N93/01713 [1994] RRTA 1689 (17 August 1994)

The Applicant, who is a Burmese national aged 30 years, entered Australia on 10 September 1986 as a visitor and, according to the Department's movements records, on entry was granted an entry permit valid for three months. On 7 January 1987 the Applicant was granted a further entry permit valid for one month. At the expiration of that entry permit the Applicant remained in Australia without the grant of any further entry permit and therefore since on or about 8 February 1987 has remained in Australia as an illegal entrant: see s.14 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (as amended) (the Act). The Applicant was detained as a suspected illegal entrant on 3 March 1993 and released on 25 March 1993 following his application for refugee status. The Applicant married an Australian citizen on 27 March 1994.

The application to the Tribunal is made pursuant to s.166BB of the Act which provides that if a valid application is made under Section 166BA for review of an RRT-reviewable decision, the Tribunal must review the decision. An "RRT-reviewable decision" is defined by s.166B(1) of the Act to include, subject to an exception which is not relevant to the present case, a decision made before 1 September 1994 that a non-citizen is not a refugee under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 (the Convention) as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (the Protocol).

It is apparent from the background circumstances that the application satisfies the requirements of s.166BAA and that therefore a valid application for review of an RRT-reviewable decision is taken to have been made under s.166BA.

Section 22AA of the Act provides that "If the Minister is satisfied that a person is a refugee, the Minister may determine, in writing, that the person is a refugee." "Refugee" is defined by the Act to have "the same meaning as it has in Article 1 of the Refugees Convention or in that Article as amended by the Refugees Protocol": see s.4(1) of the Act. The same subsection of the Act defines "Refugees Convention" and "Refugees Protocol" as, respectively, "the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951" and "the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967".

Insofar as relevant to the present matter, Article 1 A (2) of the Convention, as amended by the Protocol, provides that a refugee is any person who:

"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

This definition of a refugee contains various elements.

Firstly, the definition includes only those persons who are outside their country of nationality or, where the applicant is a stateless person, country of former habitual residence.

Secondly, an applicant must have a "well-founded fear" of being persecuted. The term "well-founded fear" was the subject of comment in Chan Yee Kin v. The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989-1990) 169 CLR 379 (Chan's case). It was observed that the term contains both a subjective and an objective requirement. "Fear" concerns the applicant's state of mind, but this term is qualified by the adjectival expression "well-founded" which requires a sufficient foundation for that fear (at 396).

The Court in Chan's case held that a fear of persecution is well-founded if there "is a real chance that the refugee will be persecuted if he returns to his country of nationality" (at 389; see also 398, 407, and 429). It was observed that the expression "'a real chance' ... clearly conveys the notion of a substantial, as distinct from a remote chance, of persecution occurring ..." (at 389) and though it "does not weigh the prospects of persecution ... it discounts what is remote or insubstantial" (at 407). Therefore, a real chance of persecution may exist notwithstanding that there is less than a 50 per cent chance of persecution occurring (at 398).

Whether an applicant has a fear of persecution and whether that fear is well-founded, must be determined upon the facts as they exist at the date when a determination is required. However, the circumstances in which an applicant has left his or her country of nationality remain relevant and these are ordinarily the starting point in ascertaining the applicant's present status. (See Chan's case at 386-387, 399, 405-406 and also Lek v. The Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, [1993] FCA 493; 1993, 117 ALR 455, at 458-463).

Thirdly, an applicant must fear "persecution". The term "persecution" is not defined by the Convention. The Court in Chan's case spoke of "some serious punishment or penalty or some significant detriment or disadvantage" if the applicant returns to his or her country of nationality (at 388). Likewise, it stated that the "notion of persecution involves selective harassment" whether "directed against a person as an individual" or "because he or she is a member of a group which is the subject of systematic harassment" (at 429). Hathaway defines persecution "as the sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection": see Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths Canada Ltd, 1991), pp.104-105. The Court in Chan's case also noted that "not every threat of harm to a person or interference with his or her rights for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion constitutes 'being persecuted' "(at 429).

