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[170]
[2026] FWC 178
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2026-01-19
Original judgment source is linked above.
[2026] FWC 178 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2026/1861) was lodged against this decision.]
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Application for unfair dismissal - no valid reason alleged - employer's direction asserted to be not lawful and reasonable - valid reason found - found Applicant failed to follow lawful and reasonable direction - dismissal not harsh, unjust or unreasonable - application dismissed.
[1] On 9 July 2025, Mr Richard Johnson (the Applicant) made an application under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) alleging that he was unfairly dismissed from his employment on 20th of June 2025.
[2] Mr Johnson's employer, PaperCut Software Pty Ltd (PaperCut or the Respondent), denies these allegations. Their position is that there was a valid reason for Mr Johnson to be dismissed. The reasons given for the dismissal was that Mr Johnson was issued, and failed to comply, with a direction by his employer to follow a return to office transition plan and, ultimately, a requirement to attend the office in accordance with its hybrid workplace policy.
[3] Mr Johnson accepts that he did not comply with the directions given by his employer to return to the office. His position is that the directions he was given were not lawful or reasonable because they were contrary to the terms of the contract of employment he signed. He argues the fact that he did not comply as directed does not constitute a valid reason for him to be dismissed and thus, has resulted in him being unfairly dismissed and seeks to be reinstated to his former position.
[4] PaperCut opposes reinstatement and maintains there was a valid reason Mr Johnson was dismissed because he failed to comply with both lawful and reasonable directions. Stating further, that he was notified of the reason for his dismissal and provided every opportunity and procedural fairness to do as his employer directed.
[5] On allocation to my Chambers, directions were issued for the merits of the application to be determined by way of hearing, consistent with the provisions of s.397 of the FW Act.
[6] Having considered all the submissions and evidence submitted by the parties, I have found that the circumstances of this case are such that Mr Johnson's dismissal was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Because of these findings, I have determined his application must be dismissed. The reasons for these findings are set out below.
[7] A hearing was held on 27th of October 2025 in Melbourne. Mr Johnson was represented by Mr Andrew White (Counsel). PaperCut was represented by Ms Catherine Pase (Counsel), both of whom were granted leave to appear.
[8] Mr Johnson filed an outline of evidence and submissions, along with a witness statement and supporting materials. He also presented and provided sworn evidence in proceedings.
[9] The Respondent also filed written submissions and several supporting documents, along with a series of witness statements. The Respondent's submissions were supported by the sworn evidence of Ms Carolyn Butcher and Ms Kathryn Pagar.
[10] A court book, containing all materials filed by the parties was compiled and distributed to the parties prior to the Hearing. I received the entirety of the court book into evidence, subject to appropriate weight being given to the evidence that was tainted by opinion, irrelevance or hearsay.
[11] Much of the evidence and facts in this case are not in dispute. Critically, it is not in dispute that Mr Johnson did not comply with a direction that he attends his employer's office and comply with its hybrid work policy. Nor is it in dispute that this failure to comply was the only reason Mr Johnson was dismissed. I have assessed and considered all the evidence and submissions of the parties in this matter to the extent relevant and necessary. Set out below are my findings of the relevant background facts.
[12] Mr Johnson commenced employment with PaperCut on 4th April 2022 in Melbourne, Victoria. Prior to commencing employment, on 16th March 2022, PaperCut provided Mr Johnson with a proposed contract of employment. Relevantly, the proposed contract included the following terms:
The Employee agrees to carry out the Duties during the Employee's employment with PaperCut and to:
a) perform the Duties and comply with such reasonable and lawful directions and all policies, rules and regulations from time to time provided by PaperCut...
The Employee is permitted to work from their personal residence in item 1 of Schedule 1 in line with relevant PaperCut policy. The Employee may be required to work at other locations from time to time."
[13] Item 1 of Schedule 1 specified Mr Johnson's name and personal residential address. The contract did not otherwise specify a primary place of work.
[14] The contract comprised 27 clauses, detailed across 28 pages setting out the proposed terms and conditions for Mr Johnson to be employed by PaperCut.
[15] Mr Johnson signed the contract on 20th March 2022, commencing work under its terms on the 4th of April.
[17] On the 25th of February 2022, the Victorian Government removed its strong recommendation for employees to work from home, encouraging a return to the office as Australia emerged from the Covid 19 Pandemic.
