1. The next offences in time were committed on 6 and 12 September 2024. The applicant was charged over these two complaints with motor vehicle stealing, aggravated burglary, two counts of stealing, drive while disqualified, trespass, breach of bail and unlawful possession of property.
2. After his arrest on 20 August 2024, the applicant was granted bail by the Supreme Court with a surety on 30 August 2024. The conditions of bail included that he live at an address at Tranmere and not leave that address unless he was accompanied by his surety. On 6 September 2024, police received a statutory declaration from the applicant's surety indicating that he wanted to withdraw. Police attended the applicant's bail address that same day and he was not present in breach of his curfew condition.
3. During the evening of 11 and 12 September 2024, a white Holden Commodore was stolen from a driveway in Risdon Vale. The car was unlocked and the keys were inside the car at the time. In the early hours of 12 September 2024, the stolen car pulled into a service station in Lutana. The driver, identified from CCTV footage as the applicant, got out of the driver's seat and put $42 worth of petrol in the vehicle before driving off without making an attempt to pay. The drive while disqualified, motor vehicle stealing and one of the stealing charges relate to this conduct.
4. At about 9.40pm on 12 September 2024, the applicant attended an address in Brighton in the stolen Commodore. He was with two other people at the time. They parked in the driveway. A 20 year old woman who lived at the address was at home by herself at the time. She heard male voices. She contacted her partner and mother for assistance. The applicant and the other males knocked on the door before entering the house by opening the unlocked front door. The occupant was extremely fearful and locked herself in her bedroom and hid in a wardrobe. She was able to make a 000 phone call to police while she was hiding. Once inside, the males moved around the house. One of them, on realising the door to the bedroom where the occupant was hiding was locked, kicked the door off its hinges to gain entry. The occupant managed to run out and escape via her bedroom window. She ran past the stolen car and one of the males who was standing next to it. She ran to a nearby street where she met her mother.
5. The applicant and the other males stole two motorbike helmets, assorted jewellery, the woman's purse containing personal identification and bank cards, various bottles of vitamins and medications and a replica of an antique firearm from the house. The total value of the stolen property was about $1,000. Police arrived shortly after the occupant fled. They found the stolen Commodore in the driveway with the engine running and keys in the ignition. The stolen property had been dropped on the lawn outside the address. Police saw one of the males leave the scene. He was wearing a red jumper. They located the applicant's co-defendant nearby. He had a number of items of property on him that had been taken from the house.
6. When the applicant fled, he ran to a nearby property in another street where he jumped the fence and entered the backyard. He was captured on CCTV footage in the backyard removing the red jumper he was wearing. The occupants of this house alerted police to the to the applicant's conduct. He was located in the vicinity of the address. He was arrested. When he was searched, police located a bank card which they believed to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. The charges of aggravated burglary, one of the stealing charges, trespass and unlawful possession of property relate to the events of the evening of 12 September 2024.

