MV [2025] WASAT 38 (5 May 2025)

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 90C, s 90G

Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 3, s 4, s 40, s 44, s 64, s 68, s 109(1)(c), s 110N

AK v NC [2003] FAMCA 1006

Durham v Durham [1885] UKLawRpPro 18; [1885] 10 PD 80

1. MV is a 57 year old woman diagnosed with early onset Alzheimer's dementia. This already distressing diagnosis is made worse because it has had a significant impact on her ability to communicate - in medical terms, the dementia is a variant known as logopenic variant primary progressive aphasia. There is a family history of dementia, from which MV's mother, QV, also suffered. Sadly, QV died the day before the hearing of this matter.
2. After receiving the diagnosis, in 2022, MV acted to appoint her brother, RV and sister AV, as her enduring attorneys and as her enduring guardians. The evidence, given both by lodged documents, and in evidence at the hearing was that MV had for many years relied on RV to help her with any financial and legal matters, and was obviously close to AV, who had attended medical appointments with MV when she received her dementia diagnosis. RV also acted as attorney for his mother QV.
3. One happy development for MV happened in 2022 when she began a romantic relationship with a longtime friend, PH, and they married in 2024. PH is the applicant in this matter. Before marrying, MV consulted a neurologist, Dr C to ask if she was capable of making the decision to do so. Dr C thought that MV had capacity to decide to marry, but could not make a will. In part this opinion was based on MV's inability to describe her assets, or who should benefit from her estate.
4. Following MV's development of a relationship with PH, tensions have arisen between MV, PH, RV and AV, and all agree that the enduring powers of attorney and guardianship held by RV and AV should be revoked. RV and AV do not wish to act under those documents. All agree that MV does not have capacity to make her own important personal decisions, or any financial and legal decisions.
5. The issue that arises is who should be appointed as MV's guardian and administrator. The applications raise interpersonal conflicts and conflicts of interest which impact who can be found suitable for appointment.

1. PH initially brought an application to Tribunal under s 109(1)(c) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act) which, relevantly, provides that 'A person who has, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, a proper interest in the matter may apply to the Tribunal for an order ... revoking or varying the terms of an enduring power of attorney ...'.
2. In the application PH sought the revocation of the documents appointing MV's siblings RV and AV as her attorneys and guardians and 'no further orders made, as [MV] has a spouse who has standing in her life and shares her resources and holds her best interests at the forefront'. Despite this, at the hearing, PH said she recognised now that in the absence of the Enduring Power of Attorney (EPA) and Enduring Power of Guardianship (EPG), some form of substitute decision-making would be required for MV. PH sought to be appointed as guardian and administrator.
3. In addition to the application under s 109(1)(c), two further applications were initiated; an application pursuant to s 110N GA Act - which allows the Tribunal to revoke an EPG - and s 40 GA Act, to appoint a guardian and administrator for MV.[1]

1. The primary concern of the Tribunal when making decisions under the GA Act is the best interests of the person for whom the application was made.[2]
2. The starting point for the Tribunal is that every person is presumed to be capable of looking after their own health and safety, managing their own affairs and making reasonable judgments about matters relating to their estate and their person. This is referred to as the 'presumption of capacity' which can be set aside by clear evidence; if so, the Tribunal can consider making guardianship and administration orders.[3]
3. When deciding whether to appoint a guardian or an administrator under s 40 of the GA Act, the Tribunal must address the following three stages of enquiry:

(a) the first stage is to determine whether MV lacks the capacity to make decisions about her personal and financial matters;

(b) if MV lacks capacity, the second stage is a consideration of whether the Tribunal needs to make an order, or whether there is another way for decisions to be made for MV that is less restrictive on her freedom of decision and action. If there is no need for an order, the matter will be dismissed; and

(c) if the Tribunal needs to make an order, the third stage involves the Tribunal determining who the guardian or administrator will be, the functions or powers they require that will be the least restrictive on the person, and how long the orders will run before they are reviewed.

1. Where MV has signed an EPA and EPG, the Tribunal will consider whether those instruments can be used as a less restrictive way for decisions to be made for MV.
2. I have taken into account the oral evidence given at the hearing and the written evidence filed in these proceedings, and while it will not be canvassed in detail, the relevant features are summarised in these reasons.

1. The Tribunal must take MV's views and wishes into account, as expressed, or as gathered from her previous actions.
2. MV was unable to clearly articulate her wishes at the hearing. AB, the investigator from the Office of the Public Advocate (asked by the Tribunal to provide a report on MV's best interests) was unable to clearly ascertain MV's views and wishes when he spoke to her before the hearing. MV was able to state that she trusted PH.[4]
3. MV's wishes in 2022, as recorded in the EPA and EPG,[5] were that RV and AV would make her important personal decisions, and manage her financial and legal affairs.
4. A couple of attempts were made at the hearing for MV to say something, but it was difficult to ascertain what she wanted to say. However, she agreed with PH's advocate DM that she wished for PH to be her guardian and administrator. When DEM, the daughter of MV's former partner XEM, nominated herself as administrator at the end of the hearing, MV reacted, and was trying to say something, but it was not possible to ascertain what it was. Insofar as I can ascertain what MV wants, I take it that she would want PH to be her guardian and administrator.

1. To appoint an administrator, the Tribunal must be satisfied that by reason of a mental disability, MV is unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all or any part of her estate. The term 'mental disability' is defined in the GA Act and describes certain disabilities such as an intellectual disability, a psychiatric condition, dementia, and acquired brain injury.[6]
2. The medical evidence establishes that MV has a diagnosis of dementia with aphasia. MV was diagnosed by Dr B and her report on 4 November 2021 records that screening tests showed significant deficits in her cognition.[7] Her memory, language, and executive functioning were all impaired by the time of the formal diagnosis. Most notable was a change in her ability to express herself. Dr B also recorded that MV had had increasing difficulty in making decisions, getting a job, and navigating while driving.
3. A clinical neuropsychologist, Ms F, in an assessment done in September 2021, noted that MV had been a counsellor, substitute teacher and carer. Word finding difficulties were noted, and MV became flustered by decision-making. The report notes 'language difficulties were striking - her comprehension appeared to fluctuate - when asked for her email address, she gave her home address, on her second attempt gave her phone number'.
4. A speech pathologist, PS, said in a report dated 14 January 2022, that MV had marked deficits in expressive and receptive language and that her circumlocution, phonological errors, and word finding difficulties were typical of logopenic primary progressive aphasia.
5. Dr C, a specialist neurologist, in a report for the Tribunal dated 30 January 2025, says that MV has a diagnosis of 'dementia with language impairment, onset since ~2017' and as a result of this progressive condition, MV is unable to make any simple or complex financial decisions, legal decisions, and cannot make medical treatment, accommodation and services decisions.
6. I accept the clinical evidence summarised above, and I am therefore satisfied, and I find, that MV has a mental disability as defined in the GA Act, in the form of dementia.

Does the mental disability cause MV to be unable to make reasonable judgments about her estate?

1. For the Tribunal to decide whether MV is 'unable' to make reasonable judgments about her estate, I must consider MV's estate and circumstances and then compare that against the extent to which MV is able to engage in the cognitive processes required to make a 'reasonable judgment'.
2. A person's 'estate' includes their real and personal property, all assets and liabilities, and all of their financial affairs. MV's estate consists of her pension, the proceeds of sale of her home, superannuation and her interest in QV's estate.
3. In my view, there is no doubt that the diagnosis of dementia with primary progressive aphasia identified by Dr B in November 2021 is the cause of MV's inability to make reasonable judgments in respect of her estate.
4. Dr C in her report of January 2025 says that MV cannot manage simple or complex financial decisions, or make legal decisions.
5. I am satisfied, and I find, that the mental disability is the cause of MV's inability to make reasonable judgments in respect of her estate.
6. Having regard to the extensive documentary and oral evidence provided to the Tribunal, I am satisfied, and I find, that the presumption of capacity has been displaced in respect of MV's ability to make reasonable judgments in respect of her estate. MV is therefore a person for whom I can appoint an administrator.

Does MV lack the capacity to make personal decisions?

1. I am satisfied, and I find, that MV is incapable of looking after her own health and safety, of making reasonable judgments in respect of her person and in need of supervision and oversight in order to protect her health and safety. MV is unable to advocate for herself and to fully understand her needs, as a result of her the impact of her dementia on her memory, language, and executive functioning. The medical and allied health reports establish that MV needs to rely on others to support her in all key areas of personal decision-making. Before and just after MV's diagnosis, AV was instrumental in assisting her to attend appointments and to make decisions, and she now relies heavily on PH for these matters. She is unable by herself to understand her accommodation, services, and medical treatment needs.
2. The presumption of capacity has been set aside in relation to personal decisions and I find that MV is a person for whom I can appoint a guardian.

Is there a need for orders appointing an administrator and guardian, or are less restrictive options available?

1. There is no doubt that MV requires assistance to deal with her estate and to make decisions about her personal matters. However, the EPA and EPG are not suitable less restrictive alternatives to formal administration and guardianship orders for the reasons set out below. Importantly, RV and AV no longer wish to act under those documents.

1. On 28 July 2022 and 24 October 2022, MV signed two EPAs to appoint RV and AV as her (joint and several) attorneys.[8] By then, she had been diagnosed with dementia. The EPA dated 24 October 2022 was apparently lodged at Landgate and used by RV and AV to conduct the sale of MV's property in [W] suburb. That document was prepared by a lawyer who, it is assumed, would have conducted his or her own assessment of MV's ability to understand the EPA and the authority it granted to the donees.
2. RV and AV wish to relinquish their roles as enduring attorneys for MV. The appointments have caused dispute and conflict about what is in the best interests of MV between RV, AV, and PH, arising mainly in management of MV's financial and legal affairs.
3. It seems a conflict of interest arose between RV's role as enduring attorney for QV (in whose house PH and MV are living) and his role as enduring attorney for MV, when RV raised the rent charged to PH and MV. I note that a residential tenancy agreement dated April 2024, signed by RV as attorney for QV on the one hand, and PH and MV (herself, not by RV as attorney)[9] provided for a rental payment of $200 per week. RV said this rate was to provide for 'future repairs and maintenance for the house' and this arrangement would be 'open ended with no fixed end date'.[10]
4. In February 2025, however, RV notified PH and MV that the rent for this property would be raised to $1,000 per week and, on 20 February 2025, notified PH that the increased sum would be directly debited from MV's bank account.[11]
5. RV stated that the rent would be increased because in October 2024, an assessment was done of the market rental of QV's property which determined a rate of $1,200 per week, so RV on behalf of QV determined the rent would be a discounted rate of $1,000 per week, and on 20 February 2025 RV notified PH that a direct debit would be set up from MV's account for this sum, and a back payment for the increased rent, from 10 February 2025.
6. RV's fiduciary duty to QV was in direct conflict with his duty to MV in relation to the determination of the rent payable; he could not act for both parties. However, on QV's death the day prior to the hearing that conflict was resolved.

1. On 28 July 2022, MV signed the EPG to appoint RV and AV as her joint enduring guardians, with all functions authorised. It was RV's evidence at hearing that he and AV had to commence acting under that authority almost as soon as the document was made.[12]
2. RV and AV have made a statement setting out the decisions that they made acting under the EPG, including providing support with medical advice, giving consent for medication, and establishing NDIS services. They consider it is in MV's best interests that her lifestyle and health decisions be managed by PH.[13]
3. I will revoke the EPA documents, and the EPG, appointing RV and AV, as they no longer reflect the current wishes of MV, and neither RV nor AV wish to continue in those roles. I am not satisfied they can stand as less restrictive alternatives in the best interests of MV in those circumstances.

1. Dr C in her report of January 2025 said she is unsure of MV's ability to make a new EPA and EPG. However, Dr C is certain she cannot make legal decisions, and cannot make a new will. RV's evidence was that he and AV had to take steps to act under their attorney and guardianship authorities as soon as the EPA and EPG documents were signed, in 2022, as MV required substitute decision-making at that time. It is inconsistent with the weight of evidence to say that MV does now understand what the enduring power of attorney and guardianship documents mean, and that she would be capable of executing such documents. I am satisfied and I find that MV is unable to make a new EPA and EPG. Further I am satisfied that MV therefore needs both a guardian and an administrator.

1. When considering the appointment of an administrator, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the administrator will act in the best interests of MV, is suitable to act as the administrator of her estate and will be able to perform the functions vested in them.
2. While RV and AV no longer wish to act under the EPA, RV proposes that the Public Trustee be appointed as MV's administrator. RV said at hearing 'in terms of purchasing the new house, I've seen that [MV] is the one bringing all the assets to the transaction, where I don't see [PH] bringing any assets into the transaction. I think there needs to be an independent person outside of myself and my ... other sister'. RV said that although she did not attend the hearing, AV shared his views.
3. PH and DEM both proposed themselves for nomination as administrator. DEM proposed herself at the end of the hearing after the possibility of an independent administrator being needed for MV was raised. Because of the late stage of the hearing at which DEM proposed herself as administrator, I asked her to provide submissions on her understanding of the role and her proposed actions as administrator. Those submissions were received following the hearing and are addressed further below.

