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austlii:cth/RRTA/1999/155
defendant. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant a protection visa.
The Refugee Review Tribunal rejected a protection visa application from a Chinese citizen who claimed he would be persecuted if returned to China due to his involvement in pro-democracy activities in 1989 and 1995. The Tribunal found that the applicant's claims were too vague and lacked important details—such as the name of the organisation he claimed to belong to, what exactly he did, and how the authorities discovered his activities. The applicant also failed to attend a hearing despite being invited. Additionally, the Tribunal noted inconsistencies in his story: there was a long gap between his claimed political activity and his expulsion from work, he was able to get a passport from Chinese authorities, and he worked in a senior job for over a year before leaving China. These factors suggested he was not of serious adverse interest to the Chinese authorities. Because the applicant did not provide enough evidence to support his claims, the Tribunal could not be satisfied that he had a genuine and well-founded fear of persecution, and his application was refused.
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The applicant's claims are so general and lacking in detail that the Tribunal is unable to establish the relevant facts. He claims to have been a member of a pro-democracy organisation but has not provided important details, eg the name of the organisation, when he joined it, his role and activities as a member of it, and how long his involvement with it was. He claims to have done what he could to support the students in spring 1989 but similarly has not given information as to what he had actually done. Thus, I consider his claimed involvement in pro-democracy activities in 1989 to be no more than an unsupported assertion.
He claims that in 1995 he and his friends printed political materials 'asking for the correct verdict for the June 4th incident'. Again, apart from claiming adverse consequences to himself (interrogation, administrative punishment, and three-week detention), he has not provided details as to the role he played in the printing of such materials, nor of how his involvement in such activity came to be known to the authorities, and when those claimed adverse consequences took place. He further claims that he was expelled from the factory because of what he did in 1995. This appears odd; it is difficult to conclude that his activity in 1995 would result in his expulsion some months later, given that he appears to have already been punished for such activity and in view of the absence of any other information which might link it to his claimed expulsion.
He claims that his alleged activities in 1989 and 1995 are noted in his personal file. Even granting this to be the case, it appears that the authorities do not regard him as a political dissident or counter-revolutionary as he claims. If this were the case, it is odd that they have let him retain his job in the period that they have. Advice from DFAT has it that being able to retain one's employment is an indication that one is not of adverse interest to the authorities: see Refugee Determination Country Profile on China, June 1994, pp28-29. And as pointed out earlier, the lapse of almost a year between his claimed 1995 involvement in the printing of political material and his claimed expulsion from the factory seriously throws into doubt the link that he claims exists between the two events.
Viewed on the whole, his evidence does not disclose that he was the subject of any serious ongoing adverse interest by the authorities in a significant period prior to his departure, that is, between his claimed expulsion and his departure from China more than a year later in 1997. This conclusion finds further support in his own evidence to the effect that he was able to find employment in an ostensibly senior role ('manager') with a private firm, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary in his evidence, I find that he was not interfered with in any way by the authorities since the claimed expulsion. Thus, his claimed experiences in China, even if accepted as truthful, do not appear on the whole to disclose a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The applicant claims that he has continued and continues to be politically active in anti-CCP activities in Australia; but as before, he has not provided any details. He has also hinted at having been involved in religious activities, but there is absolutely nothing in his evidence to support this. He has been put on notice by the Tribunal that it is unable to make a favourable decision on the information before it but has not provided any further information in support of his claims despite ample opportunity to do so. Nor has he given the Tribunal the opportunity to explore aspects of his claims with him. A number of relevant questions are therefore left unanswered.
In view of all the above, I am not satisfied, on the evidence before me, that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the Convention.
Having considered the evidence as a whole, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Therefore the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2) of the Act for a protection visa.
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant a protection visa.
This definition has been considered by the High Court in Chan Yee Kin v MIEA [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379, Applicant A & Anor v MIEA and Anor (1997) 142 ALR 331 at 354 and MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 144 ALR 567 at 575-6, and by the Federal Court in a number of cases, notably Ram v MIEA & Anor [1995] FCA 1333; (1995) 57 FCR 565. These cases have established the following general principles.
The mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is "well-founded" or that it is for the reason claimed. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out: MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 144 ALR 567 at 596. Although the concept of onus of proof is not appropriate to administrative inquiries and decision-making (Yao-Jing Li v MIMA [1997] FCA 289; (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288), the relevant facts of the individual case will have to be supplied by the applicant himself or herself, in as much detail as is necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant's case for him or her: Prasad v MIEA [1985] FCA 47; (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70; Luu & Anor v Renevier [1989] FCA 518; (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 45. Nor is the Tribunal required to accept uncritically any and all the allegations made by an
(1989) 169 CLR 379
(1997) 142 ALR 331
(1997) 144 ALR 567
(1995) 57 FCR 565
(1997) 74 FCR 275
(1985) 6 FCR 155
(1989) 91 ALR 39
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant a protection visa.