Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Judgment and punishment - Sentence - Factors to be taken into account - Factual basis for sentence - Plea of guilty and use of particulars - Admission of legal ingredients of crime or offence - Not admission of all the particulars. Nash v Haas (1972) Tas SR 1; Smith v R No 48/1979; Dale v Peterson No 64/1972, followed.

Vehicles and Traffic - Offences - Particular offences - Driving in manner dangerous to public- Penalty - Imprisonment for eighteen months and disqualification for five years - Whether excessive.

CRAWFORD J The applicant seeks to review sentences imposed on him by a court of petty sessions at Launceston on 12 April 1984 following his pleas of guilty to a number of charges contained in two complaints. On complaint No16871/94 the charges were:

(A) Driving a motor vehicle while alcohol was present in

his body when he was a person to whom the Road Safety

(Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1970, s6(3) applied contrary to

s6(2) in that on 25 March 1994 when he did not hold an

authority to drive a motor vehicle he drove one on Invermay

Road, Elm Street, Ray Street, Forster Street, Henty Street,

Invermay Road, Herbert Street, Oswald Street and Doyle

Street, public streets at Launceston, while alcohol was

present in his body in a concentration of .109 grams of

alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

(B) Threatening a police officer contrary to the Police

Offences Act 1935, s34B(1)(b) in that on 25 March 1994 at

Launceston he threatened Sergeant Patrick McMahon, a police

officer in the performance of his duty, by saying the words

"I'll break you're fucking nose again like I did the last

time, but I'll do a fucking proper job of it next time".

(C) Dangerous driving contrary to the Traffic Act 1925,

s32(1) in that on 25 March 1994 he drove a motor vehicle on

Invermay Road, Elm Street, Ray Street, Forster Street,

Herbert Street, Henty Street, Invermay Road, Oswald Street

and Doyle Street, public streets at Launceston, in a manner

which was dangerous to the public, having regard to all the

circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition

and use of the streets and to the amount of traffic that

actually was at the time or that might reasonably have been

expected to be on them.

2. Following that statement of the charge there appeared on the complaint 33 particulars of the allegation of dangerous driving. Those particulars were:

"1 That you did exceed 60 km/h, namely in excess of 80 km/h

on Invermay Road.

2 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

right from Invermay Road into Elm Street.

3 That you did disobey a 'No Entry' sign in Elm Street.

4 That you did fail to keep left when turning left into

Forster Street from Ray Street.

5 That you did fail to keep left when travelling in Forster

Street.

6 That you did exceed 60 km/h, namely in excess of 80 km/h

on Forster Street.

7 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn left

from Forster Street.

8 That you did fail to keep left in Herbert Street.

9 That you did exceed 60 km/h, namely in excess of 80 km/h

on Herbert Street.

10 That you did fail to pass through the intersection of

Herbert Street and Bryan Street at a speed to be able to

give way, to stop in case of an emergency or to be able to

avoid a collision.

11 That you did fail to pass through the intersection of

Herbert Street and Bryan Street at a speed to be able to

give way, to stop in case of an emergency or to be able to

give way.

12 That you did fail to keep left of the roundabout at the

intersection of Herbert Street and Burns Street by driving

with the right wheels over the roundabout.

13 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

left from Herbert Street into Henty Street.

14 That you did fail to pass through the intersection of

Herbert Street and Henty Street at a speed to be able to

give way to stop in case of an emergency or be able to

avoid a collision.

15 That you did fail to maintain proper control of your

vehicle when entering Henty Street from Herbert Street.

16 That you did exceed 60 km/h, namely in excess of 90 km/h

on Henty Street.

17 That you did fail to keep left in Henty Street.

18 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

left from Henty Street into Invermay Road.

19 That you did exceed 60 km/h, namely in excess of 140

km/h on Invermay Road.

20 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

left from Invermay Road into Forster Street.

21 That you did fail to keep left in Forster Street.

22 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

left from Forster Street into Herbert Street.

23 That you did fail to keep left in Herbert Street by

travelling in the centre of the road.

24 That you did exceed 60 km/h, namely in excess of 80 km/h

on Herbert Street.

25 That you did fail to pass through the intersection of

Herbert Street and Bryan Street at a speed to be able to

give way, to stop in case of an emergency or to be able to

avoid a collision.

