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[2025] NSWCA 123
procedural. The third respondent's application that Price AJA recuse himself was dismissed: [7], [40].
4 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The third respondent asked Price AJA to step aside from MTH's appeal because he had previously sat on the panel that dismissed Croft's criminal conviction appeal. The Court of Appeal applied the apprehended-bias test, which requires more than pointing to a judge's prior involvement: there must be a logical connection between that involvement and a feared failure to decide the present case impartially. The earlier criminal appeal dealt with two narrow legal grounds and did not assess the whole evidence or decide that there had been no miscarriage of justice. The Court concluded that the asserted connection was missing and dismissed the recusal application. The ruling did not determine the merits of MTH's appeal.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
1,959 words · generated 06/10/2026
This is a procedural ruling arising during MTH's appeal from the dismissal of her civil claims against the State of New South Wales, the estate of Geoffrey Croft, and Sandra Croft. The appeal was heard on 7 and 8 May 2025. On the morning of the second day, counsel for Sandra Croft, the third respondent, applied for Price AJA to recuse himself. The application was based on apprehended bias because Price AJA had previously sat on the Court of Criminal Appeal panel that dismissed Geoffrey Croft's conviction appeal: [1], [3], [18].
The underlying proceedings concerned alleged assaults by Croft against MTH. At first instance, Cavanagh J found that MTH's case had failed and was not comfortably satisfied that Croft had physically and sexually assaulted her in 1979: [8]-[9]. Croft had died before MTH commenced the Supreme Court proceedings. His estate became a party in his place: [3], [10].
Croft had been convicted by a jury in 2019 of five sexual offences against MTH and four against another young person, RS. The trial judge imposed an aggregate term of 22 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years: [12]. The appeal that Price AJA had heard was confined to two grounds: whether the Crown was wrongly permitted to lead evidence in reply, and whether the trial judge erred by not giving the jury guidance on the meaning of “beyond reasonable doubt”: [19]. The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected both grounds: [20]-[21].
The present appeal raised questions about how the convictions were considered in the civil proceedings, including a dispute about a tendency notice under s 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW): [11], [15]-[16]. In oral argument, Price AJA asked about the asserted common feature of the offending, namely violence. The third respondent relied in part on that exchange when arguing that Price AJA might be influenced by his previous role: [16], [23]-[26].
Price AJA declined to recuse himself and gave reasons. When the third respondent renewed the application to the Court as a whole, Mitchelmore and Adamson JJA also refused it. The formal disposition was dismissal of the recusal application: [30]-[31], [40]. The judgment did not decide the substantive appeal.
The court applied the test stated in Ebner. A fair-minded lay observer must reasonably apprehend that a judge might not bring an impartial mind to deciding the matter. To apply the test, the court first identifies what is said to risk a decision other than on the legal and factual merits. It then requires a logical connection between that matter and the feared deviation. Finally, the reasonableness of the apprehension is evaluated from the lay observer's perspective: [2], [33]-[37].
The third respondent's asserted connection was that Price AJA, having joined the dismissal of Croft's criminal appeal, might have a “sense of satisfaction” that the process establishing Croft's convictions was correct. That supposed satisfaction was said to risk affecting the Court of Appeal's assessment of the evidentiary significance of the convictions: [24]-[26], [38].
The court found the premise did not fit the scope of the earlier criminal appeal. The grounds were limited to the admission of Crown evidence in reply and the jury direction about proof beyond reasonable doubt. The first involved a question of mixed fact and law concerning the prosecution's case and evidence rebutting good-character evidence; the second raised a question of law: [19]-[21]. There was no ground alleging that the verdicts were unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeal was therefore not required to assess whether, on the whole evidence, the jury could be satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt: [22].
