1. Section 75 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) ('VCAT Act') enables the Tribunal to dismiss or strike out proceedings. To strike out a proceeding means that there is a possibility of the proceeding being reinstated. To dismiss a proceeding means that there is no possibility of it being reinstated and the proceedings are at an end.
2. Before I make an order striking out or dismissing the application, I am required to consider whether there is a question of real substance to go to a full hearing of this application. I must also be satisfied that the proceeding is manifestly or undoubtedly hopeless, obviously unsustainable in fact or law, untenable or must be bound to fail.[1]
3. It is settled law that a high degree of satisfaction is required before a proceeding is struck out or summarily dismissed and that the Tribunal must act with great caution and reluctance to deprive a litigant from exercising the right to air her grievances and present her case fully at the hearing.
4. Finally, VCAT is required to apply a presumption that the Applicant can prove each of the matters she asserts. VCAT should not summarily dismiss or strike out where a case is at all arguable.
5. The First Respondent's application for summary dismissal states that the application against it is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived and lacking in substance. It submitted a statement by the Appeals Officer who rejected MUL's husband's appeal. He says that the appeal was rejected because it did not address any of the three grounds for appeal listed in clause 19.1 of its Rules, which is consistent with the documents submitted by the Applicant and I can consider it.
6. The Second Respondent manages the stadium where the basketball match was played. It fielded the Venue Supervisor with whom MUL had the initial interaction complained of. The Venue Supervisor has a different recollection of the interaction between himself and MUL which is more aligned to the charges he laid against her. I do not take that version into account in a summary dismissal application because I must take the Applicant's case at its highest and assume that she can prove each assertion that she makes.
7. The Second Respondent submits that at its highest the Applicant states: 'I cannot shake the feeling that his behaviour was racially motivated' and that this is not an objective basis for the claim of racial discrimination. It notes that MUL's own account of the interaction contains no suggestion of racist comments except that MUL considers that her treatment was different to the treatment of another parent, who she infers is of a different race.
8. The Third Respondent's application by a lay advocate for summary dismissal essentially covers the field of all allegations against all respondents and introduces alternative interpretations of events which I will not take into account because I must take the Applicant's case at its highest and assume that she can prove each assertion that she makes.

1. In an application dated 18 July 2023, MUL claims that the respondents discriminated against her and her son on the grounds of disability, gender identity, race and sex in the area of clubs and club members and the provision of services and claims harassment by members of qualifying bodies and harassment in clubs.
2. Another handwritten application dated 18 June 2023 also claims discrimination on the grounds of physical features, says the area in which discrimination occurred was sport and claims sexual harassment. Her application checked boxes for failure to make reasonable adjustments for a disability and for a parent or carer in the provision of goods and services, authorising and assisting discrimination and racial vilification.
3. It is easy to understand the Applicant's narrative and her version of events from the Particulars of Claim. It is not easy, however, to understand how she correlates that narrative with the breaches of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) ('the Act') noted in her applications. In her particulars, written submissions and supporting documents, the essence of what MUL is claiming on hers and WUM's behalf is that the behaviour of the Venue Supervisor (Second Respondent) was discrimination based on her race. She then alleges that the events at the tribunal hearing (Third Respondent) were based on her race and sex and failed to take into account WUM's disability. She then alleges racial discrimination by the First Respondent because it didn't grant an appeal after her husband raised the racial discrimination. She also alleges disability discrimination against the First Respondent because it did not grant the appeal after her husband had outlined the impact that the penalty imposed on MUL would have on WUM's disability.
4. Most issues ticked in the written applications seemed to have been included by the Applicant on a 'just in case' basis, rather than stemming from a considered understanding of the application of discrimination laws. For completeness, because of the heavy onus VCAT has when considering summary dismissal, I will address each aspect claimed in the two written applications.

How does the Applicant assert that the attributes apply?

1. In MUL's materials she notes that WUM has ADHD for which he receives support from a psychologist. An effect of his ADHD is that he must be accompanied by MUL at all times. She argues that her banishment from attending training and matches will impact on him because his disability means that he cannot attend without her.

1. From MUL's materials, there is no suggestion that she or WUM has ever assumed characteristics of the other sex or meets any other aspects of the definition of 'gender identity' in the Act. Inclusion of this attribute is clearly misconceived.

