Environment and planning - Planning appeal - Parties - Application to join - Failure to make a representation.

Environment and planning - Planning appeal - Dismissal of part of proceedings - Frivolous or vexatious grounds of appeal.

Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993;

Local Government Act 1993, s 178;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020, ss 10, 75, 79, 89, Sch 2, Pt 8.

Action View Tas Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council [2020] TASRMPAT 20;

Director of Housing v Glenorchy City Council [2007] TASRMPAT 197;

E Allan v Strata Corporation No 180683 [2022] TASCAT 29;

GHD Pty Ltd v Kingborough Council [2007] TASRMPAT 102;

Langley v Niland [1981] 2 NSWLR 104;

M Drury v Clarence City Council [2020] TASRMPAT 15;

Tyre Recycle Tasmania Pty Ltd v Northern Midlands Council [2017] TASRMPAT 4

1. This decision addresses two interlocutory applications made in a planning appeal under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (LUPAA). The respondent (the council) wishes to build an aquatic, health, and wellbeing centre in George Town. The appellants have appealed against the permit that the council, as planning authority, granted.
2. The first application is made by Lorraine Wootton to be joined to the appeal.
3. The second is an application by the council for most of the grounds of appeal to be struck out or dismissed on the basis that they are frivolous, misconceived, and/or lacking in substance.
4. The appeal is listed for hearing commencing on 23 May. In addition, I am told that the council has an impending deadline relating to funding for the project. There is some urgency to determine the two applications, reflected in the relative brevity of these reasons.

1. Public notification of the development application in accordance with LUPAA commenced on 11 January and ended on 28 January 2025. The council decided to grant a permit and notified representators on 25 February. The appellants filed their notice of appeal with the Tribunal on 11 March.
2. On 21 March, Mrs Wootton, the proposed party joined, filed an application to be joined as a party. Her application was supported by a lengthy document relating to public questions she had asked of council before the development application was determined and the plans for developing the centre.
3. The Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (TASCAT Act), Sch 2, Pt 8, cl 7 regulates the parties to an appeal in the Resource and Planning stream. The provision relevantly states:

... > > (3) If an appeal has been instituted by a person, any other person whose interests are affected by the decision which is appealed against may, subject to subclauses (4) and (5) , apply in writing to the Tribunal to be made a party to the appeal and the Tribunal may, by order, make the person a party to the appeal. > > (4) The Tribunal may not, under subclause (3) , make a person a party to an appeal against a decision - > > (a) in respect of the granting of a permit under section 57 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 unless - > > (i) the person made a representation under section 57(5) of that Act in respect of the application for the permit; or > > (ii) the Tribunal considers that the person has a proper interest in the subject matter of the appeal and that it is not reasonable to expect the person to have made a representation in respect of the application for the permit; or > > (b) in respect of the granting of a permit under section 58 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 , unless the Tribunal considers that the person has a proper interest in the subject matter of the appeal.

1. Mrs Wootton did not make a representation to the council. Her application must therefore be assessed against cl 7(4)(a)(ii). To grant her application to be joined, I must be satisfied that:
   1. she has an interest affected by the council's decision to grant a permit: cl 7(3);
   2. she has a proper interest in the subject matter of the appeal: cl 7(4)(a)(ii); and
   3. it was not reasonable to expect her to have made a representation to the council in respect of the application for a permit: cl 7(4)(a)(ii).
2. Mrs Wootton's application is supported by further submissions made by email on 28 March 2025. Mrs Wootton submits that she had intended to lodge a representation with the council but, upon attempting to do so, realised that she was several days out of time. Her explanation is that representations were open over "a holiday period", she thought that she had until the end of January 2025, and:

[P]ersonal and family commitments including medical appointments and additional volunteer duties at our local museum... considerably impacted my capacity to immediately address the matter.

3. Mrs Wootton also refers to a lack of information regarding the development application (in particular, the lack of an engineering report) preventing her from making an informed representation.
4. The council opposes the application to join.

Does the proposed party joined have an interest affected?

