Fair Work Commission|2025-10-22

The Applicant's recollection of the SWMS is not accurate. The toolbox meeting on 21 February 2025 was used as refresher training on the SWMS. The record of that toolbox meeting provides:

Tuesday 20/02/2025 worker was spotted dismantling scaffold with an exposed edge to the internal face of the scaffold.

There was a gap of 750mm between the scaffold and lift core walls where hop ups had been removed.

There was a potential to fall approx 2:5m to the catch hop up to the deck bellow. [sic]

Waco Leading Hand to carry out a daily Pre-start meeting with all Scaffolders, ensure the following is discussed and recorded GO CANVAS DAILY PRE-START FORM:

Ensure all workers have been consulted and have signed the SWMS.
Discuss the work that is to be done that day and sort out who is doing what.
Discuss the hazards and controls detailed in the SWMS for the tasks that will be done on the day and other hazards that may be in the area/environment where the work is being carried out e.g. other trades, crane lifts, weather, unplanned work etc.
Ensure all workers have everything they need to be able to put all controls in place.
Discuss any foreseeable problems and how they will be managed.
Discuss how variations and day work will be managed.
Ensure injury reporting and first aid arrangements are discussed/documented.

All workers know the communication arrangements.
All material needed for the day is available on site.
Exclusion zone-barriers and signage is installed.

3 Mandatory control- Temporary Erection Platforms (TEP)- General Use

Be a minimum of two steel boards (no less than 450mm) on transoms, or
Be a minimum of two timber boards (no less than 450mm) on ledgers/guardrails
Overhang a minimum of 150mm on both sides (timber boards).
Be in direct contact with the ledger/guardrail- NOT PLACE ON OTHER TIMBER BOARDS.
Have guardrails installed on one side and both ends (one side open enables the equipment to be handed to the scaffolder installing the scaffold components)
1 metre above a FULL PLATFORM- NO MISSING BOARDS.

Responsibility: Leading hand and workers installing TEP.

4 Mandatory control- One Metre Rule- General Use

Ensure working from full platform on the first bay with guardrail and midrail (OR guardrail and mesh guard) in place on the outside.
Where the scaffold is greater than 225mm from the building a guardrail, midrail and toeboard (OR guardrail and mesh guard) must be placed on the inside of each bay.
Access top platform by stair/ladder. Do not climb the standards.
Erect the next lift above the top platform.
Place TEP at 1m height above the top platform.
Access the TEP and erect standards, guardrails and midrails for next lift.
Egress from TEP to top platform and erect boards to next lift.
Erect alloy stair bay to next lift.
Access new top platform by alloy stair (OR ladder).
Fit toeboard to the platform.
Repeat steps 1 to 10 for next bays and steps 1 to 11 for each lift.

YOU MUST ALWAYS HAVE A FULL PLATFORM 1M BELOW THE TEP
IF YOU CAN NOT, STOP WORK AND FOLLOW PHASE 6 OF THIS WORK PLAN/INSTRUCTION.

Responsibility: Leading hand and all workers installing scaffolding system.

6 Process when mandatory requirements cannot be implemented

If the work sequence or mandatory requirements detailed in this Work Plan/Instruction cannot be implemented or if there is a change to the task/project scope WORK MUST STOP and the following process MUST be applied:

A risk assessment must be completed
An alternate fall protection control measures must be identified and added to the SWMS and this Work Instruction/Plan.
The identified control measures must be approved by a Construction Supervisor or Branch Manager"

[183] The failure to follow the Respondent's SWMS in this manner is inexcusable, particularly after the recent serious accidents involving the Respondent's workforce and the toolbox talk on this very issue only 10 days previously and the Applicant's role in the organisation. I have taken this into account.

[184] Regulation 1.07 of the Fair Work Regulations 2009 states:

(1) For the purposes of the definition of serious misconduct in section 12 of the Act, serious misconduct has its ordinary meaning.

(2) For the purposes of subregulation (1), conduct that is serious misconduct includes the following conduct of an employee:

(a) wilful or deliberate behaviour that is inconsistent with the continuation of the contract of employment;

(b) conduct that causes serious and imminent risk to:

(ii) the reputation, viability or profitability of the employer's business;..."