1. A number of issues are necessary for an administrator to consider on behalf of MV, which I will discuss in turn below.

1. PH has raised concerns about the actions of RV and AV, as attorneys, in selling MV's investment property in [W] suburb, which PH says was against MV's wishes. On the sale capital gains tax (CGT) was incurred, which PH submits was to MV's financial detriment, because she says the property ought not to have been sold. RV says that the property sold at a profit, thereby incurring CGT, and that there had been a number of discussions between himself, AV, MV and PH before the sale proceeded. He said that in his view, the sale was in MV's best interests.[14]

1. PH said that neither of the attorneys had notified Centrelink that MV and PH started living together in about April 2023,[15] so that MV may have been paid at the incorrect rate of pension. There is a concern about MV having to repay a debt for an overpayment.

1. PH also raised concerns about the actions of RV in assisting MV with her finances prior to her diagnosis, and prior to the execution of either of the EPA documents made in 2022. The concerns centred around MV receiving a payout for a property she owned jointly with RV in [S] suburb. RV said he bought MV out for her share of the property, so that MV could conduct an informal property settlement with MV's former partner, XEM (DEM's mother), on the breakdown of their relationship. After that payout, MV received some $60,000.[16] . PH said she believed that this settlement took place after MV was suffering from cognitive impairment, in about 2020.[17]

1. At hearing RV said that the attorneys had not made enquiries about whether a TPD claim could be made to MV's superannuation provider, H.

Appropriate rent to be paid for living at QV's property

1. There is also the issue of RV as attorney for QV increasing the rent at QV's property to MV and PH and directly debiting the increased sum from MV's account. As QV has now passed away, any rent will be payable to her estate.
2. The executor of QV's will, or administrator of her estate (if she did not make a will), will now have to determine how much MV and PH will pay by way of rent.[18]

1. Consideration may have to be given to a claim pursuant to the Family Provision Act 1972 (WA) should further provision be sought on MV's behalf from QV's estate. Allied to this, RV claimed that QV loaned MV a sum of around $250,000, and therefore MV owes that debt to QV's estate. The exact terms of this loan, which RV said is contained in a deed dated 14 October 2016, are not known, but it is said to be a 'living will' essentially a sum which QV advanced to MV ahead of QV's passing.

1. MV and PH were married on 13 September 2024.[19] By that time, the evidence shows that MV was already significantly cognitively impaired.
2. At hearing, RV said that the attorneys acting for MV had not considered it necessary to formalise some kind of agreement with PH in order to safeguard MV's assets on entering into her marriage with PH.[20]
3. I have no information about PH's assets, save that she said at hearing that she brings her own assets to the marriage including property,[21] and that PH is currently only working part-time in order to care properly for MV.

1. According to Dr C, MV had capacity to marry PH. Dr C was asked specifically in May 2024 whether or not MV had capacity to marry and make a will. Dr C's report says that while 'it was clear she did have capacity to get married, being able to indicate what marriage was and what it meant' that 'I could not convince myself that [MV] had a clear understanding of what a will was, nor could she tell me anything about her assets or correctly nominate potentially interested parties'.[22]
2. The test for capacity to marry is simple; it is summarised in Durham v Durham [1885] UKLawRpPro 18; [1885] 10 PD 80 'it appears to me that the contract of marriage is a very simple one ... it is an engagement ... to live together and love one another ... to the exclusion of all others'.
3. MV did not need to understand the financial and legal consequences of marriage, but it is the case that 'both in law and in society, marriage has a large variety of consequences. Few lawyers, let alone non-lawyers, would be able to make a comprehensive list of even the legal consequences'.[23]
4. Dr C was of the opinion that MV could not make a will. The legal test of the ability to make a will is set out in the case of Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR5QB 549 (Eng.) per Cockburn J:

It is essential to the exercise of such a power that a testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties - that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made.

