Namiq & Asih [2025] FedCFamC1F 878 (28 November 2025)

1. The Applicant and Respondent have joint decision-making responsibility for the major long-term issues (as that expression is defined in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)) for the child, X, born in 2018.

1. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the particulars of the obligations these Orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these Orders and details of who can assist parties to adjust to and comply with an Order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached and these particulars are included in these Orders.

1. There is no Court known by the name "Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia".
2. The design of the seal affixed to this order issued by the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1) has been determined by the Attorney-General pursuant to the undated Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Seal) Determination 2021 signed by the Attorney-General.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Namiq & Asih has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. I have today an application which was commenced in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) by way of Initiating Application filed 18 August 2025 by the applicant, seeking an order pursuant to s 60G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") to grant him leave to commence proceedings for the adoption by him of the child, X, who was born in 2018.
2. By order made 17 October 2025, the proceedings were transferred to this Court.
3. The evidence establishes that X's biological father died in 2019, at which time X was an infant. The evidence also clearly establishes that the applicant has known X since about 2020, and that the applicant and the respondent, who is X's biological mother, have been a family unit since about November 2021, when they all started living together. Currently, their family comprises both of them, and X, and their biological child, B, who was born in 2023. Their family is soon to have the addition of another child, who will be X's second sibling, and add to the family in which he has lived.
4. By way of broad summary, the evidence establishes that there are no ongoing cases in relation to X's parenting arrangements in any other jurisdiction. There are no other orders relating to family or domestic violence. There is no suggestion, in the material, that X has ever been exposed to family violence or abuse of any kind. That is a credit, of course, to those who have had responsibility for his care to date. There is no evidence to suggest that there are any protection orders in force as between the applicant and respondent, and each of them assert that there are no such orders. Consequently, in this case, there is no allegation, and certainly no evidence, to suggest that risk to X is an issue.
5. The relevant legal principles require some brief discussion.
6. Section 92 of the Adoption Act 2009 (Qld) provides that a person may apply to the Chief Executive to arrange an adoption by that person of a child, only if a number of matters are satisfied. Included within those matters are that the child, the subject of the application, is at least five years of age and has not turned 17 years of age. In this case, that circumstance is clearly satisfied.
7. An additional matter prescribed by s 92, and in particular, in subparagraph 1(d) of that section, is that a person must have been granted leave, pursuant to the Act. Hence, the application with which I am now dealing.
8. In determining whether to grant leave for parties to commence adoption proceedings, this Court must be satisfied of a number of things. One is that the proceedings are by a prescribed adopting parent, as that term is defined. In this case, that condition is satisfied. This Court must also consider whether granting leave will be in X's best interests, having regard to the effect of a number of sections prescribed: namely, ss 60F4(a), 60HA3(a), 61E, and 65J of the Act, where those are applicable in any particular case.
9. The decision facing the Court this morning is, of course, one that differs from the decision facing the Court charged with the obligation to make a decision about whether to permit adoption of X or not.
10. The granting of leave to commence proceedings for adoption does not have the consequences outlined in the sections particularised in s 60G of the Act; only an order for adoption, if made by an appropriate State Court, has that effect.
11. However, given that s 208 of the Adoption Act 2009 (Qld) is to the effect that the Court may make a final adoption order under that Act only if satisfied of a number of matters, including that an order for adoption by a step-parent would better promote the child's wellbeing and best interests than an order under the Act, any Court order or no order at all, it is, I think, apparent that this Court ought not make an order granting leave to permit proceedings in a State Court to commence if such proceedings were, for example, doomed to fail because of the absence of evidence addressing the mandatory legislative requirements.
12. I record my view here that, in this case, I am easily satisfied that the mandatory legislative prerequisites are established.
13. In determining, as I must, under s 60G(2) of the Act, whether granting leave to commence proceedings for adoption is in X's best interests, I must give consideration to the familiar best interest considerations prescribed by s 60CC of the Act.
14. However, as is made clear by authorities such as Banks & Banks[1], any failure to mention specifically any particular consideration in these Reasons delivered this morning orally does not mean that such considerations have not been the subject of my consideration, determination and deliberations during my assessment of the evidence relied on in the proceedings - being evidence I have had the opportunity to consider before coming into court this morning.
15. As I noted when the proceedings commenced, I have had the opportunity to read all of the material relied upon by both the applicant and the respondent prior to commencing the hearing; I take into account and accept the evidence that each of the applicant and respondent have given in support of their joint decision to seek this Court's leave to commence adoption proceedings relating to X.
16. It is, I think, sufficient to record that, on the evidence before me, I am easily satisfied that the applicant has discharged all of the responsibilities of parenting X from the time that he has been present in his life. A conclusion other than that it is highly likely that, from X's perspective (particularly given his age at the time of his biological father's death in 2019), the applicant is very much his father figure would be perverse.
17. It would be difficult to think anything other than that X has a very close and loving relationship with the applicant; I also accept the applicant's evidence that he considers X to be his own child; I accept the evidence given by both the applicant and the respondent that X and B regard each other as the siblings that they are.
18. There could be no doubt, on the material before me, that, together, the applicant and respondent have discharged all of the obligations associated with parenting X.
19. The applicant has clearly, on the evidence, contributed to not only the practical tasks involved in parenting any child, but also to discharging the financial obligations that are associated with being a parent to a child. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that he has not carried out and discharged such obligations in anything but a caring and loving manner. I accept entirely, as is evidenced by the fact of this application, that he wishes to take a further step to, in essence, demonstrate his desire to continue to discharge such obligations for X into the future. He is clearly supported in that desire by X's mother. The fact of the application itself is, in my view, a clear manifestation of an appreciation by the applicant of what it will mean, in terms of his responsibility on an ongoing basis to X, should an order for adoption ultimately be made by the Court charged with the responsibility for the same.
20. On the evidence, a conclusion that is strongly open to me - and one which I make - is that it is much more likely than not that X will gain significant emotional benefit if, after proper consideration by the relevant State authorities, an adoption order is ultimately made.
21. Whilst in one sense, given X's age and his associated capacity to appreciate matters such as formal legalities, it may not mean much to him, there is no doubt, it seems to me, that, as he grows older, he too will come to appreciate further the importance of the step that his mother and the applicant have sought to start today by bringing this application.
22. As is apparent, the material easily persuades that the commencement of proceedings to seek that a Court make an order for X's adoption by the applicant is something which is in X's best interests.
23. For those reasons, then, I will make an order that pursuant to s 60G(2) of the Act, leave is granted for the applicant to commence proceedings for the adoption by the applicant of X, who was born in 2018.

