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[2009] QDC 258
procedural. The Court ordered two successive renewals of the claim, one to address the omitted renewal period and another for the later period sought. The extract does not state the precise operative dates or...
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The claim had been filed and stayed while steps required by the motor accident legislation were pending. Its renewal history was irregular, and no renewal was made in 2008. The judge read r 24 as allowing a claim to be renewed even if it had lapsed, while requiring court leave for renewal periods reaching the fifth anniversary of filing. Two successive renewals were ordered to address the gap and the later period sought.
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1,887 words · generated 01/10/2026
In Mitchell v Thurlow & Anor [2009] QDC 258, the District Court of Queensland considered an application to renew a plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff, Mark William Mitchell, had been injured as a passenger in a motor vehicle accident. The judgment says that the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) controlled the steps by which he could proceed to recover damages, including a compulsory conference and other identified statutory steps.
To avoid limitation difficulties, an order was obtained from the Deputy Registrar on 1 June 2004. As the judge describes it, that order permitted Mr Mitchell to start an action by no later than 27 June 2004 under s 51D(3) of the Act. The claim was filed on 8 June 2004 and stayed until the required steps had been completed. The stay mattered because the claim then needed periodic renewal to remain available for service.
The dispute over renewal arose from the sequence of Registrar orders. The judge identified orders dated 23 June 2005, 15 June 2006, 25 August 2006 and 29 October 2007. He described their periods as irregular and observed that no renewal had been made in 2008. He also noted that the claim appeared to have lapsed on more than one occasion.
The application arose against the background of a changing medical condition. Mr Mitchell had recently undergone a spinal fusion. The insurer had sought further information about his condition and its implications for liability. The judgment says it had proved difficult to hold the compulsory conference the insurer then sought.
The Court ordered two successive renewals. The judge's explanation was that a renewal for the later 12-month period sought might not be sufficient if the claim had ceased to be in force earlier. He considered a separate renewal necessary to address the omitted period, as well as the later renewal. The extract does not state the precise dates or operative wording of the two orders.
The judge focused on r 24 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, as described in the judgment. Three parts of the rule were material to the reasoning.
First, the judge stated that r 24(2) permitted renewals only for periods of up to one year. That maximum shaped the form of the relief: the judge did not treat the whole elapsed period as something that could be dealt with through a single long renewal.
Second, r 24(3) was important because it permitted renewal “whether or not” the claim was in force. The judge considered this provision helpful because the renewal history suggested that the claim may have lapsed more than once. On the judge's reading, a lapse did not by itself prevent the Court from renewing the claim.
Third, r 24(4) required the Court's leave before a claim could be renewed for a period that fell wholly or partly on or after the fifth anniversary of filing. The claim was filed on 8 June 2004, so the fifth anniversary fell on 8 June 2009. The judgment records the requirement for leave and the need for a judge to be approached; it does not set out the full text of the rule.
The judge then applied those propositions to the renewal record. The recorded orders did not form an unbroken, clearly aligned sequence, and there was no Registrar renewal during 2008. The judge considered that simply granting the later 12-month renewal could leave unresolved whether the claim had remained in force from the missed period up to the start of that renewal. In his words, the claim needed to be kept alive by renewals “covering the whole of the time that's elapsed”. He therefore considered two orders necessary and ordered two successive renewals.
The decision is procedural. It does not determine whether the defendants or insurer were liable for all the consequences Mr Mitchell attributed to the accident. The judge expressly noted that the insurer had admitted liability for the incident, but not responsibility for the extent of all the adverse consequences claimed. Nor does the judgment resolve the underlying damages claim.
The judgment is a short ruling applying r 24 to a particular renewal history. It does not describe a previous legal position that it overrules or a new general test that it introduces. Before the ruling, the claim had been filed and stayed, with several Registrar renewals on the record but no renewal during 2008. The judge considered that those orders did not clearly cover the entire period elapsed.
After the ruling, the practical procedural position in this case was that two successive renewals had been ordered. The judgment explains the reasoning: r 24(3) allowed renewal whether or not the claim was in force, r 24(2) limited renewal periods to up to one year, and r 24(4) required court leave for a renewal period reaching the fifth anniversary.
