Nassou & Rassach (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 858 (27 November 2025)

(a) Education, both current and future;

(b) Religious and cultural upbringing;

(c) Health;

(d) Name; and

(e) Changes to living arrangements.

1. The father be restrained and an injunction granted restraining him from:

(a) Attempting to remove either of the children from the mother's care; and/or

(b) Attending at any school or extracurricular activity attended by either of the children;

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer serve a copy of these orders upon the father by way of post and email.
2. Upon compliance with paragraph 4 herein, the appointment of the Independent Children's Lawyer be discharged.
3. All extant applications be dismissed as finalised.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These reasons were delivered ex tempore and have been settled from the transcript. Grammatical errors have been corrected, citations have been added and amendments have been made to make the orally delivered reasons clearer and easier to read.

1. The application presently before the court is the mother's application for parenting orders in relation to the children X, who was born in 2016 and is aged almost nine, and Y, who was born in 2019 and is aged six.
2. The proceedings have been extremely lengthy and protracted, having been commenced by an Initiating Application filed by the mother on 3 February 2020, nearly six years ago. They have been on foot for almost the entirety of Y's life.
3. Although the proceedings, when initiated, related to financial matters only, parenting matters were added by the father's Response to an Initiating Application filed on 11 March 2020. Final orders were made by consent resolving the financial aspect of the proceedings on 26 April 2022.
4. The matter was listed for a contested hearing for a period of five days to commence today.
5. On 22 October 2025, the father filed a Notice of Discontinuance. At a mention on 11 November 2025, his solicitor confirmed that he no longer pursued any final orders. That solicitor was excused from further participation in the proceedings. The father did not appear today. It is presently 35 minutes past the scheduled commencement time for this hearing.
6. As a consequence, pursuant to rules 10.27 and 15.19 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), and having regard to the overarching purpose in section 95 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") and the principles espoused by section 102NE of the Act, the mother's application proceeded on an undefended basis. I am satisfied that the father had the opportunity to be heard and declined to exercise that opportunity.
7. The mother's evidence was not challenged. It is not inherently improbable or implausible,[1] and as a consequence, I accept it.
8. The court was assisted by a Family Report prepared by Ms B, the contents of which were also unchallenged.
9. By way of background, the mother, MS NASSOU, was born in 1990 and is aged 35. The father, MR RASSACH, was born in 1988, and is aged 37. The parties married in 2014 and commenced cohabitation at that time. They separated on 24 April 2019, prior to Y's birth. The mother is engaged full-time in home duties.
10. The children have lived with the mother for the entirety of their lives. Early in the proceedings, orders were made providing for them to spend supervised time with the father. Pursuant to orders made on 14 December 2021, the children spend no time with the father. An application made by the father on 25 July 2023 seeking to reinstate time between himself and the children was unsuccessful, and he has not spent any time with the children since December 2021, being a period of almost four years.
11. The mother seeks, in summary, that the children live with her, that she have sole parental responsibility and decision-making authority with respect to major long-term issues concerning the children, and that there be injunctions restraining the father from removing the children from her care and attending the children's schools.
12. Further injunctions originally sought by her covering matters dealt with by an existing family violence order were not pressed in light of subsection 114AB(2) of the Act.
13. The mother's application was supported in its entirety by the Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL").

1. As to the relevant legal principles, I am required by section 60CA of the Act to have regard to the children's best interests as the paramount consideration. I am guided in my determination by the objects in section 60B. In determining the children's best interests, I have regard to the factors set out in section 60CC of the Act. The factors set out in subsection 60CC(2) which are most relevant to the present matter are as follows.

(a) What arrangements would promote the safety, including safety from being subjected or exposed to family violence, abuse or neglect or other harm of the children and each person who has care of the children

1. When considering those matters, I am required to have regard to:

(a) any history of family violence abuse or neglect involving the children or a person caring for them; and

(b) any family violence order that applies or has applied to the children or a member of their family.[2]