1. The second aspect of the application before the Court this morning is one in which the applicant and respondent join to seek that the Court make an order by consent in relation to the issue of joint decision making for the major long term issues relating to X.
2. Section 64B(3) provides that a parenting order may deal with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about the major long-term issues in relation to a child.
3. Section 61D(3) of the Act provides that a parenting order which deals with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues relating to a child may provide for joint or sole decision-making in relation to all or specified major long-term issues. The phrase "major long-term issues" is, of course, the subject of specific definition in the Act itself.
4. Section 61DAA of the Act provides that, if a parenting order provides for joint decision-making in relation to all or specified major long-term issues in relation to a child, the order requires the persons who are the subject of it to consult each other and to make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision about whatever the issue is.
5. The evidence here establishes that coming to joint decisions is exactly what the applicant and the respondent have been doing, no doubt, over the course of their relationship. Their engagement manifests a commitment to each other and suggests that they will continue to seek to make joint decisions about major long-term issues in relation to all of the children that are in their care or who soon will be.
6. I am easily satisfied, to the extent that it is necessary to record this, given the parties' consent to the order, that it is in X's best interests that I make an order, by consent, that the applicant and respondent have joint decision-making responsibility for the major long-term issues relating to him.

I certify that the preceding twenty-nine (29) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hogan.

[1] [2015] FamCAFC 36; (2015) FLC 93-637.