For that reason, the judgment rejected the proposition that the criminal appeal court had found there was “no miscarriage of justice”. Price AJA explained that the Court of Criminal Appeal made no credibility findings and did not examine the whole evidence: [39]. The joint reasons similarly held that the recusal argument articulated no logical connection between Price AJA's participation in that appeal and a feared departure from the merits in MTH's appeal: [4]-[6].
The court also distinguished the present evidentiary issue from a review of the criminal appeal. A certificate of conviction is evidence of the elements of an offence, but not of the detailed facts found by the sentencing judge. It may be admissible to prove the existence of a fact in issue in the criminal proceeding: [27]. The Court of Appeal's consideration of the certificate's evidentiary significance would not affect or review the decision in Croft: [39]. A judge's earlier participation in a related proceeding was not, without the necessary logical connection, enough to establish apprehended bias.
The judgment does not announce a new test. It applies the established apprehended-bias framework from Ebner and refers to later High Court restatements and explanations, including Isbester, CNY17, Charisteas, QYFM and Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith: [2], [33]-[37]. The judgment describes the framework as requiring identification of the relevant matter, an articulated logical connection to the feared departure from impartial decision-making, and an assessment of reasonableness from the fair-minded lay observer's perspective: [35]-[37].
The practical point made in this ruling concerns application of that test where a judge has previously participated in a related criminal appeal. The fact of prior participation, and the fact that the earlier appeal was dismissed, did not by themselves establish the required connection. The court examined what the earlier appeal actually decided and what it did not decide: [5]-[6], [19]-[22].
The judgment also sets out a limited proposition about certificates of conviction, relying on Sukkar and Osborne. Such a certificate is evidence of the elements of the offence, but not the sentencing judge's detailed factual findings; it can prove the existence of a fact in issue in the criminal proceeding: [27]. The ruling uses that distinction to explain why considering the certificate in the civil appeal would not amount to reviewing the criminal appeal.
The source does not set out a comprehensive account of the law before this ruling or identify any change in doctrine after it. It records no later judicial treatment of MTH v State of New South Wales (No 2). Accordingly, the significance that can be grounded in this judgment is its application of established principles to the particular scope and subject matter of the earlier criminal appeal.
At [2], the joint reasons state the core question: whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably think the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the issue. In plain English, the concern is not whether a party dislikes a judge's earlier decision or whether a judge has encountered related facts before. The question is whether the identified circumstance reasonably suggests a risk that the present decision will not be made impartially.
At [35], Price AJA quotes Ebner's requirement for a “logical connection” between the matter relied on and the feared departure from deciding the case on its merits. Put simply, an application must explain how the prior involvement could affect the judge's decision-making in the current case. Naming an earlier case or asserting an “interest” does not complete that explanation: see also [36].
At [22], Price AJA explains that the criminal appeal did not raise an unreasonable-verdict ground. The court had not been asked to decide whether the whole body of evidence could support the jury's verdict beyond reasonable doubt. In plain English, the earlier appeal did not involve the broad merits review that the recusal submission's premise appeared to assume.
At [39], Price AJA identifies what a fair-minded lay observer would understand about the circumstances. The observer would know the earlier appeal's limited grounds, the public availability of its reasons, and that the present appeal's consideration of the certificate would not affect the criminal appeal. The court concluded that these matters did not support a reasonable apprehension of partiality.
The joint reasons at [6] make the result particularly clear: the fact that the criminal appeal was decided against Croft was not, by itself, enough to supply the required logical connection. In plain English, an adverse prior ruling is not automatically evidence that the judge will be unable to decide a later related matter fairly.
The ruling is relevant to recusal arguments based on a judge's prior participation in a proceeding connected with the current dispute. It shows the importance of identifying precisely what the judge previously decided and comparing it with the issue now before the court. Here, the earlier appeal was confined to two specified grounds and did not assess the whole trial evidence: [19]-[22].
It may also be relevant where a party says that prior judicial involvement gives the judge an “interest” in the outcome. Ebner, as applied here, requires the nature of the asserted interest and its connection to the feared departure from impartial decision-making to be articulated: [36], [38]. A bare assertion of prior involvement, or a general concern about possible subconscious influence, needs to be connected to the present decision-making task.