Fourthly, the applicant must fear persecution or be at risk of serious harm for a Convention reason, viz. for reasons of "race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". If the harm suffered is related to some other reason, such as economic conditions, Convention protection is not available.

Finally, the applicant must be unable, or unwilling because of his well-founded fear, to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality. "A person cannot be said to be at risk of persecution if she can access effective protection in some part of her state of origin. Because refugee law is intended to meet the needs of only those who have no alternative to seeking international protection, primary recourse should always be to one's own state" (Hathaway, op cit, p 133). It follows that "whenever the protection of the country of nationality is available, and there is no ground based on well-founded fear for refusing it, the person concerned is not in need of international protection and is not a refugee" (UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Reedited, Geneva, January 1992, at paragraph 100).

The Applicant availed himself of the opportunity of a hearing before the Tribunal on 27 July 1994, at which he was accompanied by his adviser, Mr Philip Smyth. The facts and issues of his case were explored with the Applicant, including the claims advanced by the Applicant at the primary stage and in his review application.

The Applicant is a Burmese male who came to Australia on a visitor's visa in September 1986. He subsequently stayed in Australia illegally, and applied for refugee status in March 1993 after being arrested and detained.

The Applicant attended university in Rangoon from 1981 to 1986, with a break from mid-1982 to mid-1984. He claims that he was excluded from sitting for the annual examinations in mid-1985 and mid-1986 because of his political activities at the University. These, he says, consisted of participating in clandestine anti-Government activity consisting of distributing leaflets and writing up slogans, specifically in the context of protesting on the anniversary of the students movement of 7 July 1962 and 11 December 1974.

The Applicant does not claim to have been questioned or detained about these activities.

The Applicant claims that the exclusion from the examinations means that he has been blacklisted from further education and from public employment.

The Applicant claims that his father paid a bribe to secure the Applicant a passport, in 1986.

The Applicant states that after he left Burma, in December 1986 military Intelligence questioned his father about anti-Government activity in the local mosque and the Applicant's non-return from his trip.

The Applicant states that in 1989, when new National Registration Cards (NRC) were issued to everyone in Burma, not all members of his family received them. His mother and one sister were denied them as foreigners, although they were born in Burma. The Applicant states that he was not issued with one himself, as he was overseas. The Applicant states that local officials questioned his father in May 1989 as to why the Applicant had not registered for his NRC.

The Applicant claims that he was discriminated against as a Muslim. Mosques had been damaged in Burma. He stated that military intelligence harassed those worshipping at the local mosque. Specifically, they would demand a copy of the sermon beforehand and listen to the sermon for any anti-government material. The Applicant did not cite anything which happened to him because he was a Muslim. The Applicant stated that he would not be persecuted because of his religion, but because he happened to be a Muslim he would be punished more severely for other offences. He also pointed to the treatment of and flight of Muslim Rohingyas across the border into Bangladesh.

The Applicant states that because of his activities in 1985/86, he is on the Government's list and fears that on return to Burma he would be arrested at the airport, interrogated and tortured, and might end up being used in military operations as a porter, a human shield or a mine sweeper.

The Applicant stated that Burmese citizens returning to Burma without a valid passport would be prosecuted under the Immigration Act and fears that he would be punished for returning on an expired passport.

The Applicant states that to renew his passport (which he is not willing to do), he would have to pay a 10% tax on his earnings while in Australia and sign a declaration that he had not been involved in any anti-government activities. The Applicant claims that he would also be subject to arrest because the Embassy will know that he has applied for refugee status in Australia.

(The following two paragraphs draw upon the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, Burma; and The Far East and Australasia 1994, EUROPA Publications, pp. 586-591.)

Burma has been ruled by an authoritarian military regime since a military coup in 1962. Popular unrest, spearheaded by students, led to mass demonstrations in Rangoon from March 1988 resulting in the declaration of martial law. Many demonstrators were killed. The present State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took power in September 1988 and acted harshly to suppress massive pro-democracy demonstrations. Relatively free elections were held in 1990 and were won by the pro-democracy NLD but the authorities refused to honour the results and instead attacked pro-democracy supporters through detentions, house arrests and intimidation. Government control is reinforced through a pervasive security apparatus.