1. To satisfy the first limb of the test, the interest must be "one which could be affected by the permit being acted upon": Tyre Recycle Tasmania Pty Ltd v Northern Midlands Council [2017] TASRMPAT 4. Something more than a mere general interest in the subject matter is required: M Drury v Clarence City Council [2020] TASRMPAT 15. But the interest need not necessarily be adverse: Director of Housing v Glenorchy City Council [2007] TASRMPAT 197 at [8].
2. Mrs Wootton bears the onus of persuading me that she has an interest affected.
3. Mrs Wootton is a local resident but, I infer, does not own or occupy land proximate to the site. It is clear from the applicant's materials that she opposes the proposal and is concerned about (in her view) inadequate public consultation. It is also clear that she has had a long-standing interest in the subject matter of the permit dating at least as far back as August 2024 when she asked questions in an ordinary meeting of the council.
4. With some hesitation, I am persuaded that the proposed party joined's interest extends beyond a mere general interest in the subject matter. Accordingly, I am satisfied that she has an interest affected.

Does the proposed party joined have a proper interest?

1. I follow the approach taken by the then Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (RMPAT) in Action View Tas Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council [2020] TASRMPAT 20 when considering the predecessor to cl 7(3) and (4)(a)(ii). RMPAT said, at [12]:

The Tribunal has considered the meaning of interests affected in s14(2) and proper interest in s14(3)(a)(ii) in a number of decisions. Principles that may be distilled from those decisions include the following:

(a) By requiring the existence of a proper interest in the subject matter of the appeal s14(3)(a)(ii) limits the class of persons granted a right of appeal rather than enlarging it;

(b) A proper interest is something that goes beyond mere general interest in the subject matter and is akin to a special interest as discussed in Australian Conservation Foundation v The Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493 and Onus v Alcoa of Australia Limited [1981] 149 CLR 272. Something more than a mere general interest in the subject matter or a belief that a particular law should be observed is required for a proper interest to be found;

(c) What constitutes a proper interest is determined by the nature and subject matter of the appeal and the interest of the applicant to be joined must be one which may be affected by that subject matter such that they ought be afforded a right to be heard;

(d) The interest must be one which could be affected by the permit being acted upon or the permit not being able to be acted upon;

(e) Consideration of whether a person's interests are affected is not limited to the issues raised by the grounds of appeal, but extends to the matters relating to the decision being appealed against and the outcomes which are open on an appeal;

(f) 'Affected' in s14(2) is not limited to adversely affected and a person may have a proper interest in preserving the status quo or achieving a positive effect on its interests.

This list is not intended to be exhaustive. [Citations omitted]

1. For the same reasons as I have outlined above, and with some hesitation, I accept that Mrs Wootton has a proper interest. Given my conclusion as to the reasonableness of expecting the applicant to have made a representation, it is unnecessary to address this any further.

Was it reasonable to expect the proposed party joined to make a representation?

1. This is the weakest part of Mrs Wootton's argument.
2. The category of reasons for why it was not reasonable to expect an applicant to make a representation is not closed. Examples may, depending on the particular circumstances, include illness and pressing work and family commitments: GHD Pty Ltd v Kingborough Council [2007] TASRMPAT 102 at [9].
3. The council referred me to several cases in which the Tribunal or RMPAT found it not to have been reasonable to expect a prospective applicant to make a representation. I consider each case to be distinguishable from the circumstances of this application.
4. I consider it to be reasonable to expect Mrs Wootton to have made a representation. I do not accept that the second half of January is properly regarded a holiday period. I consider Mrs Wootton's reference to personal and family commitments to be vague and uncompelling. Moreover, her reasons do not adequately address the applicant's mistaken belief as to the closing date.
5. Accordingly, the application to join does not meet the mandatory criteria prescribed by cl 7(4)(a)(ii) and must be dismissed.

1. The council applies under the TASCAT Act, s 89(2) for part of the appeal to be dismissed or struck out.
2. Section 89, titled 'Frivolous or vexatious proceedings', relevantly provides:

(1) This section applies if the Tribunal believes that a proceeding or a part of a proceeding - > > (a) is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or > > (b) is otherwise an abuse of process. > > (2) If this section applies, the Tribunal may order that the proceedings, or the part of a proceeding, be dismissed or struck out and may make any related or ancillary order. > > ...

3. The council's application was first made in respect of the entire appeal. Since then, there has been some back and forth between the parties relating to the grounds of appeal, culminating in revised grounds of appeal being filed on 14 April. They are annexed to these reasons.
4. The grounds of appeal are unusually drafted. There are seven headings, running from A through to G. Most headings, each of which for convenience I will call an assertion, has a series of numbered grounds. Some have further subheadings. The council submits that all but assertion C "are misconceived or irrelevant or both, fail to raise any justiciable matters, and should be dismissed/stuck out".