Following our conversation on 5th August 2022, this letter outlines a variation to your employment contract (Contract).
As discussed, an incorrect variation of Clause 7 concerning your place of employment was included in your initial Contract. This incorrect variation of Clause 7 does not mention the PaperCut office as a place of employment in addition to your personal residence.
This letter constitutes a formal written variation to your Contract in accordance with Clause 22 of the Contract.
For clarity, the Contract is varied by the replacement of the following clause in the Contract:
The Employee is permitted to work from their personal residence in item 1 of Schedule 1 in line with relevant PaperCut policy. The Employee may be required to work at other locations from time to time.
with the inclusion of the following new clause in the Contract:
The Employee's place of employment will be PaperCut's premises in item 4 of Schedule 1. The Employee may be required to work at other locations from time to time. The Employee may be permitted to work from their personal residence in line with relevant PaperCut policy."
[21] Mr Johnson did not agree to this proposed variation to his contract of employment as required by clause 21. He also did not agree to subsequent requests to vary his contract and maintained his understanding was that he had a contract that allowed him to work remotely. His evidence is that previous managers told him he did not have to as they accepted his contract, while not intentionally, allowed him to work remotely.
[22] Neither Mr Johnson nor PaperCut have presented further evidence from Mr Johnson's former managers about this proposed variation.
[23] Ms Pager became Mr Johnson's manager in 2024, and her evidence is that she determined the best way to deal with Mr Johnson's non-attendance was as part of PaperCut's implementation and transition compliance with its hybrid work policy by January 2025. I accept this evidence.
[25] PaperCut have not previously raised any issues or concerns with Mr Johnson's conduct, performance or capacity to perform his duties.
"Effective from 1 January 2025, your primary work location will change from your personal residence to our offices at....
This change is being implemented in line with our efforts to standardise employee contracts and maintain consistency across PaperCut.
This change will not impact your existing hybrid work arrangement, and you will continue to have flexibility in line with PaperCut's hybrid workplace policy."
[27] Mr Johnson raised concerns at this meeting, and following, that the change proposed was in breach of the mobility clause in his contract of employment. In response to these concerns, a further meeting was proposed for early 2025 and the requirement to comply was put on hold.
[28] A further meeting was held on 13 January 2025. At this meeting, Mr Johnson was told PaperCut had received legal advice and was confident its requirement was not a breach of his contract. He was then advised he would now be required to comply by the 1st of February. He was also invited to get his own legal advice if that would be of assistance.
[29] Mr Johnson sought his own advice. On January 16th, he advised PaperCut that his advice was their direction was a breach of his contract of employment.
"Re: Clarification of Relocation of Primary Work Location
We acknowledge that you have informed us of the legal advice you received regarding your relocation and that it was suggested that the change breaches your contract under the Mobility Clause. You have indicated that you intend to continue working from home.
PaperCut has completed a final review with external legal advice and we do not accept that this change constitutes a breach of your Employment Contract. The Mobility Clause operates by reference to company policy, and as such, we maintain that our requirement for in-office attendance is both lawful and reasonable.
Specifically, our position remains that you are required to comply with PaperCut's
policy of attending the office at least 3 days per week. Failure to comply with this
"Re: Your work location and PaperCut's Hybrid Work Policy
PaperCut has completed a review of this letter, and we do not accept that this change constitutes a breach of your Employment Contract.
As previously explained, PaperCut's position is as follows.
Under clause 3(a) of your employment agreement, you are required to "comply with such reasonable and lawful directions and all policies, rules and regulations from time to time provided by PaperCut".
...Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action."
"Richard, we want to be super clear: This letter serves as your final warning regarding your non-compliance. You are required to attend the office three days per week, immediately and consistently, starting tomorrow, Thursday, 12 June 2025, and maintaining it going forward (subject to any approved variations or approved leave).
Please understand that failure to meet this attendance requirement in line with the agreed-upon transition plan on a weekly basis will result in disciplinary action, which may include termination of your employment."
[37] Mr Johnson accepts that he did not comply with his employer's direction. He accepts he was made aware of the reasons why he was dismissed, but maintains this was not a valid reason. He does not suggest he was not provided with an opportunity to have discussions with his representatives or have them participate in discussions on his behalf. His primary case is that he was unfairly dismissed because his employer did not have a valid reason to terminate him. This is because the reason they relied on was unlawful and unreasonable because it breached the mobility term of his contract of employment.