The extract does not establish that every gap in every claim can be cured in the same way. Its reasoning is tied to the specific renewal dates, the stay, the statutory steps still to be completed, and the rule provisions as described by the judge. The decision also does not set out a comprehensive interpretation of r 24 or reproduce the rule's full text. Any broader account of the rule would need to be checked against the rule itself, which is not reproduced in the judgment extract.
No other judgments or later authorities are cited in the supplied text. On this source alone, it is not possible to describe a general change in the law or the ruling's position in a later line of precedent.
The supplied judgment does not include numbered paragraphs. The quotations below therefore cannot be assigned numbered paragraph references.
“Sub-rule (3) is of great assistance to Mr Mitchell in the circumstances, permitting renewal of a claim whether or not it's in force.”
In plain English, the judge treated a possible lapse as something that did not necessarily bar a renewal. The judgment attributes that effect to r 24(3). It does not say that renewal follows automatically whenever a claim has lapsed; the Court was considering an application against this particular procedural history.
“A Judge had to be applied to, by reason of sub-rule (4) which requires the Court's leave be obtained before a claim may be renewed for a period any part of which falls on or after the fifth anniversary of the date when the claim was originally filed.”
In plain English, according to the judge, a Registrar's renewal was not enough for a period that reached the fifth anniversary of filing. Court leave was needed for such a renewal. Here, the filing date was 8 June 2004, making the fifth anniversary relevant to the later renewal period.
“The need to make it clear that the claim has been kept alive by renewals covering the whole of the time that's elapsed explains why multiple renewals are included in the same order.”
In plain English, the Court used successive renewals because a single later renewal might not account for the earlier gap. The focus was on covering the elapsed period, rather than considering only the final requested renewal.
The judge also remarked that he wondered why renewals had not been made for a year by reference to the filing anniversary. That observation explains his concern with the dates, but it is not presented as a separate rule or binding test.
The reasoning may be relevant for understanding a procedural situation with features similar to those described in the judgment:
These are indicators drawn from the circumstances and reasoning in this judgment, not a complete statement of when r 24 applies or how a court must exercise any discretion. The judgment does not specify the precise dates covered by its two orders, nor does it explain how the result would differ if the parties disputed the underlying facts or opposed renewal.
The motor accident context explains why the action was stayed and why the claim had remained unresolved. But the reasoning about successive renewals is expressed through r 24 and the renewal history. The ruling does not decide the merits of the accident claim or establish a rule about medical evidence, the conduct of compulsory conferences, or the insurer's substantive liability.
The supplied judgment contains no discussion of later cases and cites no other decisions. No conclusion about whether later courts followed, distinguished, limited or questioned Mitchell v Thurlow can be drawn from this source alone.
The judgment itself also does not label its reasoning as a new principle or refer to a broader line of authorities. It gives a case-specific explanation for ordering successive renewals, based on the wording of r 24 as the judge described it and the sequence of Registrar renewals in Mr Mitchell's file.
For professional use, any account of the decision's later treatment would need to be based on later judgments or a citator, neither of which is included in the material supplied here. Accordingly, this section can report only that the provided text supplies no later-treatment information.
Several details remain unresolved in the extract. First, it does not state the exact periods or dates covered by the two successive renewal orders. The judge explains why two orders were considered necessary, but the operative order is not reproduced.
Second, the judgment does not provide the full text of r 24 or explain the complete criteria relevant to granting leave under r 24(4). It reports the one-year limit, the ability to renew whether or not the claim was in force, and the fifth-anniversary leave requirement. Those statements should not be treated as a substitute for checking the rule's full text.
Third, the judgment does not explain the legal or practical consequences of each earlier Registrar order beyond describing its wording and dates. It says the claim appeared to have lapsed a couple of times, but does not identify each precise gap or calculate the effect of every order.