1. The TASCAT Act, s 89 has been considered in several cases. In E Allan v Strata Corporation No 180683 [2022] TASCAT 29, the Tribunal said at [10]:

Section 89 of the TASCAT Act provides that the Tribunal may order that proceedings be dismissed where it believes that they are frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance or are otherwise an abuse of process. What might be frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance or an abuse of process can be protean, and the natural meaning of those words has somewhat contumelious overtones. However, their broad meaning in law is that the proceeding lacks a legal foundation to provide relief.

2. The terms frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, and lacking in substance are often used in legislative provisions relating to summary dismissal. Hunt J considered the four terms in Langley v Niland [1981] 2 NSWLR 104, which has been applied in several cases of this tribunal. At 107, his Honour said that frivolous, vexatious, and lacking in substance:

[C]learly refer to the insufficiency or to the absence of merit of the factual basis for the allegations made in the complaint rather than to whether the complaint is one within the provisions of the Act at all.

3. Hunt J considered misconceived to mean "something which is founded upon a wrong idea as to the facts".
4. The council contends that, with the exception of assertion C, the proceedings are:
   1. "frivolous in that they are manifestly futile and cannot result in any enquiry or action by the Tribunal with respect to the decision appealed against;"
   2. "misconceived in that they seek to agitate matters that do not form part of the statutory land use planning system, and therefore are not justiciable in the context of these proceedings;" and
   3. "lacking in substance because there is not even a remote possibility of merit, nor a hint of anything set out in the grounds, capable of founding a justiciable matter in the context of these proceedings".
5. With respect to the appeal itself, the Tribunal's task is to produce the correct or preferable decision, standing in the shoes of the planning authority: TASCAT Act, s 75(1). On hearing the appeal, I will need to determine whether the proposal complies with LUPAA and the relevant planning scheme requirements, being the Tasmanian Planning Scheme. My task is not to determine whether the proposal has merit in a broader sense or to conduct some wide-ranging inquiry into the process by which the proposal was conceived by the council as developer and approved as planning authority.
6. On the other hand, I should not take an overly literal or legalistic approach. The Tribunal is required to proceed "with the minimum of formality" and act "without regard to legal technicalities": TASCAT Act, s 79(a) and (c).
7. Where I have concluded that a ground of appeal is frivolous, misconceived, or lacking in substance, I have considered whether I should allow the appellants an opportunity to amend (i.e. replead) that ground. I have decided that it would not be in the interests of justice to allow the appellants to do that because:
   1. the matter is already listed for hearing such that any further delays would likely require the hearing dates to be vacated;
   2. the Tribunal is required to hear and determine the appeal within 90 days after it is instituted, subject to extensions: TASCAT Act, Sch 2, Pt 8, cl 9(1);
   3. the Tribunal's main objectives include keeping costs to the parties to a minimum insofar as it is just and appropriate: TASCAT Act, s 10(1)(d);
   4. the appellants have already amended or provided further particulars in respect of their grounds of appeal several times; and
   5. the deficiencies (in the sense of being frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, or lacking in substance) are significant; and
   6. although a comparatively minor factor, the first-named appellant, while self-represented, has previously been a litigant in RMPAT proceedings under LUPAA and therefore has some familiarity with the procedural requirements.

1. Assertion A is titled 'insufficient documentation provided during public consultation'. It relates to information that was available to the planning authority and to the public. The appellants contend that a 'condition report' of the existing facility was not available during the statutory consultation period. I accept the council's submission that the report did not form part of the development application. Accordingly, the report did not need to form part of the documents available as part of the public notification process.
2. The complaints in assertion A are frivolous and misconceived. They are irrelevant to the Tribunal's task in hearing the appeal and are not justiciable. Assertion A and its grounds must be struck out for being frivolous, misconceived, and lacking in substance.

1. Assertion B contends incompatibility in uses. Although prolix, the substance is an assertion that certain aspects of the proposal (a café and professional consulting rooms) are prohibited within the relevant zone of the planning scheme.
2. The Tasmanian Planning Scheme, cl 6.2.2 provides that "[a] use or development that is directly associated with and a subservient part of another use on the same site must be categorised into the same Use Class as that other use". In this case, the council asserts that the principal use is as a fitness centre, which falls into the 'Sports and Recreation' use class.
3. The appellants' arguments to the contrary appear to be relatively weak and contrary to cl 6.2.2. On the other hand, I accept that I should be slow to strike out or summarily dismiss a ground before I have received all the evidence and heard all the submissions. Moreover, hearing evidence and submissions are unlikely to unduly lengthen or prolong the appeal.
4. On balance, I do not consider assertion B to be lacking in substance or otherwise falling within the ambit of the TASCAT Act, s 89(1). The appellants should be afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence and make submissions in relation to whether the café and/or professional consulting rooms are not directly associated with and a subservient part of the fitness centre.