1. The last complaint relates to offences committed on 23 January 2025. The applicant pleaded guilty on this complaint to charges of lurk within the curtilage of a dwelling house, possession of a stolen firearm, possess a firearm when not the holder of a firearm licence of the appropriate category, possess ammunition when not the holder of the appropriate firearm licence, conveying a firearm contrary to the prescribed safety requirements, conveying ammunition contrary to prescribed safety requirements, possess a loaded firearm in public when not the holder of a firearm licence, motor vehicle stealing and four counts of breach of bail.
2. The breach of bail charges relate to two different bail orders, one made in the Supreme Court on 6 January 2025 and the other in the Hobart Magistrates Court on 16 January 2025. Both orders included conditions that the applicant reside at an address in Claremont and not be absent from those premises between 9pm and 7am. Police attended the address on 23 January 2025 at 1.43am to conduct a curfew check and were advised by the applicant's surety that the applicant was not home. They searched the house and did not locate him. Two of the breach of bail charges relate to this curfew check.
3. The remaining two breach of bail charges relate to police locating the applicant at 10:09pm on 23 January 2025 at Old Beach in breach of his curfew condition. At some time between 5:00am and 9:50pm that day, a Nissan Pathfinder was stolen from a property at Old Beach. It was parked outside the owner's home and locked prior to being stolen. The ignition keys had been left hidden on top of one of the tyres by the owner's brother. Around the same time that the owner realised that her car had been taken, police were alerted to a crash at the intersection of the East Derwent Highway and Baskerville Road at Old Beach. A witness saw two males fleeing the scene of the crash. The witness approached the crashed car and saw a firearm lying on the ground next to the front passenger door. Police attended and identified that the car involved in the crash was the stolen Nissan Pathfinder. The firearm was examined by police. It was on the ground and unsecured. It was identified as a stolen .22 calibre centrefire rifle. It had a single live ammunition round in the chamber and a magazine attached which contained live .22 ammunition.
4. Police searched the area for the occupants of the crashed car. Information from members of the public lead them to an address in Old Beach where they located a 15 year old male hiding in the backyard. Police continued to search the yard of the property and just after 10:00pm they located the applicant hiding in thick vegetation under a bush. The applicant had a cut above his left eye and was covered with blood. The applicant and the youth were both arrested and cautioned before being taken to the hospital to receive medical treatment. While the applicant was waiting to receive medical treatment, he told police he had recently "dug up" the stolen firearm and the ammunition that was found in the stolen car. He also said he believed the firearm may have been discharged during the crash as he was holding it. The applicant explained to the magistrate during the sentencing hearing that he told police he thought he had shot himself in the head.
5. Police later obtained a statement from a witness who said that two agitated males had attended his residence, said they had been in a crash, told him not to tell police and offered to pay $10,000 to get a lift. Police ascertained that the firearm had been stolen from Ridgeley in 2019. Police also located a bag in the stolen car which contained 50 rounds of .22 calibre live ammunition and a spent casing.
6. After the applicant had received medical attention, he participated in a video record of interview. He made no comment in relation to the stolen firearm and ammunition. He said he was aware of his bail conditions, including the curfew. He told police he had a dispute with his mother, had slept in the shed and was unaware that police had attended his curfew address. He admitted he was involved in the car crash and ran away. He told police he did not know the car was stolen. He said he did not recall what he said to police about the firearm at the hospital as he would have been "off his head". He agreed he did not hold a firearms licence. He recalled attending the address at Old Beach and asking the residents for assistance. He admitted he was hiding at the time he was found and arrested by police.

1. The applicant had a number of relevant prior convictions at the time of sentence. In her sentencing comments, the magistrate summarised his record as follows:

"You have a lengthy list of prior convictions which include matters commencing, it appears, in youth court in your late teens but unfortunately continue into adulthood. They include matters of dishonesty, driving matters, resist, threaten police, assault police, secrete within the curtilage, assaults, motor vehicle stealing.

In 2022, you were dealt with in the Supreme Court by a judge in Burnie for the offences of aggravated assault, possess firearm unlicensed and not an appropriate category, possess shortened firearm, possess firearm with identification marks altered or defaced and, together with an activation of a dangerous driving partly-suspended sentence, you served a lengthy term, which you were released early in 2024, having had parole revoked."

