Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act), sections 227(1)(b) and 229(3)(a)

Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 2020 (Standard Module)

INTERIM ORDERS - whether interim orders are warranted in circumstances where the applicant is asserting the committee is making decisions (to engage lawyers and to authorise the payment of invoices above committee spending limit in relation to various disputes involving the applicant or its associates) that are beyond the committee's powers.

Act, ss 100, 242, and 279; Standard Module, ss 73, and 172

1. From the date of this order, the Committee for the Body Corporate for Mount Whitsunday may not incur or make payment for any future legal services, where the value or charge for such future services is above the current relevant spending limit for spending by this committee, unless the body corporate has at a general meeting either:

a) increased the relevant limit for committee spending, or > > b) expressly approved the retention of a law firm to provide further legal services at a cost above the committee spending limit and has authorised payment for services costing more than the committee spending limit to be made from body corporate funds.

2. For the avoidance of doubt, I declare the above interim order does not apply to preclude the committee from making payment for legal services rendered prior to the date of this interim order.
3. The above interim orders have effect until the earlier of: the issue by an adjudicator of a further interim or final order for the application, the application is withdrawn or otherwise ended, or 12 months have elapsed from the date of this order.
4. The application for interim orders is otherwise dismissed.

• [1] This is the latest in a series of applications for adjudicator's orders relating to disputes between these two parties or their representatives in various capacities. Indeed, this order is the fifth order made this year.
• [2] The first application seeking interim orders was brought by the lot owner naming the body corporate as the respondent. That application related to committee decisions to engage a law firm to provide advice on the validity on the calling of an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of the body corporate for July 2025. Although the application for interim orders was dismissed (Interim 1),[1] the application for final orders remains pending.
• [3] The second application seeking interim orders was brought by the body corporate naming as the respondent a person who was both a representative of the lot owner and, at the time of that application, also the chairperson and secretary of the body corporate. The second application sought interim orders about decisions that might be made at the July 2025 EGM. Interim orders were made temporarily restraining the body corporate from acting on any decisions made at that meeting (Interim 2).[2] The application for final orders relating to the July 2025 EGM remains pending.
• [4] The third application for interim orders was made by the lot owner naming the body corporate as respondent. That application was made after the body corporate decided at an August 2025 EGM to remove the lot owner's representative from her positions as chairperson and secretary. By its application, the lot owner sought interim orders appointing an administrator to replace the committee until the election of a new committee at the body corporate's next annual general meeting (AGM). The application for interim orders was dismissed by an adjudicator (Interim 3).[3]
• [5] Subsequently, an adjudicator also dismissed the lot owner's application for final orders about the August 2025 EGM and decisions made at that meeting (Final Order).[4] As part of the Final Order, the lot owner was ordered to pay $2,000 to the body corporate towards its costs.
• [6] The lot owner has since filed a notice of appeal of the Final Order to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT).
• [7] The same lot owner, represented in this application by a different director, is now disputing the committee decisions to authorise the engagement of lawyers and spend body corporate funds on those engagements. The owner says the committee did not have the power to decide to authorise payments that individually or collectively exceed its spending limits. As such, it says the committee's decisions are ultra vires and the spending on legal fees is not validly authorised by the body corporate.
• [8] Until its application for final orders can be determined, by this application the lot owner is seeking an interim order restraining the body corporate from making any further payments to any lawyers relating to the applications for adjudicator's orders or to the appeal of the Final Order unless and until such expenditure has been authorised by the body corporate at a general meeting. The applicant says the requested interim order is necessary to prevent further "unrecoverable" expenditure while its application for final orders about authorisation for the expenditure is pending.
• [9] For the reasons given below, I have declined to make the interim order in the form requested but I have made an interim order in a more limited form.

• [10] Mount Whitsunday community titles scheme 37885 (Mount Whitsunday) is a scheme consisting of 33 lots and common property. The community management statement (CMS) shows the Standard Module applies.
• [11] The applicant is the owner of Lot 11. It is represented by one of its directors, Stewart Lewis.
• [12] The respondent is the Body Corporate for Mount Whitsunday.

