[2020] QIRC 196
General information, not legal advice.
Queensland Industrial Relations Commission
2020-11-17
O'Connor VP
Original judgment source is linked above.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION - APPEAL AGAINST DECISION - where the appellant stepped onto a large batten screw causing injury to his left foot - where appellant alleges injury sustained whilst carrying out work duties at lodging houses - whether the duties were completed at the direction and under the control of the employer - where credibility of witnesses is in issue - whether the appellant is a worker pursuant to s 11 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003.
Carna Group Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company (No 2) [2019] FCA 2209
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298
RHG Mortgage Limited v Rosario Ianni [2015] NSWCA 56
Shane Joseph Farrell AND Q-COMP [2013] QIRC 19
Mr D.G.H. Turnbull, Counsel instructed by Mr R. Anderson, Bounty Law for the Appellant.
Ms L.A. Neil, Counsel directly instructed by Ms R. Jamieson, Workers' Compensation Regulator for the Respondent.
MR TURNBULL: All right. Now, what happened during the journey to the hospital?
MR MOTLAP: So during the journey, he said, "Whatever you do, please, don't say nothing about compensation to the doctors or anybody at Centrelink or nothing," because there's insurance and he'll lose his insurance, he'll lose his properties and he'll lose everything and he'll go straight - he'll lose the whole lot. And I said, "Look, mate, I don't really care. I'm in that much pain. Yeah." It started going blue.
This is how I go about the business of finding facts. I start from the undisputed facts which both sides accept. I add to them such other facts as seem very likely to be true, as, for example, those recorded in contemporary documents or spoken to by independent witnesses like the policeman giving evidence in a running down case about the marks on the road. I judge a witness to be unreliable if his evidence is, in any serious respect, inconsistent with these undisputed or indisputable facts, or of course if he contradicts himself on important points. I rely as little as possible on such deceptive matters as his demeanour. When I have done my best to separate the true from the false by these more or less objective tests, I say which story seems to be the more probable, the plaintiff's or the defendant's?[50]
MR TURNBULL: No. Well, can you - about a month ago, did you have a conversation with Ms Jamieson about procuring the attendance here today of your son Zach?
MR TURNBULL: And what discussions did you have with Zach after that?
MR VAN SMOORENBURG: Ms Jamieson said that he would be by video conference, so there could have been a possibility if they would have asked him to do that.
MR TURNBULL: All right. Does it surprise you that he's not a witness here today?
MR VAN SMOORENBURG: Because he told me that he is not in the state of mind because he broke off - a girlfriend of three years broke off with him and that he did not feel that he could contribute anything.
The principle in Jones v Dunkel at its most fundamental is usually understood as an inference that can arise against a party who elects not to adduce evidence on a matter in issue.
Windeyer J, at 320 to 321, embraced the notion of "fear of exposure" on the part of the party who fails to call the witness, quoting Wigmore on Evidence:
"The failure to bring before the tribunal some circumstance, document, or witness, when either the party himself or his opponent claims that the facts would thereby elucidated, serves to indicate, as the most natural inference, that the party fears to do so, and this fear is some evidence that the circumstances or document or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavourable to the party."
In Manly Council v Byrne & Anor, Campbell J cited the joint judgment of Gibbs A-CJ, Stephen, Mason and Aickin JJ in the High Court's decision in Brandi v Mingot to support the proposition that:
"Insofar as the passage from Wigmore approved the drawing of an inference that a witness if called would have exposed facts unfavourable to the party who failed to call that witness, it is not the law in Australia . . . [L]ater cases confirm that the fullest extent of the inference which can be drawn is that the evidence which was not called would not have helped the party who failed to call the witness" and at paragraph 51:
"Thus, if a witness is not called two different types of result might follow. The first is that the tribunal of fact might infer that the evidence of the absent witness, if called, would not have assisted the party who failed to call that witness. The second is that the tribunal of fact might draw with greater confidence any inference unfavourable to the party who failed to call the witness, if that witness seems to be in a position to cast light on whether that inference should properly be drawn."
[15] TR1-107, LL32-47 - TR1-108, LL1-8.
[50] 5 Irish Jurist vol. IX, New Series, p. 1 quoted in JPO Barry, The Methodology of Judging (1994) 1
[52] TR2-8, LL16-17; Exhibit 1, pp 8-14.
[75] Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298.
[79] [2013] QIRC 19 [51], [52], [53].
[81] RHG Mortgage Limited v Rosario Ianni [2015] NSWCA 56 [76], [78].
[83] White v State of Queensland (Central Queensland Hospital and Health Service) [2017] QIRC 041 [74].
[86] Carna Group Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company (No 2) [2019] FCA 2209 [19].
Motlap
Workers' Compensation Regulator [2020] QIRC 196
(1959) 101 CLR 298