[185] The Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th Edition) defines:-

'serious' to mean: "...3. Significant or worrying in terms of danger or risk: serious injury"; and

'misconduct' to mean: "1. unacceptable or improper behaviour".

I have adopted the plain English meaning of these two words as defined above.

[186] I am satisfied and find that the Applicant engaged in serious misconduct by deliberately ignoring the SWMS. This created a dangerous situation for himself where he could have been seriously injured. Such actions are easily defined as being unacceptable or improper behaviour. As a former Supervisor, a current Leading Hand and a very experienced Scaffolder, I cannot accept or condone that the Applicant would be ignorant of the 1M Safety Deck Rule.

[187] For the reasons stated above, I am satisfied and find that the Respondent had a valid reason to terminate the Applicant.

[188] The Respondent submitted that it put the Applicant on notice of its concerns in relation to the safety breach within minutes of the breach occurring on 3 March 2025, and that the allegations against the Applicant were reiterated to him in the meetings of 4 and 6 March 2025. The Applicant has acknowledged that he was notified of the reason for his dismissal. I have taken this into account.

[189] The Applicant acknowledged that he attended an initial meeting in relation to the safety breach on 4 March 2025 and was invited to a further meeting on 6 March 2025 where he was asked to 'show cause' as to why he should not be dismissed for the safety breach of 3 March 2025. I have taken this into account.

[190] The Applicant was entitled to be given the accusations of his safety breach in writing. The Applicant should then have been given an opportunity to respond to those allegations in writing prior to any disciplinary meeting. It is not in dispute that the Applicant was not provided with these essential procedural processes. I have taken this into account.

Section 387(d) - Any refusal of a support person

[191] There was no refusal of a support person by the Respondent. The Applicant availed himself of the opportunity to have a support person present with him at the dismissal meeting of 6 March 2025. I have taken this into account.

[192] The dismissal was not due to unsatisfactory performance of the Applicant. This is a neutral factor.

Section 387(f) and (g) - Size of Employer and dedicated HR specialists

[193] The Respondent is a large enterprise that employs dedicated human resource personnel. I have taken this into account.

[194] It is not in dispute that the Applicant is the carer for his disabled partner, and I am satisfied that the Applicant's partner had been rushed to hospital on the day of the safety incident. Further, the Applicant had spent an excessive amount of time at the hospital between the two meetings that were convened by the Respondent. I am satisfied and find that the Applicant would have been suffering from sleep deprivation during the disciplinary process conducted by the Respondent. I have taken this into account.

[195] I do not accept the description of the incident as described by Mr Schiaffi for a number of reasons:-

If the Applicant had been working as inherently unsafely as described by Mr Schiaffi, i.e., holding on to the scaffold with one hand whilst having both feet outside the structure of the scaffold, at a height of 2.7 metres, then Mr Schiaffi should have stopped his car and given instructions to cease this life-threatening work practice immediately. There was no danger to Mr Schiaffi stopping his car in the middle of the road for 10-15 seconds to call out to the Applicant. The roadway was under the control of traffic controllers.

Mr Schiaffi did not immediately call the Applicant's Supervisor to have him stop the dangerous work practice. Nor did the Supervisor tell the Applicant to stop the work practice.

The Respondent did not call or subpoena the other witness to the incident. No employee would be admonished by his colleagues if they reported a fellow employee working in a manner as described by Mr Schiaffi.

Mr Schiaffi was driving his vehicle, albeit at a slow speed. Mr Schiaffi testified that he was driving safely and only fleetingly diverted his eyes off the road.

[196] At the Hearing, in response to questions from me, Mr Schiaffi testified as follows:

"I'm just wondering about the safety issue. You're travelling 10 to 15 ks an hour, you said, you had just gone through a traffic controller's stop sign, it's a closed road. I'm just wondering where the safety issue arises. Had you stopped the car, or opened the door, or put your hazard lights on, for example, that would have made the situation pretty safe?‑‑‑I could have potentially done that. I acted in the way that I thought would be most appropriate at the time in the short space of time that I had to see and judge and - - -

It's just that I'm not sure about how short the time was on the basis that, paragraph 41, you've looked up and seen scaffolders working at height, then, at 44, you've looked up again, so obviously you'd be closer now because you were able to judge that Mr Kehoe was working at a height of 2.5 metres, and you were so close in fact you were able to observe him basically standing on the side bars or handrails of the scaffold, which I would think was highly dangerous. You would agree with that, I'm assuming?‑‑‑Yes.

