1. Con Mydaras and Alan Ford ('applicant') seeks a review of a decision of Stonnington City Council ('council') to grant a permit for a three storey apartment building at 27, 29 and 31 Grange Road, Toorak. This is a site that is directly east of Mr Ford's property and directly south of Mr Mydaras's property.
2. The application to the Tribunal, was made via the Tribunal online portal by Mr Mydaras, at 10:23pm on 16 January 2026. This is after the 28 day period prescribed under the Planning and Environment Regulations 2015 (Vic) ('PE Regulations') for an application under s 82 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) ('PE Act') to be lodged with the Tribunal.
3. By email on 19 January 2026, the Tribunal advised Mr Mydaras that the application appeared to be filed out of time for an application under s 82 of the PE Act. Subsequently, Mr Mydaras requested in writing by email, that the application be accepted despite its late filing, and paid the application fee to the Tribunal.
4. By email dated 21 January 2026, the respondent's representative wrote to the Tribunal and the parties foreshadowing the respondent's intention to oppose any extension of time to commence the proceeding. On 23 January 2026, the council advised the Tribunal and the parties it did not oppose the Tribunal granting an extension of time to commence the proceeding.
5. On 29 January 2026 the Tribunal directed the matter be listed for a practice day hearing with purposes to:
   • consider the reasons that the application was filed out of time;
   • consider whether to grant an extension of time to file the application pursuant to section 126 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) ('VCAT Act'); and
   • if an extension of time to file the application is granted, to consider the future conduct of the proceeding. This may include a consideration of dates, duration, compulsory conference and/or venue.

1. Section 82(1) of the PE Act provides that an objector may apply to the Tribunal for review of a decision of the responsible authority.
2. Regulation 35 of the PE Regulations provides that an application for review under s 82(1) of the PE Act must be made within 28 days after the date of notice of the decision. The notice of decision is dated 18 December 2025. Notice under s 64 of the PE Act was also given to the review applicants on 18 December 2025. Parties all agree that 28 days from this date was 15 January 2026.
3. The application for review under s 82(1) of the PE Act was lodged with the Tribunal on 16 January 2026, at least[1] 29 days after the date of the notice of decision.

1. The responsible authority issued a notice of decision dated 18 December 2025 ('NOD'). The Council confirmed the NOD was emailed to Mr Mydaras on the same day. The NOD states that the proposed permit will allow, including the matters that are subject to review at VCAT, as follows:

1. The NOD also contains information as required in Form 5 of Schedule 1 of the PE Regulations and relevantly states:

1. The first page of the Tribunal application form, completed by Mr Mydaras also clearly states 'You must apply for a review within 28 days of the date of the Notice of Decision to Grant a Permit or a Notice of Decision to Grant an Amended Permit'.
2. There is no dispute that the council, as responsible authority, gave the NOD to the applicant in compliance with the requirements of s 64 of the PE Act and that the NOD complied with the requirements of Form 5 of Schedule 1 of the PE Regulations.
3. There is also no dispute that the application made to the Tribunal under s 82 of the PE Act was late. The application for review under s 82(1) of the PE Act was lodged with the Tribunal late on 16 January 2026. Parties all submit this was one day late, after the 28 day period ended on 15 January 2026.
4. Under section 126 of Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) ('VCAT Act') the Tribunal has the power to extend any time limit fixed by or under an enabling enactment for the commencement of a proceeding.
5. In this proceeding the applicant requests the Tribunal to extend the time limit. The council does not oppose the extension being granted. The respondent / permit applicant opposes the extension of time being granted.

126. Extension or abridgement of time and waiver of compliance

(1) The Tribunal, on application by any person or on its own initiative, may extend any time limit fixed by or under an enabling enactment for the commencement of a proceeding.

(2) If the rules permit, the Tribunal, on any application by a party or on its own initiative, may -

extend or abridge any time limit fixed by or under this Act, the regulations, the rules or a relevant enactment for the doing of any act in a proceeding; or

waive compliance with any procedural requirement, other than a time limit that the Tribunal does not have power to extend or abridge.

