[2009] VCAT 2218
General information, not legal advice.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2009-10-22
Mr J
Original judgment source is linked above.
These 39 or more turbines sited, we think, between 2.5 and 3.5 km from Mawallok will destroy Mawallok as a heritage site of national significance. In addition to lodging a thick industrial screen in the core vista, other turbines with their 1000 tonne reinforced concrete foundations to be placed in the aquifer recharge area and thereby threaten the springs from which allow the garden to be maintained and the pastoral activities to flourish. The project will slash Mawallok's value by approximately $4 million, according to expert valuation advice.
In relation to the efficacy of wind energy to reduce Victoria's greenhouse gas emissions at the levels claimed by the government, work continues to be published which shows that wind energy can play no more than a token role, and in doing so is one of the most expensive ways to reduce emissions when compared to other options (such as low emission fossil fuels).
Document 6 is the final version of the VRET BIA. That document contains opinions in relation to the policy issues concerning the VRET scheme. Those opinions were expressed by KPMG, on behalf of the Department of Infrastructure, for the sole purpose of informing and assisting Cabinet in its deliberations about whether to introduce a Bill into Parliament concerning the VRET scheme, and (if that were to be done) about what the Bill should contain.
... a BIA is treated as a Cabinet-in-confidence document. There are strong reasons around such documents being kept confidential. The sanctity of Cabinet confidentiality is fundamental to a well-functioning government. Disclosing a BIA without the consent of the executive would violate that confidentiality. That, in turn, would compromise the integrity of the Cabinet process, which would be contrary to the public interest.
... I prepared the Cabinet Submission, that Document 6 (with some very minor modifications - which I now note were made at around the time I prepared the Cabinet Submission) was Attachment 3 to the Cabinet Submission, and that I summarised the document in the body of the Cabinet Submission. That summary was in the nature of an executive summary.
In late March 2006, the Cabinet Secretariat received an 'approved in Principle' submission for Cabinet in relation to the Victorian Renewable Energy Target Bill ('the Cabinet submission'). The Cabinet submission was distributed to ministers on 29 March for consideration by Cabinet on 3 April 2006, and is held by the Cabinet Secretariat.
(b) a document that has been prepared by a Minister or on his or her behalf or by an agency for the purpose of submission for consideration by the Cabinet;
(c) a document that is a copy or draft of, or contains extracts from, a document referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (ba); or
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a document referred to in a paragraph of that subsection to the extent that the document contains purely statistical, technical or scientific material unless the disclosure of the document would involve the disclosure of any deliberation or decision of the Cabinet.
The matters in dispute in relation to this claim are :
Whether the report is actually brought into the meeting room is immaterial. The executive summary explains to the members of the board or committee in a shorthand way what they would themselves read if they examined the report. The fact that such a summary is prepared does not make the report itself any the less a document for consideration by the board or committee for whom the summary is prepared.
It is important to observe that section 28(1)(b) of the Act does not extend to a document merely because the document has been prepared for the purpose of submission to the Cabinet. Rather the purpose of the preparation of the document must be for submission for consideration by the Cabinet. Hence documents will not fall within the exemption in section 28(1)(b) of the Act just because they were prepared with the intention of physically placing them before the Cabinet. Rather it is necessary to ask whether, at the time a document was prepared, the only purpose, or one of the substantial purposes, for the preparation of the document was for the purpose of submission for consideration by the Cabinet.
Mr Bayne did not comment upon the possibility that in a particular case all the documents which were created to assist in the preparation of a submission might also be physically submitted to the Cabinet. But it is likely that if he had considered this possibility he would have concluded that the words of the exemption do not extend to documents which have been created, not for the purpose of being considered by the Cabinet, but for the purpose of preparing another document or documents to be considered by the Cabinet.
.... Typically information provided to Cabinet ministers will be in summary form; if all the information provided to Cabinet ministers to enable Cabinet to make decisions was in raw or primary form, the process would be unworkable. Sometimes a primary document, or raw information, will be prepared for submission to, and consideration by, the Cabinet. But when this occurs it is likely to involve relatively few documents; and it is likely to be confined to those that are politically important or politically sensitive.
.... Frankly it is far fetched to think that members of Cabinet would examine some hundreds of certificates of title. Not only would such a process be tedious, but it would be unlikely to provide facts, without further analysis, which would inform the decision Cabinet had to make.