The judgment also concerns cases where a civil court is asked to consider the evidentiary significance of a criminal conviction. The court distinguished that task from reviewing the criminal appeal itself and described what a certificate of conviction establishes: [27], [39]. The ruling does not decide the admissibility or weight of the convictions in MTH's substantive appeal. It addresses only whether that issue, combined with Price AJA's prior role, required recusal.
The decision should therefore be read in the factual setting it describes. It does not state that prior participation can never give rise to apprehended bias. It concludes that the particular prior appeal, with its limited grounds and the separate nature of the certificate issue, did not establish the necessary logical connection: [4]-[6], [39]-[40].
The judgment is dated 6 June 2025, and the supplied text contains no later decisions discussing or applying MTH v State of New South Wales (No 2). It therefore provides no source-grounded account of subsequent treatment, such as whether later courts have followed, distinguished, or developed this ruling.
The cases discussed in the judgment are authorities cited by the Court in reaching its decision, not later treatments of this judgment. Ebner supplies the central test. Isbester, CNY17, Charisteas, QYFM and Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith are cited in relation to the test and its assessment: [2], [33]-[37]. Croft v R is the earlier criminal appeal central to the factual issue, not a later treatment of the present ruling: [3], [19]-[22].
The judgment leaves the merits of MTH's appeal unresolved. It does not determine whether Croft assaulted MTH, whether the primary judge correctly dealt with the convictions or tendency evidence, or what weight or admissibility should be given to particular evidence in the appeal: [8]-[16], [40].
It also does not provide a general test for every situation in which a judge has previously decided a related proceeding. Its conclusion depends on the specific limits of Croft's criminal appeal and the nature of the current certificate issue. A different prior proceeding, a broader merits determination, or a materially different connection to the current issues would require its own application of the apprehended-bias test.
Finally, although the judgment explains the evidentiary status of a certificate of conviction at [27], it does not resolve all questions about how the criminal convictions or the underlying evidence should be treated in MTH's civil appeal. Those matters were part of the substantive appeal, which this procedural ruling did not determine.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: MTH v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 123
Hearing dates: 7-8 May 2025
Date of orders: 8 May 2025
Decision date: 06 June 2025
Before: Mitchelmore and Adamson JJA at [1];
Price AJA at [8]
Decision: Dismiss the third respondent’s application that Price AJA recuse himself.
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal – whether apprehended bias – application declined
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 97
Cases Cited: Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; [2021] HCA 29
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76; [2019] HCA 50
Croft v R [2021] NSWCCA 146
Croft v The Queen [2022] HCASL 120
Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [2024] HCA 32; (2024) 98 ALJR 1163
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135; [2015] HCA 20
Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288; [1983] HCA 17
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63
Osborne v Butler (a pseudonym) (2024) 73 VR 386; [2024] VSCA 6
Polsen v Harrison [2021] NSWCA 23
QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 279 CLR 148; [2023] HCA 15
SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13
The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341
Texts Cited: S Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (19th ed, 2024, Thomson Reuters)
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: MTH (Appellant) (self-represented)
State of New South Wales (First Respondent)
Estate of the late Geoffrey Croft (Second Respondent)
Sandra Croft (Third Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
C P O’Neill (First Respondent)
K W Andrews (Second Respondent)
P A Tierney (Third Respondent)
Solicitors:
Makinson d’Apice Lawyers (First Respondent)
Keypoint Law (Second Respondent)
Moin Morris Schaefer (Third Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/34755
Publication restriction: Publication of names and any information or material that may lead to the identification of the appellant is prohibited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 578A; Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15A
MITCHELMORE AND ADAMSON J****JA: On the morning of the second day of the hearing of the appeal in this matter, counsel for the third respondent made an application that Price AJA recuse himself. The basis of the recusal application was apprehended bias. The judgment of Price AJA below sets out the background to the recusal application, the basis on which it was made and the arguments that counsel for the third respondent advanced in respect of it.