[38] In the event the Commission finds a valid reason exits, Mr Johnson argues he was unfairly dismissed because this decision was disproportionate and harsh in circumstances where there were no other issues with his employment. Previous attempts by PaperCut to vary his contract of employment had not been pressed indicating there was some ambiguity in his contract. Other employees of the Respondent continue to be allowed to work remotely without being subjected to disciplinary action. And that the Respondent had more appropriate options, other than the disproportionate step of termination, to call Mr Johnson to account for conduct he made them aware he was legally entitled to take.
[40] Mr Johnson's consistent evidence is he made his employer aware of what he believed were his rights in his contract of employment and that he did not accept that he had to comply with their direction because of these rights and would not comply. He accepts he did not comply, and he was dismissed for this non-compliance.
[42] The Respondent accepts Mr Johnson's employment contract permits him to work from home. Their position is this permission is subject to relevant PaperCut policy and that it also provides that Mr Johnson may be required to work from other locations from 'time to time' without limitation. They submit, that from August 2023 and throughout 2024, PaperCut consulted with its workforce, including Mr Johnson, about the implementation of its hybrid work policy. That the policy was implemented through a staged transition to achieve 3 days of office attendance from January 2025.
[44] PaperCut also submitted that it treated Mr Johnsson fairly, provided him procedural fairness and every opportunity to comply with this direction. They argue they have acted reasonably in all the circumstances of this case. Including, that its hybrid work policy was reasonable and soundly based on the needs of the business, developed in consultation with staff and implemented through a staged transition. Adding, that at no time has Mr Johnson presented any reason or personal circumstance why he could not comply with his employer's direction to attend the office and comply with its hybrid work policy.
[45] Section 396 of the Act sets out the following:
"The FWC must decide the following matters relating to an application for an order under Division 4 before considering the merits of the application:
(a) Whether the application was made within the period required in subsection 394(2);
(b) Whether the person was protected from unfair dismissal;
(c) Whether the dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code;
(d) whether the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy."
[46] As set out above in s.396 of the Act, consideration as to whether the dismissal was unfair cannot occur unless the Commission is first satisfied that the provisions of s.396 have been met. In the present case, it is not contested, and I am satisfied that Mr Johnson has made his application within the requirements of the Act. It is not contested, and I am satisfied that Mr Johnson was earning below the high-income threshold and is a person protected from unfair dismissal. It is also not contested, and I am satisfied, that the Respondent is not a small business that seeks to rely on the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code. Nor is it asserted, and I am satisfied, that this is not a case of genuine redundancy.
[47] As I have been satisfied that the requirements of s.396 are met, I am required to consider the merits of whether Mr Johnson's dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
Was the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable?
"It may be that the termination is harsh but not unjust or unreasonable, unjust but not harsh or unreasonable, or unreasonable but not harsh or unjust. In many cases the concepts will overlap. Thus, the one termination of employment may be unjust because the employee was not guilty of the misconduct on which the employer acted, may be unreasonable because it was decided upon inferences which could not reasonably have been drawn from the material before the employer, and may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct in respect of which the employer acted."
[49] Section 387 of the Act provides for the criteria for consideration whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable as follows:
In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person's capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and
(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person--whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
(f) the degree to which the size of the employer's enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant."
[50] In the present case, Mr Johnson does not press any procedural matters with respect to sections 387 (b) to (e). The key issue in dispute is whether there was a valid reason for him to be dismissed and if there are any other matter relevant that must be considered.
s.387(a) Whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person's capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees)
[59] In support of this position, Mr Johnson identifies that the letter of offer he received attached to his contract of employment specified his start date of "4 April 2022 at your home address." Adding that his recollection at the time of employment is that the Respondent confirmed his understanding that the role would not generally require in office attendance. Finally, that any policy of the Respondent would not be lawful or reasonable if it was not consistent with the express terms of Mr Johnson's employment contract.
[60] Mr Johnson also argues that the Respondent's direction was not reasonable because it was arbitrary and capricious and not made on reasonable business grounds. The essence of these arguments on reasonableness include that PaperCut has not been able to justify its position that requiring some employees to work from the office 3 days a week will add to business productivity and efficiency. That PaperCut has not identified any reason why Mr Johnson's position could not work remotely as other employees were permitted to do. Finally, that for the last 3 years Mr Johnson has successfully performed his role without issue or concern, while working predominantly from home.