A different conclusion can be reached in relation to those documents consisting of maps showing attributes about sites and areas of interest. It is realistic to think that, when such maps were produced, it was contemplated that Cabinet ministers would examine the maps and consider them. This would extend to maps, based upon certificates of title, showing land tenure in and around sites and areas of interest. .... in Re Olexander v Department of Premier and Cabinet to the effect that an executive summary, or a summarised document, put before Cabinet does not make the full report itself any less a document for consideration by the Cabinet than the summary. I certainly agree with the observation made in Olexander to this effect. ... A summary of a document is, in effect, the same document in a shortened form.
Document 6 does not contain information that may be characterised as purely statistical, technical or scientific material. Rather, it contains opinions and analysis in relation to policy issues.
Paragraph 38 of Mr Corden's first statement provides that he signed Document 20, which was prepared for the sole purpose of being submitted to Cabinet for its consideration.
Further, paragraph 7 of Ms Poland's statement provides that Document 20 is identical to Attachment 4 of the Cabinet submission, except that Attachment 4 has an attachment number at the top right hand corner, whereas Document 20 does not.
And paragraph 9 of Mr Krabelski's third statement provides that Document 20 (with a very minor modification made at around the time he prepared the Cabinet submission) was Attachment 4 to the Cabinet Submission, and he summarised that document in the body of the Cabinet Submission.
If VCEC had expressed concerns about the BIA, details of those concerns would be attached to the Cabinet submission, and would 'therefore be taken into account in the Cabinet ... decision-making process.
(1) Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if it is a document the disclosure of which under this Act -
(a) would disclose matter in the nature of opinion, advice or recommendation prepared by an officer or Minister, or consultation or deliberation that has taken place between officers, Ministers, or an officer and a Minister, in the course of, or for the purpose of, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the government; and
(3) This section does not apply to a document by reason only of purely factual material contained in the document.
The purpose of the 26 September meeting was to discuss SV's very preliminary strategy in anticipation of it preparing Document 1 for the VCEC to review.
I am informed by the Officer on maternity leave and believe that she and her then colleague at VCEC created the file note for their reference, and to later assist them, or any other VCEC officers subsequently assigned to work on this proposal, when reviewing Document 1 against VCEC's assessment criteria. The file note is based purely upon the Officers' recollection of events, and includes their opinions, or that of the SV Officer, about matters relating to the Government's policy proposal and options that were under consideration at that time. They are not, and do not purport to be, minutes of the 26 September meeting. As such, they are necessarily incomplete and may contain material that could mislead a reader if that person did not fully understand what has been written and the relevant context. I am informed by the Officer on maternity leave and believe that, if the file note were released, Officers in her position would be less inclined to create such notes in the future as they would become much more time-consuming to prepare if public release was thought likely.
Releasing Document 7 would disclose very preliminary consultations, including sharing of opinions on issues that might need to be covered in the analysis, that took place between the VCEC and officers of SV in relation to the development of a draft BIA. That consultation took place, and the opinions were expressed, purely for the purpose of VCEC's review process.
(a) The document was prepared at a very early stage. The information contained in the document does not accurately reflect the content of Document 1, which itself is substantially different from the final version of the VRE BIA. As such, disclosure of Document 7 would be misleading and confusing, and could lead to ill-informed debate about material that may or may not have been considered by Cabinet in its decision making.
(b) As I have said in paragraph 23 of my First Statement, the success of VCEC's process of review would be severely compromised if preliminary and incomplete draft documents it receives or creates were to be disclosed under the FOI Act. That is because it is likely that some departments and agencies would not engage with the VCEC and its iterative review process early in the policy development process if at all - as such early engagement is, after all, a voluntary process - if it were thought that documents created for or during the review process would be released under the FOI Act.
(c) As I state in paragraph 24 of my First Statement, compromising the success of VCEC's review process would inevitably lead to a reduction in the quality of documents being provided to Cabinet, which in turn would lead to a reduction in the quality of the Cabinet decision-making process. This would be contrary to the public interest.
(d) The disclosure of Document 7 would cause reluctance in junior officers to freely record preliminary thinking, ideas and opinions discussed prior to the finalisation of all issues, as they would be concerned that such early thinking would be publicly critiqued. This would reduce the efficiency of the VCEC, which would be contrary to the public interest.
The frankness and candour ground has long been treated with scepticism by the Tribunal.