• [13] The Commissioner referred the application for an interim order to department adjudication under section 247(2)(b) of the Act. The parties to the dispute are the owner of a lot and the body corporate. This is a combination of parties provided for in the Act.[5]
• [14] An adjudicator has jurisdiction generally to make orders that are just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute between certain parties about a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or CMS, or about the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under the Act or CMS.[6]
• [15] This dispute includes assertions that the committee for the respondent is contravening the Act. I am thus satisfied this is a dispute within the dispute resolution provisions of the Act and it is within the jurisdiction of an adjudicator.[7]
• [16] There is no statutory requirement to obtain comment from a respondent or affected party before an interim order is decided. In the circumstances, I considered I had sufficient information to decide the application for interim orders and I did not seek comments.

• [17] The applicant is asserting, among other things, that the committee did not have the legal authority to authorise the payment of 6 invoices - dated from 7 August to 11 November 2025 - for legal services provided to the body corporate relating to disputes the applicant characterises as the "2025 governance dispute project." It is expressly challenging a 22 July 2025 decision of the committee (July 2025 VOCM) that purported to authorise the engagement of a law firm to provide legal services. The applicant is also concerned payments have been made out of the sinking fund, where it believes payments should have been debited from the administrative fund. Finally, it says the committee's decisions to authorise spending above its limits involve negligence and bad faith.
• [18] The applicant is seeking 4 final orders, which can be summarised as follows:
  1. Final Order 1 - a declaration that the decisions by the committee to incur and to pay 6 invoices for legal services were beyond the committee's spending limits and therefore beyond its power to authorise on behalf of the body corporate
  2. Final Order 2 - a declaration that a committee resolution made by vote outside a committee meeting (VOCM) on 22 July 2025, purporting to authorise spending legal expenditure above the committee spending limit, is invalid and of no effect.
  3. Final Order 3 - an order that the body corporate prepare and provide to all owners a reconciliation of payments made relating to legal fees and, where any such payments have been made from the sinking fund, take steps to correctly allocate the expenditure in accordance with the legislation
  4. Final Order 4 - a declaration that the statutory immunity applicable to committee members does not apply to members that authorised payment of the legal invoices described in Final Order 1 and an order requiring the body corporate to seek recovery of the unauthorised expenditure from those committee members.
• [19] Until the application for the above final orders is determined, the applicant is seeking an interim order that:

... the Body Corporate for Mount Whitsunday CTS 37885 (by its Committee or Body Corporate Manager) be restrained from making any further payments from the Administrative Fund or the Sinking Fund to Chambers Russell Lawyers, or any other legal service provider, in relation to the 2025 "governance dispute project" (including adjudication application 0789-2025, QCAT Appeal APL478-25, and any related adjudication or appeal concerning the 28 July 2025 EGM and the removal or appointment of committee members), unless and until such expenditure has been expressly authorised by a resolution of the Body Corporate at a general meeting.

• [20] As grounds for the interim order, the applicant says it understands the limit for spending by the Committee for Mount Whitsunday is $6,600. It says each of the 6 challenged payments to the lawyers was above that limit. It also says the legal services are all part of the same continuous project, which means the total expenditure on the project - currently around $45,000 - also far exceeds the applicable spending limits.
• [21] Further, the applicant says the body corporate has not resolved at a general meeting to authorise the expenditure on legal fees. Accordingly, the applicant says the committee did not have the power to authorise the payments and its decisions were ultra vires.
• [22] Moreover, the applicant says the 22 July 2025 committee decision to authorise the engagement of lawyers at an estimated cost of $6,000 - 8,000 (ex GST) was also above its spending limit.
• [23] The applicant says it is seeking the above interim order to prevent further unrecoverable expenditure while this application is being determined. The applicant says the interim order is necessary to preserve the body corporate's funds.
• [24] As further grounds, the applicant also says an interim order is necessary to give effect to the protections afforded by the statutory spending limits, which it says are designed specifically to prevent committee's exposing owners to unauthorised spending including on contested governance disputes. Without an interim order, if spending on legal fees is allowed to continue at the current rate, the applicant claims those protections will have been rendered meaningless.
• [25] In support of its argument that there is an ongoing and imminent risk of further expenditure, it points to the pattern of invoices from the law firm and monthly billing. It also points to a recent motion, proposed on 10 December 2025 and to be decided by the committee by VOCM, that the committee resolve to engage the law firm to represent the body corporate in responding to the applicant's appeal of the Final Order at an estimated cost of $15,400 plus, to be paid from the administrative fund.
• [26] The applicant says if the interim order is refused, all lot owners including itself, will be prejudiced and suffer harm because the administrative fund will be further depleted. It says there is also a serious risk that ongoing legal liabilities will be met from the sinking fund prejudicing the body corporate's ability to fund long-term maintenance.
• [27] In contrast, it says the interim order sought would not prejudice the body corporate. The applicant contends the requested order would not prevent the body corporate from obtaining legal advice, but would only restrain the committee from unilaterally paying further invoices until properly authorised by the body corporate at a general meeting.

