"All information - documents, hard copies of info on computer data bases, diary notes, records of meetings phone calls etc - mentioning @ MORGAN (Input as MORGAN MORGAN) & RYAN IVAN PEREGRINE (a minor) held by CPPC - 1 DAVID SPOKES, CEO & 2 KATE INCERTI - Housing Info + Support Worker dates should be from July 2006 - current."

1. The applicant has described the documents to which she is seeking access as relating to complaints by her "regarding criminal conduct of 'agencies' in the employ/funded by Council, and the records of response by Council -some of which are evidence of criminal Conspiracy of which the Applicant is the victim and her child an intended victim"[5].
2. In response to the applicant's request, the Council notified her by letter dated 19 September 2007 that access would be granted to some of the documents requested by her and that access was refused to other documents. Exemption was claimed for the documents not released to her under s 33 of the FOI Act which deals with information relating to the personal affairs of any person. The applicant sought an internal review of the Council's decision on 26 September 2007 and, on 4 October 2007, the Council affirmed its original decision. By application received by the Tribunal on 8 October 2007, the applicant sought a review of the Council's decision.
3. At the hearing before me, the Council released further material to the applicant and she withdrew her request for other material, leaving 4 documents in dispute. Each of these 4 documents has been released to the applicant except for the names and identifying information of Council officers and staff below a certain level of seniority referred to in the documents. Section 33 of the FOI Act is claimed by the Council in relation to the unreleased material.
4. The central issue in these proceedings is whether the names and identifying information of the Council officers relates to their personal affairs, and if so, whether disclosure of the information is unreasonable.

1. The material for which exemption is claimed by the Council is contained in the documents set out below. The first two documents appear to be unrelated to the matters referred to in paragraph 1 to 3 above.

1. Document 1 is a 2 page customer request record. It records a complaint made by the applicant to the Council on 23 May 2006 about the use of land in Grey Street, St Kilda. It records the investigation undertaken by the Planning Enforcement Area of the Council and the outcome of that process.

1. Document 2 is also a 2 page customer request record. It relates to a request made by the applicant on 9 August 2006 for the Council to purchase a property which the applicant considered suitable for public housing. It also records an enquiry by the applicant in relation to emergency housing.

1. Document 3 is a 6 page customer request record. It commences on 8 September 2006 and relates to accommodation problems which, in the view of the applicant, existed in St Kilda at a particular address. It also makes reference to housing arranged by SKYS for the applicant's son and related issues, including the provision of accommodation for the applicant and her son.

1. Document 4 is a 2 page chain of emails between 30 July 2007 and 10 August 2007 in relation to a complaint made by the applicant about accommodation provided to her son through SKYS, and related issues.

1. Under s 53A of the FOI Act, where an agency has decided that a document is exempt under s33(1) and the applicant has applied for a review of that decision, the agency must give written notice to the persons to whom the personal information relates. The notice must, amongst other things, inform the person to whom the notice is directed of their right to intervene in the VCAT proceeding.
2. In accordance with that requirement, the Council's solicitors wrote to each of the Council officers named in the documents in dispute. The names withheld are those people who objected to release of their names and identifying information. A significant number of the 18 people who responded to the notice expressed concerns about the applicant's behaviour, referred to threats made by her or to her threatening and aggressive manner, or expressed concern for their personal safety.

1. Ms Allison Downs, Team Leader, Risk and Compliance for the Council gave evidence for the Council. She said that between September 2007 and December 2007 when the applicant's FOI request was dealt with by the Council, she was responsible for administering the Council's FOI process.
2. Ms Downs gave evidence about comments made by the applicant prior to, during and after the hearing before Master Kings (referred to in paragraph 3 of these reasons). Ms Downs said that in the proceedings before the Magistrates Court, the applicant stated in open court that she sought one of the documents in dispute to identify the Council officer who authored one part of the document as she believed that there were grounds to prosecute the officer.
3. Ms Downs said that she had spoken directly to some of the individuals whose names appeared in the documents in dispute. Some of them recalled the applicant and expressed concern about the disclosure of their details. Others referred to the aggressive and threatening manner in which the applicant behaved in her dealings with the Council.
4. Ms Downs said that usually customer request records and full names of staff were not provided to ratepayers.
5. Ms Fahna Ammett, solicitor and senior associate employed by FOI Solutions, solicitors for the Council, gave evidence that she had performed various tasks in relation to the conduct of her firm's file relating to the applicant. Ms Ammett referred to two file notes which she had made during a conversation with the applicant on 5 February 2008. In one file note, Ms Ammett recorded the following comments by the applicant in relation to the proceedings referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of these reasons:

"Anyway what has all that got to do this? It's being used to defame me ... This is what I do for a living, try to get rid of the dirt in the legal profession. If I get elected I can know who these people are and get them fired.