1. The appellants contend, by reference to a fact sheet produced by the Integrity Commission, that the council failed to comply with the Local Government Act 1993, s 178(4)(a) and (b). That section regulates a council's power to sell, lease, donate, exchange, or otherwise dispose of public land.
2. Whether the council complied with s 178 is irrelevant to the Tribunal's task in reviewing the council's decision to grant a permit under LUPAA. The assertion lacks a legal foundation provide to relief and should be struck out.

1. It is unclear whether assertions E and F are standalone grounds or adjuncts to the other grounds. In any event, each is argumentative and irrelevant to the Tribunal's statutory task and lacks a legal foundation to provide relief. I repeat the observations at [35], above. Assertions E and F should be struck out.

1. Assertion G is phrased as the orders or relief that the appellants seek. Strictly speaking, it is not a ground of appeal. However, I do not consider it appropriate to strike it out. At the hearing of the appeal, I will consider it as a submission as to what orders I should make.

1. The council does not seek that this assertion be struck out. The council concedes that it raises a relevant planning matter; in particular, compliance with the applicable standards in cl 29.3.1 A1/P1 of the Tasmanian Planning Scheme. Instead, the council seeks a direction that the appellants provide further and better particulars of "what specific adjacent properties hosting sensitive uses [the appellants] claim will be impacted by the [p]roposal to such a degree that P1 is not satisfied."
2. P1 focuses on preventing "unreasonable loss of amenity to adjacent sensitive uses". 'Adjacent' and 'sensitive use' is each defined in the scheme.
3. I accept the council's submission. The lack of particularisation of the sensitive uses makes it difficult for the appellant to respond to the ground at the hearing and for the Tribunal to determine it. I will direct that the appellants provide further and better particulars.

1. The council seeks an order allowing costs to be applied for in respect of the council's interlocutory application. I consider the preferable course to be for the question of costs to be reserved (i.e. dealt with at the conclusion of the appeal).

1. I make the following orders:
   1. Lorraine Wootton's application to join the appeal be dismissed.
   2. Grounds of appeal A, D, E, and F be struck out.
   3. By 25 April 2025, the appellants file and serve particulars of the properties and the sensitive uses falling within the ambit of ground C.
   4. The costs of each application be reserved.

A. INSUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED DURING PUBLIC CONSULTATION

1. Under Section 57(5) of LUPAA, all relevant documents must be made available during the statutory 14-day public notification period.
2. Key reports including the Condition Report, for the pools only, were:
   • not provided in full for public review prior to closure for representations
   • requested under RTI 19 December 2024, and when finally received on 7 March 2025 was so heavily redacted (95%) as to provide no useful information. (document already supplied)
3. The lack of complete documentation meant that interested parties were unable to make informed representations concerning reasons for demolition.
4. Failure to provide full documentation constitutes a procedural flaw, undermining the fairness and transparency of the planning process.
5. Improper Justification for Withholding Documents
   • The General Manager of George Town Council incorrectly cited intellectual property concerns in stating that the reports could not be provided because they could be used by a third party.
   • However, this is a misinterpretation of the clause governing intellectual property rights in professional reports.
   • The correct interpretation is that the reports cannot be used by another organisation to construct a competing facility, but they can and must be reviewed as part of a public planning process.
   • This reasoning is an improper attempt to block transparency and prevent full scrutiny of the application by the public.
6. Legal Precedents on Document Withholding
   • The failure of George Town Council to provide full transparency in the consultation process could render the decision unlawful and constitutes a breach of procedural fairness and natural justice.
   • In similar cases, the withholding of expert reports has been considered a denial of natural justice, particularly where those documents are necessary for assessing discretionary planning approvals.

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B. INCOMPATIBLE USES WITHIN THE OPEN SPACE ZONE

1. The Open Space Zone is intended to provide land for open space purposes, including passive recreation and landscape amenity.
2. The Sport & Recreation use class is discretionary within the zone, meaning it can be approved if it aligns with the zone's intent. However, other uses proposed within the development must also be considered.
3. The proposal includes:
   • Gym (Sport & Recreation - Discretionary)
   • Indoor Swimming Pool (Sport & Recreation - Discretionary)
   • Café (Food Services - Prohibited in Open Space Zone)
   • Consulting Rooms - Operator not specified (Medical or Professional Services - are Prohibited in Open Space Zone)
4. In the Council DA documents, at recent meetings, discussions, information sessions, radio interviews, etc the mayor and Council officers have given no clear indication of how the café, gym and consulting rooms - or indeed the pools - will operate, whether they will be leased out or run by Council and under what conditions. In fact there is no known business plan for the new complex.
5. Issues with Café (Food Services):

• Insufficient detail on operation, independent branding, and public accessibility.
• Commercial use conflicts with the recreational intent of the zone.