26 That you did fail to pass through the intersection of

Herbert Street and Burns Street (roundabout) at a speed to

be able to give way to stop in the case of an emergency or

to be able to avoid a collision.

27 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

right from Herbert Street into Henty Street.

28 That you did fail to pass through the intersection of

Henty Street and Herbert Street at a speed to be able to

give way, to stop in the case of an emergency or to be able

to avoid a collision.

29 That you did fail to maintain proper control in Henty

Street.

30 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

right from Henty Street into Oswald Street.

31 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

right from Oswald Street into Doyle Street.

32 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

right from Doyle Street into Herbert Street.

33 That you did fail to indicate your intention to turn

right from Herbert Street into Henty Street."

3. Major issues on this motion include whether the learned magistrate had regard to those particulars and whether he was entitled to have regard to them when determining what sentence to impose for dangerous driving.

(D) Driving while disqualified contrary to the Traffic Act

1925, s37(1) in that on 25 March 1994 he drove a motor

vehicle on Invermay Road, Elm Street, Ray Street, Forster

Street, Herbert Street, Henty Street, Invermay Road,

Forster Street, Herbert Street, Henty Street, Oswald

Street, Doyle Street and Herbert Street, all public streets

at Launceston, while he was disqualified from holding or

obtaining a driver's licence.

(E) Motor vehicle stealing contrary to the Police Offences

Act 1935, s37B(1) in that on 25 March 1994 at Launceston he

used a Holden Commodore Station Sedan motor vehicle,

without the consent of its owner or of some person in

lawful charge of it.

(A) Driving without authority to drive with alcohol in his

body - three months' imprisonment cumulative to other

sentences of imprisonment and disqualified from holding or

obtaining a driver's licence for twelve months cumulative

to the disqualification for five years imposed on the

dangerous driving charge.

(B) Threatening language - one month's imprisonment

cumulative.

(C) Dangerous driving - eighteen months' imprisonment and

disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence

for five years to commence immediately upon the expiration

of periods of disqualification (totalling two years from

his release from prison on 25 March 1994) imposed in a

court of petty sessions at Launceston on 27 October 1993

(upon a conviction for dangerous driving and refusing a

breath analysis).

(D) Driving while disqualified - three months' imprisonment

concurrent with the sentence of three months' imprisonment

imposed on A above and disqualified for twelve months

concurrent with the disqualification on A above.

(E) Motor vehicle stealing - eight months' imprisonment

cumulative and disqualified for twelve months cumulative to

the other disqualifications.

6. The learned magistrate said that in all 2 and a half years' imprisonment was to be served commencing on 25 March 1994 being the date upon which the applicant was taken into custody. The learned magistrate also said that the total effective period of disqualification imposed by his orders was seven years and that on his Worship's calculations the applicant would be disqualified until March 2004. To say that the learned magistrate must have thought that the disqualification would commence in March 1997 but it seems to me on the applicant's record which is before the court that that is erroneous and that the disqualification will start in March 1996 and finish in March 2003.

7. It can be seen from the 33 particulars of dangerous driving that what was being alleged in the complaint was a very bad case of dangerous driving over quite a considerable distance. With the agreement of counsel I caused inquiries to be made and have ascertained that the applicant's plea of guilty to the charge of dangerous driving followed the reading out to him of the charge and of all of the 33 particulars. However, when stating the facts to the learned magistrate the prosecutrix gave a much briefer and less detailed description of the manner of driving. What she said was as follows:

"... police were on mobile patrol when at about 10.50 pm

they noticed a blue Commodore station wagon travelling at

excessive speed North on Invermay Road. The vehicle turned

into Elm Street without indicating, the vehicle's

registration was obtained. The vehicle was followed down

Elm Street where it disobeyed a 'No Entry' sign and then

the vehicle turned right into Ray Street. At this point an

attempt was made to intercept the vehicle. The vehicle

then travelled along Ray Street, left into Forster Street,

turned left into Herbert Street, left into Henty Street

mounting the footpath, then travelled left into Invermay

Road travelling in excess of 140 kph and then turned left

into Forster, left into Herbert and avoided a collision

with another vehicle at the intersection of Bryan and

Herbert Streets. The vehicle failed to give way at the

roundabout at the intersection of Herbert and Burns

Streets, then turned right into Henty mounting the footpath

and hitting a tree. The vehicle then turned right into

Oswald Street, right into Doyle and again right into

Herbert. The vehicle braked heavily at the junction of

Henty and Herbert causing the police vehicle to run into

the back of the offending vehicle. The defendant was the

driver at the time and he jumped out of his vehicle and ran

off on foot. The police gave chase, catching the defendant

over the fence of a nearby property. He'd been knocked

unconscious as a result of the fall and was conveyed to the

LGH for treatment and was then submitted to a breath

analysis. The breath-analysis resulted in a reading of

0.10 of alcohol and 100 millilitres of blood. The

defendant was arrested and conveyed back to Police

Headquarters where he was formally charged. During the

charging procedure the defendant threatened Sergeant

McMahon stating 'I'll break your fucking nose again like I

did the last time, but I'll do a fucking proper job of it

next time.' He was subsequently charged with that offence

also and he was searched and detained. It was subsequently

found that the motor vehicle had been driven by the

defendant had been stolen from outside a residence in

Herbert Street at Invermay and at the time of the offence

the defendant was in fact disqualified from driving and

those are the facts, sir, and he has prior matters."

8. Counsel for the defendant said very little to the magistrate concerning the offence of dangerous driving. He said that "these are a number of very serious offences that have been committed by the defendant and the defendant takes no issue with anything that has been said by the prosecution". It may fairly be presumed that counsel was talking about all of the offences to which the applicant had pleaded guilty. When the learned magistrate pointed out that the applicant had three previous convictions for dangerous driving alone, his counsel said that the applicant "realises this is fourth offence of a very serious nature". Counsel said nothing else to the magistrate which might be relevant to the fifth ground of the motion to review which is:

"5 That the Learned Magistrate erred in law or in fact or

both by proceeding to sentence the applicant for the charge

of dangerous driving in breach of Section 32(1) of the

Traffic Act 1925 upon the finding of fact that:

(a) The applicant was driving on the wrong side of the road

on occasions;

(b) Not slowing at intersections;

(c) Failing to indicate intentions to turn from his line of

travel;

(d) Involved high speed

when such findings of fact were not open to the learned

Magistrate."

9. Before imposing the sentences the learned magistrate had the following to say concerning the charge of dangerous driving:

"... I note the other personal matters put forward by your

counsel and I've certainly considered those. Having

considered them they pale into the background somewhat,

although I still have them in mind as much as I feel able

to but they really pale beside the driving you demonstrated

on this occasion which was, in my view, a bad case of

dangerous driving. It wasn't a momentary lapse so to

speak, but it was an act of driving, wilfully pursued over

a longish distance, a fair distance in a built up area and

it involved high speed, driving on to the wrong side on

occasions and not slowing at intersections and failing to

indicate intentions to turn from your line of travel. It

was a bad case of dangerous driving. Not only that, of

course, but you drove with alcohol in your body, you drive

whilst disqualified and you were driving a stolen motor

vehicle."

10. The first finding of fact complained of by the applicant is that he was driving on the wrong side of the road on occasions. That must be interpreted as a finding that the applicant did so on more than one occasion. When stating the facts to the learned magistrate the prosecutrix did not state that the applicant drove on the wrong side of the road at any time, although she referred to two occasions when the vehicle mounted the footpath, without saying on which side of the street the footpaths were. In the complaint containing the dangerous driving charge particulars 4, 5, 8, 12, 17, 21 and 23 alleged a failure to keep to the left. I cannot be absolutely certain but conclude that the learned magistrate's finding of fact was drawn from the particulars and not from anything said by the prosecutrix.

11. The second finding of fact complained of by the applicant is that his driving involved not slowing at intersections. The prosecutrix did not mention that aspect to the magistrate although she referred to the vehicle failing to give way at one intersection. None of the particulars in the complaint alleged not slowing at intersections but particulars 10, 11, 14, 25, 26 and 28 alleged failures to pass through intersections at speeds which would enable the applicant to give way or stop. If the learned magistrate made his finding on the basis of information he had it could only have been drawn from the particulars.

