[2014] QCAT 478
General information, not legal advice.
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2014-10-08
Original judgment source is linked above.
The applicant puts forward no particular reason why it did not appeal against this ruling in relation to amendment within time. Additionally, there is to my mind no sufficient doubt about the correctness of the President's construction of the power to amend under section 178, to warrant further investigation of that power by way of appeal. I note that a newly worded power has been included in the QCAT legislation. For the aggregation of those considerations I exercise the discretion against extending time for appeal in relation to that ground. If I had extended time I would have dismissed an appeal on that round.
[39] There are some decisions of this Tribunal that have arrived at a different result. These decisions include: Baldwin v Robinson and Cooroy Golf Club Inc [2010] QCAT 118, Daw v QR Limited & Anor [2011] QCAT 319, and , each of which is a decision of Senior Member Endicott and each of which was heard on the papers. There is also a decision to similar effect in Obviously, each of them post dates the amendment to s 178 and all but the final one post dates the decision on appeal in . None makes reference to it, and clearly the Tribunal had not been made aware of it.
[40] In those cases it has decided that:
Section 178 did not extend in its operation to add a claim for victimisation based on conduct that gave rise to the original complaint because it could only relate to matters related to the original complaint and did not permit matters amounting to "adding a fresh complaint"; Baldwin.
That the language used in the explanatory notes to describe the purpose of the introduction of the amendments to s 178 was merely to clarify the power and did no more than express in clearer language the existing power of the Tribunal to amend the complaint. Thus it did not include a power to amend to include a victimisation allegation because they are fresh complaints; Daw v QR Limited and Smith v Lutheran Church of Australia.
Despite the wide discretion in s 178 to amend, it did not include power to make an amendment that related to allegations never part of a validly made complaint and therefore which failed to attain "the threshold requirements of s 136"; Smith v Lutheran Church of Australia and X v Q.
That the power in s 178 to amend does not provide jurisdiction to QCAT to determine allegations of fresh complaint where the power under s 178 relates to allegations that should be considered "as so close related to the complaint referred by the Commission that they should be formally made part of the complaint by way of amendment". That did not extend to complaints of victimisation: X v Q. It should be noted that this sought to make further allegations of victimisation in the same case in which the President of the ADT, Mr Savage in X v Q (No 3) allowed an amendment.
[41] In the decision in Daw, Senior Member Endicott expressed the view that whilst it was inconvenient to the complainant not to allow the amendments "issues of convenience or even costs are not relevant in this case to the exercise of the discretion in s 178". I beg to differ.
[42] In my view it is clear that the amendments which were made to s 178 were facilitative, established in the Tribunal an unfettered discretionary power to allow an amendment to raise a matter notwithstanding that it was not included in the original complaint, and expected this Tribunal to exercise that power in ways which, inter alia, facilitated the just and expeditious hearing of the matters in dispute, to minimise inconvenience and cost associated with that process, and to avoid unnecessary technicality and formality in this process. In my view the decisions of this Tribunal which have held otherwise were incorrectly decided. As the Chief Justice concluded in X v Q, even before the 2009 Amendments to s 178 of the ADA, s 178 gave an "unfettered discretion" to allow amendments to bring new claims.
[43] The just and expeditious determination of the matters in issue between these parties would be facilitated by permitting the amendments sought here. It therefore seems to me to be clear that an appropriate exercise of discretion in this particular case would be to allow the amendments to be made to make allegations of victimisation broadly in the terms which are contained in the proposed statements of contentions.
[44] I therefore order:
A statement from each witness to give evidence for the Second Respondent at the hearing, including experts; and
Any documents referred to in a statement of evidence which must be identified, explained and attached to the appropriate witness statement by 19 January 2015.
MM
State of Queensland [2014] QCAT 478
Wilson v Lawson [2008] QADT 27
Yohan v Qld Basketball Incorporated [2010] QCAT 459
Hopper v Mount Isa Mines [1998] QSC 287; (1999) 2 Qd R 496
McKenzie v MacKay and State of Queensland [2005] QADT 24
X v Q (No 3) [2009] QADT 21
Baldwin v Robinson and Cooroy Golf Club Inc [2010] QCAT 118
Daw v QR Limited & Anor [2011] QCAT 319
Smith v The Lutheran Church of Australia Queensland District t/as St Peter's Lutheran College (No 2) [2011] QCAT 304
X v Q [2011] QCAT 453
Coleman v Ngoonbi Co-operative Society Ltd [2013] QCAT 207
The inclusion of a new section 177 is to clarify that QCAT may join a third party to a proceeding where the person is not a complainant or respondent to the complaint to which the proceeding relates. Former decisions of the ADT have narrowly interpreted the former section 177 thus restricting the use of the section 177 to join third parties to a proceeding. The relevant decisions include Lundbergs v QSuper [2003] QADT 8, Mickelo v Kotlaro & Cellcom Pty Ltd t/a Melbourne Hotel [2004] QADT 31, H v T [2006] QADT 20 and Black and White (Quick Service) Taxis Ltd v Sailor & Anor [2008] QSC 77.
(1999) 2 Qd R 496