[64] In terms of the reasonableness of its direction, the Respondent argues that its policy and the requirement employees work from the office 3 days a week is objectively reasonable, other than those with approved arrangements. That it was developed in consultation with employees and founded on a considered and rational position that the best interest of the business is served if most of its employees work from the office. The policy allowed for flexibility. It is implemented through a staged transition over 16 months. And its requirement was for in-office work 3 days a week. However, employees with specific circumstances could request alternative arrangements to suit their needs.
[65] PaperCut identifies that Mr Johnson has not requested a flexible work arrangement or identified any personal reason why he could not comply with the policy and directions. Adding that while his subjective evidence of what he was told at the time he entered the contract goes some way to account for his conduct, it is inconsistent with the evidence of his office attendance.
[66] I have considered the submissions of the parties, and I am satisfied that the direction Mr Johnson was given was a lawful direction. Plainly, the direction involved no illegality.
[67] I am also satisfied that the direction was within the scope of Mr Johnson's employment contract and not in any way prohibited by the employment agreement he entered. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the terms of Mr Johnson's employment contract and his argument that these terms prevented his employer from requiring him to work from the office and complying with its hybrid work policy because it entitled him to work from home.
[68] I am not persuaded that Mr Johnson's interpretation of the terms of his employment contract provide him any basis to reach a conclusion he had an unconditional right to work from home. Applying the principles relevant to the interpretation of employment contracts set out above at [56], my assessment is that, objectively viewed, a reasonable person would find these words to mean PaperCut agreed he could work from home at the time the contract was entered into. The inclusion of the word "permitted" supports this being the correct conclusion, as something that PaperCut allowed Mr Johnson to do.
"[43] The difficulty, of course, with the ordinary English meaning is that the expression admits of more than one meaning. It might refer to a situation in which permission is granted. More commonly, however, "permitted" is used as a synonym for "allowed".
[45] Apart from the archaic use of the verb "permit" to connote "commit, submit, hand over, leave, resign or yield", the first meaning of the transitive verb given in the Oxford English Dictionary is:
To allow the occurrence of (an action, etc.); to allow (something) to be carried out or to take place; to give permission or opportunity for.
[47] The meaning given to the adjective "permitted" (of a thing, action, etc.) is "allowed, not forbidden".
[70] As in that case, this is precisely the meaning of word "permitted" in the context of Mr Johnson's contract. Working from home, is something PaperCut "allowed" him to do. It was not, however, as Mr Johnson believed, a "right" he was entitled to without caveat.
[71] The words following, "in line with relevant policy", make it clear the permission was conditional. It was only permitted if it was consistent or in accordance with PaperCut policy. In the event PaperCut policy changed, working from home may no longer be allowed. The subsequent sentence further clarifies this fact, making it clear that the employer reserved the right to require Mr Johnson to work from other locations from time to time.
[72] Clause 3 of the contract further reinforces this conclusion that it was a condition of Mr Johnson's contract that he was required to comply with all policies, rules and regulations from time to time provided by PaperCut.
[73] It follows from the above that I find, read as a whole, a reasonable person would objectively conclude the terms of Mr Johnson's contract allowed him to work from home provided it was consistent with PaperCut's policy as determined by it.
[74] I do not conclude there is any ambiguity in the plain meaning of these words. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered both Mr Johnson's evidence of his subjective views of what he was told and understood, and what followed once the agreement was reached in terms of PaperCut's variation attempts. Because I am satisfied there is no ambiguity in what a reasonable person would conclude the terms of contract to mean, I do not consider these to be relevant factors.
[75] Because of this finding, I am satisfied that PaperCut provided Mr Johnson with a lawful direction that he failed to comply with.
[76] I am also satisfied that PaperCut's request was not unreasonable. In this regard, I accept PaperCut's evidence of the steps it took to develop its hybrid work policy in consultation with staff, including Mr Johnson. The steps it took to transition to these new working arrangements as it emerged from the pandemic and the steps it took to seek to explain its position to Mr Johnson. I also consider the numerous opportunities that were provided to him to understand their position, proposed transitional arrangements and the time he was given to comply with the direction further demonstrate reasonableness.