Why wouldn't you stop immediately?‑‑‑I would say that that was an error in my judgment."[43]

[197] For reasons known only to Mr Schiaffi, he did not raise the allegation with the Applicant that he was working outside of the scaffolding in either the meeting on 4 March or 6 March 2025. In response to questions from Ms Bouwsema, Mr Schiaffi testified:

"But you agree that it's quite a serious allegation, that you observed, you say, not just that he did not have a catch deck, which is already, obviously, in breach of the SWMS, which Mr Kehoe has acknowledged and is uncontroversial, but this further allegation that you've made, Mr Schiaffi, why was that not raised in either the investigation meeting of 4 March and the final meeting of 6 March?‑‑‑I would argue that any breach of the SWMS is serious.

Yes, that is not in contest, Mr Schiaffi. What I'm concerned about is that the allegations were not put to Mr Kehoe in the manner that you observed in either meeting that took place with Mr Kehoe?‑‑‑Well, the breach of the SWMS, you know, not having a catch deck within a metre was a big enough issue and a big enough problem in my mind without even getting into anything else.

I put it to you that they were not raised, those issues, those allegations were not raised because they were false and you did not observe Mr Kehoe balancing on the transom and a ledger with his arm wrapped around the standard in the way that you allege in your statement?‑‑‑I strongly disagree with what you're saying."[44]

[198] I have taken the issues outlined in paragraphs [195] - [197] into account.

[199] I have taken into account the emotional response by Mr Schiaffi at the meeting on 6 March 2025. Slamming his hands on the table and raising his voice at the Applicant is not appropriate behaviour during a disciplinary meeting for a manager - despite the level of frustration.

[200] I have taken into account the somewhat carefree attitude of the Applicant during the process. Even allowing for his sleep deprivation and concern for his partner's well-being, the Applicant failed to acknowledge the safety requirement for a full 1 metre deck below his work platform.

[201] The Applicant raised a previous incident in relation to a fellow employee, who also had failed to construct a temporary platform 1 metre below his working platform. In that instance, the employee was given a final warning and was not dismissed. The Applicant has claimed that this disparate treatment is unfair. However, I do not agree. The Applicant was a former Supervisor, was now a Leading Hand and had undertaken a re-training on the SWMS in the period immediately before the incident of 3 March. The Respondent is entitled to demand absolute compliance from an employee with the Applicant's experience and position. I have taken this into account.

[202] The Respondent referred the Commission to a Full Bench decision in Newton. Whilst I have rejected the evidence of Schiaffi in relation to his description of the Applicant working outside of the scaffolding structure, for completeness I note paragraphs [183] and [184] of Newton as follows:

"[183] As observed by the Full Bench in Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd:

'As a matter of logic procedural fairness would require that an employee be notified of a valid reason for their termination before any decision is taken to terminate their employment in order to provide them with an opportunity to respond to the reason identified. Section 170CG (3)(b) and (c) would have very little (if any) practical effect if it was sufficient to notify employees and give them an opportunity to respond after a decision had been taken to terminate their employment. Much like shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted.'

[184] The above statement of principle also applies to ss.387(b) and (c)."

These extracts indicate that an employer has a requirement to advise an employee of the reasons for their termination in order to satisfy the procedural fairness requirements of the FW Act.

[203] The building and construction industry is a very dangerous industry where there are far too many injuries and fatalities every year. The CFMEU has been instrumental in the introduction of safety processes, such as SWMS for basically every task, to minimise the inherent risks associated with working in this industry. However, all of those successful campaigns for a safer workplace are in vain if employees do not follow the relevant safety procedures. I am satisfied and find that the Applicant did not follow the SWMS in this incident despite having been retrained on them in the previous fortnight.