1. The total effective sentence imposed in 2022 in the Burnie Supreme Court across all matters was one of 20 months' imprisonment. Sixteen months of that sentence related to the aggravated assault and related firearms offences. An eight month non-parole order was made in respect of that sentence. The partly suspended sentence that was activated on that occasion was one imposed in the Supreme Court in 2020. The sentences imposed by the Supreme Court in 2022 were ordered to operate cumulatively to the sentence he was then serving. In October 2021, the applicant was sentenced in respect of breaches of suspended sentences imposed in January 2019 and March 2021 on a range of summary offences together with new matters which included assault of a public officer, breaches of bail and driving offences. In total, the applicant was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment from 14 August 2021. The applicant was also sentenced to a cumulative period of three months' imprisonment in August 2022 for charges of assault a public officer, threaten a public officer and common assault.
2. As at the time of sentencing, the applicant had 29 prior convictions for breach of bail and 10 prior convictions for offences of assault, resist, threaten and abuse police officers or public officers. The combined effect of the cumulative sentences imposed upon the applicant on 4 October 2021, 16 June 2022 and 8 August 2022 resulted in the imposition, by my calculation, of 33 months imprisonment backdated to 14 August 2021.[1] The applicant was briefly released on parole but returned to prison and served the entirety of his sentence. The magistrate was told he was released from custody in early 2024.
3. The magistrate accurately summarised the applicant's personal circumstances as they had been put to her in the plea in mitigation as follows:

"You're 24 years of age, you're nearly 25 in a month. You're single with no children. Your childhood was described as a reasonably stable one, with your mother and stepfather providing the parental role for you. I do note that your father was not present, and the impact that'd have on you. I also take into account that, more recently, that relationship cannot be reconciled as a consequence of his tragic passing.

Unfortunately, as I often hear, methylamphetamine has been a devastating effect on your life. You started using it at a relative early stage and, apart when you were in custody, you've been unable to remain abstinent.

Methylamphetamine causes much harm to the individual, to their families and to the community, and you're no exception to that, unfortunately. In relation to this, you, when you're not using, you've been described as industrious with a long work history in many areas; furniture removal, firewood, assisting - I'll call him your step - he's your stepfather, but your father, general labouring and maintaining social housing.

You've been described as an excellent footballer and cricketer. So, you're still young and there is the prospect that you can make the decisions to turn them around. Only you can do that. And only you can determine what's important in your life, the protection of those that might be co-accused or the protection of your life and your family. You've been in custody for 201 days. I'll backdate the sentence that I'll impose to the 20th of September '24, as suggested by your counsel.

I take into account, as your counsel submits, that time in custody was difficult back in - when you served it following the sentence from the Burnie Supreme Court, but also more recently. Of the 201 days, there's been many lockdowns that I take into account adds to the punitive effect over and above what prison already is intended to be punitive. In relation to this, you have the support of your family. You can remain abstinent, and you chose to do so in prison.

The reason, your counsel explains, that your relapse into greater use of methylamphetamine on the most recent spate of offending that I'm dealing with relates to processing trauma within the family, and you retreated to heavy use of drug use. Part of the sentence I'll impose will be to support the rehabilitation and hopefully obtain further skills to allow you to deal with it in an alternative way."

1. In addition, the magistrate noted the applicant's pleas of guilty as a matter counting in his favour as they saved considerable court time and resources. She also took into account that the property stolen during the course of the aggravated burglary was recovered as a consequence of the offenders being interrupted when police attended.
2. During the plea in mitigation, the applicant's counsel had explained that the applicant offended when under the influence of methylamphetamine or in order to obtain funds to obtain the drug. He suggested it would be appropriate for any sentence imposed to include a "corrections type order" with a therapeutic aspect. As to the ultimate disposition of the matter, the applicant's counsel submitted that the magistrate could consider a sentence that did not require the applicant to serve any further actual imprisonment, perhaps by suspending any further period to be imposed. During a discussion about the applicant's previous custodial sentences, the applicant told the magistrate he had been paroled but was returned to prison after only 21 days because of a breach of parole conditions. The magistrate sought submissions from the applicant's counsel as to parole eligibility. He submitted that an order allowing for parole would be helpful given the oversight that could be provided on the applicant's release which would be of assistance to both the applicant and the community.