[77] While I have considered Mr Johnson's arguments that PaperCut acted unreasonably towards him, I do not consider this to be the case. I do not discern any amount of unreasonableness in their conduct.
[79] Mr Johnson also asserts his employer's conduct was unreasonable because it was arbitrary and capricious, in effect because it was made without any reasoned justification. I do not accept these submissions. The essence of these arguments is that it is unreasonable for an employer to require an employee to present at a place of work determined by them to be in the best interest of the business without justifying this decision to the employee concerned. I do not accept there is a sound basis for this assertion.
[80] Furthermore, in the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that PaperCut's reasoning for seeking to implement a hybrid work policy and have Mr Johnson comply with it was sound, considered and well founded. The Respondent's witnesses provided consistent evidence in this regard, and I accept it to be the case.
[81] While I have also considered Mr Johnson's other arguments that his employer's direction was unreasonable, including employment history and how other employees may have been treated, because of the findings I have made above, I do not consider these matters weigh against a conclusion PaperCut's direction was reasonable.
[82] After considering all the evidence and submissions in this case, I am satisfied that the direction Mr Johnson was provided was both lawful and reasonable. Mr Johnson does not dispute that on several occasions he did not comply with this direction, and I am satisfied this is so. This finding weighs against a finding his dismissal was unfair.
s.387(b) Whether the person was notified of that reason
s.387(c) Whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person
[86] It is not contested that Mr Johnson was not provided an opportunity to respond to reasons given for his dismissal and provided clear direction and opportunity to comply with the employer's directions. I consider this factor weighs in favour of the Respondent.
s.387(d) Any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal
[87] This factor is not relevant to the facts of this case. There is no evidence or submission that Mr Johnson requested nor was denied representation. I consider this factor to be neutral.
s.387(e) If the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person‑ - whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal
[88] Mr Johnson was not terminated because of unsatisfactory performance. As such this is not a relevant factor, and I consider it to be neutral to my determination of this matter.
s.387(f) The degree to which the size of the employer's enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal and s.387(g) - Whether the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise impacted on the procedures followed
[89] The Respondent is not a small business and has the benefit of a dedicated human resource management specialist. While I have considered these factors, I do not consider they are relevant to the circumstances of this case. I, therefore, consider this to be a neutral factor.
s.387(h) Any other matters that the FWC considers relevant
[90] The provisions of s.387(h) requires the Commission to take into account any other matters it considers relevant. There are several other matters in the circumstances of this case that require consideration.
[91] Mr Johnson submits that in circumstances where all he has done is act on a genuine belief that he had a contractual right to work from home, informed his employer of this, and provided them a copy of the legal advice to support his position, the termination of his employment was harsh. He further argues, the fact that PaperCut accepted an element of ambiguity in his contract and a chance his interpretation was right support this conclusion. Particularly, in circumstances where Mr Johnson was a good performing employee and PaperCut had more proportionate options it could have pursued, such as a court declaration of contractual rights, rather than dismissal.
[92] Mr Johnson adds the fact he was prepared to undertake any training in relation to PaperCut's polices and/or his conduct and performance prior to his dismissal and that his role could be, and had successfully been, performed from home are other relevant matters to be considered. Concluding that his dismissal has significantly impacted him in financial, emotional and psychological terms.
[93] The Respondent rejects these contentions are relevant. In summary, their position is that faced with Mr Johnson's clearly articulated decision that he was not prepared to comply as directed, PaperCut had no other option but to conclude the continuation of his employment was unsustainable. Adding that they made this decision only after providing Mr Johnson ample opportunity to comply with its direction and clearly articulating on both the 20th of May and 11th of June, that a continued failure to do so would result in termination.
[94] I have considered these other matters. I have accepted Mr Johnson held a genuine belief he had a right to work from home and did not have to comply with his employer's direction. I have considered the terms of Mr Johnson's employment contract on which he formed this belief. This consideration does not lead me to conclude there was a reasonable basis for him to hold this belief.
[96] I accept this evidence. I further accept that PaperCut's response was not disproportionate in the circumstances of this case. In reaching this conclusion, I am persuaded that Mr Johnson's conduct left his employer with no other real or reasonable option but to bring his employment to an end. Further, that Mr Johnson was made aware that this would be the consequence of his conduct, should it continue.