Since General Than Shwe became Chief of State in April 1992, the SLORC has taken some modest steps to ameliorate its harsh rule, including reopening the universities and releasing over 2,000 political prisoners. However, the absence of fundamental change has been underlined by the Government's stage-management and harassment of a constitutional convention which met during 1993.

The Applicant submitted material concerning the present situation in Burma, including the detention of persons currently engaged in political dissidence.

The Tribunal gives weight to evidence that the present Burmese authorities continue to commit human rights violations against the Burmese people and that persons who receive adverse attention as perceived dissidents face the real possibility of arrest, interrogation and human rights violations while in detention (Amnesty International Myanmar - the climate of fear continues, October 1993; US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, Burma; EUROPA Regional Survey, The Far East and Australasia, 1994, pp. 588-592).

The issue is whether the Applicant has a profile with the authorities which establishes the basis for a well-founded fear of such persecution on return to Burma.

1985/86 Demonstrations and consequent black-listing

The Applicant was a university student from 1981 to 1986. He completed the first year of his degree in 1981/82, did not attend university in 1982/83 or 1984/85 and then returned to take up the second year of his degree. The Applicant claims that because of his political activities he, together with some other students who had been involved, was excluded from sitting for the annual university examinations in mid-1985 and again in mid-1986. The Applicant states that, on both occasions, his name did not appear on the list for the examinations and when he enquired at his university department he was referred to his lecturer, who told him that it was because of his activities. The Applicant stated at hearing that he did not re-enrol for the following academic year because he left Burma in September 1986. Nothing else happened to the Applicant as a result of these activities.

The Applicant stated that he was part of a clandestine group of about ten trusted friends at the university. There was no formal membership or structure. The Applicant stated that his anti-Government activities, which took place from the beginning of the 1984/85 academic year, included distributing anti-government leaflets and writing up slogans. This was normally done in the early morning so that they were not seen.

The Applicant stated at hearing that three of his friends were arrested in 1986 (prior to the examinations in June) and were still in detention when he left Burma. The Tribunal concludes that if these arrests were going to have adverse consequences for the Applicant or lead to his own arrest, this would have happened by the time he left Burma some three months later.

It is significant that although the Applicant's activity was known to and disapproved of by the university authorities as early as June 1985, he was not questioned or detained by military intelligence at all in the period after these incidents and prior to his departure from Burma in September 1986. It is not plausible that if such activity was of concern to the security authorities he would not at least have been questioned.

The Applicant states that because of this activity he is on the Government's list and that military intelligence is looking for him to question and arrest him. Again, if the security authorities knew of, and placed weight upon, the Applicant's activities, it is not plausible that the Applicant was not questioned or detained at the time or that direct interest in him by military intelligence for this reason would be so delayed.

The Applicant was a credible witness and the Tribunal accepts the evidence he gave at hearing concerning his activities in 1985 and 1986.

However, it is clear from the evidence given by the Applicant that he did not suffer any adverse consequences of his claimed activity in 1985/1986, other than exclusion from annual examinations in 1985 and 1986. On the Applicant's evidence, it cannot even be concluded that he was formally excluded from the university. Although the Applicant claimed that his exclusion from the examinations in 1985 and 1986 means that he has been blacklisted from further education and from public employment, the Applicant stated at hearing that he does not know whether or not he would have been eligible to re-enrol for the 1986/87 university year. In any case, denial of access to higher education is not normally regarded as amounting to persecution. This will occur only where substantial prejudice arises from the denial of access to normally available educational facilities (UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva 1991, para 54). In Burma in 1988 enrolment at secondary school was equivalent to only 26% of the relevant age group and only a small proportion of these went on to tertiary education (The Far East and Australasia 1994, EUROPA Publications, pp. 605 and 610), indicating that tertiary education is not generally available in Burma. Further, as noted by Hathaway the right to education set out in the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires universal access only to primary education, with further opportunities conditioned by circumstances. (Hathaway, p. 117).

The Tribunal therefore concludes that the Applicant has not experienced persecution as a result of anti-government activities at university prior to departing Burma in 1986.