• [28] An adjudicator is expressly given the power to make an interim order "if satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that an interim order is necessary because of the nature or urgency of the circumstances to which the application relates."[8]
• [29] If I am satisfied an interim order is necessary, I may make an interim order that is just and equitable. Adjudicators often make interim orders in the form of a temporary injunction (an order not to do something) to preserve the status quo pending a final determination of an application.
• [30] To determine whether I am satisfied an interim order is necessary and that it would be just and equitable to make one, there must be some reason in law to make an interim order. To make those determinations, I must consider the substantive issue in dispute. As an initial matter, the applicant must satisfy me that there are serious legal questions to be answered. At this stage, an applicant does not need to satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that their legal arguments will be successful.[9] However, I must be satisfied there is a sufficient likelihood the applicant will ultimately succeed to justify making an interim order while the application for final orders is pending.
• [31] I must also consider the practical reasons for and the likely effects of an interim order. This is known as assessing the balance of convenience or harm between the parties. To do this, I must consider the inconvenience or harm to the applicant if I do not make an interim order but final orders later determine there is a contravention of the Act. I must weigh that against the harm to the body corporate if I grant an interim order and the applicant is later unsuccessful in its application for final orders.
• [32] Accordingly, to determine whether I am satisfied an interim order is necessary and appropriate, I will consider whether a serious legal issue has been presented with sufficient likelihood of success and I will also weigh the balance of convenience and potential for harm to the respective parties.

• [33] The applicant raises several issues relating to the committee's statutory power to make decisions about spending body corporate funds on legal services.
• [34] Although the committee may make some spending decisions for the body corporate, section 172 of the Standard Module, which is titled "Spending by committee" provides in pertinent part:

_(1) The committee may only give effect to a proposal involving spending above the relevant limit for committee spending for the community titles scheme if - _

(a) the spending is specifically authorised by ordinary resolution of the body corporate; or

(b) the owners of all lots included in the scheme have given written consent; or

(c) an adjudicator is satisfied that the spending is required to meet an emergency and authorises it under an order made under the dispute resolution provisions; or

_(d) the spending is necessary to comply with - _

(i) a statutory order or notice given to the body corporate; or

(ii) an order of an adjudicator; or

(iii) a judgment or order of a court; or

(iv) an order of QCAT; or

• [35] The relevant limit for committee spending is the amount last set by the body corporate at a general meeting or, if no amount has been set, $200 multiplied by the number of lots.[10]
• [36] Section 172 of the Standard Module provides further that:

(2) For this section, if a series of proposals forms a single project, the cost of carrying out any 1 of the proposals is taken to be more than the relevant limit for committee spending if the cost of the project, as a whole, is more than the relevant limit.