[97] I do not consider the fact Mr Johnson's role had been performed in large part from his home for the period of his employment, or the fact 7 other PaperCut employees were allowed to work from home material to this case. Mr Johnson was required to comply with the reasonable directions of his employer. He refused to do so. As a result, he was dismissed.
[98] I do not consider these other factors weigh in favour of a finding his dismissal was unfair.
Is the Commission satisfied that the dismissal of Mr Johnson was harsh, unjust of unreasonable?
[100] I have been satisfied of a valid reason for dismissal and that this factor weighs in favour of the Respondent. I have also considered the fact Mr Johnson was provided notice of the valid reason and an opportunity to respond to it also weigh in the Respondent's favour. I have considered each of the other factors set out in s.387 to be the neutral and determined there are no other relevant matters that weigh in Mr Johnson's favour.
[101] The balance of these considerations weighs in favour of the Respondent and a finding that the dismissal was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Therefore, I find that Mr Johnson was not unfairly dismissed.
[102] As I have found that Mr Johnson's dismissal was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable, accordingly, this application is dismissed.
[1] Respondent's Outline of Submissions at [9]-[10], Court Book ('CB') p.131.
[4] Statement of Evidence of Richard Johnson at [12], CB p.31 and Witness Statement of Carolyn Lee Butcher at [40]-[45], CB p.143.
[5] 'RJ-2', Statement of Evidence of Richard Johnson, CB p.63.
[6] Transcript of Proceedings on 27 October 2025 at PN87-89.
[7] Outline of Evidence of Richard Johnson, CB p.14.
[8] 'RJ-3', Statement of Evidence of Richard Johnson, CB p.65.
[15] Outline of Evidence of Richard Johnson, CB p.15-16.
[19] Respondent's Outline of Submissions, CB p.130.
[21] Australian Hearing v Peary [2009] AIRCFB at [39].
[23] Sayer v Melsteel Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 7498 at [14]; Smith v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd PR915674 (AIRCFB Ross VP, Lacy SDP, Simmonds C, 21 March 2002, at [69].
[24] Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 333; (1995) 62 IR 371 at [373].
[26] Walton v Mermaid Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd [1996] IRCA 267; (1996) 142 ALR 681 at [685].
[27] Edwards v Justice Giudice [1999] FCA 1836 at [7].
[28] Raj Bista v Glad Group Pty Ltd t/a Glad Commercial Cleaning [2016] FWC 3009 [34] and Kylie Smith v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2021] FWC 4 [124], [126].
[30] King v Catholic Education Office Diocese of Parramatta (2014) 242 IR 249; [2014] FWCFB 2194 at [27]- [29]; also Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighthouse Ltd; Ex parte Halliday and Sullivan [1938] HCA 44; (1938) 60 CLR 601 at 621-622.
[31] Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Glencore Mt Owen Pty Ltd [2015] FWC 7752.
[32] Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 37; 256 CLR 104 cited in HealthX Group Pty Ltd v Palling (No 2) [2025] FCA 1300 at [71].
[33] Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2024] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 cited in Wilke v National Storage Operations Pty Ltd [2013] FCCA 1056 at [71] cited in HealthX Group Pty Ltd v Palling (No 2) [2025] FCA 1300 at [71].
[34] Per Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; 251 CLR 640.
[35] Per Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1982] HCA 24; 149 CLR 337 cited in HealthX Group Pty Ltd v Palling (No 2) [2025] FCA 1300 at [71].
[36] Per Electricity Generation cited in HealthX Group Pty Ltd v Palling (No 2) [2025] FCA 1300 at [71].
[44] Bartlett v Ingleburn Bus Services Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 6429 at [19]; Reseigh v Stegbar Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 533 at [55].
[45] Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd (2000) 98 IR 137 at [151].
[46] Previsic v Australian Quarantine Inspection Services Print Q3730 (AIRC, Holmes C, 6 October 1998).
[51] ALH Group Pty Ltd t/a The Royal Exchange Hotel v Mulhall (2002) IR 117 357 [51]; Edwards v Giudice [1999] FCA 1836 [6]-[7].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Mr Richard Johnson
PaperCut Software Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 178
(1938) 60 CLR 601
(1995) 131 ALR 422
(1995) 62 IR 371
(1996) 142 ALR 681
(2014) 242 IR 249
(2004) 219 CLR 165
(2000) 98 IR 137