1. The magistrate made the following observations concerning the nature of the offences when sentencing the applicant:
   • As to the charge of resist a police officer, police have a job to do, and when they are acting in the execution of their duty, those being arrested have an obligation to comply. She noted that a person, when resisting, risks injury to themselves and others and encourages people to undermine the authority of police;
   • As to the breach of bail charges, bail conditions are expected to be complied with. They are put in place so that the community can be protected from further offences. Breaches are viewed seriously as they undermine the integrity of the bail system;
   • She considered the aggravated burglary was a very serious example of the offence. It involved a group of men breaking into a residence, at the time of day you expect someone to be home, for the purpose of stealing. It involved a gross invasion of privacy and the occupant's sense of safety. There was an inherent risk that someone would be inside in the circumstances and that would be traumatic for the homeowner;
   • She viewed the firearms offences very seriously. She noted possession of a stolen firearm is a serious offence which, when dealt with summarily, attracts a maximum penalty of 100 penalty units and imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. This is indicative of the seriousness with which the offence is viewed by the legislature and the community. These penalties reflect community concerns associated with stolen firearms and their use in crimes of dishonesty and violence;
   • In this case, the firearm involved was not only stolen but was loaded. General deterrence was, therefore, important. It was possessed by the applicant in a loaded state in a vehicle, and not stored safely, which contributed to the potential of it being dangerously misused.

1. The magistrate referred to the applicant's prior convictions. She noted he was not to be resentenced on his prior convictions, but that they were relevant "in regards to the impact previous sentences had" on the applicant, his response to them and whether they had the desired effect of breaking the cycle of his offending. She noted, that to date, previous sentences had not achieved that.
2. In sentencing the applicant, the magistrate stated:

"Having taken into account all the circumstances, a term of imprisonment is the only appropriate sentence to meet each of the expectations and sentencing considerations, including your rehabilitation. I'll make an allowance for parole as a minimum period of time to reflect the various considerations, including your rehabilitation.

Taking into account each of the - all circumstances, including the principle of totality, that is, that I impose a sentence that's appropriate, reflects the criminality but is not crushing, I proceed to sentence you as follows: You are convicted of each matter on each count.

On complaint 950/25 (sic), count 4, I don't proceed to any further penalty than simply recording a conviction. It's the fine-only possess ammunition charge. On the motor vehicle stealings, 9834/24 count 1 and count 8 on 950/24, you're disqualified from driving for a period of 12 months upon your release from custody.

On the balance of the matters, I impose a single sentence of 30 months' imprisonment, backdated to the 20th of September 2024. I order that you be eligible to apply for parole after you have served 20 months of that sentence."

1. The applicant was not represented at the hearing of this application. He told the Court he had chosen to represent himself. He was at somewhat of a disadvantage as a consequence. The applicant had received and read the contentions filed by the respondent which set out the principles which apply to motions to review sentence alleging manifest excess. The applicant's attention was drawn to those principles before he addressed the Court to explain why the sentence was manifestly excessive. He had notes of the matters he wished to raise in support of his application which he read to the Court.
2. The applicant argued that he was sentenced harshly in light of his pleas of guilty, his age and the prospects of him being rehabilitated within the community. He acknowledged his offending was bad, but argued that he had seen more lenient sentences imposed on other people. He considered he had been sentenced harshly because of his background and because he did not last long on parole last time. He considered he did not have a very big criminal prior record, especially not for firearms, noting he only had one prior for firearms in the past. He emphasised he had no priors for aggravated burglary. He also asserted no one was hurt in the course of his offending. He believed that matters that he had been charged with but not convicted of had been taken into account in some way by the magistrate who had also dealt with the applicant during a bail application prior to the sentencing hearing. The applicant said that most of his offending was drug related. He felt like he had not been given any chance at proper rehabilitation.