12. The third finding of fact complained of is that the applicant failed to indicate intentions to turn from his line of travel. The prosecutrix told the learned magistrate of only one occasion when it happened. Eleven particulars referred to it, they being particulars 2, 7, 13, 18, 20, 22, 27, 30, 31, 32 and 33. The only information the learned magistrate had before him which might have led to his conclusion that it happened on occasions, rather on a single occasion, is contained in the particulars.

13. The fourth finding of fact complained of is that the driving involved high speed. Particulars 1, 6, 9, 16, 19 and 24 referred to high speeds or speeds in excess of the legal limit. But the prosecutrix did inform the learned magistrate of the vehicle travelling at an excessive speed on Invermay Road, of it mounting the footpath twice when turning corners and hitting a tree, and of it travelling at a speed in excess of 140 kilometres per hour. A finding of high speed was therefore supported by what the prosecutrix said, quite apart from the content of the particulars in the complaint.

14. I therefore conclude that three of the findings of fact as to the manner of driving were drawn from the particulars and not from anything said by the prosecutrix or by counsel for the applicant. Those findings were not reasonably open to the learned magistrate because he was not entitled to have regard to the particulars without them being adopted by either party.

15. It is clear law that a plea of guilty admits only the essential ingredients of the crime or offence charged. Nash v Haas (1972) Tas SR 1 at 3; Smith v R No 48/1979 at 6. A plea of guilty to dangerous driving does not amount to an admission of all the particulars of dangerous driving contained in the complaint. Dale v Peterson No 64/1972 at 3 and 4. There are two ways in which a prosecutor can have the matters alleged in particulars to a count considered as part of the factual basis for sentencing. One way is to expressly state the facts in open court. The other way is to expressly adopt the particulars, in open court, as part of the prosecution case. But if neither course is followed the sentencing court must ignore the particulars except in so far as it may be necessary to have regard to them to ascertain what legal ingredients of the crime or offence are to be deemed admitted by the plea of guilty.

16. My conclusion therefore is that the learned magistrate erred by finding three facts on the basis of the particulars only. Although the use of the particulars was not made a separate ground of the motion to review, the use of them in this way is of real concern in this case for it raises a suspicion that the learned magistrate may have had regard to all 33 of the particulars as the basis for his finding that it was "a bad case of dangerous driving".

17. The fifth ground of the motion therefore succeeds. The sentence imposed for dangerous driving will be set aside. It becomes unnecessary for me to deal with grounds 1 and 4 which raise manifest excessiveness in that sentence.

18. The third ground of the motion complains that in respect of the offence of threatening a police officer contrary to the Police Offences Act 1935, s34B(1)(b) the learned magistrate erred by failing to take into account, sufficiently or at all, the matters in mitigation put to him by counsel for the applicant. This ground must fail as nothing was said by the learned magistrate which supports it. The specific error complained of in the ground has not been established.

19. The second ground of the motion complains that the learned magistrate erred in imposing a manifestly excessive sentence of one month's imprisonment for the offence of threatening a police officer contrary to the Police Offences Act 1935, s34B(1)(b). The facts of the offence upon which the learned magistrate had to sentence were that when the applicant was being charged at Launceston Police Headquarters for the other offences he threatened Sergeant McMahon by saying "I'll break your fucking nose again like I did last time, but I'll do a fucking proper job of it next time". The prosecutrix said nothing else about the circumstances of the offence. It would have been of considerable assistance to the court to know whether the applicant had previously assaulted Sergeant McMahon, whether any and if so what animosity existed between the applicant and the Sergeant and what if anything occurred shortly prior to the making of the threat which might have influenced its making. Instead the magistrate was left completely uninformed about any background to the threat.

20. Before sentencing the applicant for all of the offences, the learned magistrate referred to the applicant's "atrocious" record. When sentencing the applicant for threatening a police officer the learned magistrate said:

"You've done that in the past, there are two convictions at

least for that, and you've shown violence to police, you've

been convicted of assault police and so forth, you are

sentenced to a term of one month's imprisonment

cumulative".

