[2026] FWC 519
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2026-02-20
Original judgment source is linked above.
The attached document replaces the document previously issued with the above code on 20 February 2026.
The appearances for the Respondent are amended from 'Ms A. Pierce, for the Respondent' to 'Mr N. Duggal, for the Respondent'.
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Application for unfair dismissal remedy - application dismissed.
[1] Mr Kumar (Applicant) has made an application under section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 ('Act') for an unfair dismissal remedy. By that application, the Applicant contended that he had been dismissed without notice on 16 May 2025 by his employer, Hansen Corporation Pty Ltd (Respondent). Initially, the Applicant expressly sought reinstatement to his position with his former employer, together with an order to restore lost pay.
[3] Confidentiality orders were made at the commencement of the hearing, to accommodate the fact that some of the evidence to be led in the proceedings involved the names of the Respondent's clients. One consequence of those orders is that parts of the hearing were held in camera, and the transcript for those parts of the hearing remains confidential.
a) "I accept the issues Hansen has with me";
b) "My work hours are an issue and I accept the outcome of the Hansen investigation";
c) "discussing it further is psychologically not going to help me";
d) "I don't blame anyone accept [sic] myself";
e) "I have been barely been keeping up with the minimum"; and
f) "I have lost my motivation".
[7] The Applicant's case before the Commission is essentially that none of the above constitutes an admission and that he has done nothing wrong other than perhaps not provide sufficient details on his timesheets, which he says is a matter his manager could have addressed with him in some way other than summary dismissal.
[22] Ms Chand gave evidence that in early May of 2025 she became aware of concerns raised by Mr Fletcher about the Applicant recording full days of work that contradicted data concerning his logins and work activity. Ms Chand says she discussed those matters with the HR Manager, Ms Pierce, who has since left the organisation. Ms Chand said she formed the view that there was a potential case of misconduct that needed to be answered and agreed with Ms Pierce that it was appropriate to have a meeting with the Applicant to put the allegations to him. Ms Chand said she did not attend any meeting with the Applicant relating to these matters, but did review the letter of allegations, a summary of the meeting that had occurred and the letter notifying the Applicant of termination.
[36] There is no dispute that the Applicant did not log in to his laptop that day. However, in attempting to explain the activities that had been recorded on his timesheet for that day, the Applicant said that he was writing and responding to e-mails from his phone and working on long term projects. This departs from the premise that he had been reading a report. It also departs from the Applicant's evidence that he was not assigned any project work.
[37] The Applicant's concession in cross examination was that he "cannot argue" with the proposition that completing a timesheet for 23 April allocating work across different clients cannot be justified if he did not even log in to the Respondent's systems.. Whilst I am not certain of precisely what the Applicant was doing on the day, I am satisfied that he did not perform the client work that he indicated he did perform on his timesheets.
[38] I note that I provided an opportunity for the parties after the hearing to make written submissions concerning some documents that the Applicant considered relevant but had not been able to obtain from the Respondent before the commencement of the hearing. As part of that process, the Applicant provided a copy of the "Oracle CP" report he had referred to in the hearing. It is a 72 page document, containing many hyperlinks. Whilst it is dated April 2025, the copy provided bears a header that suggests it was printed on 27 October, so cannot be a scan of the actual physical hard copy that the Applicant said he utilised in April of 2025. I also observe that during the hearing, the Applicant utilised and admitted to utilising an electronic copy of the hearing book, rather than printing it. Whilst this may raise some doubts as to whether the report took as long to read as the Applicant said it did, or whether, if it was read, it was read on a device rather than a hard copy, I am prepared to give the Applicant the benefit of the doubt in that respect. However, that does not provide an excuse for misrepresenting his work activities in his time sheets.
[39] This was the second day in relation to which the Respondent had obtained details of the Applicant's interactions with their systems. In light of the Anzac Day public holiday, it was the Applicants fifth day at work after leave, so the three days he says it took him to read the report referred to had passed.
[40] I have found the Applicant's explanation for the gaping chasm between the 10 minutes of activity noted in the Respondent's system and the 7.5 hours of timesheet time wholly unconvincing. I note that the explanation of work on projects is inconsistent with the evidence that there was no such project work. I accept Mr Fletcher's evidence that it was not possible for the Applicant to have done the work that he claimed on his timesheet to have done that day.