The test for apprehended bias in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 (“Ebner”) at [6] is whether “a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”. The test requires, first, the identification of what it is said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits; and, second, an articulation of the “logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits”: Ebner at [8]. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed: Ebner at [8], see also eg Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135; [2015] HCA 20 at [59]; Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; [2021] HCA 29 at [11].
The apprehension of bias on which the third respondent relied was said to arise from the circumstance that Price AJA was a member of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Croft v R [2021] NSWCCA 146 (the conviction appeal). The applicant in that matter, Mr Geoffrey Croft, was the second defendant in the proceedings the subject of the present appeal until his death in 2022. The convictions the subject of his appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which was dismissed, included convictions for offences against the appellant in the present appeal, MTH, and another individual, RS. MTH relied on the offending conduct of Mr Croft in her claims against the respondents (with Mr Croft’s estate taking the place of Mr Croft as a party following his death).
Price AJA’s judgment below demonstrates that the test for apprehended bias was not made out. In particular, no logical connection was articulated between his Honour sitting on the Court of Criminal Appeal in the conviction appeal and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the present appeal on its merits.
The premise of the connection on which the third respondent relied was flawed. Counsel for the third respondent submitted that it rested on his Honour having been satisfied, in the conviction appeal, that there was no miscarriage of justice and “with that goes, in a sense, satisfaction that the processes that be established a conviction and therefore established the guilt of the late Mr Croft”. As Price AJA explains below, Mr Croft’s two grounds of appeal were narrowly drawn and their determination did not involve a detailed review of the evidence in the trial (as an unreasonable verdict ground of appeal may have done) or any consideration of miscarriage of justice.
“ADAMSON JA: Right, okay, all right. But in terms of that, the certificate of conviction of RS, had it been tendered, would have proved that Mr Croft sexually assaulted RS. Now that would not have implicated your client per se. But if RS had come and said, “Yes, when he was making me and my brother do various things, Mrs Croft was watching,” then that would have affected it, but it didn’t of its own, but it was a fact, it was a piece of evidence that could have established, could have assisted to establish the appellant’s case against your client.
TIERNEY: I don’t agree with that, your Honour. If we take the threshold under section 97 of significant probative value, that’s a very high threshold. So a certificate of conviction alone, accepting that it may go to the elements of the offence, isn’t within a bull’s roar of establishing significant probative value on the authorities. Now there’s an interesting commentary beyond the bare provisions of section 97 by Mr Odgers and this is the 19th edition at pages--
ADAMSON JA: Sorry, when you say “not within a bull’s roar”, do you say that the fact of Mr Croft having sexually assaulted a male foster child under his care would not have been substantially probative of his sexually assaulting another foster child under his care, being the appellant?
TIERNEY: I do say that.
…
PRICE AJA: Just sorry to interrupt you. What are the considerations by the High Court in Bauer in respect of tendency evidence? Was it a common feature of the offending?
TIERNEY: Yes.
PRICE AJA: As I understood it, there is a common feature of the offending which was alleged in respect of RS and the appellant in these proceedings which was violence.
TIERNEY: Yes, yes, that’s true.
PRICE AJA: But that tends to diminish to some extent your argument.
TIERNEY: *Not much, I’d say, your Honour, with respect. But the point, I can’*t develop it any further unless your Honour wishes to engage with me.
PRICE AJA: No, no.” [3] (emphasis added)
“Similarly, in R v Bauer (2018) 266 CLR 56; 92 ALJR 846; [2018] HCA 40, the High Court observed at [58] that ‘the mere fact that an accused has committed an offence against one complainant is ordinarily not significantly probative of the accused having committed an offence against another complainant’. There ‘must ordinarily be some feature of or about the offending which links the two together’, ‘some common feature of or about the offending’, before the requirement of significant probative value will be met.”
On the morning of the second day of the hearing, counsel for the third respondent made an application that I recuse myself from continuing to hear the appeal. The basis of the application was that I was a member of the Court of Criminal Appeal which dismissed Mr Croft’s appeal against his convictions.
Before advancing further, it is apposite to recount that Mr Croft’s appeal was confined to the following grounds:
“(1) It was an error to permit the Crown to lead evidence in reply.
(2) It was an error to decline to provide the jury with any guidance about the meaning of “beyond reasonable doubt” and instead direct it that the meaning of the phrase was a “question of fact” for the jury to determine.” [4]
Basten JA (with whom I and Garling J agreed) concluded that each ground should be rejected and therefore the appeal dismissed: Croft at [34], [40]-[41] (Basten JA), [42] (Price J), [43] (Garling J).
Ground 1 raised a question of mixed fact and law. Mr Croft in his case had adduced evidence of prior good character and the issues for the Court were whether the trial judge had failed to apply the principles governing the prosecution splitting its case, and whether the Crown should have been permitted to adduce evidence in rebuttal of good character. The Court’s consideration of the facts of the case was confined to this issue. Ground 2 of the appeal raised a question of law alone.
A ground of appeal was not raised by Mr Croft that the verdicts were unreasonable and could not be supported by the evidence. The Court was not required to consider the question whether the Court “thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that [Mr Croft] was guilty”: M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ); [1994] HCA 63; SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13 at [11]-[14] (French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ).
In oral submissions, Mr Tierney raised an apprehension of bias. He referred to the issue of prejudgment because of my prior involvement in the Court of Criminal Appeal citing Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288; [1983] HCA 17. Mr Tierney referred to the similarity in my exchange italicised in the quote above at [16] with a statement in Basten JA’s judgment. He submitted that he did not know what material had been before the Court of Criminal Appeal. He argued that “it’s probably not going to be possible to know whether Price AJA’s analysis of the evidentiary value of a certificate of conviction may not be compared or infected by knowledge which perhaps may even be subconscious knowledge … [t]he example yesterday is a case in point”. [5]
Mr Tierney submitted that the nature of my “interest” was that “the Court of Criminal Appeal bench in the appeal, has an interest, according to the authorities, in relation to the outcome of a review of that decision” [6] , citing Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135; [2015] HCA 20 (“Isbester”) as authority “where the High Court develops the concept of ‘personal interest’ beyond simply a pecuniary interest”. [7] He further submitted:
“His Honour having been satisfied that there was no miscarriage of justice, has therefore ordered the dismissal of the appeal and with that goes, in a sense, satisfaction that the processes that be established a conviction and therefore established the guilt of the late Mr Croft.” [8]
Mr Tierney referred to “[undertaking] an assessment of the certificate of conviction” [9] and “the fact of satisfaction … of the outcome of the appeal in the criminal case was correct”. [10]
Mr Tierney submitted that this Court was “potentially going to embark upon a review of the product of that judgment, the certificate of conviction”. [11] He further submitted that “a fictional person would be capable of saying, ‘[i]s it appropriate that the product of a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal is reviewed by a member of the bench of that appeal?’”. [12] Mr Tierney further referred to Polsen v Harrison [2021] NSWCA 23 at [46] (Bell P, Basten JA and Simpson AJA).
As Mr Tierney’s argument referred to a review of the certificate of conviction, it is necessary to briefly refer to what may be established by such a certificate. A certificate of conviction is evidence of the elements of the offence for which Mr Croft was convicted but not of the detailed facts found by the sentencing judge: The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341 at [9] (Hodgson JA, Tobias and Basten JJA agreeing). The certificate is admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in the criminal proceeding: *Osborne v Butler (*a p**seudonym) (2024) 73 VR 386; [2024] VSCA 6.