(3) The Tribunal may extend time or waive compliance under this section even if the time or period for compliance had expired before an application for extension or waiver was made.

(4) The Tribunal may not extend or abridge time or waive compliance if to do so would cause any prejudice or detriment to a party or potential party that cannot be remedied by an appropriate order for costs or damages.

(5) In this section - relevant enactment means an enactment specified in the rules to be a relevant enactment for the purposes of this section.

1. Rule 4.25 and Schedule 1 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2018 (Vic) read together provide that the PE Act is a relevant enactment for the purposes of s 126 of the VCAT Act.
2. Clause 65(1) of Schedule 1 of the VCAT Act prohibits the Tribunal from extending the time to commence a proceeding under a planning enactment if:

a proceeding in respect of the same or related facts and circumstances has already been set down for hearing; or

a permit, licence or works approval has been issued to any person on or after the expiration of the time appointed for lodging an application for review of the decision to grant that permit, licence or approval.

1. The responsible authority and the respondent confirmed that a permit has not been issued by the responsible authority to the respondent. Clause 65 of Schedule 1 of the VCAT Act does not therefore apply on the facts in this matter.

1. The factors set out in the Tribunal's decision of Katsanis v Wyndham CC (Red Dot) [2005] VCAT 824 ('Katsanis') are often relied upon by the Tribunal when considering whether to extend time to commence applications for review under the PE Act. These factors are:
   1. What reasons are given for the delay by the applicant for extension of time in lodging its appeal?
   2. Did the applicant for extension of time take any other action (apart from the lodging of the late objection or the late appeal) which continued to make the responsible authority aware that its decision to grant a permit was being contested?
   3. Will granting the extension of time result in the unsettling of other people or of established practices?
   4. Does the proposal appeal have a real chance of success?
   5. Are any considerations of fairness as between the applicant for extension of time and other persons in a like position which are relevant?
   6. Is there to be an appeal in any event brought by persons who did lodge an appeal in time?
   7. If there any other reason why it would be fair and equitable in the circumstances for extension of time to be granted?
2. These matters were addressed in written submission of the respondent and in written and oral submissions of the applicant in response to questions at the Practice Day Hearing.
3. I address these factors below.

1. The applicant's written submission sets out the reason for delay was that:
   • The 28 day period included public holidays, including Christmas day, Boxing day and New Year's day that 'resulted in a bit of confusion about counting of days'. This led to the applicant telephoning the council on 16 January 2026 to clarify the closing date for an application to VCAT.
   • They further submit that as the NOD 'was issued by council over the Christmas holiday period' it put them at a disadvantage to have sufficient time for an appropriate response 'compared to issuing it when everyone is back at work'.
   • Days are usually counted as business days in VCAT matters.
   • The application was only one day late and Alan Ford is a lay person.
2. While the council does not oppose the extension of time being granted, it commented by email before the Practice Day Hearing:

In response to Item 2 in the applicant's submission that Council advised that public holidays changed the date to lodge an application for review, Council has no record of this call and the responsible officers for the permit application were not contacted. The applicant states the call was made on 16 January 2026 which was already out of time, and therefore if this advice was given it would not have caused the application to be late. While Council supports an extension of time, this should not be a reason which weighs in favour of granting one.