1. When sentencing the applicant, the magistrate noted the relevance of the totality principle to the exercise. Its operation was recently explained by Jago J in Dickson v State of Tasmania [2024] TASSC 24 at [20] as follows:

"The principle of totality is well recognised. It requires a judicial officer imposing sentences for multiple offences to review the aggregate of the sentences and consider whether the total effect of the sentences is just and appropriate. The totality principle serves to ensure both that the overall sentence is not excessive relative to the totality of the criminality of the offending, and also that an offender is not subjected to a 'crushing sentence' not in keeping with his record and prospects: Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295 at 304."

1. Resolution of this application to review requires consideration of both the length of the head sentence and the length of the non-parole period imposed. It is well recognised that a long parole eligibility period may make a sentence manifestly excessive: Butt v State of Tasmania [2018] TASSC 3, Pearce J at [68].

1. As to the length of the head sentence, the applicant was to be sentenced for 21 offences committed over a five-month period. The first of those offences was committed about six months after his release from prison. He was initially remanded in custody from 20 August 2024 before being released on bail on 30 August 2024 on strict conditions. The second group of offences were committed on 6 and 12 September 2024, less than a fortnight after the applicant's release on bail. The offences with which he was charged included a breach of bail by breaching curfew within a week of being granted bail. The applicant was then remanded in custody following his arrest on the matters before he was granted bail on 16 January 2025. The final set of offences were committed on 23 January 2025, a week after he was granted bail. Again, the offences included a number of charges of breach of bail. Consequently, in the five month period of the offending, the applicant was on bail in the community for a total of 20 days during which time he committed the most serious of the offences for which he fell to be sentenced.
2. It was not alleged that the applicant's conduct in resisting police in fact caused injury to any of the officers involved. In my view, it was a moderate example of such an offence. The applicant also had an extremely concerning record for offending of that type. The breach of bail charges, each of which related to breach of curfew conditions, were also reasonably serious examples of their kind in light of the speed with which the applicant chose to ignore conditions which were plainly directed at controlling his behaviour and reducing his risk of offending while in the community. Again, he had an extensive record of committing similar breaches of bail in the past. General and specific deterrence both loomed large as sentencing considerations in respect of the resist police and breach of bail charges as a result.
3. The more serious offences for which the applicant fell to be sentenced were those arising from the events of 12 September 2024 and 23 January 2025. The overall behaviour engaged in by the applicant demonstrated a concerning level of criminality.
4. The aggravated burglary committed by the applicant in the company of other offenders was a serious example of such an offence. The magistrate rightly observed there was a real risk that someone would be home at the time the aggravated burglary was committed. That risk was realised in this case. The facts do not suggest that the applicant was aware that someone was in the house at the time, however the occupant was forced to hide and was understandably terrified. Ever since the 1997 amendments to s 245 of the Criminal Code 1924, it is a circumstance of aggravation that a burglary is committed at a place which is being used, or is ordinarily used, for the purposes of human habitation. The purpose of those amendments was to send a "clear message to those persons who invade the privacy of a person's home, causing stress and shock to the occupants, that this sort of behaviour is serious criminal conduct and will be treated accordingly": see Second Reading Speech, Criminal Code Amendment (Aggravated Burglary) Bill 1997, Tasmania, House of Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 19 March 1997. A burglary committed at a time when it was likely that premises would be occupied, particularly at night, has also been recognised by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal as a circumstance enhancing the seriousness of the offence: R v Ponfield [1999] NSWCCA 435; (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; NSWCCA 435 at [48]. The magistrate's characterisation of the nature of the offending is well-supported by that authority and the legislative purpose of the relevant amendments.
5. The magistrate was also right to observe that the firearms offences were objectively serious examples of such offending. Not only did the applicant have possession of a stolen firearm, it was also loaded. There was evidence that the firearm had been accidently discharged during the course of the crash, only serving to emphasise the inherent danger of transporting a loaded firearm. The applicant was unlicensed. His record was such that he would not be able to obtain a licence for any form of firearm: see s 29 of the Firearms Act 1996. A considerable amount of additional ammunition was also located in the crashed car. The firearm and ammunition were not stored or conveyed correctly. The applicant was in possession of the firearm and ammunition while travelling in a stolen car. The applicant had relevant and serious prior convictions, having been convicted and sentenced in June 2022 to 16 months imprisonment on charges of aggravated assault, possess a firearm when unlicenced, possess a shortened firearm and possess a firearm with identification marks altered or defaced.
6. In Williams v Parker [2016] TASSC 39, Pearce J considered whether a sentence of 14 months' imprisonment with no order for parole, imposed by a magistrate for drugs and firearm offences, was manifestly excessive. In that case, the firearm offences related to the offender's possession of a shortened firearm without a licence which was stolen and in breach of a firearm prohibition order. It is not alleged in this case that the firearm was shortened or that the applicant has ever been the subject of a prohibition notice. In reasoning to the conclusion the sentence in that case was not manifestly excessive, Pearce J noted at [11] the following in relation to the introduction of the offence of possessing a stolen firearm:

"By reference to the Minister's second reading speech made in the House of Assembly on 24 and 25 March 2015, the creation of the offence and the heavy potential penalties which accompany it, disclose a legislative intention that those found in possession of a stolen firearm should face a harsh punishment."

1. General deterrence and denunciation are important considerations when sentencing for such offences. In the applicant's case, the exercise of discretion required that particular consideration also be given to specific deterrence given the applicant's record of prior convictions, recent release from custody and persistent offending while on bail. While the applicant did not have a prior conviction for aggravated burglary, this was of little moment. The applicant's record demonstrated he had been involved in a good deal of criminal conduct of various kinds which included offences of dishonesty. The applicant was not to be sentenced on his record in a way that was disproportionate to the offending involved, however, his antecedents served to demonstrate this offending was not out of character and reflected his continuing disregard of the law: see Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; 164 CLR 465, Mason DJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ at 477.
2. The applicant complained that no consideration was given to suspending part or all of the sentence of imprisonment imposed. He also argued consideration should have been given to having him assessed for a drug treatment order in light of the connection between his drug use and offending. On the issue of suspension, counsel for the applicant submitted to the magistrate that consideration could be given to suspending any further period of imprisonment imposed in addition to the time already served in custody. In her sentencing comments, the magistrate noted that previous suspended sentences had been activated by courts. She had regard generally to the impact of previous sentences upon the applicant and his response to them. She noted that past sentencing orders, which included suspended sentences, had not had the desired effect of breaking the applicant's cycle of offending. This was an observation that was plainly open in the circumstances. This alone would be sufficient reason to conclude that a sentence of imprisonment suspended in whole or in part would not be an adequate response to the offending.
3. No direct request was made of the magistrate to have the applicant assessed for suitability for a drug treatment order or any other community-based order. Counsel did, however, request that consideration be given including a "corrections-type" order as part of any sentence imposed so as to include a therapeutic aspect to encourage the applicant to make the right decisions in the future. This was in the context of submissions concerning the applicant's significant drug use and prospects of rehabilitation. What was meant by this submission was not further elaborated upon by counsel. Relevantly, s 27S(2)(a)(i) of the Sentencing Act 1999 provides that a motion to review does not lie against a refusal of a court constituted by a magistrate to make a drug treatment order. No specific error has been alleged by the applicant in his motion to review, either by failing to suspend any of the sentence of imprisonment or in failing to make a drug treatment order. No such error has been demonstrated.
4. The circumstances of the applicant's offending, the maximum statutory penalties available, the objects of those penalties and the relevant sentencing principles were such that, in my view, it could not be said that the head sentence of 30 months' imprisonment was outside of the range of sentences reasonably available to the magistrate. This is not to say that it would not have been open to the magistrate to impose a shorter head sentence; the discretion available to a sentencing court is a broad one. But that is not the test. As was made clear by Pearce J in TAB v Moore [2017] TASSC 65 at [21], "It is not to the point that it was open to the magistrate to sentence the applicant in a different way". The applicant has not demonstrated that the head sentence was so obviously excessive that the sentencing discretion must have miscarried.