1. I am also required by section 60CG of the Act to ensure that any orders made do not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.
2. The word "safety" is not defined in the Act. It is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "the state of being protected from or guarded against hurt or injury and freedom from danger."
3. In Oyama & Oyama,[3] Gill J held that safety in this context is a term that is wired in nature and bounded only by its object being to keep children and those who care for them from harm, and that should not be taken to have a fixed content or standard. The paragraph requires the court to consider the risk of harm that accompanies the relationship in whatever form it may take, and does not contemplate consideration of the benefits of a relationship where such relationship is not safe.
4. In Denton & Denton (No 3),[4] Altobelli J expressed the view that safety is a state in which hazards or conditions leading to physical, psychological or material harm are controlled in order to preserve the health and well-being of an individual and that it is not the complete elimination of risk of harm but rather making such orders affords the child the most optimal protection from harm.
5. In Melounis & Melounis (No 4),[5] Altobelli J again held that to promote safety for the purposes of subsection 60CC(2)(a) means "to advance the interests of and move to a stronger or more prominent position the safety (i.e. to be free from hurt, damage, harm or danger) of children and those who care for them" and that the statutory requirement to promote safety involves advancing a positive outcome which would necessarily include protection from harm but would not be limited to this.
6. I respectfully adopt these definitions.
7. The mother's evidence is a very serious family violence inflicted on her by the father, including sexual, physical, emotional and verbal abuse and controlling behaviour, as well as exposure of X to family violence and subjection of X to physical and verbal abuse.
8. There was an intervention order made in mid-2021, which remains in force. The mother is the protected person and the father the respondent.
9. The evidence before the court suggests that when the children spent time with the father earlier in the proceedings, the mother struggled to cope with the necessary interactions with him. The mother's evidence is that she finds any contact with the father highly distressing and that she felt anxious, fearful, and intimidated during her interactions with him when he was spending time with the children.
10. To Ms B, the mother expressed concern about the impact on her, which she anticipated would include distress and becoming dysregulated, if she was required to be involved in a process of reconnection between the father and the children.
11. The mother relies on Re Andrew[6] and other authorities[7] with respect to the relevance of the impact on the primary caregiver and their parenting to determination of a child's best interests.

(c) The developmental, psychological, emotional, and cultural needs of the child

1. In this case, both children have extensive special needs, which were described by Ms B as "significantly challenging." X has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD") with a persistent demand avoidance profile, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), hypermobility, intermittent faecal incontinence, and severe nosebleeds. Y has been diagnosed with ASD, ADHD, and childhood apraxia of speech. Both children are in receipt of National Disability Insurance Scheme ("NDIS") support. They attend on psychologists, occupational therapists, and other health and allied health providers.
2. Ms B reported that, importantly, when experiencing emotional overwhelm, X and Y require carers who are emotionally consistent and who are less likely to punish, but seek to understand the reasons for the behaviours they are exhibiting. Failure to attune to X and Y's individual needs will only escalate their behaviours and lead to worse outcomes for them.
3. Ms B further reported that X and Y remained at a precarious stage of their development and required extensive intervention to help support their behavioural and emotional needs. Both children are presently home schooled by the mother as a result of their significant needs and issues associated with the ability of their previous school to meet those needs.

(d) The capacity of each person who is or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional, and cultural needs.