[204] However, every employee is entitled to "a fair go", which includes an opportunity to respond to a set of written allegations. This did not occur in this circumstance. As a result, I am satisfied and find that the Applicant did not receive his statutory entitlement to a fair go.

[205] I am satisfied and find that the Applicant's termination lacked the requisite procedural fairness, which renders the Applicant's termination as harsh.

[206] As a result, I am satisfied and find that the Applicant was unfairly dismissed.

[207] Having found that the Applicant's termination was harsh, I now turn to the issue of an appropriate remedy.

[208] The relevant provisions of the FW Act in relation to a remedy for an unfair dismissal are:

"390 When the FWC may order remedy for unfair dismissal

(1) Subject to subsection (3), the FWC may order a person's reinstatement, or the payment of compensation to a person, if:

(a) the FWC is satisfied that the person was protected from unfair dismissal (see Division 2) at the time of being dismissed; and

(b) the person has been unfairly dismissed (see Division 3).

(2) The FWC may make the order only if the person has made an application under section 394.

(3) The FWC must not order the payment of compensation to the person unless:

(a) the FWC is satisfied that reinstatement of the person is inappropriate; and

(b) the FWC considers an order for payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

Note: Division 5 deals with procedural matters such as applications for remedies."

(1) An order for a person's reinstatement must be an order that the person's employer at the time of the dismissal reinstate the person by:

(a) reappointing the person to the position in which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal; or

(b) appointing the person to another position on terms and conditions no less favourable than those on which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal.

(a) the position in which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal is no longer a position with the person's employer at the time of the dismissal; and

(b) that position, or an equivalent position, is a position with an associated entity of the employer;

the order under subsection (1) may be an order to the associated entity to:

(d) appoint the person to another position on terms and conditions no less favourable than those on which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal.

(2) If the FWC makes an order under subsection (1) and considers it appropriate to do so, the FWC may also make any order that the FWC considers appropriate to maintain the following:

(b) the period of the person's continuous service with the employer, or (if subsection (1A) applies) the associated entity.

(3) If the FWC makes an order under subsection (1) and considers it appropriate to do so, the FWC may also make any order that the FWC considers appropriate to cause the employer to pay to the person an amount for the remuneration lost, or likely to have been lost, by the person because of the dismissal.

(4) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (3), the FWC must take into account:

(a) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for reinstatement; and

(b) the amount of any remuneration reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for reinstatement and the actual reinstatement."

(1) An order for the payment of compensation to a person must be an order that the person's employer at the time of the dismissal pay compensation to the person in lieu of reinstatement.

(2) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (1), the FWC must take into account all the circumstances of the case including:

(a) the effect of the order on the viability of the employer's enterprise; and

(b) the length of the person's service with the employer; and

(c) the remuneration that the person would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if the person had not been dismissed; and

(d) the efforts of the person (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered by the person because of the dismissal; and

(e) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation; and

(f) the amount of any income reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation; and

(g) any other matter that the FWC considers relevant.

(3) If the FWC is satisfied that misconduct of a person contributed to the employer's decision to dismiss the person, the FWC must reduce the amount it would otherwise order under subsection (1) by an appropriate amount on account of the misconduct.

(4) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt, caused to the person by the manner of the person's dismissal.

(5) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not exceed the lesser of:

(a) the amount worked out under subsection (6); and

(b) half the amount of the high income threshold immediately before the dismissal.

(6) The amount is the total of the following amounts:

(whichever is higher) for any period of employment with the employer during the 26 weeks immediately before the dismissal; and

(b) if the employee was on leave without pay or without full pay while so employed during any part of that period - the amount of remuneration taken to have been received by the employee for the period of leave in accordance with the regulations."

[209] Further to the hearing in this matter, both parties provided submissions in relation to remedy as follows.

[210] The Applicant provided calculations in relation to the sum of compensation sought as follows:

"• Applicant's average weekly earnings at the Company (at [103] of the Statement of Tim Schiaffi, based on 36.5 weeks): $3,918.99

Total estimated earnings had the employment continued (average x 24 weeks): $94,055.76

Applicant's mitigated loss (7 March 2025 to 25 July 2025) cash in hand/casual work (estimated): $4,150.00

Applicant's mitigated loss (26 July 2025 to 21 August 2025): $15,479.55

[211] The Applicant provided payslips in support of these calculations. The Applicant noted that he has provided an estimate of his earnings for the period of 7 March 2025 to 25 July 2025 as he did not have written records of the cash in hand work he had performed.