Questions of government policy and whether legislation ought to be amended to reflect government policy are political in nature which lie within the sovereignty of the Parliament. That is why Parliamentary debates occur, why proceedings in Parliament are afforded absolute privilege and may not be impugned by courts or tribunals for to do so is a contempt of the Parliament itself.
The formulation of policy by government entails a consideration of a host of factors, the execution of a balancing process in order to ascertain whether amendment to legislation is required and rests, in part, upon the advice of many people and bodies. This is part of the consultative or investigative processes, and if government cannot conduct this process freely and confidentially there is potential for the impairment of the consultative process because government, or for that matter, any member of Parliament, may not seek and canvas [sic] a range of views on the subject under consideration, whether from public servants, consultants or review committees if those communications may ultimately become public. The merits and demerits of any effects of a change to legislation should, in order to maintain the efficiency of government, remain within the confidence of the party seeking the advice ... It is upon the completion of this process that policy is formulated and legislation is then proposed in the form of a Bill for the consideration of Parliament. It is there that the public interest is preserved through the process of representative democracy. Bills are debated, often amendments are made to them and an Act of Parliament is passed.
In my opinion, there remains a real potential for the conduct of government to be inhibited in the investigative process involved in the formulation of policy if the opinions of those persons or bodies from whom or from which the government seeks advice, was sought in circumstances where it may become public. This may result in a reluctance on the part of the government to canvas [sic] advice from appropriate sources, or on the other it may result in inhibited advice from those persons or authorities providing it.
The information contained in the document does not accurately reflect the content of Document 1, which itself is substantially different from the final version of the VRE BIA. As such, disclosure of Document 7 would be misleading and confusing, and could lead to ill-informed debate about material that may or may not have been considered by Cabinet in its decision making.
(a) VCEC's process of review is intended to encourage improvement in the quality of documents going to Cabinet, including through exploring a wide range of options for addressing a clearly identified problem. The success of this process would be severely compromised if preliminary and incomplete draft documents were to be disclosed under the FOI Act. That is because it is likely that departments and agencies would not engage with the VCEC and its iterative review process early in the policy development process if at all - as such early engagement is, after all, a voluntary process - if it were thought that documents created in the course of the review process would be released under the Act. In addition, the leading consultancy firms that assist agencies prepare this analysis would also be reluctant to provide early and incomplete drafts for comment if these drafts could be released under the Act;
(b) compromising the success of VCEC's review process in the manner described in the previous paragraph would inevitably lead to a reduction in the quality of documents being provided to Cabinet, which in turn could lead to a reduction in the quality of the Cabinet decision-making process. This would be contrary to the public interest; and
(c) further, the draft VRET BIA received on 20 February 2006 is different from the final version of the BRE BIA. Disclosure of documents commenting on the draft VRET BIA would therefore be misleading and confusing, and could lead to ill-informed debate about the material that may or may not have been considered by Cabinet in its decision-making. This would also be contrary to the public interest, particularly as the VRE Act is a public document and the merits of the policies embodied within it may be freely discussed;
(d) disclosure of Documents 13 to 16 under the Act would lead to VCEC officers being less frank and candid in preparing similar documents in the future; and to them providing some such feedback orally. Being able to express frank and candid criticisms of draft BIAs in a written form and in a confidential manner is vital to the success of the VCEC review process. There are two reasons for that. First, it allows for superior quality control and oversight processes by the Executives within the Commission's Secretariat and by the Commissioners. This promotes both consistency of advice over the course of the development of each BIA, and consistency of the treatment of similar issues between BIAs for different regulatory proposals. And second, providing frank and candid criticisms of draft BIAs confidentially is essential to not damaging on-going relationships with agencies and their advisors, so as to encourage them to proactively engage with VCEC early in the policy development process;
(e) accordingly, a reduction in that frankness and candour in the written feedback would reduce the effectiveness of the VCEC review process itself, which in turn would reduce the quality of documents being provided to Cabinet, which in turn would lead to a reduction in the quality of the Cabinet decision-making process. This would be contrary to the public interest;
(f) in addition, the disclosure of VCEC criticism of preliminary analysis in the draft documents prepared by agencies and their advisors, such as those critiques contained in Documents 13 to 16 would discourage agencies (and in turn their advisors) from providing their early thinking to VCEC in the form of such drafts, and thus the ability of VCEC to encourage them to explore a full range of policy options at the early stage in the policy development process. This would lead to the BIA process being less effective at ensuring Cabinet has the opportunity to consider the merits of a full range of policy options.