The State did not seek to join the third respondent’s recusal application. However, counsel for the second respondent, Mr Andrews, stated he did not oppose the recusal application although mentioning he had not had an opportunity to fully consider the Croft decision. [13]
At the conclusion of oral submissions on the recusal application, a short adjournment was taken by the Court to allow me to consider the application.
On recommencement of the hearing, I stated that I declined to recuse myself and would provide reasons in due course.
After I dismissed the recusal application, Mr Tierney indicated that he wished to renew his application to the Court as a whole. Mitchelmore and Adamson JJA independently delivered judgment their Honours each refusing the recusal application. [14]
What follows are my reasons for declining to recuse myself.
The test for apprehended bias is well established and was stated by the plurality of the High Court in Ebner at [8] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), and more recently restated by the High Court in QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 279 CLR 148; [2023] HCA 15 at [37] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J), [67] (Gordon J), [162] (Edelman J), [194] (Steward J), [225] (Gleeson J), [274] (Jagot J) (“QYFM”).
In Ebner, the plurality said at [6]:
“[A] judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done …” (footnotes omitted)
“First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.”
“The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an ‘interest’ in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.”
It is apparent from the recent High Court authorities that what is sometimes referred to as the “third step”, follows Ebner*’*s two step process and requires the assessment of the “reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer”: Isbester at [59] (Gageler J); CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76; [2019] HCA 50 at [21] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J); Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; [2021] HCA 29 at [11] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ); QYFM at [38] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J), [67] (Gordon J), [225] (Gleeson J), [293] (Jagot J); Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [2024] HCA 32; (2024) 98 ALJR 1163 at [92] (Gageler CJ, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ).
Mr Tierney’s articulation of the second step in Ebner – the logical connection – appears to be that having been a member of the Court of Criminal Appeal that dismissed Mr Croft’s appeal, I would have a “sense of satisfaction” [15] in the process that established his conviction. In dealing with the certificate of conviction, my sense of satisfaction that the outcome of the appeal was correct could be perceived to infect the “delicate weighing issues” [16] that may arise.
A fair-minded lay observer would be taken to appreciate the following:
be aware that I was a part of the bench in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal that heard and dismissed Mr Croft’s conviction appeal;
the italicised exchange between myself and Mr Tierney (quoted above at [16]) arose from Mr Tierney’s “bull’s roar” submission and his reliance on the passage in S Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law at [EA.97.120], and was motivated by my desire to understand the submission;
the reasons for judgment in Croft have been publicly available to read since 5 July 2021 and the trial judge’s remarks on sentence were included in the appeal books;
my reference to a common feature of the offending being violence was not based on any material which was not otherwise available to the other members of the Court;
the Court of Criminal Appeal in Croft did not make a finding that there was no miscarriage of justice. The Court did not make any credit or credibility findings and did not consider the whole of the evidence in Mr Croft’s trial. The Court’s consideration was confined to the issues raised in the two grounds of appeal;
would reasonably understand that this Court’s decision on the issue of the admissibility of Mr Croft’s certificate of conviction will not affect the decision in Croft in any way;
**********
Black Vol 2 of 2 pp 805-828.
Blue Vol 1 of 1 pp 93-100.
Tcpt, 7 May 2025, pp 16(24-45)-17(18-35).
Croft at [4] (Basten JA).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 87(25-30).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 89(5-7).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 92(4-8).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 90(6-10).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 90(10).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 90(35-36).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 91(25-26).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 91(34-37).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 93(40-50).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 94 (20-31).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 90(6-9).
Tcpt, 8 May 2025, p 90(19-22).
MTH
State of New South Wales
(2021) 273 CLR 289
(2019) 268 CLR 76
(2024) 98 ALJR 1163
(2000) 205 CLR 337
(2015) 255 CLR 135
(1983) 151 CLR 288
(1994) 181 CLR 487
(2024) 73 VR 386
(2023) 279 CLR 148
(2011) 243 CLR 400
(2018) 266 CLR 56
The third respondent's application that Price AJA recuse himself was dismissed: [7], [40].