[41] This was the third day in relation to which the Respondent had obtained details of the Applicant's interactions with their systems. Whist the Applicant conceded that he first logged in at 9:24AM and last logged in at 1:48PM on that day, there is no support in the evidence prepared by the Respondent that this is correct other than in a table summarizing the "Key Example Days", which is not in fact representative of the actual data presented elsewhere in the same document as to the Applicant's interactions with the Respondent's systems on that day. Rather, I consider the correct position is, as was Mr Fletcher's oral evidence, that the laptop was logged in at 10:59 AM and not engaged with for several hours until between 4:11PM and 5:07PM. Mr Fletcher said it was "not at all" possible that the Applicant could have performed the 7.5 hours client work that had been entered into the Tempo system on that day. I accept that evidence.
[42] This was the fourth and final day in relation to which the Respondent had obtained details of the Applicant's interactions with their systems. The Applicant accepted he first logged into the Respondent's systems at 9:55AM and last logged in at 2:34PM and also recorded 7.5 hours of time through the Tempo System to different line items. The latter date was not supported in the data provided by the Respondent, rather it indicated that the last login on that day was at 2:19PM, although Mr Fletcher said that the evidence was consistent with there being some activity on the laptop until 2:34PM. Whilst the Applicant was not prepared to accept his timesheet entries were falsified, I accept Mr Fletcher's evidence that it was "not possible" for the 7.5 hours of work entered into the Tempo system to have been performed by the Applicant on that day.
[44] The two significant events on this day were the Applicant responding to the e-mail from Mr Fletcher that had attached the letter of allegations, and a meeting occurring between the Applicant, Mr Fletcher and Ms Pierce.
[45] Once again, the Applicant's written response to the e-mail on that day speaks for itself. During the hearing, the Applicant sought to characterise that response in ways that were implausible.
[47] Under section 396 of the FW Act, the Commission is obliged to decide the following matters before considering the merits of the application:
(a) whether the application was made within the period required in subsection 394(2);
(b) whether the person was protected from unfair dismissal;
(c) whether the dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code;
(d) whether the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy.
[48] The application was made on 5 June 2025. There is no dispute that the application related to employment that came to an end on 16 May 2025. Nor is there any dispute that the employment ended by way of a dismissal within meaning of section 386(1)(a) of the Act taking effect on that day. The application was brought within the required period.
[49] Similarly, there was no dispute that the Applicant was at all relevant times protected from unfair dismissal. The Applicant had worked on an ongoing basis for the Respondent since 2019, and his earnings were below the high income threshold at the relevant time.
[50] The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code has no relevance to the matter, as the Respondent at the relevant time employed far in excess of 15 employees. There was no suggestion that the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy. The Applicant was dismissed for the conduct the Respondent found he had engaged in.
Was the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable?
[51] Section 387 of the FW Act provides that, in considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the Commission must take into account:
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person's capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and
(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person - whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
(f) the degree to which the size of the employer's enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.
[53] I set out my consideration of each below.
Was there a valid reason for the dismissal related to the Applicant's capacity or conduct?
Was the Applicant notified of the valid reason?
[59] The Applicant was given notice in writing by a letter that was e-mailed to him on 15 May 2025.
Was the Applicant given an opportunity to respond to any valid reason related to their capacity or conduct?
[60] An employee protected from unfair dismissal should be provided with an opportunity to respond to any reason for their dismissal relating to their conduct or capacity. An opportunity to respond is to be provided before a decision is taken to terminate the employee's employment.[113]
[62] The Applicant first responded to the allegations made against him in writing, in the terms set out in paragraph [6] above. He was asked to attend a meeting to discuss the allegations. He agreed to reschedule that meeting and participated in the meeting, but chose to not review or contest the evidence that had been brought to the meeting for discussion.
Did the Respondent unreasonably refuse to allow the Applicant to have a support person present to assist at discussions relating to the dismissal?
[63] Where an employee protected from unfair dismissal has requested a support person be present to assist in discussions relating to the dismissal, an employer should not unreasonably refuse that person being present. There is no positive obligation on an employer to offer an employee the opportunity to have a support person:
"This factor will only be a relevant consideration when an employee asks to have a support person present in a discussion relating to dismissal and the employer unreasonably refuses. It does not impose a positive obligation on employers to offer an employee the opportunity to have a support person present when they are considering dismissing them."[116]
[64] The letter of 15 May 2025 encouraged the Applicant to bring a support person to the meeting that was scheduled for the following day. The Applicant did not bring a support person, and brought no evidence to suggest that any support person had been refused.
Was the Applicant warned about unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal?
[65] As the dismissal did not relate to unsatisfactory performance, this factor is not relevant to the present circumstances.
To what degree would the size of the Respondent's enterprise be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal? To what degree would the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the Respondent's enterprise be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal?