[212] In response to the Applicant's calculations, the Respondent submitted as follows:

"1. The Union's calculation infers that the Applicant's employment would have continued for a period of 24 weeks had his employment not been terminated. Given the Applicant's unwillingness to acknowledge that he had even done anything wrong and his unwillingness to accept responsibility for his serious safety breach, the Commission could reasonably find that the Applicant's employment would have ended within an 8 week period such that the maximum claim should be limited to 8 x $3,918.99 - being an amount of $31,351.92 (the Maximum Amount).

2. Regarding the estimated earnings for the period between 7 March 2025 to 25 July 2025, when the Applicant allegedly performed cash-in-hand work, the estimated earnings of $4,150 is remarkably low, as this means that over a period of 20 weeks, the Applicant only earned an average of $207.50 per week. The Respondent submits that it is too convenient that the Applicant has no records of what he received during this period of employment and is only providing an estimate. It was open to the Applicant to request records under Reg 3.42 of his earnings and hours of work from all employers he had worked for during this period to substantiate his earnings, but the Applicant has failed to do so.

Further, the Applicant has not provided any documentary evidence to indicate the extent of his job-seeking activities during the period 7 March 2025 to 25 July 2025 and, accordingly, cannot properly satisfy the Commission that he took reasonable steps to mitigate his loss before he obtained his current position.

Applying the Applicant's own estimated earnings to the 8-week anticipated period of employment, and using the average earning of $207.50 per week, the Applicant's estimated earning between 7 March 2025 to 1 May 2025 (being the date that is 8 weeks after the date of termination) is $207.5 x 8 = $1,660.00 (Deduction A).

The Respondent submits that the failure to mitigate should reduce the Maximum Amount by at least a further 15% being an amount of (0.15 x $31,351.92) $4,702.78 (Deduction B).

3. The amount of $15,479.55, which the Applicant asserts is his earnings for the period 26 July 2025 to 21 August 2025, is inaccurate. That amount is his earnings for the period 26 July 2025 to 15 August 2025. The Applicant has not provided any payslips for any work performed after 15 August 2025. In this circumstance, it would be appropriate for the Commission to estimate the Applicant's income for the additional week based on an average of his income for the three prior weeks, which amounts to a discount on the Maximum Amount of approximately $19,165. This inaccuracy having been noted, this amount is not relevant for the purposes of calculating compensation because it falls outside the 8-week anticipated period of employment.

4. Finally, given the Applicant's culpability for participating in a serious safety breach, the Respondent submits that the Maximum Amount should be discounted by at least 70% being an amount of $21,946.34 (Deduction C)."

[213] The Respondent concluded that when the 'Maximum Amount' is reduced by 'Deduction A, Deduction B, and Deduction C' (equalling an amount of $28,309.12), the amount of compensation that could be awarded by the Commission should be no more than $3042.80.

[214] The Applicant has sought reinstatement, compensation for lost wages and continuity of service.

[215] The Respondent has strongly opposed the Applicant being reinstated on the basis that it has lost trust and confidence in his ability to work safely or to comply with its safety requirements. I have taken this into account.

[216] The Applicant was in a position of authority and leadership as the Leading Hand for the Respondent on this site. The Respondent was entitled to expect that the Applicant would follow the safety standards that had been set by the Respondent. His blatant disregard of these safety requirements and his arrogant and dismissive approach to his actions, has resulted in a justifiable and understandable loss of trust and confidence by the Respondent in the Applicant's ability to continue in his role.

[217] Even though reinstatement is the primary remedy under the FW Act, I am satisfied and find, for the reasons stated above, that the required level of trust and confidence cannot be restored in this circumstance.

[218] I have taken into account the provisions of s.392 of the FW Act and the approach adopted Sprigg v Paul's Licensed Festival Supermarket,[45] as articulated in the context of the FW Act in Bowden v Ottrey Homes Cobram and District Retirement Villages.[46]

[219] I have previously found that the Respondent had a valid reason to terminate the Applicant, but they have not afforded the Applicant his statutory entitlement to procedural fairness in the termination process. As a result, the only compensation to which the Applicant is entitled, is the period of time that the Respondent should have taken in undertaking the appropriate process.

[220] This process was rushed for no apparent reason. The Applicant should have been put off on special leave without pay for 1 week to deal with his partner's hospitalisation. The Applicant should then have been provided with the SWMS breach allegations in writing at a convened disciplinary meeting and given 4-5 days to respond. This would have allowed the Applicant to get advice from his union in relation to his written response. The Respondent then should have taken some time to properly consider the Applicant's written response and invite the Applicant and his support person to a further meeting to advise them of their considered outcome.

[221] Due to the special circumstances of this case, I am satisfied and find that the Respondent must pay to the Applicant 2 weeks' pay plus superannuation.

[1] WorkPac Pty Ltd v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131; 280 IR 191 at [197].

[2] The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary (2004) 4th ed, 1297.

[5] Johnson v Marshall, Son & Co Ltd [1906] UKLawRpAC 17; [1906] AC 409 at 415.

[7] Lawrence v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd [2010] FWAFB 10089 at [20] and [38].

[8] Fair Work Bill, Explanatory Memorandum at [1541].

[9] Selvanchandran v Petaron Plastics Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 333; (1995) 62 IR 371 at 373.

[10] Lawrence v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd [2010] FWAFB 10089 at [20] and [38].

[11] Allied Express Transport Pty Ltd v Anderson (1998) 81 IR 410 at 5; Yew v ACI Glass Packaging Pty Ltd (1996) 71 IR 201 at 204.

[12] Statement of Tim Schiaffi, filed on 14 July 2025, at Annexure TS1.

[18] Walton v Mermaid Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd [1996] IRCA 267; (1996) 142 ALR 681 at 685.

[19] The Respondent cited the Statement of Rick Kehoe, filed on 23 June 2025, at [51]. The Respondent also cited the Applicant's Outline of Submissions filed on 23 June 2025, at [21] where it is stated "The Applicant does not dispute the safety breach that occurred on 3 March 2025".

[22] Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Arnotts Biscuits Limited (2010) 188 FCR 221; [2010] FCA 770 at [18] - [19].

[23] Statement of Tim Schiaffi, filed on 14 July 2025, at [82].

[26] Statement of Tim Schiaffi, filed on 14 July 2025, at [82].

[27] Statement of Rick Kehoe, filed on 23 June 2025, at [29].

[32] Parmalat Food Products Pty Ltd v Wililo [2011] FWAFB 1166 at [24].

[33] Statement of Tim Schiaffi, filed on 14 July 2025, at [87].

[42] Statement of Tim Schiaffi, filed on 14 July 2025, at Annexure TS1.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

Work Regulations 2009

Mr Rick Kehoe v Waco Kwikform Limited [2025] FWC 2551 (22 October 2025)

[43] The Applicant cited the decision in Perri v Anglo Italian [2013] FWC 10 (Perri), in which the Commission distinguished between the true reason for dismissal and the stated reason. In Perri, the employer, Anglo Italian, alleged that the dismissed employee's attitude and behaviour in the disciplinary meeting "were such to destroy any belief about his commitment to workplace health and safety", leading to his dismissal. The employer alleged that Mr Perri had "smirked" and was contemptuous in the disciplinary meeting. However, the Applicant submitted that in that matter, the Commission determined that Anglo Italian's view and their subsequent decision to terminate Mr Perri was made "in haste", and that Mr Perri did not intend to give the impression that was alleged by the employer.

[59] The Applicant cited the Full Bench decision in Nguyen v Vietnamese Community in Australia [2014] FWCFB 7198, which set out the following principles in relation to whether reinstatement should be ordered:

Mr Rick Kehoe v Waco Kwikform Limited [2025] FWC 2551

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (163 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (3)

Cases Cited (13)

Mr Rick Kehoe v Waco Kwikform Limited [2025] FWC 2551 (22 October 2025)