1. The mother has been diagnosed with ASD, ADHD, and complex post-traumatic stress disorder. She receives NDIS support and has therapy with a clinical psychologist.
2. Prior to his withdrawal, the father's position, as relayed to Ms B, involved the children remaining in the primary care of the mother. I infer from this, as submitted on behalf of the ICL, that he did not seriously dispute her capacity to provide for them.
3. The mother has engaged and continues to engage with significant support services for the children in relation to which there is extensive evidence before the court.
4. Although some concerns have previously been raised by child welfare, particularly surrounding a crisis in September 2024 where X had been hospitalised in the context of repeated aggressive behaviours, X's therapist reported that the mother is attuned to the children and knows how to help them regulate. She reported that the mother can handle X's meltdowns, which she reported as being very significant and difficult to manage, and that the mother was responsive to suggestions as to his care.
5. A section 91B report produced by child welfare and released on 13 February 2025 ultimately concluded that the children were safe in the care of the mother.
6. Paragraphs 76 and 77 of the family report dated 30 June 2025 provide as follows:
   1. Given these high emotional, behavioural and social demands, it is understandable that Ms [Nassou] has sought to surround herself with a community who are not only understanding of her children's needs but support her in providing similar rules, boundaries and structures. Whilst concerns were raised about Ms [Nassou] seeking services which colluded with her opinion, from the writer's perspective, it could also be explained by Ms [Nassou] seeking advice from people who were understanding of her children's situation and who were likely to provide strategies which were consistent with her care of the children.
   2. Importantly based on Ms [C's] descriptions, it appeared that Ms [Nassou] was open to criticisms of her parenting and was willing to reflect and adapt her parenting practices if this was in the best interests of the children. Similarly, Ms [Nassou] herself acknowledged that whilst she may hold differing views about Mr [Rassach's] role in the children's lives, she was willing to accept any recommendation if this was considerate of the children's needs and ensured their optimum wellbeing. As such, the writer perceived that whilst Ms [Nassou] may seek to align herself with services which supported her perspective, she was also receptive to feedback and willing to alter her care practices if this was required.
7. Ms B concluded that although X and Y's behaviours remained extremely variable, it was apparent that the mother was aware of their individual requirements and had sought the supports needed to prioritise the children's optimum development.
8. No significant concerns were raised in the observation between the mother and the children, as reported by Ms B.
9. There are concerns raised in the material before the court as to the extent of the father's insight into the children's significant needs and his willingness and ability to become educated about how best to support them. He acknowledged to Ms B that he had not actively engaged with the children's therapist, despite having had the opportunity to do so. Ms B questioned his commitment to the children's development, even prior to his withdrawal from these proceedings. She reflected that he would need to display an ongoing commitment to understanding X and Y's developmental needs and the strategies required to manage their behaviours, which he has not done.
10. The mother's evidence is also of the father having had limited tolerance towards X prior to separation, particularly when he experienced meltdowns, and the father having taken a punitive and abusive approach to dealing with X's behaviour.

(e) The benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so.

1. The children have spent no time with the father for over four years. In Y's case, this is most of his life. There is no existing relationship between them.
2. In circumstances where the father is not pursuing any time with the children, there is little the court could do to create or facilitate a relationship with him. In any event, there are very real concerns as to whether this could occur safely.
3. When the children spent supervised time with the father during the early stages of the proceedings, their behaviour was adversely affected, and this was observed by their treaters as well as others. The mother's evidence is of very severe and concerning behaviour on the part of X in particular, following time with the father.
4. The father has a younger child, D, who is the children's half-brother. Whilst there would likely be a benefit to the children of establishing a sibling relationship with D, this is unfortunately not a realistic possibility in the present circumstances.

1. As to the injunction sought by the mother, section 68B of the Act provides that the court may make such an order, or grant such an injunction as it considers appropriate for the welfare of the children. The power expressly includes, but is not limited to, a number of the injunctions of the type sought by the mother.
2. The injunctions sought are child-focused and protective, and aligned with the matters already discussed.

1. The ICL has not met with the children and given them an opportunity to express their views, as is ordinarily required by subsection 68LA(5A). Subsection 68LA(5B)(c) provides that the ICL is not required to perform that duty, if there are exceptional circumstances that justify not performing the duty.
2. In this case, the ICL formed a view that there were exceptional circumstances, in that meeting with the children could potentially cause them harm. The Family Report indicates that the children refused to be interviewed by Ms B, either separately or together, and that they became increasingly distressed at the prospect of separating from the mother for that purpose.
3. As a consequence, Ms B, in her professional judgment, determined not to meet with them.
4. The report also records that X's therapist, who also routinely engages jointly with Y and his therapist, as having reported that it was very tricky to engage the children in conversations, and that any time the father was raised, X would shut down and struggled to manage the discussion.
5. I am satisfied that these circumstances, in light of the children's significant special needs, constitute exceptional circumstances within the meaning of subsection 68LA(5B)(c).

1. Having regard to all of these considerations, I am satisfied that the orders and injunctions proposed by the mother, and supported by the ICL, are in the children's best interests, or appropriate for their welfare as applicable, and orders will be made as sought by the mother.

I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Parker.

[1] Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553; Scott & Scott [1994] FamCA 12; (1994) FLC 92-457; Bain & Bain (Deceased) [2017] FamCAFC 80; (2017) FLC 93-772.

[2] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60CC(2A).

[3] [2024] FedCFamC1F 738.

[4] [ 2024] FedCFamC1F 476.

[5] [2024] FedCFamC1F 778.

[6] [1996] FamCA 43; (1996) FLC 96-692.

[7] Modlin & Anstead and Anor [2013] FamCA 955; Perton & Hungerford [2018] FamCA 583. See also A & A [1998] FamCA 25; (1998) FLC 92-800.