(a) early engagement with agencies and Departments about BIAs increases the probability of exemplary analysis in BIAs, and the VCEC is striving to achieve the result that more BIAs contain exemplary analysis, and fewer BIAs contain inadequate analysis;
(b) disclosure of the documents in dispute is likely to discourage agencies and Departments from engaging with the VCEC at an early stage, and is therefore likely to diminish the quality of BIAs produced in the future;
(c) disclosure of the documents in dispute would lead to VCEC officers giving more oral advice 'at the margins', and would lead to them preparing written documents in a less direct way.
(a) Document 17 is a memorandum addressed to me about the Assessment letter together with a first draft of it. That first draft contains handwritten opinions about how the draft could be improved, and those opinions were expressed by officers of the VCEC;
(b) Document 18 is a memorandum addressed to me about the Assessment letter together with a second draft of it. The second draft incorporates the handwritten suggested changes to the first draft, and contains my handwritten opinions about how the second draft could be improved;
The memoranda in Documents 17 and 18 contain opinions expressed by officers of VCEC in relation to the adequacy of the VRE BIA. They also contain an opinion that the draft letter was appropriate for me to send to the Department. Those opinions were expressed during and for VCEC's process of reviewing the VRE BIA.
In my view, it is contrary to the public interest to disclose the preliminary workings of an agency, such as those contained in documents 17-19, as it may constrain the internal debate about the final form of the document. Such a disclosure will also be misleading and confusing and could lead to ill-informed debate about why the drafts were revised. In addition, I cannot see how the public interest would be served in any way by their disclosure.
(a) the disclosure of paragraphs 2, 3, 5 (the last sentence only), 6, 7 and 8 of the memoranda would disclose the substance of part of Document 6, which would, as I understand it, involve the disclosure of part of a Cabinet submission;
(b) the disclosure of paragraph 9 of the memoranda would disclose the substance of part of Document 20, which would also, as I understand it, involve the disclosure of part of a Cabinet submission;
(c) it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose part of a Cabinet submission; and
(d) I cannot see how the public interest would be served in any way by disclosure of the memoranda.
In the circumstances, the disclosure of the memoranda in Documents 17 and 18 would, in summary, be contrary to the public interest because :
(a) such disclosure would involve the disclosure of part of the Cabinet Submission; and
(b) Documents 17 and 18 were not relied upon by the Cabinet in making the decision to introduce the VRET Scheme, and their disclosure would therefore not advance or promote any public interest in assessing the underlying merits of that decision.
(4) On the hearing of an application for review the Tribunal shall have, in addition to any other power, the same powers as an agency or a Minister in respect of a request, including power to decide that access should be granted to an exempt document (not being a document referred to in section 28, section 29A, section 31(3), or in section 33) where the Tribunal is of opinion that the public interest requires that access to the document should be granted under this Act.
Disclosure of the documents in dispute will advance or promote the public interest in :
(a) fully informed public debate about climate change and greenhouse gas emissions;
(b) fully informed public debate about whether wind power generation projects are likely to deliver the economic and environmental benefits touted by project developers, their peak body and government;
(c) fully informed public debate about the true costs and side effects of wind power generation projects, particularly as borne by rural communities;
(d) fully informed public debate about the departmental advice provided prior to the passing of the VRE Act, and in particular whether or not that advice canvassed the matters above;
(e) fully informed public debate about the advice provided by the Respondent prior to the passing of the VRE Act, and in particular whether or not that advice canvassed the matters above;
(f) fully informed public debate about the sources of any of the abovementioned advice (and, conversely, the sources not relied on); and
(g) fully informed public debate about whether the VRE Act is likely to deliver the economic and environmental benefits touted by government.
(a) first, the applicant's asserted interest in disclosure is a 'public' interest in disclosure;
(b) secondly, the Tribunal finds that disclosure of the document advances or promotes the asserted public interest; and
(c) thirdly, the Tribunal finds that the public interest 'requires' the disclosure of the document (see Richards v Transport Accident Commission [2005] VCAT 1444 at [62].
In addition, the imperative force of the word 'requires' in the subsection should not be ignored. The public interest will not require the release of otherwise exempt documents if the public benefit in view can be achieved by other means than by overriding exemptions otherwise available under the Freedom of Information Act. Likewise, the public interest will not require release, unless the release is clearly adapted to achieve relative public benefit.
Mitchell
Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission