Administrative appeal - Decision to declare that a dog is a dangerous dog - Application by respondent for appeal to be dismissed - Application by appellants for extension of time - No extension of time - Appeal dismissed

Dog Control Act 2000;

Magistrates Court (Administrative Appeals Division) Act 2001;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Additional Jurisdictions) Act 2025;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020;

Animal Welfare Act 1993

C Howlett v Clarence City Council [2022] TASCAT 72;

Raymond Hoser v Christophe Hatcher [1999] NSWSC 527;

E Allan v Strata Corporation No. 180683 [2022] TASCAT 29;

Respondent: Michael Jaques, Senior Legal Counsel, Glenorchy City Council

1. On 12 September 2024, Ms Trista Mollross and Mr Anthony Blackaby were notified by the Glenorchy City Council that their dog, Billie, was declared to be a dangerous Dog under s 29(1) of the Dog Control Act 2000 (the DC Act).
2. Section 29 of the DC Act provides:

29. Declaration of particular dangerous dog > > (1) A general manager, by notice served on the owner of a dog - > > (a) may declare that dog to be a dangerous dog if - > > (i) the dog has caused serious injury to a person or another animal; or > > (ii) there is reasonable cause to believe that the dog is likely to cause serious injury to a person or another animal; and > > (b) is to give reasons for the declaration in the notice; and > > (c) is to advise the owner of the right of appeal under section 31.

3. On 25 September 2024, Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby appealed the decision, declaring Billie to be a dangerous dog (the decision) to the Magistrates Court of Tasmania. The appeal was made pursuant to the Magistrates Court (Administrative Appeals Division) Act 2001 (the MCAAD Act).
4. On 23 October 2024, a statement of the reasons for the decision were filed by the respondent pursuant to s 21 of the MCAAD Act, together with materials that had been taken into consideration at the time the decision was made.
5. It appears from the Magistrates Court file that the proceedings did not progress, pending the outcome of relevant charges against the appellants that were on foot in the Supreme Court.
6. On 1 July 2025, as a consequence of the commencement of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Additional Jurisdictions) Act 2025, the jurisdiction to hear this appeal was transferred to the Tribunal.
7. The Tribunal conducted several directions hearings by telephone. On 2 September 2025 the respondent advised that the majority of its evidence had been filed when the proceedings were before the Magistrates Court, but that it intended to also file some additional documentation arising from the resolution of the proceedings in the Supreme Court.
8. Directions were made on 2 September 2025 that the respondent was to file and serve any additional evidence upon which it intended to rely within seven days. The appellants were directed to file any evidence upon which they wished to rely within 28 days.
9. On 9 September 2025, the respondent filed a hearing book containing all the material intended to be relied upon. The appellants have subsequently filed their own material. I will refer to the evidence filed by the parties in more detail later.
10. The respondent has now made an application to have the appeal against the decision dismissed. The application for dismissal has been made on the grounds, firstly, that there has been a want of prosecution of the appeal from the decision; secondly, that the appeal is lacking in substance, and therefore frivolous; and thirdly, that the appellants are no longer the owners of the dog, and cannot maintain the appeal.
11. In their response to the application for the dismissal of the proceeding, the appellants sought extensions of time to provide further evidence in support of the appeal.
12. I will first consider the application for an extension of time that has been made by the appellants, and then make a determination about the application to dismiss the appeal. If necessary, I will then consider the argument that the appellants no longer have standing to maintain the appeal.
13. The Tribunal has the power to dismiss proceedings under Division 3 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (the TASCAT Act).
14. Section 88(4) of the TASCAT Act provides:

At any time, the Tribunal may make an order dismissing or striking out all, or any part, of proceedings for want of prosecution.

15. Section 89 of the TASCAT Act relevantly provides as follows:

(1) This section applies if the Tribunal believes that a proceeding or a part of a proceeding - > > (a) is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or > > (b) is otherwise an abuse of process. > > (2) If this section applies, the Tribunal may order that the proceedings, or the part of a proceeding, be dismissed or struck out and may make any related or ancillary order.

1. The decision to declare Billie a dangerous dog was sparked by an incident on the evening of 27 February 2024 where the appellants and Billie were in the grounds of Dominic College in Glenorchy. Billie attacked and killed or severely injured two wallabies.
2. Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby were each subsequently charged with aggravated animal cruelty contrary to s 9(1) of the Animal Welfare Act 1993. The charges were brought in relation to what occurred on 27 February 2024, and in relation to another incident in the early hours of 7 March 2024 where Ms Mollross was present with Billie, again in the grounds of Dominic College, when Billie attacked two wallabies.
3. The statement of reasons filed by the respondent gave the following background:
   • On 27 February 2024 at approximately 8:24pm Billie was present in the grounds of Dominic College located on Tolosa Street in Glenorchy. At the same time, Billie was off her lead however she was accompanied by Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby.
   • The grounds of the school are considered a "prohibited public area" under s 28(1) of DC Act meaning that a person must not take a dog into that area without the permission of a person in charge of the place. There is not evidence that prior permission was granted by the school for Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby to take Billie onto its grounds.
   • Ms Mollross spotted a Bennetts Wallaby on the grounds and incited Billie to attack it, stating "go get it". Billie charged at the wallaby and latched onto the base of its tail and at its neck, shaking the animal vigorously.
   • The attack was incited to continue for approximately 9 minutes and caused serious injuries to the wallaby from which it died. Video footage of the attack was captured by Ms Mollross on her mobile phone. The footage shows that Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby made no efforts to stop Billie from attacking the animal. Instead, the actively encouraged the attack by praising the dog, making statements such as "what a good girl", "she needs to get its head or something", and "get it, good girl, I think it's dead now".
   • Mr Blackaby further participated in the attack by grabbing the wallaby by its neck and presenting to Billie so that the dog could better latch onto the animal.
   • The attack caused serious injuries (ie. death) to the wallaby.
4. In its reasons for decision, the respondent also considered Ms Mollross to have an extensive history of irresponsible dog ownership, and outlined a history going back to 2020 which included failures to register a number of dogs, a number of dogs being owned by Ms Mollross being declared dangerous dogs, and three instances of Ms Mollross failing to comply with conditions of keeping a dangerous dog, leading to Notices of Intention to Destroy a dangerous dog being issued in relation to three different dogs.
5. The respondent outlined the basis upon which the decision to declare Billie a dangerous dog had been made:

Council has decided that the offence of 27 February 2024, by itself, is serious enough to declare Billie to be a dangerous dog. > > Although the dog is unregistered, it seems from the facts of the incident when both Applicants participated in the unlawful behaviour, that the Appellants both live at the same address with the dog, and the joint application to this court, that Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby share the ownership of "Billie". Under Section 6 of the Act the person who is the owner of an unregistered dog is "the person who ordinarily keeps the dog". > > Ms Mollross' history of non-compliance with the Dog Control Act 2000 has also been taken into account. Council is satisfied that both the situations set out in section 29(1) of the Dog Control Act 2000 exist, and that it is appropriate in the circumstances to declare Billie to be a dangerous dog. This is because:

• The injuries inflicted upon the wallaby were very serious and resulted in the death of that animal. According to a statutory declaration dated 15 April 2024 by veterinary consultant, Dr Robert Jackson, the attack would have caused "unreasonable and unjustifiable pain and suffering to the wallaby".
• The attack occurred at a location accessible to the public, and at a time when people may have been present (an unidentified child's voice can be heard in Ms Mollross' recording of the attack stating, 11Your dog is naughty"). The location increased the possibility that a member of the public could have been injured in the attack, particularly if they had attempted to intervene.
• The conscious participation of Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby in the attack is extremely disturbing and demonstrates a severe escalation in Ms Mollross' ongoing noncompliance with animal management laws.
• Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby have failed to demonstrate remorse or regret for their actions that resulted in the death of the wallaby. This is evident by Ms Mollross' intent and willingness to incite Billie to attack another wallaby at the same location a month later on 7 March 2024.
• Ms Mollross has demonstrated a long history of noncompliance with her legal obligations relating to owning a dog. This includes a failure to ensure that animals are secure on her property and a failure to ensure that her dogs do not pose a risk to other animals and the public.
• On several occasions in the past, Council has attempted to work with Ms Mollross to educate her on responsible dog ownership, however Ms Mollross has demonstrated an apparent lack of willingness to learn and adjust her behaviour. For example, Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby have not registered Billie with Council as required by section 8(1) of the Act, despite Council's numerous and previous advice to Ms Mollross since 2020 that she needs to register her dogs. Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby have also failed to provide Council with a microchip number for Billie, so it is unclear whether the dog has been microchipped as required by section 15A(1) of the Act.
• Due to the owners' repeated, notably Ms Mollross' poor behaviour and the actions of the dog "Billie", Council has reasonable cause to believe that Billie will not be responsibly managed and is likely to cause serious injury to an animal in the future, unless she is kept under the strict conditions that are required to comply with a dangerous dog declaration.
• Council must act in the best interests of the community to ensure that members of the public and other animals are safe from risks of harm. Council is satisfied that the conditions of a dangerous dog declaration, including keeping Billie on a lead attached to a dangerous dog collar and fitted with a muzzle while in a public place, is essential to ensuring that Billie will not be a risk to other people or animals.

1. Evidence filed by the respondent in support if its decision included:
   • various records relating to Ms Mollross' history of dog ownership, including infringement notices
   • a copy of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment Tasmania, Investigations and Enforcement Services prosecution brief relating to charges against the appellants
   • Comments on passing sentence of Estcourt J dated 30 May 2025
   • CCTV footage of the incident on 27 February 2024 on Dominic College grounds

1. On 18 September 2025, Ms Mollross filed in the Tribunal two photographs of documents that appear to relate to the criminal charges and bail arrangements that were ultimately the subject of the comments on passing sentence of Estcourt J on 30 May 2025.Ms Mollross also filed two short videos, one of Billie interacting in a friendly fashion with another dog, and one of Billie tentatively (and not aggressively) approaching what appears to be a small prostrate animal or bird.
2. On 5 October 2025, Ms Mollross filed five statutory declarations. The statutory declarations consisted of brief statements by people who had known Bille for some time and who say they have never witnessed any aggression by Billie towards, variously, people, children, or other dogs (and in one case a pet bird). Another statutory declaration in similar terms was filed on 12 October 2025.

1. Dismissal of proceedings under the TASCAT Act was considered in C Howlett v Clarence City Council [2022] TASCAT 72. In that case Deputy President Grueber at [10] referred to Raymond Hoser v Christophe Hatcher [1999] NSWSC 527, which set out a non-exhaustive list of principles relevant to the exercise of a discretion to dismiss for want of prosecution. These were summarised as:
   • The ultimate question is whether justice demands that the action be dismissed.
   • The discretion should be exercised only in a clear case where it is manifestly warranted, each case depends on its own facts and rigid formulae should not be applied in the exercise of the discretion.
   • Any explanation offered by the Plaintiff for a delay in the proceeding must be considered.
   • Personal blamelessness on the part of a party, as distinct from fault on the part of that party's legal representative, is relevant.
   • A Respondent who takes no steps to secure progress in proceedings or to activate an apparently inactive Plaintiff or who stands by in the hope that passage of time will ensure the quiet death of the proceedings or that longer delay will strengthen the case for striking out runs the risk that that behaviour will operate to the Respondent's disadvantage.
   • Delay between the date that a cause of action arose, and the commencement of the proceedings may be a relevant factor, but its weight is limited.
   • The onus lies on the Respondent to establish any prejudice upon which reliance is placed.
   • Prejudice to a Respondent caused by delay must be balanced against prejudice to a Plaintiff deprived of an otherwise valid claim.
   • What a Respondent has or has not done by way of preparation for trial may be relevant in respect to consideration of prejudice caused by delay.
   • The Appellant's prospects of success are relevant to whether justice will be done by striking out the claim. If it appears that the prospects are minimal, the discretion is more likely to be exercised in favour of the respondent.
   • The exercise of the discretion to strike out should not incorporate any element of punishing a tardy Applicant or of excluding one who may appear to have some unworthy characteristics as to supplant the overall aim of the attainment of justice.
2. Deputy President Grueber also noted at [11]:

To that list can be added modern case management considerations and an acknowledgement that inefficiency or incompetence in the conduct of litigation may unjustly burden other parties and the administration of justice itself[1].

3. For the purposes of s 89 of the TASCAT Act, the Tribunal has held that the broad meaning in law of the words 'frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance' is that the proceeding lacks a legal foundation to provide relief. In particular, the Tribunal has adopted the interpretation of the phrase 'lacking in substance' to mean an insufficiency or absence of merit of a case being put forward by a party: See E Allan v Strata Corporation No. 180683 [2022] TASCAT 29, and Neilsen v George Town Council [202] TASCAT 76.

1. In support of the application for dismissal, the respondent submits that the appellants have failed to provide any salient evidence, and that the appeal is futile. The respondent notes the comments on passing sentence in relation to the convictions of the appellants in the Supreme Court, which supports that there were attacks on wallabies that were serious, sustained and unprovoked.
2. The respondent submits that the only evidence put forward by the appellants are statements about the benign nature of Billie, and the evidence does no more than demonstrate that the appellants are unable to make any objective assessment of risk. In particular, the respondent refers to a message sent by Ms Mollross to a family member on the evening of 27 February 2024 (referred to in the comments on passing sentence of Estcourt J): "I didn't think she had it in her ahahah but she was savage as ahaha". The respondent says that this is a clear acknowledgement that Billie can be savage, and contrary to the evidence filed by the appellants about Billie's nature.

1. After the respondent's submissions in support of the application to dismiss were filed and served, the appellants applied for an extension of time to obtain legal representation and obtain further evidence about hunting/working dogs. They said they want to obtain such evidence because there are dogs all over the world that are trained to hunt wildlife and yet are not deemed to be dangerous dogs. The appellants also want further time to enable Billie's general disposition to be assessed by an expert in dog behaviour, and/or for Bille to be rehoused, and trained and then assessed by an expert.

1. This appeal was made to the Magistrates Court in September 2024.The respondent's statement of reasons, and the materials the respondent had before it when it made the decision were filed soon after that time.
2. By the time the appellants filed the evidence they intended to rely upon in October 2025, the proceedings had been on foot, and they had been aware of the respondent's position for approximately a year.
3. Although the appeal had not progressed in the Magistrates Court whilst the proceedings under the AW Act were pending, there was no reason why the appellants could not have taken steps to prepare their case. If the appellants wanted to arrange for expert assessment of Billie's temperament, or professional retraining and assessment, they could have done so. There is no explanation about why that could not have been organised in a timely fashion, or any indication about any steps that have been taken to pursue either course to date.
4. Similarly, the appellants have had a considerable period of time to seek legal representation if that is what they wish to do, and have, apparently taken no steps to do so to date.
5. In relation to the suggestion that the appellants intend to obtain expert evidence about trained hunting dogs, I can not see how that evidence could be relevant to these proceedings. Billie is not, and never has been, a trained hunting dog. These proceedings are about Billie and a review of the decision to declare her a dangerous dog after she attacked wallabies on 27 February 2024. There is no reason to give the appellants further time to seek any evidence about other dogs who may be trained to hunt wildlife.
6. I am not going exercise my discretion to extend the time for the appellants to pursue retraining or assessments of Billie or further evidence, nor to adjourn the proceedings until such time as the appellants obtain legal representation.

1. I do not consider that there ought to be an order dismissing the appeal under s 88(4) for want of prosecution. The appellants filed the evidence they relied on within the time directed by the Tribunal, or soon thereafter, and the respondent's evidence was not complete until about that time in any event.
2. However, I consider that it is appropriate for me to exercise my discretion to dismiss these proceedings under s 89 of the TACAT Act, on the basis that the appeal is lacking in substance.
3. The evidence upon which the respondent relies in support of the decision is very strong and not impacted by the limited observational evidence relied upon by the appellants.
4. On 30 May 2025, after pleading guilty to charges of aggravated cruelty under the Animal Welfare Act 1993, Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby were each sentenced in the Supreme Court to periods of imprisonment (wholly suspended on conditions), and each disqualified from having custody of any dog for a period of 18 months.
5. The factual matrix surrounding the incident on 27 February 2024 as expressed in the decision of the respondent to declare Billie a dangerous dog is supported by the comments on passing sentence by Estcourt J.
6. The respondent's evidence included CCTV footage from Dominic College and video footage taken by either or both Ms Mollross and Mr Blackaby on their phones. The footage is, quite frankly, sickening. In part, it is sickening because neither of Billie's owners make any attempt to restrain or call off Billie as she relentlessly attacks wallabies. In the CCTV footage from the early hours of 3 March 2024, Ms Mollross leaps around so she can continue filming on her phone as Billie attacks a wallaby that is effectively trapped.
7. The extent to which an owner takes responsibility for a dog's behaviour may be relevant to the discretion to make a declaration that a dog is a dangerous dog under the DC Act. The behaviour of the appellants for which they were convicted in the Supreme Court, and the extensive history of irresponsible dog ownership by Ms Mollross are significant matters that are relevant to considerations regarding public safety in the future, and therefore relevant to the decision under review.
8. In its review proceedings, the Tribunal is required to reach the correct or preferable decision, standing in the shoes of the original decision maker. It will have regard to the material before the original decision maker, and may have regard to other, relevant material that is placed before it.
9. The appeal is without merit. I consider there would be no basis for the Tribunal to make any decision on the hearing of the review other than to affirm the decision to declare Billie a dangerous dog under s 29 of the DC Act.
10. The appeal is dismissed under s 89 of the TASCAT Act on the ground that the appeal is lacking in substance.
11. Because the appeal is dismissed, it is not necessary for me to determine the third ground of the application made by the respondent, related to the standing of the appellants.

1. The appeal (Tribunal reference AS/2025/9) by Trista Mollross and Anthony Blackaby against a decision of the Glenorchy City Council to declare Billie a dangerous dog under s 29 of the Dog Control Act 2000 is dismissed under s 89 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020, on the basis that the appeal is lacking in substance.
2. If any ancillary orders are sought by either party, they are directed to file submissions identifying the orders sought, and submissions in support, within 21 days.

[1] Citing Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 at [30] and Rozenblit v Vainer [2018] HCA 23 at [41]