1. The council reiterated at the hearing that it had no record of contact from Mr Mydaras or Mr Ford.
2. I am not satisfied the reasons put by the applicant justify the delay in making the application. The NOD was issued, by email, on 18 December 2025, one full week before Christmas day. If there was confusion about how to calculate the 28 days there was opportunity both before and after the public holidays to confirm with the Tribunal the closing date for a review application.
3. In response to question 16 of the review application form, the reasons for applying states 'clause 55 standards have not been met as per attached objections'. A copy of the original objections to the permit application to the council were then attached. Nothing in the application received indicated that it was complicated for Mr Mydaras to complete the form in time.
4. On questions I put to Mr Mydaras at the practice day hearing he acknowledged he had made a mistake with the dates and acknowledged he was one day late. He reiterated that he relied on advice from a telephone call to an unknown council officer on 16 January 2026 that while the due date had passed it would be okay to lodge the application.
5. In response to further questions I put to him about this at the practice day hearing Mr Mydaras made various comments that he 'did not want to disturb' Mr Ford during the holiday period, he considered holidays 'started' on 19 December, as this is when building sites closed. I also asked if he had made enquires to the Tribunal during the 28 day period noting that I was aware the Tribunal registry was open throughout the December / January period, including days in between public holidays. He indicated he had maybe called the Tribunal once or twice but had not 'got through' or been left on hold so had hung up.
6. Mr Mydaras acknowledged he has an architectural drafting practice. He did not dispute the respondent's submissions that he has participated in various Tribunal proceedings as an advocate for parties. It was Mr Mydaras who submitted the review application and appears to have made enquiries to the council, after the closing date, to ascertain if an application could still be made to the Tribunal. The only time he indicated he had tried to contact the Tribunal, was in response to a question I put to him.
7. The NOD clearly sets out that an application needs to be made 'within 28 days' and to contact the Tribunal with any queries about lodging an application.

1. There is nothing to indicate the applicant sought to forewarn the applicant or the council of its intention to lodge a review application.
2. The respondent advised the first it was aware of an application was when it was notified by the Tribunal of the late application on 20 January 2026.

1. The council could have issued a permit on 16 January 2026 and the respondent had reason to expect a permit would be granted on 16 January 2026.
2. I accept that if an extension of time is granted to the applicant, the respondent will suffer the costs of defending the application for review and delay in advancing the proposed development (if it is successful in any application for review).
3. I accept that if an extension of time is not granted to the applicant may suffer some prejudice as they will not be able to seek review of the responsible authority's decision and a permit will issue to the respondent.

Unsettling of people or established practices

1. As has been observed by this Tribunal before, timeframes for the commencement of proceedings exist for very good reasons. One of these reasons is to provide all stakeholders in the decision-making process certainty as to the outcomes that can be expected once a decision is made. The grant of an extension of time to commence this proceeding on the facts before the Tribunal would unsettle established practice in the absence of an adequate justification for the delay in filing the application for review on time.
2. As commented in 285 Lennox Pty Ltd v Yarra CC[2] with reference to Katsanis:

[23] The Tribunal has taken a particularly stringent view about the need for objectors in particular to adhere strictly to the time limits allowed for lodging applications for review. It has taken the view that in the case of an application for review lodged out of time by an objector there must be a very good reason to extend the time limit that will tilt the scales significantly in favour of the person seeking the extension of time in order to overcome the disadvantage caused to a permit applicant by opening the certainty of a permit to challenge. In the present case, I am not satisfied there is a sufficiently good reason.[3]

1. This stringent view of the Tribunal is long held. As commented in Katsanis, earlier decisions of the Tribunal have refused extensions of time when lodged one day late.[4] Such stringency continues to apply, such as in Brown v Boroondara CC[5].

Does the review application have a real chance of success?