1. The application and MUL's husband's appeal letter mention racist behaviour but do not specify a particular race. Documents submitted by the Applicant on 26 February 2025 allege that the tribunal members would have been aware of the Applicant's race because in an email she sent about scheduling the tribunal hearing to a person called 'Rebecca' she noted her unavailability due to observance of the Nowruz, the Persian New Year. I accept that MUL and WUM have the attribute relating to race.

1. References to MUL's gender are mostly about the fact that she attended the tribunal hearing without her husband because he was unwell. She says the tribunal members were impatient and argumentative with her because she was alone as a female.

1. The Act states 'physical features' means a person's height, weight, size or other bodily characteristics. Nothing in any of the Applicant's materials relates to hers or MUL's height, weight, size or other bodily characteristics. The inclusion of this attribute is misconceived.

In what areas does the Applicant allege discrimination?

... an association of more than 30 persons associated together for social, literary, cultural, political, sporting, athletic or other lawful purposes that-

(a) has a licence (other than a temporary limited licence or a major event licence) to supply liquor under the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998; and

(b) operates its facilities wholly or partly from its own funds

There is no evidence of whether any of the three respondents has a liquor licence. Given that WUM was playing in the Under 12s, it seems highly unlikely. I consider that any action under Part 4 Division 6 is misconceived.

1. I will accept, for present purposes, that the three respondents were in some way providing services, as none of them has argued that they were not.

1. The application fits most neatly with regard to all three respondents to the area of sport, notably participating in a sporting activity being '(b) umpiring or refereeing a sporting activity; (c) participating in the administration of a sporting activity.' However, the application of Part 4 Division 7 is very limited. Section 71 of the Act prohibits discrimination by excluding someone from participating in a sporting activity - that is, it is prohibited to exclude someone from being an umpire or being involved in sports administration. It does not apply to how a spectator is treated by an umpire or referee or how one is treated by the administration of the sport. Therefore, I consider that any action under Part 4 Division 7 is misconceived.

1. None of the Applicant's materials make any suggestion of any sexual conduct described in section 92 of the Act. It seems she checked these boxes (including claims of harassment by members of qualifying bodies and harassment in clubs) on the application form, because she felt the tribunal's impatience with her at the hearing was 'harassing' and that was because she was alone there as a female. This does not approach anything like sexual harassment as defined in the Act and is misconceived.
2. Although she has checked the box for 'failure to make reasonable adjustments for a disability and for a parent or carer' in the provision of goods and services, I think she means by this that the penalty imposed by the tribunal, and the failure to grant an appeal on that basis, did not take into account the impact on WUM of not being able to play without his mother present. As she has never articulated what adjustment ought to have been made and by whom, there is no evidence that would support a claim under section 45 of the Act.
3. None of the Applicant's materials allege that any person requested, instructed, induced, encouraged, authorised or assisted a person to contravene the Act, which is what is required to establish a claim under section 105 that a respondent has authorised or assisted discrimination. This too is misconceived.

1. There is no evidence that any respondent, on the ground of the Applicant's race, engaged in any conduct that incited hatred, serious contempt, revulsion, severe ridicule of the Applicant as is required by section 7 of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic). Again, this is misconceived.

1. In Dickie v State of Victoria & Ors (Anti-Discrimination),[2] Senior Member Megay said:

Racist and discriminatory behaviour is rarely overt and it is mostly the case that it is to be inferred from the surrounding factual matrix and the behaviour of those involved.

Before turning to the evidence there are some preliminary comments that are often voiced in this Tribunal and which bear repeating. The Equal Opportunity Act 1995 is conceptually difficult. It is poorly understood by the community in general and by litigants in person specifically.

What is not understood by many is that much conduct that is considered unfair by a particular litigant is not necessarily discriminatory conduct per se. Put simply, just because someone does not warm to you and does not like you and does not agree with you and does not share your particular passions, it does not follow that his or her conduct is unlawful and falls within the Act.

1. Deputy President McNamara in Drummond v Telstra Corporation Limited (Anti-Discrimination)[3] said:

Most people in one form or another possess most of the attributes [as defined in the Act]. It is a frequent experience in this List that people who feel they have been unjustly dealt with whether in employment or other contexts identify what they see as unfair treatment and their possession of one or more attributes as leaping to the allegation then that they have been the victims of direct discrimination.