6. Council may argue that the café is ancillary to the aquatic centre; however, the following issues arise:

• If the café is open to the general public and operates independently (e.g., separate branding, street frontage, external access, run by separate entity), it is not ancillary and should be classified as Food Services, which is not permitted in the Open Space Zone.
• A small kiosk inside the aquatic centre, operated by the same management as the pool, providing refreshments exclusively for facility users, might be considered ancillary. However, the scale and operation of the proposed café are unclear.
• The café introduces commercial activity into an open space area, which contradicts the zone's intent.

• Classified as prohibited.
• No direct relationship demonstrated to Aquatic Centre operation.
• Potential for commercial leasing undermines zone purpose.
• Council failed to justify alignment with zone purposes.

B.2. Professional Consulting Rooms as an Ancillary Use

8. The professional consulting rooms present a more significant zoning conflict:

• Consulting rooms are classified under Business and Professional Services, which is not a permitted use in the Open Space Zone.
• Council has not demonstrated how these consulting rooms are directly related to and subordinate to the aquatic centre. Nor have they clearly outlined how the rooms will be utilised and whether activities will occur that are commercial in nature (ie: money exchanged for goods or services).
• If the rooms are intended for physiotherapy or sports rehabilitation, this may justify their inclusion, but the planning approval does not explicitly restrict them to these uses. Even then, if businesses are operating from the rooms, this is in conflict with the Open Space zone and not ancillary to the Aquatic Centre as those businesses/ consultancies could be set up anywhere in George Town where there are many 'consulting rooms' available already.
• If they can be leased to external practitioners for general consulting services, they are functioning independently and should be assessed as a separate discretionary or prohibited use.
• There is no provision in the Open Space Zone that allows Business and Professional Services as an ancillary use.

9. Council has relied solely on Sport & Recreation being discretionary, but has not justified how a commercial café and consulting rooms align with the zone purpose statement.

10. The Open Space Zone Purpose (Clause 29.1) states:

• "To provide land for open space purposes including for passive recreation and natural or landscape amenity."
• "To provide for use and development that supports the use of the land for open space purposes or for other compatible uses."

11. The café and consulting rooms are not inherently related to the recreational function of the aquatic centre and introduce commercial activities that do not align with the intent of the Open Space Zone.

12. The Council's failure to assess these uses separately against the zone purpose and use table constitutes a legal and procedural error.

• Strong Argument Against Ancillary Uses:
• Ancillary use must be strictly subordinate and reliant upon primary permissible use.
• Commercial viability independent of aquatic centre indicates primary prohibited use.
• Approval sets negative zoning precedent, eroding integrity of the planning scheme.
• Failure of Council Assessment:
• Café and consulting rooms were not separately assessed.
• Inadequate justification for their inclusion under discretionary Sport & Recreation use.
• George Town Council has a track record of complete disregard for the Open Space zone, having recently constructed a Bike Pump Track in the Open Space zone, despite pump tracks being classified as Sport and Recreation - a discretionary use within the Open Space Zone - and not classed as "passive recreation" as it was claimed to be.

13. The George Town Swimming Pool Complex has been on this same site since 1986 so the 'principal use' has been 'Sport and Recreation' since then, and this will continue with the proposed development.

It could have been expected that area would have been changed from Open Space to the more appropriate 'Sport and Recreation' in the relatively new George Town Planning Scheme so the major use would no longer be 'discretionary'.

C. NOISE AND AMENITY IMPACTS FROM 24-HOUR OPERATION

1. The facility includes a 24-hour gym, which does not comply with the Acceptable Solution for hours of operation under Clause 29.3.1 (Open Space Zone Use Standards).
2. The assessment under the Performance Criteria failed to:
   • Adequately assess potential amenity loss to nearby residences from night-time noise, vehicle movements, and lighting.
   • Consider additional mitigation measures beyond banning amplified music at night.
3. The approval conditions do not sufficiently protect the residential character of the area, contrary to the objectives of the Open Space Zone.
   • Relevant Clause: Clause 29.3.1, Use Standards
   • 24-hour gym exceeds Acceptable Solution.
   • Inadequate assessment of impacts (noise, lighting, vehicle movement).