The Applicant states that the security authorities called at his home in December 1986 after he had left Burma, asking about his whereabouts. He states that the authorities called again in 1989, asking about him.

The Applicant infers that, on both occasions, the authorities were looking for him in relation to his activities at university in 1984/86 and that therefore, on return to Burma, the authorities would still be seeking him for this purpose thus exposing him to a real chance of persecution.

On the first occasion, in December 1986 (three months after the Applicant had left Burma), military intelligence detained the Applicant's father overnight to question him about a recent speech or sermon at the local mosque (at which the father was active), the content of which was perceived to be critical of the government. While detained, the father was also questioned about the Applicant's whereabouts and activities.

The activities at university took place from mid-1984 up to mid-1986 and were known to the university authorities by mid-1985 when the Applicant was first excluded from examinations. He left Burma in September 1986. The Tribunal does not consider it plausible that not having shown any interest in questioning the Applicant while he was at the university, or for some months thereafter, the security authorities should suddenly show an interest in these past activities in December 1986. It is more plausible that the authorities were simply seeking information about the Applicant's whereabouts and activities as part of the general authoritarian and intrusive oversight of Burmese life rather than in connection with any specific past activity. The Tribunal concludes that the questioning of the Applicant's father about the anti-government speech at the local mosque was the main purpose of military intelligence, and that any questions about the Applicant himself were subsidiary and opportunistic.

The Applicant also stated in his original application that in May 1989 the local governing party officials and police came to his family's home in Burma to find out why he had not renewed his National Registration Card and to ask where he was.

The Tribunal accepts that this may have been the case, but is unable to agree with the Applicant's suggestion that this was because of his past political activities. Given the pervasive state apparatus in Burma there is no reason to doubt that the local authorities did indeed simply want to know why the Applicant had not registered when (as stated by the Applicant in his original application) new National Registration Cards were issued to everyone in Burma in 1989. It is significant that on this occasion there was no involvement by military intelligence, which holds authority for security matters (including political dissidence).

The Applicant does not claim any other indication of interest in him by the authorities in the ensuing five years.

The Tribunal does not accept that the security authorities have shown any direct or continuing interest in the Applicant's low-level activities at university in 1984/86 or that he would face a real danger of persecution on return to Burma for that reason.

The Applicant claims that he was discriminated against as a Muslim. He stated that mosques and Muslim cemeteries had been damaged in Burma. He also pointed to the flight of Muslim Rohingyas across the border into Bangladesh.

The Applicant stated that military intelligence harassed those worshipping at his local mosque. Specifically, they would demand a copy of the sermon beforehand and listen to the sermon for any anti -government material. At interview and at hearing, the Applicant was not able to cite anything which happened to him because he was a Muslim or which prevented him from worshipping. The Applicant acknowledged that he would not be persecuted because of his religion, but stated that because he happened to be a Muslim he would be punished more severely for other offences.

Although there is detailed evidence concerning the repression of the linguistically distinct Muslim Rohingyas in the Rakhine (Arakan) state, in the southwest of Burma bordering Bangladesh (Amnesty International Burma Human Rights Violations against Muslims in the Rakhine State, May 1992), this is not indicative of a general repression or persecution of Muslims elsewhere in Burma. There is rather evidence that the freedom of religion provided for in law in Burma is widely observed in practice, and that Muslim mosques operate openly with minimal interference, at least in those areas of central Burma accessible to independent observers, although the government subjects religious publications to the same control and censorship imposed on secular publications. (US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, Burma). The Tribunal accepts that the local security authorities may indeed monitor sermons at the mosque for anti-government material, but concludes that this is part and parcel of the general authoritarian control in Burma and is not indicative of persecution of Muslims as such or a fundamental constraint on ability of Muslims to practice their religion.

The Applicant has also referred to the closure of three mosques in 1989/90 and of Muslim cemeteries in Mandalay in 1989. He referred again at hearing to recent bull-dozing of Muslim cemeteries, including in Mandalay. There is evidence that "As part of its large-scale urban development program in recent years, the Government has taken control of several Christian and Muslim properties throughout Burma, including cemeteries". (US State department ibid). Again, the Applicant acknowledged that Muslims are not prevented from worshipping and that he had not been impeded in the practice of his religion while in Burma.