21. The applicant was aged 22 years at the time of both the offences and the imposition of the sentences. In the previous 5 and a half years he had been convicted of obstructing police (1), resisting arrest (3), assaulting police (3), threatening language (2), abusive language (1), assault (8), false name (2), drunk and disorderly (6), drunk and incapable (1), injuring property (1), damaging property (2), destroying property (1), trespass (1), burglary (6), stealing (9), motor vehicle stealing (8), unlawful possession (1), receiving (1), uttering (1), reputed thief in area for unlawful purpose (1), false pretences (1), exceeding .05 (3), refusing breathalyser (1), driving while disqualified (6), negligent driving (1), dangerous driving (3), failing to appear (3) and failing to pay fines (1). He had been sentenced to many terms of imprisonment before, some of them being cumulative and some concurrent. For each of the convictions for assaulting police suspended imprisonment had been imposed. For one of the threatening language convictions a community service order was made and for the other he was sentenced to seven days' imprisonment. For the abusive language conviction he had been sentenced to seven days' imprisonment.

22. Under the Police Offences Act 1935, s34B(1)(b) the prescribed penalty for threatening language is $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding twelve months. The sentence of one month's imprisonment is well within that limit.

23. The prosecutrix told the magistrate that the applicant suffered a fall when being chased by the police at the conclusion of the dangerous driving episode. As a result of the fall he was knocked unconscious. He was taken to hospital for treatment, submitted to a breath analysis which resulted in a reading of .1 gram of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood and was then arrested and conveyed to Launceston Police Headquarters. During the course of being charged he threatened Sergeant McMahon. In the course of the plea in mitigation counsel for the applicant said that the applicant had suffered a concussive injury which caused some retrograde amnesia and resulted in the applicant's recollection of the events being unclear and certainly so as to why he had committed the offences. Notwithstanding the claimed loss of memory counsel asserted that "there is no doubt the defendant was disinhibited at the time as a result of consuming some alcohol and because of the concussive injury. Once again that doesn't explain his outburst at Sergeant McMahon. He has known Sergeant McMahon for a number of years because he was a street kid, what has colloquially been called a 'street kid' for a number of years and dealt with Mr McMahon in his licensing duties". The learned magistrate did not comment on that submission but I would expect that it had little if any influence on the sentence imposed. The applicant was not entitled to leniency because of his consumption of alcohol particularly having regard to his atrocious record. The suggestion that a concussive injury had resulted in disinhibition which in turn was a cause of the threatening language offence was deserving of scant regard also.

24. Although I think a very short period of imprisonment was justified having particular regard to the applicant's record I have concluded, after some initial misgivings, that the sentence of 1 month's imprisonment for threatening language was manifestly excessive. I come to this conclusion because nothing was put before the learned magistrate by the prosecutrix which should have led his Worship to conclude that it was a bad case or that the threat was anything other than an empty threat by a person affected by alcohol. Imprisonment for 1 month for words spoken in the form of a threat to a police officer is in my view manifestly excessive, notwithstanding an extensive record, unless the occasion is shown to be a serious one and to warrant significant imprisonment. I have concluded that one week's imprisonment was deserved but one month's imprisonment was manifestly excessive, after some initial concerns that I am indulging only in tinkering with the sentence.

25. There is no need for me to deal with the other grounds of the motion to review, they being grounds 6 and 7. They complain that the cumulative effect of the imprisonment imposed and of the orders disqualifying the applicant from driving were manifestly excessive. Because I will be setting aside the lengthy term of imprisonment and disqualification imposed on the dangerous driving charge, those grounds no longer have application.

26. It is appropriate that I impose sentences for dangerous driving and threatening language without remitting the case to a court of petty sessions. The material which was before the learned magistrate is before me. Counsel for the respondent urged that I should remit the case to another magistrate, and I think he pressed for that course so that a much stronger case could be asserted against the applicant this time. However, I think it would be unfair to the applicant to allow the prosecution the opportunity of presenting a stronger case.

27. When considering the appropriate sentence for dangerous driving I have particular regard to the fact that this is the applicant's fourth conviction for the offence in a three year period. On the previous three occasions he was sentenced to imprisonment but seemingly imprisonment has had no deterrent effect on him. On this occasion he committed the offence on the very day he was released from serving a six month sentence for dangerous driving. That offence was committed by him shortly after his release from an earlier prison term. Less than two years ago he was sentenced to imprisonment for what was effectively nine months for dangerous driving committed only nine days after being released from prison. His record is atrocious. Although on the facts presented to the learned magistrate the case cannot be said to be in the worst category of dangerous driving cases, it was still a bad case which included driving at a speed in excess of 140 kilometres per hour on one of the main roads of the City of Launceston. I will not repeat the other circumstances of the offence as related to the learned magistrate. In my view the appropriate sentence is imprisonment for a term of one year cumulative to the other sentences of imprisonment and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of five years cumulative upon the disqualification imposed on count 1 in the same complaint. The applicant has proved a real menace to society in the way he drives motor vehicles and for the protection of society and by way of punishment a very long period of disqualification is required.