Conditions are insufficient to protect residential amenity (only banning amplified music is inadequate).

4. Many local residents are shift-workers and young families and extra traffic, noise and lighting from a 24 hr Gym will be disturbing. Residences on the northern side of William St are directly across the street from the carpark and vehicle movements. There is minimal vegetation in the existing carpark to mitigate the sound between adjacent residences and inside the gym and the carpark during the night.

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D. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PROVISIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1993

1. We contend that under Section 178 Local Government Act - Sale, exchange and disposal of public land - that the buildings and other tangible built assets form part of the "Land" at 24 William St George Town under the definition of "Land." Council has not complied with the provisions of the Act namely (4) (a) & (b).

2. Integrity Commission Tasmania Fact Sheet - Public Resources states in regard to the disposal of goods and property that:

"Any assets belonging to a public organisation must be accounted for appropriately, from procurement to disposal."

3. George Town Council's only reference to the disposal of the said assets was when presenting DA 2024/114 for approval Condition 11 - 'Demolition' and Redevelopment

4. The Development Application did not have the support of a prior resolution of Council to negotiate contracts on the basis of the site being demolished/disposed of.

5. No reports on the condition of the assets, including the existing building, or future or alternative uses were made available.

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• Conflict of Interest and Procedural Fairness:
• Councillors publicly supported the project; approval tied to securing $15 million funding.
• Non-independent consultant engaged (former staff member, regular contractor).
• Approval predetermined due to financial incentives; lack of impartiality.
• Recent Council Conduct and Trust Issues:
• Unapproved Bike Pump Track constructed without discretionary permit.
• Ongoing disregard for planning regulations.
• Extensive redaction (95%) of RTI requests; community trust compromised.
• Zoning Comparisons with Other Municipalities:
• George Town attempts a replication of Launceston Aquatic Centre (Recreation Zone), but uses inappropriate Open Space Zone.
• West Tamar's aquatic centre is correctly zoned as 'Community Purpose.'

• Approval improperly granted without transparency or compliance.
• Council's conflict of interest undermines fairness.
• Appeal seeks lawful reconsideration under LUPAA and the Tasmanian Planning Scheme.
• Council had the opportunity to rectify the zoning at the pool given they were aware at that time that they would be upgrading it, and resolve the issue with the illegally built pump track, but failed to do so.

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The appellant requests that the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal:

1. Set aside the Council's decision to grant the planning permit.
2. Remit the application back to Council for reconsideration, with a requirement to:
   • Provide full and proper documentation for public review.
   • Impose stronger conditions to mitigate amenity loss.
   • Assess the café and consulting rooms separately against the Open Space Zone.
3. Alternatively, impose additional planning conditions to:
   • Restrict gym operating hours to 6 AM - 10 PM.
   • Ensure a transparent review of all parking and traffic impacts.
   • Exclude or separately assess commercial uses (café and consulting rooms) within the Open Space Zone.

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This appeal is lodged on the basis that the planning permit was granted without full documentation, without a transparent process, and without properly applying key planning provisions. The appellant seeks a fair and lawful reconsideration of the application to ensure compliance with the Tasmanian Planning Scheme and LUPAA.

We, repeat that we are not against the building of the new Aquatic, Health and Well-being Centre, but we represent the wider community who oppose the removal of their much loved community facility, when there is no shortage of space on the site.

Had the Request for Quote - RFQ 05/2024 for Provision of Professional Architectural Design Service not stipulated that "... all current buildings and facilities can and will need to be demolished", architects could have planned the new facility around the existing infrastructure, leaving the outdoor pools intact and reusing much of the existing building and the recently upgraded filtration and heating plant - as the community expected - and avoided considerable and needless addition to landfill and waste of resources.

Note that an expert Condition Report, of the pool infrastructure only, was commissioned only in late 2024, well after the RFQ 05/2024 and after the architect design had been selected.

The cost of any future outdoor pool must surely be considerably more if a new excavation is required to accommodate it. Numerous outdoor pools that are up to 22 years older than the George Town Pools have recently been successfully renovated to continue in use.

We request that Mediation take place as soon as possible, preferably on the site of the George Town Swimming Pool Complex, with a view to finding a solution that enables the development to proceed as soon as possible.

Ms Fiona Hills - Mr Graeme Neilsen - Mrs Lorraine Wootton