Anyway I know someone who is running and I will find out who they are and fire them and their names will be published, that's what we do in a tribe, we shun them, we kick them out of the tribe and say 'you're not a human being and you don't come up to muster'."

1. Ms Ammett said that at the conclusion of her telephone conversation with the applicant, the applicant said she would take legal action against Ms Downs and that Ms Ammett should inform her of this.

1. In her oral evidence before the Tribunal and in the witness statements and the written material filed by her, the applicant denied there was any reason for Council officers to fear for their safety and she said that any suggestion that she was violent was "laughable". She said she was a female Druid and not allowed to be violent.
2. In rejecting Ms Downs' evidence as to the concerns of Council officers if their names were released, she said that they were "merely concerned that what they did in taxpayers' time would become exposed to public scrutiny". She said that the author of one of the documents in dispute should be fired and that he was a bully and a coward.
3. She made a number of allegations against the Council, its staff, related organisations and others, including the following:
   • SKYS attempted to steal legal guardianship of my son with the assistance of Inner South Community Health Services Inc and Port Phillip Housing Association Ltd.
   • It is estimated that approximately 1000 people are killed every year in vendettas and the judicial system has contributed to that figure.
   • The award for irrelevant and inaccurate witness testimony must go to Ms Downs,
   • Ms Downs' evidence was "irrelevant and self-praise blurb",
   • Ms Downs "lied her guts out"
   • Ms Downs is a liar and an "ill mannered pleb"
   • The authors (of the documents in dispute) were "fearless in their complicity in defaming the Applicant in order to justify criminal offences involving a child and his mother".
   • The authors (of the documents in dispute) were cowards and using fear of violence as an excuse to refuse access because they were afraid of their conduct being exposed.
   • In an undated letter to Ms Downs received by Ms Downs on 23 September 2007[6] the applicant said "Your failure to provide under the FOI Act will result in civil action for breaches of the Privacy Act (handling a citizen's private business with government to private "individuals" and Negligence - foreseeable damage to the citizen. (Get a grip on reality -apart from the legal aspect - public servants cannot expect to sit around having a good old gossip about citizens at taxpayers' expense... if they don't want the world to know they are a mentally challenged, ill mannered plebs who don't know their place in the world- then they should do it in their own time".
4. The applicant made serious allegations against various other people including the Council's lawyer, accusing him of unethical conduct and deliberate false assertions.
5. During cross examination by Mr Batskos, who appeared for the Council, she agreed that in the past Mr Batskos had written to her regarding threats made by her to his staff. She denied Ms Ammett's evidence that she said she was trying to get rid of the dirt in the profession. She also denied that in the past, she had told a law student working for Mr Batskos that she would enforce her privacy rights with a gun.
6. When asked by Mr Batskos why she sought release of the names, the applicant replied that she wanted to know who was "hunting" her son, that it was a matter of safety, and that she could put the material to whatever use she chose. She said that it was a person's fundamental right to know which public servants wrote the documents.

1. Section 33 of the FOI Act relevantly provides :

(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person (including a deceased person).

(2) Subject to subsection (4), the provisions of subsection (1) do not have effect in relation to a request by a person for access to a document by reason only of the inclusion in the document of matter relating to that person.

(2A) An agency or Minister, in deciding whether the disclosure of a document under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person, must take into account, in addition to any other matters, whether the disclosure of the information would, or would be reasonably likely to, endanger the life or physical safety of any person.

information relating to the personal affairs of any person includes information -

(a) that identifies any person or discloses their address or location; or

(b) from which any person's identity, address or location can reasonably be determined.