28. In determining the above sentence for the offence of dangerous driving I have had regard to the plea in mitigation made by the applicant's counsel to the learned magistrate and to the so called totality principle which applies when sentences are imposed for multiple offences.

29. Counsel for the applicant submitted that when imposing a sentence for dangerous driving a court may not have regard to the fact that the manner of driving was deliberate, for to do so would be to sentence the person charged for the offence of reckless driving. Reference was made to Wise v R (1965) Tas SR 196 at 201 and 207 and to R v De Simoni [1981] HCA 31; (1981) 147 CLR 383 at 394. I reject the submission. The court may not sentence the applicant as if he had been convicted of reckless driving but there is no reason why I should not take into account when sentencing him for dangerous driving that the general manner of his driving was deliberate. Indeed it would be a rare case where a person is convicted of dangerous driving arising out of an inadvertent manner of driving. I do recall one such case many years ago in which a driver inadvertently failed to give way to his right and was convicted by a jury of driving in a manner dangerous to the public.

30. Counsel for the applicant directed my attention to Sentencing in Tasmania by Warner (1991 Federation Press) where at 316-318 it is said that between 1980 and 1989 the longest term of imprisonment imposed for the offence of dangerous driving was nine months. Counsel argued that I should have regard to the range of sentences imposed by courts during that period of time. The submission loses much of its force when regard is had to the fact that until 1987 the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed for dangerous driving was two years. In 1987 s32(1) was amended to provide that for a second or subsequent offence imprisonment for a term not exceeding four years could be imposed. I add that it is my view that if the applicant was before the court for dangerous driving only, the manner of his driving and his record would justify a sentence of imprisonment for at least fifteen months but having regard to the so called totality principle, I have determined that the sentence will be one of twelve months. Such a term is far below the statutory maximum.

31. For threatening a police officer the applicant will be sentenced to one week's imprisonment.

32. Because some of the sentences imposed by the court of petty sessions were expressed to be cumulative upon other sentences and I propose to set aside some sentences, it is appropriate that all sentences the subject of the motion to review be set aside and that new sentences be reimposed in appropriate terms. The following orders will be made:

1 That all sentences imposed by a court of petty sessions

at Launceston on 12 April 1994 on counts 1, 2 and 4 in

complaint 16871/1994 and on counts 1 and 3 in complaint

45315/1994 are set aside.

2 For the offence of driving without authority to drive

with alcohol in his blood being count 1 on complaint

16871/1994 the applicant is sentenced to three months'

imprisonment to commence on 25 March 1994 and he is

disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence

for a period of twelve months commencing at the expiration

of any period of disqualification imposed upon him in a

court of petty sessions at Launceston on 27 October 1993.

3 For the offence of threatening a police officer being

count 2 on complaint 16871/1994 the applicant is sentenced

to imprisonment for seven days to commence on 25 March

4 For the offence of dangerous driving being count 4 on

complaint 16871/1994 the applicant is sentenced to

imprisonment for twelve months cumulative upon the sentence

imposed on count 1 and he is disqualified for obtaining or

holding a driver's licence for a period of five years

cumulative upon the period of disqualification imposed on

count 1.

5 For the offence of driving while disqualified being count

1 on complaint 45315/1994 the applicant is sentenced to

imprisonment for three months commencing on 25 March 1994

and he is disqualified for obtaining or holding a driver's

licence for a period of twelve months commencing at the

expiration of any period of disqualification imposed upon

him in a court of petty sessions at Launceston on 27

October 1993.

6 For the offence of motor vehicle stealing being count 3

on complaint 45315/1994 the applicant is sentenced to

imprisonment for eight months cumulative upon the sentences

of imprisonment imposed on him on counts 1 and 4 in

complaint 16871/1994 and he is disqualified for obtaining

or holding a driver's licence for a period of twelve months

cumulative upon the period of five years' disqualification

imposed upon him on count 4 in complaint 16871/1994.