[66] The Applicant made no submissions about these issues.
[67] The Respondent submits these are neutral considerations in this matter. I agree. Ms Chand's evidence was that there was involvement from both herself, as General Counsel, and Human Resources specialists in bringing this matter forward.
[68] Section 387(h) requires the Commission to take into account any other matters that the Commission considers relevant.
[70] The Applicant's initial response to the allegations was to not contest them. That response was wise. His decision to bring and persist with these proceedings was ill advised.
[71] For completeness, I have found the additional submissions of the parties on the documents provided at a late stage to be unhelpful. The most that can be said is that the notes of the meetings between the Applicant and his manager say nothing of him being asked to, or indicating that he was, reading reports. They are also consistent with the Applicant not raising any concerns about his lack of duties at those meetings.
Is the Commission satisfied that the dismissal of the Applicant was harsh, unjust or unreasonable?
[72] Each matter specified in section 387 as relevant must be considered and given due weight to each as a fundamental element in determining whether the termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.[124]
[73] I have found a valid reason for dismissal and no reasons to suggest that the manner in which the allegations were progressed with the Applicant raised any unfairness.
[74] Having considered each of the matters specified in section 387 of the FW Act, I am satisfied that the dismissal of the Applicant was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

[1] PN1634-1639 (confidential transcript).
[11] PN603-604 (confidential transcript).
[17] PN619-624 (confidential transcript).
[18] PN686-687, 709-710 (confidential transcript).
[41] PN 440-472 (confidential transcript).
[42] PN489-492 (confidential transcript).
[45] PN534-536 (confidential transcript).
[49] PN543-544 (confidential transcript).
[50] PN569-576 (confidential transcript).
[51] PN580-584 (confidential transcript).
[53] PN635-637 (confidential transcript).
[54] PN648-649, 660-663 (confidential transcript).
[56] PN682-683 (confidential transcript).
[57] PN190-199. The records of these meetings were provided after the hearing and the parties were given an opportunity to make submissions about them.
[83] PN1254-1270 (confidential transcript).
[91] PN1289-1304 (confidential transcript).
[92] PN1348-1355 (confidential transcript).
[93] PN1386-1389 (confidential transcript).
[95] PN1431-1439 (confidential transcript).
[96] PN1192-1198, 1221-1228 (confidential transcript).
[98] PN1613-1614, 1830 (confidential transcript).
[99] PN674, 699, 1480-1482, 1600-1614, 1829-1830, 1839 (confidential transcript).
[100] PN699 (confidential transcript).
[101] PN1305-1319 (confidential transcript).
[102] Sayer v Melsteel Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 7498, [14]; Smith v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd PR915674 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Lacy SDP, Simmonds C, 21 March 2002), [69].
[103] Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 333; (1995) 62 IR 371, 373.
[105] Walton v Mermaid Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd [1996] IRCA 267; (1996) 142 ALR 681, 685.
[106] Edwards v Justice Giudice [1999] FCA 1836, [7].
[107] King v Freshmore (Vic) Pty Ltd Print S4213 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Williams SDP, Hingley C, 17 March 2000), [23]-[24].
[109] Bartlett v Ingleburn Bus Services Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 6429, [19]; Reseigh v Stegbar Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 533, [55].
[110] Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd (2000) 98 IR 137, 151.
[111] Previsic v Australian Quarantine Inspection Services Print Q3730 (AIRC, Holmes C, 6 October 1998).
[113] Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd t/a Noble Park Storage and Transport Print S5897 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Acton SDP, Cribb C, 11 May 2000), [75].
[114] RMIT v Asher [2010] FWAFB 1200; (2010) 194 IR 1, 14-15.
[115] Gibson v Bosmac Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 222; (1995) 60 IR 1, 7.
[116] Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth), [1542].
[117] PN1566 (confidential transcript), PN842-856.
[119] PN1625-1627, 1647, 1836 (confidential transcript).
[122] PN629-633 (confidential transcript).
[123] PN1647, 1838 (confidential transcript).
[124] ALH Group Pty Ltd t/a The Royal Exchange Hotel v Mulhall (2002) 117 IR 357, [51]. See also Smith v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd PR915674 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Lacy SDP, Simmonds C, 21 March 2002), [92]; Edwards v Justice Giudice [1999] FCA 1836, [6]-[7].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Mr Neeraj Kumar
Hansen Corporation Pty. Ltd. [2026] FWC 519
(1995) 62 IR 371
(2000) 98 IR 137
(2010) 194 IR 1
(1995) 60 IR 1
(2002) 117 IR 357
(1996) 142 ALR 681