1. The requirements of the Banks v Goodfellow test must all be met - if any one limb of the test is not met, then testamentary capacity will not be made out.
2. It seems from Dr C's assessment, that MV was unable to understand the nature of making a will, the extent of the property of which she was disposing, or to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which she ought to give effect.
3. In my view, given that by the time of her marriage, MV did not have capacity to manage her financial or legal matters, she required a substitute decision-maker to consider, and safeguard, her financial and legal position upon marriage; to provide some kind of clarity to MV's financial picture and allow budgeting for her future needs. This is particularly so as MV and PH plan to purchase a property together.
4. It might be said that few couples would consider entering into some kind of financial contract upon marriage - even later in life, when they are more likely to have their own assets to bring to the relationship; that such contracts are more often the province of the rich. However, given the vulnerability of a person who cannot make decisions about their financial and legal affairs, I consider that that it is incumbent on a substitute decision-maker to review the financial and legal implications of an incapable person's marriage and to take action they consider to be in that person's best interests.
5. In my view an administrator should consider whether a Binding Financial Agreement is available to MV, or whether some other kind of agreement can be reached between MV and PH to record the assets each of them bring to the marriage and what will happen to those assets. PH is obviously in a position to do this; MV is not.[24]

1. It appears that the appointment of PH is consistent with the wishes of MV. The relationship they have developed is supportive and PH is keen to advocate for MV. Further, as PH was formerly a police officer, I do consider that she would be able to fulfil the statutory requirements of an administrator.
2. However, I do not consider she is suitable[25] to be appointed as administrator at this time because:

(a) The disharmony between PH, RV and AV has affected her ability to consider, to an appropriately neutral extent, the financial and legal issues to be addressed in the best interests of MV in future.

(b) PH has, self-evidently, a conflict of interest in acting to safeguard MV's property interests upon marriage.

1. DEM has provided comprehensive submissions and as a practising lawyer, would be able to fulfil the statutory duties of an administrator. She provides a plan for dealing with MV's affairs including obtaining documentation, developing a financial management plan, creating a budget, dealing with Centrelink and superannuation providers.
2. I am unable to confirm whether or not the appointment of DEM is consistent with the wishes of MV. In any case, I do not consider she is suitable to be appointed as administrator because:

(a) I am not persuaded that she has a full appreciation of the complexities involved in acting as MV's administrator.

(b) In her submissions, DEM's plan for acting as administrator does not raise consideration of the need to safeguard MV's assets upon her marriage.

(c) PH has said an issue an administrator will have to consider is whether or not, following the property settlement between DEM's mother XEM, MV should have received more from RV buying MV out from the property in [S] suburb. This issue is not addressed by DEM in her submissions and may raise a conflict of interest for her, as it involves her mother.

1. I am satisfied that the only administrator I can appoint for MV at this time is the Public Trustee.
2. I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the administration order be a plenary order, which will allow the administrator to deal with all aspects of MV's estate in her best interests.
3. I will also include a gifting authority of $1,000 per year so the administrator can purchase gifts on MV's behalf.
4. In the hope that the Public Trustee will resolve the financial and legal issues currently needing to be addressed, I will make the orders reviewable in 2 years.

1. When considering the appointment of a guardian, the Tribunal must hold the opinion that the proposed guardian will act in the best interests of the person, is suitable to act as the guardian, is not in a position where their interests conflict or may conflict with MV's interests and that the proposed guardian will be able to perform functions vested in them.[26]
2. When assessing suitability, the Tribunal must take into account:

(a) the desirability of preserving existing relationships within MV's family;

(b) the compatibility of the proposed appointee with the administrator;

(d) whether the proposed appointee will be able to perform the functions proposed to be vested in the Guardian.

1. PH is over the age of 18 years and has consented to act as guardian.
2. I accept the evidence that PH is a loving wife who has worked hard to understand MV's diagnosis and needs. At the hearing, several people spoke at length about the beneficial relationship MV and PH have. RV and AV agree that it is appropriate to relinquish their roles as enduring guardians because they believe it is in MV's best interests that her important personal decisions be done by PH with MV.[27]
3. I find that PH will act in best interests of MV because her personal interests do not conflict with those of MV, and PH will take into account MV's views and wishes. Despite the difficult relationship between PH and RV and AV, both PH and RV at hearing said that they will work hard to restore and maintain the supportive relationships that MV has. I am satisfied that PH will make her best efforts to keep RV and AV informed about important decisions concerning MV and involved in MV's life. I am satisfied that PH's appointment is consistent with the wishes of MV as best I was able to ascertain them at the hearing. I am satisfied that PH will be able to work cooperatively with the Public Trustee as administrator.
4. As a consequence of the above findings, I am satisfied that PH should be appointed as MV's guardian.