When asked what specific persecution was experienced by Muslims, the Applicant stated that they were discriminated against in employment. He said that although there was nothing on paper, Muslims were discriminated against in employment and promotion in state-owned enterprises. In general, persecution through denial of access to employment may be established where an individual is prevented from securing any employment, or where the only work which he is permitted to access is, for example, of an extremely dangerous nature or grossly out of keeping with his qualifications and experience (Hathaway, p.123). Discrimination in employment might constitute persecution where it involved serious restrictions on a person's right to earn a livelihood (UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Reedited, Geneva, January 1992, at paragraph 54). In this instance, there was no evidence that Muslims in general (or the Applicant and his family in particular) have been prevented from earning a livelihood.

The Tribunal concludes that there is no general persecution of Muslims in Burma apart from the particular situation of the Rohingya community in the southwest. The Applicant is not a Rohingya and was not able to point to any specific discrimination or persecution he has suffered as a Muslim.

While it may be the case that the Applicant, if arrested for another reason, might receive greater scrutiny or be treated more harshly because he is a Muslim, on the basis of the evidence advanced by the Applicant the Tribunal was unable to conclude that the Applicant has experienced, or faces a real chance of, persecution by reason of his religious beliefs.

The Applicant stated in his review application that "I have not been politically active in Australia, because I have avoided the Burmese community, since I arrived in 1986". However, he claims that his presence in Australia is now known to the Burmese Embassy because of his detention in 1993.

The Tribunal concludes that since the Applicant has engaged in no anti-government activity while in Australia, he therefore has no reason to fear persecution for this reason. There was no evidence that the fact that the Burmese Embassy or government may be aware that the Applicant is present in Australia would give rise to adverse consequences or that any such adverse consequences would amount to persecution for a Convention reason.

At hearing, the Applicant explained that his concern was that coming to the attention of the Burmese authorities in any way would mean that his file would be re-opened and examined by the authorities and that he would be punished on return for his activities in 1984-86. This concern is addressed below under "Difficulties on return to Burma".

The Applicant's Burmese passport expired in September 1989. The Applicant states that he fears the consequences of return to Burma on an expired passport. The Applicant stated that Burmese citizens returning to Burma without a valid passport would be prosecuted under the Immigration Act and stated his fear that he would be punished for returning on an expired passport. The Applicant cites an advice from the Burmese Embassy in Tokyo in December 1985 that a Burmese citizen should only re-enter Burma with an unexpired Burmese passport, or face arrest and prosecution. The penalties for such an offence are not stated.

The Applicant has not applied to renew his passport and provided no evidence why an application to the Burmese Embassy to renew his passport would be rejected and why he would therefore be in the position of returning to Burma with an expired travel document. The Applicant states that to renew his passport (which he is not willing to do), he would have to pay a 10% tax on his earnings while in Australia and sign a declaration that he had not been involved in any anti-Government activities. Since the Applicant does not claim to have been involved in any anti-government activities while in Australia, it is not clear why the requirement to sign a declaration to this effect gives rise to any difficulty. With regard to the tax payable on earnings, there is some evidence that this requirement can be negotiated with the Burmese authorities. (Comments by First Secretary of Burmese Embassy in Canberra, reported in Sydney Morning Herald, 22 November 1991 p.21 and conversation between Second Secretary of Burmese Embassy and RRT research officer, 6 March 1993). The Applicant commented that one could not place weight on anything said by the Burmese authorities. In any event, a tax obligation of this sort does not amount to persecution for a Convention reason.

There was no evidence before the Tribunal that any difficulties arising for the Applicant from not complying with taxation or passport conditions or indeed any difficulty or penalties for possessing or travelling on expired documents would amount to persecution for a Convention reason.

The Tribunal finds that the assertion that the Applicant would have to return to Burma on expired travel documents is speculative only. The Tribunal finds that even if this were the case, and even if some penalty were associated with this eventuality, it would not amount to persecution for a Convention reason.