1. The purpose of legislation providing for parole eligibility is to "provide for mitigation of the punishment of the prisoner in favour of his rehabilitation through conditional freedom, when appropriate": Power v The Queen [1974] HCA 26; 131 CLR 623 at 629. The prospect of parole "provides a prisoner with the hope of release and an incentive for rehabilitation": Brennan v Tasmania [2022] TASCCA 9, Wood J at [83] citing Bugmy v The Queen [1990] HCA 18; (1990) 169 CLR 525 per Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 536. In setting a parole eligibility period, a sentencer has a broad discretion. Some guidance is provided by the terms of s 17(4) of the Sentencing Act which provides that regard may be had to all or any of the following: the nature and circumstances of the offence; the offender's antecedents or character; and any other sentence to which the offender is subject. Section 17(4) makes clear, however, that these factors do not limit the generality of the court's ability to "have regard to such matters as it considers necessary or appropriate" when exercising the discretion. The length of the non-parole period set by a sentencing court is to reflect the minimum period of time that the court determines that justice requires to be served by the offender, having regard to all the circumstances of the offending: Power v The Queen at 629; Deakin v The Queen [1984] HCA 31; 54 ALR 765; Carr v The Queen [2002] TASSC 60, 11 Tas R 362 at [96]; Richman v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 18 at [47]; Director of Public Prosecutions v Harris [2013] TASCCA 5 at [10]. There is no presumption that the non-parole period should be the minimum: Pickrell v Tasmania [2011] TASSCA 13 at [13].
2. In Gill v The Queen serial no A34/1990, Crawford J (with whom Neasey J agreed), stated at 7-8:

"The making of an order by a sentencing judge that a prisoner shall not be eligible for parole, or extending the non-parole period, has the effect of increasing the severity of the punishment by delaying the possible time for release from prison. It may act as a deterrent to the prisoner and others contemplating crime. It may also have the effect of protecting the public from further criminal conduct by the prisoner by keeping him locked away. Conversely it may discourage reformation and good behaviour in prison, and prevent or lessen the chances of rehabilitation under supervision through conditional freedom. These effect, or the possibility of them or the object of achieving them, or some of them, should be considered by sentencing judges before making an order removing eligibility for parole or extending the non-parole period."

1. In this case, the magistrate gave consideration to the overall criminality and the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation when setting the minimum period of time he was required to serve before being eligible for release on parole. The parole eligibility period imposed exceeded the minimum available by five months and amounted to two-thirds of the total period of imprisonment imposed upon the applicant. It does, however, provide the applicant the opportunity of early release ten months prior to the expiration of the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him.
2. There was good reason for the magistrate to decline to impose the minimum non-parole period upon the applicant. Not only had the applicant, by his own admission, performed poorly on parole when he previously had that opportunity, his record of prior convictions reflected a failure to comply with other rehabilitative orders in the form of suspended sentences and community corrections orders. In light of those matters, combined with the circumstances of the offending, it could not be said that the imposition of a parole eligibility period in excess of the minimum provided for by the Sentencing Act was demonstrative of error in the exercise of the magistrate's sentencing discretion.
3. A sentence of 30 months' imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 20 months is a significant sentence. While it would have been open to the magistrate to impose a shorter head sentence and non-parole period, that does not mean the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust. In my view, the sentence imposed in this case, taking into account both the length of the period of imprisonment imposed and of the non-parole period, was not so obviously excessive that some error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion must have occurred.
4. The motion is dismissed.

[1] The applicant's record of prior convictions is somewhat ambiguous. It is not clear whether a four month period of suspended imprisonment was activated or not. If it was not activated, the periods of imprisonment imposed on those dates total 30 months and 2 weeks.