1. It was common ground that the Council is an agency for the purposes of the FOI Act[7].
2. Prior to the introduction of s 33(9) into the FOI Act the names of agency employees were generally not considered to be information of a personal nature because the disclosure of their names revealed no more than the fact that they were performing their public duties[8].
3. Section 33(9) was inserted into the FOI Act by Act No 38/1999. By Act No 57/1999 Section 33(9) was substituted by the current s 33(9) and came into operation on 1 January 2000. Deputy President Coghlan in Beauchamp v Department of Education[9] made a number of observations in relation to the introduction of this subsection and at paragraphs 33 to 35 she stated as follows:

As commentary on the legislation has observed[10] the amendments reversed a trend of finding that the name of an officer of an agency, in the context of the performance of their duties, is not information relating to their personal affairs[11] and that a distinction should be drawn between "those aspects of an individual's life which might be said to be of a private character and those relating to or arising from any position, office or other public activity with which the person occupies his or her time"[12].....

As Mr Pizer himself observed, s 33(9) is an inclusive definition. Without taking away from the meaning of personal affairs of any person which has long been regarded as being "matters of private concern to an individual"[13], it is now clear that those matters of private concern include information that identifies any person or discloses their address or location and information from which any person's identity, address or location can reasonably be determined.

1. Jones J in Re Page v Metropolitan Transit Authority[14] expounded what had become a classic formulation of disclosure that is unreasonable for the purposes of s 33(1). His Honour said:

What therefore has to be decided is whether disclosure of this information would be unreasonable. This requires a balancing of interest: the right to personal privacy of an individual whose personal affairs may be unreasonably disclosed by granting access to the information the object of the Act to extend as far as possible the right of a community to access to information in the possession of the Government or agencies. ... More particularly, this balancing of interest requires a consideration of all the circumstances, including the interest that the applicant has in the information in question the nature of the information that would be disclosed, the circumstances in which the information was obtained, the likelihood of the information being information that the person concerned would not wish to have disclosed without consent, and whether the information has any current relevance.

1. The applicant submitted that the term "personal affairs" was applicable to private individuals referred to in government documents and not the public servants engaged in government business at taxpayers' expense. She argued that the documents in dispute relate to her dealings with local government, not the personal affairs of the Council officers.
2. She argued that the documents relate to her personal affairs and entitlement to the withheld material should be automatic, given that the withheld information was the response of local government to matters raised by her. Further, she said, a reading of the contents of one of the documents "makes evident that one of the authors is a criminal - thus there is a 'public interest' for the protection of women and children".
3. The applicant relied on a decision of Naughton J of the District Court of New South Wales given on 3 April 1998 in proceeding No 7694/97 between her and the New South Wales Department of Education and the New South Wales Ombudsman. In that case she was granted access to the names of people who signed letters to the principal of a school complaining about her behaviour. It appears that at least two of the signatories were employed at the school.
4. In that case Naughton J was dealing with clause 6(1) of Schedule 1 to the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) which states that a document is exempt if it contains matter the disclosure of which would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of any person. His Honour found that the three letters and the names of the signatories did not fall within clause 6(1)of the Schedule and were not exempt under the Freedom of Information Act.

1. Mr Batskos relied on s 33(9) in arguing that the withheld information is information relating to the personal affairs of the persons concerned.
2. He submitted that disclosure would be unreasonable in all of the circumstances taking into account, amongst other things, the risk of endangerment to the life or physical safety of any person (s 33(2A)), the nature of the information, that the individuals concerned did not wish their information to be disclosed, and the absence of any public interest in disclosure.
3. Mr Batskos submitted further that there was no public interest in favour of disclosure into the public domain and there was nothing to suggest that disclosure would benefit the community in general. To the extent that the applicant asserted impropriety, wrongdoing or inappropriate behaviour, release of the withheld material would not advance the private objective of the applicant let alone any public interest.