At hearing, the Applicant expressed his concern that returning to Burma without valid documents would result in his arrest. The authorities would then become aware of his past activities, and he would be persecuted for that reason. The Applicant also expressed concern that an application to renew a long-expired passport would be referred to Rangoon, with similar consequences. This concern is addressed below under "Difficulties on return to Burma".

The Applicant claims that he would be subject to arrest or penalty on return to Burma because the Embassy will know (as it is common knowledge within the Burmese community) that he has applied for refugee status in Australia. When asked how it was that his refugee claims were known, given the confidentiality with which the Australian Government treats such matters, the Applicant said that people who were aware of his detention and subsequent release would infer that he had lodged a refugee application. The Applicant said that he had also told some people himself. The Tribunal is perplexed to understand why, if the Applicant has a fear of the consequences of his refugee application being known to the Burmese authorities, he has not been more circumspect in discussing it with other members of the Burmese community.

The Tribunal noted that any members of the Burmese community who were aware of the Applicant's refugee claim would also be aware of his prior detention. They (and the Embassy) would be likely to link the two and to draw the inference that the Applicant may have lodged his refugee claim in order to secure release from detention.

In any event, there was no evidence before the Tribunal that anyone had been punished on return to Burma solely on the basis of having made a refugee claim.

The Applicant suggested that a number of Burmese students who had fled to the Thai border to establish resistance after the violent events of 1988 had been detained after their return to Burma, notwithstanding assurances by the Burmese authorities. It appears that their difficulties arose in relation to their involvement before they left Burma and in being associated with organised resistance at the border, rather than having sought asylum. The Tribunal does not accept that their circumstances are relevant or comparable to those of the Applicant.

As noted, the Applicant has argued that should he come specifically to the attention of the Burmese authorities - whether because he had been detained in Australia, applied to renew his passport or returned to Burma without valid documents - they would become aware of his past political activities and he would be persecuted for that reason. The persecution might take the form of punishment for other offences, such as for non-compliance with taxation requirements. In the light of the Tribunal's finding about the lack of serious concern about the Applicant's activities at the time he left Burma in 1986, such a fear is speculative and not well-founded.

The Tribunal has already concluded that the Burmese security authorities have not shown a direct interest in the Applicant's low-level activities at university in 1984/86 and that he would not face a real danger of persecution on return to Burma for that reason. It follows that the Applicant coming to the attention of the authorities for some other, non-Convention related reason, would not give rise to a real chance of persecution in relation to those earlier activities.

The Applicant also referred to the random seizure of persons from the streets to act as military porters or labourers. If this is random, it cannot be attributed to a Convention reason. Material submitted by the Applicant at hearing refers to "members of ethnic minorities" being arbitrarily seized by the military to serve as military porters or unpaid labourers (Amnesty International Report 1994, p.219). The Applicant stated at hearing that, although his grand-parents came from India, he is a Burmese national and regards himself as Burmese. The Applcant does not claim to be at risk on the basis of ethnicity.

The Applicant referred specifically to people being forced to work on the Ye to Tavoy railway in south-eastern Burma near the Thai border. The Applicant submitted at hearing a detailed report concerning this project under cover of an undated statement by the Overseas Burma Liberation front covering a report on the project by the Karen Human Rights Group dated 13 April 1994. These documents detail the forced labour of villagers from the area, the majority of whom are of Mon ethnicity (emphases added). The Applicant is from Rangoon, is not a villager from the area and is not a Mon.

The Tribunal concludes that the Applicant does not face a real chance of being forced to work as a military porter or as a forced labourer on a project such as the one described.

The Tribunal concludes that the Applicant does not face a real chance of persecution on return to Burma. The Tribunal therefore finds that the Applicant cannot be regarded as a refugee for Convention purposes.

The Tribunal affirms the decision of the primary decision-maker that the Applicant is not a refugee under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 and that the application for a Domestic Protection (Temporary) Entry Permit be refused.

1In accordance with s[.]166EA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), (as amended), the published version of this decision does not contain any statement which may identify the Applicant or any relative or other dependant of the Applicant.