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 644 at [64], referring to Reeves v Reeves (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 386 per Meek J, an executor may not be entitled to an indemnity out of the estate of the deceased, when the litigation they are undertaking is essentially in their own interest, such as where an executor is also a sole beneficiary.
I note that Kristie, as executor, was also the sole beneficiary of the estate of the deceased. In this, whether Deanne’s costs and the estate’s costs of defending these proceedings are paid out of the estate, or whether Kristie is to personally pay those costs, may be academic, in that in each case those costs may well be paid from the residue of the estate by Kristie.
In PWS [63] Deanne stated that, subject to the Court’s final decision, Deanne would seek to make submissions on the question of costs.
I accept there is some complexity in relation to any consideration of Kristie’s costs, which at the very least may be considered to comprise of costs associated with: the defence of Deanne’s family provision claim; defence of Suzanne’s family provision claim; settlement of Suzanne’s family provision claim in the amount of $80,000; and administration costs.
As already observed, in consenting to the orders made on 20 February 2026, Deanne has agreed to the payment to Suzanne of $80,000, together with the payment of Kristie’s costs out of the estate of the deceased, on the indemnity basis. I do not know what Kristie’s costs of defending Suzanne’s proceedings are.
Considering these complexities, I will not make any costs orders at this point and propose to provide the parties with the opportunity to either agree on the appropriate orders or to otherwise make submissions on costs.
Given the modest size of the estate, which has already been lessened by the need to make payments in relation to Suzanne’s lump sum, and now further lessened by Deanne’s lump sum, it is hoped that the parties will be able to come to some practical agreement without the need to incur the further costs associated with a costs argument.

Nevin v Nevin-Large

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Catchwords

Judgment

Source

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JUDGMENT

Introduction

Relevant Persons

Background

Deanne’s early life

The abuse allegations

Kristie’s adulthood and relationship of Suzanne and deceased

Hearing details

The Will, the estimated net distributable estate, and costs

Issues and summary of conclusion

The Law

Statutory scheme and legal principles

Legal principles – Adult child

Legal principles – Lack of contact or “estrangement”

Legal principles – Buffer for “contingencies”

Legal principles – Duty to disclose financial position

Qualifications on “Principles”

Anterior issue: Should the Court make findings as to whether the abuse occurred?

Evidence and Credit

Legal principles – Fact finding and witness credibility

Legal principles – Fact finding in civil child abuse litigation

Legal principles – Unchallenged and uncontradicted evidence

Witness evidence and witness credibility and reliability

Deanne’s credit and reliability

Deliberate falsehoods regarding abuse allegations

Financial disclosures

Credibility more generally

Kristie

Suzanne

Volatility of the household

Jones v Dunkel

Facts and circumstances

Facts: Approach to fact finding generally

Facts: Events not seriously in dispute

1987 Counselling

1989: Leaving home

1993: Tarago semi-disclosure

1993: St George Hospital

Facts: Current mental health status

2024 Psychology Report

Facts: Matters of common knowledge and child sexual abuse

Child sexual abuse

Deanne and vulnerability and being a “target”

“Absence of complaint”

“At-the-coalface understanding”

Facts: Findings sought by the plaintiff

General household dynamics

Sexual abuse allegations

Deanne’s ages when alleged sexual abuse took place

a. That the incident occurred with the deceased’s friend Mr X’s son and was the trigger for subsequent events

b. The oral sex incidents: The deceased performed oral sex on the Plaintiff after apply thrush medication

c. The Cardigan Lane incident: the deceased exposed himself to Deanne in the car talking of the “birds and the bees”

d. The Bathroom incidents: The deceased repeatedly touched Deanne in the Bathroom

e. The 1989 incident: The incident in 1988/9 when Sue, Kristie and Garth were at the snow when the deceased seeks sexual satisfaction from Deanne

f. The Deanne was the subject of CSA throughout large parts of her childhood between 4-18 that included: (i) Oral sex; (ii) Digital penetration; (iii) Penile vaginal penetration; (iv) Touching; (v) Masturbation; (vi) Inappropriate language of a sexual nature to a child.

Physical assaults

a. About 1986, Deanne is 15 and is grabbed by the throat and reaches for a knife.

b. The snow incident

c. The deceased was a violent person

Conclusion

Consideration

Section 60(2) matters

Section 60(2)(a): any family or other relationship between the applicant and the deceased person, including the nature and duration of the relationship

Section 60(2)(b): the nature and extent of any obligations or responsibilities owed by the deceased person to the applicant, to any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or to any beneficiary of the deceased person’s estate

Medical conditions suffered by Deanne

Causation

Nature and extent of obligations to Kristie

Section 60(2)(c): the nature and extent of the deceased person’s estate (including any property that is, or could be, designated as notional estate of the deceased person) and of any liabilities or charges to which the estate is subject, as in existence when the application is being considered

Section 60(2)(d): the financial resources (including earning capacity) and financial needs, both present and future, of Deanne

Income and employment