Fourth, the ruling does not determine the underlying motor accident claim. The insurer's admission of liability for the incident did not, as the judge noted, amount to agreement that it was responsible for the extent of all the adverse consequences attributed to the accident. The claim's substantive merits and the assessment of damages remained unresolved in the extract.
Finally, no later authorities are supplied, so the extract cannot show whether subsequent courts adopted or qualified this reasoning. This analysis is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes, and before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
CATCHWORDS: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r 24 - application for renewal of plaintiff's claim stayed by court order to permit steps required under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 to be completed - more than 5 years had elapsed since filing of claim - renewals ordered by the Registrar did not cover the whole period - court ordered 2 successive renewals.
HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff/applicant, Mr Mitchell, was injured as a passenger in a motor vehicle accident.
The Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 controls the way in which he may proceed to recover damages by insisting upon steps being taken such as a compulsory conference with the respondent, which means that effectively here Suncorp Metway Insurance Limited; the insurer has admitted liability for the incident, but not that it is responsible for the extent of all the adverse consequences Mr Mitchell might attribute to it.
To avoid limitations problems, an order was obtained from the Deputy Registrar in BD 1784 of 2004 on the 1st June 2004 permitting an action for damages to be started by Mr Mitchell in respect of his claim by no later than 27th June 2004 pursuant to Section 51D(3) of the Act.
A compulsory conference under subsection (1) was dispensed with. As is customary, the order ordered that the action if started be stayed until various identified steps required by the Act were gone through. The matter has dragged on without resolution because of the way in which Mr Mitchell's medical condition has developed.
It's not necessary to go through all the details. Recently Mr Mitchell has undergone a spinal fusion. The insurer has been desirous over the years of obtaining further information regarding his condition and the implications of it so far as its liability might be concerned.
It has proved difficult to hold the compulsory conference which the insurer now understandably desires for various reasons. Given the stay in the Registrar's order, it has been necessary pursuant to Rule 24 for the applicant to obtain renewals of the claim to keep it alive for service. The claim was filed on the 8th June 2004.
The parties appear to have assumed that renewals had been obtained from the Registrar yearly to keep the claim alive. My own scrutiny of the file overnight suggested that that was not so and that the necessary approach to the Registrar in or about June 2008 had not occurred.
The first renewal, according to the Court's order sheet, was obtained on the 23rd June 2005 and curiously in the form "Renew claim for 2 (two) months from 8/06/05." The second renewal on the 15th June 2006 was to "renew claim for 12 months from 8/8/05." The 8th August date obviously flowed from the two month extension previously quoted.
Then on 25th August 2006, a Registrar's order was made in terms of "Renew claim for 12 months from 8/9/06." That followed by one on 29 October 2007 renewing the claim for "12 months from 8/8/07."
As noted, there was nothing done by the Registrar at any time during 2008. One wonders why from the beginning there were not renewals for a year by reference to the anniversary of the filing of the claim. The claim appears to have lapsed a couple of times. Sub-rule (3) is of great assistance to Mr Mitchell in the circumstances, permitting renewal of a claim whether or not it's in force.
A Judge had to be applied to, by reason of sub-rule (4) which requires the Court's leave be obtained before a claim may be renewed for a period any part of which falls on or after the fifth anniversary of the date when the claim was originally filed.
Given that sub-rule (2) permits renewals only for periods of up to a year, it appeared to me necessary for the Court to make two orders, one curing the omission in respect of the last year, when a renewal ought to have happened; otherwise there may be little point in a renewal sought by the applicant for 12 months from the 8th or 9th June 2009 if the claim had somehow become bad because it wasn't in force on the starting date. The need to make it clear that the claim has been kept alive by renewals covering the whole of the time that's elapsed explains why multiple renewals are included in the same order.
The cooperative attitude of the respondent insurer, which is what one would expect in the circumstances, has been persisted in by Mr Freis, and I'd say correctly, notwithstanding the potential for taking of unfriendly technical points which a close examination of the circumstances may have unearthed.
The Court ordered two successive renewals of the claim, one to address the omitted renewal period and another for the later period sought. The extract does not state the precise operative dates or wording of the orders.