1. The Court in Department of Health v Arumagam[4] held that, while one may draw inferences from the surrounding factual matrix, racial discrimination is a serious matter, which is not lightly to be inferred and should not be inferred where a more probable and innocent explanation was available on the evidence.
2. The Applicant's evidence of race discrimination is:

(i) 'I firmly believe it [Venue Supervisor's actions] was racially motivated.[5] She says he said to her:

1. 'You are not a coach or a team manager; you are not allowed to talk to me';
2. 'I know what to do with you'.

And that his treatment of her was different to treatment of parents 'of a non-minority background'.[6]

(ii) The difference in the Applicant's penalty and the penalty of another parent who appeared before the tribunal at that time.[7]

(iii) 'I believe the Tribunal's conduct was influenced by racial discrimination'[8]

(iv) 'The refusal to consider my son's ADHD ... and the dismissive handling of my appeal suggest that the decision was influenced by both racial and disability discrimination'.[9]

(v) 'I believe the rejection of my appeal was influenced by both racial and disability discrimination'.[10]

1. Source documents, including pre-litigation correspondence, does not put the allegations any more specifically. The Applicant has relied solely on her own beliefs or feelings rather than objective evidence. An assertion that another parent received different treatment does not equate to proof that it was because of the race of the Applicant. I cannot draw an inference that because two parents were treated differently, the reason was the Applicant's race.
2. As Member Dea in Ryder v Money3 Corporation Limited (Anti-Discrimination)[11] said:

In cases of discrimination the person engaging in that conduct does not usually announce the fact. It is often necessary for an inference to be drawn from the evidence presented that the reason for the less favourable treatment is the relevant attribute, in this case race.

...

The difficulty for the complainant is that there is nothing in the material before me to point to the reason relating to her race other than her own belief. It may be that the staff were rude because they were unwell or grumpy or unhappy or because they behaved like that with everyone.

...

The suspicion that discrimination was behind the staff's behaviour, even if strongly held, is not enough.

1. In this case, there is no evidence upon which I could draw any inferences that race was a factor in the behaviours about which the Applicant complains. As the Applicant has no evidence other than her suspicion, internal belief or feeling, the allegations of race discrimination lack substance.

1. The Applicant's sex discrimination claims are lacking in substance. The assertion that she was not listened to, was hurried up, was not able to fully put her case to the tribunal because she is female is similarly based only on her belief, feelings and suspicions. The other parent who was heard by the tribunal on that occasion was also female, and possibly unaccompanied, and said in a text submitted by the Applicant 'they were actually OK with me'. As with the race discrimination claims, sex discrimination must be proved by objective evidence, of which there is none, even when I take the Applicant's case at its highest.

1. The issue of disability first arose between the Applicant and the respondents when MUL's husband raised the impact of the tribunal's decision on WUM's health. That appeal was rejected as it did not raise any of the three criteria set out in the Rules which were:

(i) New or additional evidence

(ii) The penalty exceeded those allowed under the by-laws

(iii) A lack of procedural fairness

1. The Applicant has not explained whether she alleges direct or indirect disability discrimination. It appears that she alleges disability discrimination because the impact on WUM, because of the penalty imposed on her, was greater because he has a disability.
2. The Applicant does not assert that she raised WUM's disability in the tribunal hearing. She asserts that she should have been granted an appeal because the penalty affected his disability. I cannot conceive how the application of the Rules set out above could be demonstrated to be a condition, requirement or practice that has or is likely to have the effect of disadvantaging players with disabilities for the purposes of section 9 of the Act. None of the Applicant's evidence supports that the Rules had that effect, it was the penalty that affected WUM, not the Rules themselves.
3. The claim of disability discrimination is lacking in substance.

1. I am satisfied that the Applicant's claims are obviously unsustainable in law, are untenable and are bound to fail. The applications are dismissed. The respondents have applied for their costs. I do not see any reason to depart from the usual rule in section 109 of the VCAT Act that parties bear their own costs.

[1] Norman v Australian Red Cross Society (1998) 14 VAR 243, Forrester v AIMS Corporation [2004] VSC 506; (2004) 22 VAR 97.

[2] [2009] VCAT 713.

[3] [2008] VCAT 2630.

[4] [1988] VicRp 42; [1988] VR 319 as approved in Sharma v Legal Aid (Qld) [2002] FCAFC 196 and Masri v Costco Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (Human Rights) [2021] VCAT 183.

[11] [2011] VCAT 2167.