1. Using the factors set out in Katsanis it is relevant to consider the grounds set out in a review application against the decision made by the responsible authority and whether there is a real chance of success in the application made. In this consideration the Tribunal does not undertake a detailed review of the merits of the application for review, but some consideration to the grounds pursued needs to be considered.
2. The review application refers to objections lodged by Mr Mydaras and Mr Ford. These objections raise a number of matters against the proposed three storey apartment building in a General Residential Zone, in which the site sits. The main assessment tool to address such an application, clause 55 of the scheme, also includes 'deemed to comply' measures and a number of tests that are exempt from third party review.
3. Mr Mydaras's objection letter to the council sets out eight issues. The objection claims a wall on boundary is too high, the overall height of the building is non-compliant and there is excessive overlooking into his secluded private open space.
4. The council officer report usefully tabulates its assessment of clause 55 provisions and whether they are deemed to comply. It sets out that the relevant overlooking, daylight, building height and wall on boundary standards of clause 55 are met and therefore deemed to comply. There are no review rights for the applicant to address these matters.
5. On questions I put to Mr Mydaras about matters of potential merit, he submits that he considers the overlooking test may not be met and that the plans considered by the council were not that clear. No information about how the council assessment was incorrect was provided in the review application. Nor was Mr Mydaras able to clarify his concerns on this issue at the practice day hearing.
6. The objection states the front building setback and front fence height is non-compliant with relevant clause 55 standards, but does not explain how the applicant will be specifically impacted by the non-compliances or how the relevant clause 55 objectives are not met.
7. The officer report sets out that in context of varied setbacks along Grange Road and the traffic using Grange Road, that the objectives for front setback and front fencing was acceptable.
8. At the hearing the council submitted that given the two provisions are not met there may be an argument to be put to the Tribunal on the issues. The applicant did not clarify further about the impact of the variations sought and the respondent clarified that simply because an argument could be put, it did not mean, in the balance of prejudices to parties, that the inability to make such arguments should override the prejudice to the respondent in not having a permit granted.
9. The objection of Mr Mydaras then raises concern about an implied sewer easement on the land. I asked Mr Mydaras how this was relevant to a possible proceeding, noting that usually such easements are generally not a relevant matter to the decision to be made in accordance with clause 32.08 and clause 55 of the scheme. He indicated that if a permit was granted it could be futile if the landowner could not address servicing issues.
10. I also note the objection comments that a council street tree is in front of the proposed driveway and that the driveway is located at a busy intersection that may contribute or cause accidents. There may be a matter of merit consideration in addressing the impact of traffic. The permit application however includes a report from a qualified traffic engineer and the officer report includes acceptance of the driveway and access from the council engineering department.
11. Mr Ford's objection raises issues of potential overlooking, loss of daylight and construction of walls on boundary that are noted in the officer report as 'deemed to comply'.
12. The objection also questions the clarity of the application plans and that proposed landscaping at four metres high will further reduce light into their adjoining property. I note there is no requirement in clause 55 to avoid landscaping on the basis of casting shadow on adjoining properties. Rather the clause 55 provisions seek a minimum number of canopy trees to be planted.
13. The respondent submits that if the matter proceeds to a hearing it would seek further and better particulars from the applicant on their grounds given the lack of clarity on what issues were sought to be reviewed. The respondent also submitted that this may lead to a question of law to be determined by the Tribunal.
14. I concur with the respondent that the prospect of the application, as submitted to the Tribunal, leading to a material change to the proposal through either a varied decision or the decision being set aside is limited. This is because:
    • There is no clear indication of the prejudice or detriment to the applicant from the varied front setback or front fence standards not being met. Simply because they are not met does not mean a permit cannot or should not be granted.
    • While the applicant questions if overlooking standards have been met there is no material before me to indicate that the council failed in its consideration of this matter. The council consideration of overlooking was made in response to the objections made and no new material was provided in the review application to indicate why the council decision was flawed.
    • The permit application, subject to possible review, is for a three storey apartment building with a front fence over 1.5 metres high. This needs to be addressed in accordance with provisions of the General Residential Zone, limited by considerations to clause 55. Matters beyond this scope, such as building over implied, or even identified easements are matters normally addressed during a building permit stage.
15. While there may be some grounds of review that could be pursued, they are either broad or unclear.

1. The question I need to determine is if the prejudice to the applicant that may arise from not being able to pursue the matters raised by the applicant in their review application, outweighs the prejudice to the respondent in, delay, as well preparing and presenting at a hearing.
2. While the 28 day application period included three public holidays, I am not satisfied these days warrant the late application being accepted. There is nothing to indicate the applicant was unable to lodge the application within the statutory time period. This is noting that the person filing the application has some experience participating in Tribunal proceedings. This weighs heavily against the grant of an extension of time which is not overcome by any other consideration on the facts before the Tribunal.
3. The applicant's application for an extension of time under s 126 of the VCAT Act is therefore refused and the application is struck out.

[1] Noting the application was lodged after business hours on 16 January 2026 so could be regarded as being received the following day.

[2] (Red Dot) [2018] VCAT 2029.

[5] [2022] VCAT 99.