1. The clinical reports and the oral evidence of family members satisfies me that the areas of personal decision-making where there are live issues or reasonably foreseeable decisions to be made for MV are medical treatment, accommodation, services, and restrictive practices.

1. The medical evidence is that MV has a diagnosis of a progressive illness such that she will need a guardian for the rest of her life and so I make the orders for the maximum period possible under the GA Act, that is to be reviewed within five years.

1. The Tribunal declares that the represented person, MV is:

(a) unable, by reason of a mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all of her estate;

(c) incapable of looking after her own health and safety;

(d) unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to her person;

(e) in need of oversight, care or control in the interests of her own health and safety; and

1. The Public Trustee of 553 Hay Street, Perth, Western Australia is appointed plenary administrator of the represented person's estate with all the powers and duties conferred by the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA).
2. The administrator is authorised to expend up to a total amount of $1,000 per annum on gifts on behalf of the represented person.
3. The enduring powers of attorney dated 28 July 2022 and 24 October 2022 by which the represented person appointed [RV and AV] to be their attorney, are revoked.
4. The Public Trustee is to be provided with copies of all documents on files [GAA 388 of 2025, GAA 431 of 2025 and GAA 432 of 2025].
5. The administration order is to be reviewed before 5 May 2027.

1. PH of [address] is appointed limited guardian of the represented person with the following functions:

(a) To decide where the represented person is to live, whether permanently or temporarily;

(b) To decide with whom the represented person is to live;

(c) To make treatment decisions for the represented person, subject to Division 3 of Part 5 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA);

(d) To determine the services to which the represented person should have access;

(e) To decide whether to give or withhold consent to the use of any restrictive practices proposed in any behaviour support plan developed from time to time for the represented person in compliance with the requirements of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Restrictive Practices and Behaviour Support) Rules 2018.

1. The guardianship order is to be reviewed before 5 May 2030.

1. [MV] made Enduring Powers of Attorney dated 28 July 2022 and 24 October 2022 appointing [RV] and [AV].

On an application by [PH] pursuant to s 110N of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), concerning an Enduring Power of Guardianship dated 28 July 2022 by which [MV] appointed [RV] and [AV] to be her enduring guardians.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] The initial application pursuant to s109(1)(c) is GAA 388 of 2025. The application made pursuant to s 110N is GAA 431 of 2025, and that made pursuant to s 40 is GAA 432 of 2025. Unless otherwise stated, the references to folios are those lodged in GAA 388 of 2025.

[5] There were two versions of the EPA signed by MV appointing RV and AV; one dated 28 July 2022, and one dated 24 October 2022. The former was signed by two witnesses, but their qualifications for signing the document were not stated. The latter was correctly executed and successfully lodged at Landgate. The EPG is dated 28 July 2022.

[7] A score of 9/30 for the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) was noted in November 2021. A score below 25/30 on that test indicates cognitive impairment is present.

[8] It seems that because the qualifications of those witnessing the EPA dated July 2022 were not included in that document, the document was signed again by all parties before qualified witnesses in October 2022.

[9] The reason why MV signed this document herself is unknown.

[10] Folio 19; email from RV to PH dated 1 April 2024.

[11] Folio 19; email from RV to PH dated 20 February 2025.

[16] At the hearing, PH said that her knowledge of these transactions came from MV and from XEM; ts 13.

[17] The formal diagnosis of dementia was made by Dr B around November 2021.

[18] The Tribunal has no information regarding QV's estate, any will made and if there is a named executor. Pending the handing down of the Tribunal's decision, RV (QV's attorney) provided an undertaking that the rent payable by MV and PH would be returned to the previous rate.

[23] AK v NC [2003] FAMCA 1006.

[24] The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) provides at s 90C that Binding Financial Agreements (BFA) can be entered into after marriage; s 90G sets out what is needed to make such an agreement binding - including the provision of independent legal advice from a legal practitioner (s 90G(1)(b)) to each spouse. It is not clear if a person with incapacity is therefore able to make a BFA.

[25] As required by s 68 of the GA Act.