• [37] This latter sub-section seems to be aimed at precluding a committee from deliberately or inadvertently circumventing its spending limit by breaking a project into a smaller payments that are within its spending limits rather than submitting the cost of the whole project to owners for authorisation at a general meeting.
• [38] Notwithstanding the above, it is generally accepted that a body corporate has the power to decide to regularise past irregular conduct in certain circumstances.[11] This includes deciding at a general meeting to ratify decisions made, or actions taken by, its committee.
• [39] For a ratification to be effective, the following conditions must be satisfied:
  1. the agent must have purported to act for the principal
  2. at the time the agent acted, the principal must have been existing and ascertainable
  3. the principal must have been legally capable of doing the act in question
  4. when deciding to ratify, the principal must have knowledge of all the material facts and circumstances pertaining to the agent's acts, and
  5. the decision to ratify must be within a reasonable time.[12]
• [40] In terms of this application for an interim order, I am satisfied the applicant has raised at least two issues about the authorisation of spending by the committee on legal services.
• [41] Firstly, whether the committee has purported in one or more instances to authorise spending of body corporate funds above its spending limits. Secondly, whether the pending legal disputes between the parties and their associates should be viewed as one "project" and therefore with limits to be calculated by reference to expenditure on legal services for all the disputes. Alternatively, whether each dispute should be considered as a separate "project" with spending limits calculated by reference to each dispute.
• [42] Relevant to both those legal issues is the question of what amount is currently set as the relevant limit for spending by the Committee for Mount Whitsunday? The applicant has asked the body corporate manager whether the body corporate has, by ordinary resolution, set a spending limit for its committee. In the absence of a response, the applicant assumes the relevant spending limit for the committee is the default amount which it calculates as $6,600, being the number of lots in the scheme (33) x $200.
• [43] Where it is certainly possible the body corporate has not set a higher limit for committee spending, and it is alleged the committee has approved payment of some of the invoices for legal services in amounts exceeding $6,600, I am satisfied the applicant has raised a serious legal question with sufficient chance of success for me to consider whether making the requested interim order.
• [44] I note I am less persuaded at this preliminary stage about the applicant's chances of success on its argument that the various disputes (and by implication spending on legal services) should be viewed collectively as a single project.[13] My preliminary view is that, at a minimum, the applicant's appeal to QCAT is a distinct and separate project.

• [45] I am satisfied the nature of the circumstances presented includes a committee potentially authorising spending on legal services beyond its spending limit. Where the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal of an adjudicator's order with QCAT on 19 November 2025, I am also satisfied further spending on legal services by the committee is likely imminent.
  • [46] However, even where serious legal issues have been raised, interim orders are only granted if they are necessary due to the nature or urgency of the circumstances. I must also consider the consequences of an interim order, including how an interim order could inconvenience or harm the respective parties in view of different outcomes on the application for final orders.
  • [47] The applicant is seeking an order restraining the body corporate (through its committee) from making any further payments to any legal service provider for services in relation to the pending adjudication applications or the applicant's appeal of the Final Order except where such payments have been expressly authorised by the body corporate at a general meeting.
  • [48] In terms of the balance of convenience and harm to the respective parties and affected persons, if the interim order is not made, the applicant argues the body corporate will incur and/or pay for legal expenses, which funds it will not be able to recover. The applicant also suggests the protections afforded to owners by the spending limits will be removed.
  • [49] Conversely, if the interim order is made, the applicant says the only "inconvenience" to be suffered by the body corporate is that the committee will be required to call an EGM to approve further spending on legal services. The applicant comments that being required to comply with statutory spending limits should not be considered to be an inconvenience. It also says such an interim order, as a "temporary pause" would not deprive the body corporate of legal representation but would simply ensure owners rather than the committee alone decide what should be spent on legal services.
  • [50] Although the applicant seems to acknowledge the law firm providing services might suffer the inconvenience of delayed payment for services if the interim order is made, it says "[l]aw firms routinely await payment pending body corporate approvals."
  • [51] In my preliminary view, the circumstances presented involve:
    1. multiple proceedings commenced or continued by the applicant or one of its directors (elected and acting as a committee member as the nominee representative of the applicant) naming the body corporate as the respondent
    2. the committee deciding to engage lawyers to advise or represent the body corporate in responding to those proceedings
    3. expenses for legal services, which are often difficult to anticipate and estimate not least because advice and services may be contingent upon unpredictable events, and
    4. lawyers having already providing services to the body corporate[14] which may or may not have been invoiced as of this date (past services), and
    5. the committee's intention to retain lawyers to provide further legal services (future legal services), notably for the appeal of the Final Order.
  • [52] In those circumstances, I do not consider it would be just and equitable to make the interim order in the form sought by the applicant.
  • [53] The interim order proposed by the applicant would have the effect of precluding the body corporate from paying for past services it has already received as well restraining it from paying for future legal services above the committee spending limit unless the spending was approved by owners at a general meeting.
  • [54] Regarding payments for past services, to the extent it engaged lawyers to assist it, the body corporate likely has a contractual obligation to pay for those legal services. Where the law firm has already provided past legal services that have not yet been invoiced, in my view, the risk and harm to the body corporate in not paying for services it has received outweighs any harm to the applicant or to other owners. Moreover, the applicant provides no support for its statement that law firms routinely wait for payment pending approvals nor any justification why it would be just and equitable for the law firm to incur that inconvenience.
  • [55] Nevertheless, when it comes to future services that are yet to be provided, I am inclined to make an interim order on some but not all of the terms sought by the applicant. For decisions about future legal services, which will likely relate to the applicant's QCAT appeal, I am of the view at this time that:
    1. legal advice and services relating to the QCAT appeal is a new and separate "project" for which the committee is empowered to authorise expenditure on such services up to its spending limit, and
    2. the body corporate will not be prejudiced if an interim order is made restraining the committee from spending more than its relevant limit on future services (including on the QCAT appeal as a new "project") where:
       1. the committee's spending limit is at least $6,600 and may be higher if the body corporate has previously approved a higher limit at a general meeting
       2. the law firm that will provide services in relation to the QCAT appeal is already familiar with the matter having represented the body corporate in responding to the application for adjudication, and
       3. the committee may decide to call an EGM (in accordance with the statutory requirements for notice etc) to seek body corporate authorisation to expend funds above the committee spending on future legal services.[15]
  • [56] For the above reasons, I have made an interim order in the form above.