The feared deviation was said to relate to his Honour’s consideration of the evidentiary significance of Mr Croft’s convictions, which has been raised as an issue in the present appeal. There was no logical connection between his Honour dismissing an appeal from those convictions and the feared deviation on which the third respondent relied, particularly when the nature of the conviction appeal is properly understood. The fact that the conviction appeal was determined adversely to Mr Croft was not of itself sufficient to ground the logical connection required, which counsel for the third respondent implicitly recognised by not relying on that matter alone.
The test for apprehended bias not having been established, we agreed that the recusal application be dismissed.
PRICE AJA: On 7 and 8 May 2025, the Court constituted by Mitchelmore JA, Adamson JA and myself heard an appeal by MTH (“the appellant”) from the whole of the decision of Cavanagh J (“the primary judge”) who found that the appellant’s case against the State of New South Wales (“the first respondent”), the estate of the late Geoffrey Croft (“the second respondent”) and Mrs Sandra Croft (“the third respondent”) had failed.
Central to the primary judge’s decision was his Honour’s finding that he was not comfortably satisfied that Mr Croft had physically and sexually assaulted the appellant in 1979.
Mr Croft died in June 2022, which was prior to the commencement of the proceedings by the appellant in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant’s amended statement of claim was filed in April 2023.
The appellant who was self-represented before the primary judge and in this Court raised 33 grounds of appeal but it became apparent to the members of the Court after reading the parties’ submissions and the trial transcript that there may be an issue as to how the convictions of Mr Croft for five offences against MTH and four offences against another young person, RS, had been considered by the primary judge.
Mr Croft had been found guilty by a jury on 30 September 2019 of five sexual offences against the appellant and four sexual offences against RS after a trial in the District Court at Armidale. McLennan SC DCJ (“the trial judge”) on 22 November 2019 sentenced Mr Croft to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 22 years with a non-parole period of 10 years.
The trial judge’s remarks on sentence were placed before the primary judge in an “outline of submissions: abuse of process” by counsel for the first respondent who had agreed to assist the Court in an issue which had arisen as to whether it was open to the second and third respondents to deny that the abuse occurred. The submissions noted that Mr Croft appealed to the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal which was dismissed on 5 July 2021: Croft v R [2021] NSWCCA 146 (“Croft”). Mr Croft sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, but his appeal was dismissed as he died before the application for special leave could be determined: Croft v The Queen [2022] HCASL 120. All of this material is in the appeal books prepared for this Court. [1]
The trial judge’s sentencing remarks included his Honour’s findings that Mr Croft’s offending against RS and the appellant had involved sexual and physical violence.
The appeal books also contained the appellant’s notice pursuant to s 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). Table “A” to the tendency notice included circumstances of what were submitted to be Mr Croft’s offending against two male children, RS and PS. [2] The appellant’s grounds of appeal include complaints that the primary judge erred by not admitting the tendency notice and not permitting the appellant time to subpoena RS.
Much of the argument on the first day of the hearing of the appeal concerned submissions from the parties as to the primary judge’s ruling that the convictions of Mr Croft for five offences against MTH and for offences against RS were not admissible to prove the elements of those offences. During the submissions of the third respondent’s counsel, Mr Tierney, the following exchanges took place:
would not reasonably apprehend on the decision made in the Court of Criminal Appeal in Croft that I might have a sense of satisfaction that the processes that established Mr Croft’s conviction were correct;
would appreciate that the Court of Appeal does not undertake a review or analysis of a certificate of conviction. A fair-minded lay observer, without being taken to have a detailed knowledge of the law or legal principles, would understand that a certificate of conviction is evidence of the elements of an offence for which Mr Croft had been convicted; and
would not reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the arguments of all the parties in the appeal.
Accordingly, I declined the application. I formally dismiss the third respondent’s application to recuse myself.