1. The material in dispute is exempt if two conditions are met. The disclosure of the document must "involve" the disclosure of information relating to the "personal affairs" of any person, and such disclosure must be unreasonable.
2. I am satisfied that the first condition is met. It is the case, as the applicant submitted, that the information in the documents relates to her personal affairs. However, the withheld information also contains personal information because the information identifies a person or persons, that is, the council officers concerned. The material therefore contains "information relating to the personal affairs of any person" within the terms of s 33(9)(a).
3. It is clear that s 33(9) applies to all natural persons, whether or not they are agency officers engaged in the performance of their duties and I respectfully adopt the observations of the editors of Kyrou[15] that s 33(9) applies to all natural persons, including officers of agencies, and that to read down the expression "any person" to exclude agency officers is impermissible. I also respectfully adopt the observations of DP Coghlan in Beauchamp referred to earlier. The decision of Naughton J to which the applicant referred dealt with different FOI legislation. It is unclear whether the NSW legislation with which he was concerned contained a provision similar to s 33(9) of the Victorian Act but I note that his Honour made no reference to such a provision.
4. In determining whether disclosure would be unreasonable it is unnecessary for me to make any findings as to precisely what happened or what was said by the applicant during and after the hearing before Master Kings, and in the conversations with Ms Ammett and other members of Mr Batskos' firm. The applicant's evidence and demeanour in the hearing before me demonstrated that there is clearly bad blood between her and Council staff. In these circumstances it is not unreasonable for the officers who seek to have their names withheld to entertain serious apprehension as to the consequences if their names are released.
5. I think that there is also a real likelihood that release will cause distress and anxiety to those officers, whether or not this is intended by the applicant. The applicant used threatening and unpleasant language in the way she described Ms Downs and others as indicated in paragraph 24 of these reasons. During the course of the hearing she at times, spoke in an intimidatory manner, referring to the evidence of the Council's witnesses as rubbish and garbage. She has embarked on what could be described as a personal crusade against the Council and its officers and other bodies evidenced by her allegations against these organisations and the legal proceedings she has instituted.
6. It is not clear how release of the names of the individuals concerned (who are not senior officers of the Council) will be of assistance to her. I accept Mr Batskos' submissions in relation to the public interest. The applicant has not established that the public interest would be promoted by the release of the material and I am not satisfied that the material if released would reveal any illegality or wrongdoing on the part of the people concerned.
7. Weighing the competing interests I am satisfied that the release of the material would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to personal affairs of the persons concerned. I am therefore satisfied that the exemption under s.33(1) has been made out.
8. Whilst it is not necessary for me to make a finding in relation to s 33(2A), I am not satisfied that release would be reasonably likely to endanger the life or physical safety of any person, a matter which I am required to consider

under s 33(2A). The evidence does not establish that the applicant has engaged at any time in acts of physical violence.

1. As the material is exempt from release under s 33(1), it is not necessary for me to consider whether the "public interest override" in s 50(4) applies.

1. The decision under review is affirmed. Reserve the question of costs.

[1] The material before me does not indicate the precise nature of the applicant's allegations.

[2] It is not clear from the material before me what relationship exists between the Council and the organisations just referred.

[3] Paragraph 5.9 of statement of evidence of A Downs dated 31 January 2008.

[4] Paragraphs 5.10 and 5.11 of statement of A Downs dated 31 January 2008.

[5] Statement by the applicant dated 5 October 2007.

[6] In response to a letter from Ms Downs denying access to the documents sought by the applicant

[7] S 5 Freedom of Information Act 1982

[8] See, eg Commissioner of Police v District Court of NSW [1993] 31 NSWLR 606 and Re Milthorpe and Mt Alexander Shire Council (1997) 12 VAR 105.

[9] [2006] VCAT 1653

[10] Kyrou & Pizer, Victorian Administrative Law [2350] update 83.

[11] See, eg,; Re Baird and VicRoads (1998) 12 VAR 126; Re Coulston and Mornington Peninsula and District Hospital (unreported, VCAT, Megay SM, 22 November 1998); Re Baird and VicRoads (No 2) (1999) 16 VAR 92. See also Commissioner of Police v District Court of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 606; Queensland v Albietz [1996] 1 Qd R215. See also [2353A/2].

[12] Observations made by Eames J in The University of Melbourne v Robinson [1993] VicRp 67; [1993] 2 VR 177 at 187.

[13] Re Williams and Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [1985] AATA 226; (1985) 8 ALD 219 at 221.

[14] (1998) 2 VAR 243 at 245-246

[15] Victorian Administrative Law Vol @, 626-24 [2350]