• [57] I have made an interim order for the reasons given above.
• [58] An adjudicator has the power to extend, vary, renew, or cancel an interim order.[16] Accordingly, if there are matters not presently known me which would justify varying or cancelling the interim order, the respondent or an affected party may make a request that I do so.
• [59] If the dispute is not resolved and the applicant does not withdraw the application, the application for final orders will remain to be determined. The application for final orders will be referred back to the Commissioner to progress under the Act. The dispute may then be resolved by an adjudicator with the benefit of submissions from the respondent, owners, and other affected persons.
• [60] The applicant and the body corporate are reminded that they are able, and indeed are encouraged, to continue to try and resolve their disputes without waiting upon final orders.

[1] See Mount Whitsunday [2025] QBCCMCmr 260 (Interim 1)

[2] See Mount Whitsunday [2025] QBCCMCmr 259 (Interim 2)

[3] See Mount Whitsunday [2025] QBCCMCmr 306 (Interim 3)

[4] See Mount Whitsunday [2025] QBCCMCmr 407 (Final Order)

[7] Sections 226, 228 and 276 of the Act

[9] Although an applicant must identify a genuine legal issue to be decided, the granting of an interim order does not mean an applicant will necessarily prevail on an application for final orders.

[10] See Schedule 1 Dictionary of the Standard Module defining "relevant limit for committee spending"

[11] See e.g., Warren v Body Corporate for Buon Vista CTS 14325 (No 2) [2006] QCA 398 (Warren), para 31

[12] See Carroll and Ors v Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences CTS 29467 [2013] QCATA 21

[13] See e.g., Somerset Gardens [2025] QBCCMCmr 238 at [21]- [27] discussing what may amount to a single "project." I note the applicant may also wish to have regard to [28] regarding exceeding budgets.

[14] For example, it appears that the lawyers for the body corporate have already provided submissions to this office in connection with the two applications for final orders that remain to be resolved, namely applications 0705-2025 and 0717-2025.

[15] To the extent it decides to call an EGM, the committee may wish to also consider proposing motion(s) for the body corporate to decide to ratify any prior expenditure on legal services that may have been above the committee's spending limit.