Milner & Milner [2025] FedCFamC2F 1286 (15 September 2025)

(a) the sale be conducted by Mr D from E Real Estate ("the Appointed Agent");

(b) the parties are to do all things and sign all documents required of the selling agent including to progress the sale including signing any exclusive authority;

(c) the appointed Agent undertake an inspection of the property (including taking photos) and provide a report to the parties about its current condition and in that condition the expected sale price and any recommendations of works that can be undertaken to increase the sale price with such works be undertaken prior to the property being listed for sale pursuant to these Orders;

(d) the sale price of the property shall be such amount as is agreed between the parties (taking into account the recommendation of the Appointed Agent);

(e) the mode of the sale be agreed between the parties taking into account the Appointed agent's recommendation and if the property does not sell on or before the 17 November 2025 then the parties do all things necessary to list the property for Auction forthwith;

(f) the parties are to co-operate in every way with the selling agent in relation to the marketing of the properties for sale including making the key readily available, allowing inspection of the properties at all times reasonably requested by the agent and ensuring that each of the properties are clean, neat and in good order at the time of inspection by any prospective buyer to; and

(g) that the settlement period is not more than 60 days from the date of the sale.

1. That pending the sale of the Town C property, the Husband shall be solely liable and indemnify the Wife in respect of the outgoings including the rates and mortgage and in the event that such outgoings are in arrears the time of settlement the payments hereof shall be adjusted as against the Husband in any final settlement being deducted from his share and paid to the Wife.
2. That each party shall be responsible for their own PEXA expenses on the sale.
3. That the parties appoint such conveyancers to complete the conveyancing of the sale as agreed between them and failing agreement with such conveyancer to be nominated by the Wife.
4. Upon the settlement of the sale, the proceeds be applied as follows:

(a) firstly, to pay all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale (including vendor/purchaser adjustments);

(b) secondly, to discharge the mortgages ... and ... to ANZ Bank; and

(c) the balance distributed equally between the parties.

1. In accordance with paragraph 5 of the Orders made 24 June 2025, the Husband pay the Wife's costs of $4,400.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 7 to 15:

(a) "the SMSF fund" means the Milner Self-Managed Superannuation Fund; and

(b) "the SMSF trustee" means Milner Investments Pty Ltd ACN ....

1. Having been accorded procedural fairness in relation to the making of this Order upon the Husband and the Wife in their capacity as directors of the SMSF trustee of the SMSF fund, paragraphs 9 to 15 are binding on them and the SMSF trustee.
2. Paragraphs 10 to 12, and if required paragraph 15 have effect from the operative time, which is four (4) business days after settlement of the sale of the Town C property.
3. Pursuant to Part VIIIB Division 2 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the Husband and the Wife, in their capacity as directors of the SMSF trustee having been accorded procedural fairness, the Husband and Wife shall forthwith do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required to:

(a) request the SMSF Trustee to rollover or transfer the Wife's interest in the SMSF fund having an estimated value as at today of $113,896 (Wife's member balance), to another complying superannuation fund of the Wife's choosing (Rollout), with this Order being deemed to constitute such request; and

(b) the Rollout of the Wife's member balance be by way of in specie transfer in cash and shares.

1. Forthwith upon the Rollout, pursuant to section 90XT(1)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), whenever a splittable payment becomes payable in respect of the interest of the Husband in the SMSF Fund, the SMSF Trustees shall:

(a) pay the amount of $91,609.50 to the Wife or her administrators, executors, beneficiaries, heirs or assigns; and

(b) make a corresponding reduction in the entitlement the Husband would have had in the SMSF Fund but for this Order.

1. The SMSF Trustee of the SMSF Fund shall do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be necessary so that, in accordance with the obligations set out under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2025 (Cth), the SMSF Trustee can calculate the entitlement of, and make payment to, the Wife in accordance with paragraph 11 of these Orders.
2. Save for the purposes of giving effect to paragraph 10 to 12 of these Orders, the Husband and Wife shall be and is hereby restrained both in their personal capacity and in capacity as trustee of the SMSF fund from otherwise dealing with their respective interests in the SMSF fund.
3. Upon compliance with paragraphs 10 to 13, and if required 15 herein:

(a) the Wife thereafter forthwith do all such acts and things and sign all such documents (to be prepared at the expense of the Husband) as may be required to:

(i) resign as director of the SMSF trustee and from any office she may hold with the SMSF trustee; and

(ii) if necessary, join with the Husband in the Wife being removed as a joint account holder or signatory in her capacity as director of the SMSF trustee; and

(iii) the Husband shall thereafter be solely liable for and indemnify the Wife against any and all liabilities of the SMSF trustee and the SMSF fund including but not limited to all liabilities to the ATO and from all costs, claims and demands with respect to the SMSF Fund.

1. Forthwith and save for as otherwise referred to in these Orders, the Wife retain, free from claim by the Husband and for her sole use and benefit the following:

(a) the balance of all funds held in credit in any bank or credit institution in her name;

(b) her Motor Vehicle 1 registered in her name;

(c) her interest in Super Fund 1; and

(d) any other personal property in her possession and/or control including choses in action.

1. Forthwith and save for as otherwise referred to in these Orders, the Husband retain, free from claim by the Wife and for his sole use and benefit the follows:

(a) the balance of all funds held in credit in any bank or credit institution in his name;

(b) his Motorbike;

(c) his Motor Vehicle 2;

(d) the Caravan and two trailers located at the Town C property;

(e) the home contents of the Town C property;

(f) his interest in Super Fund 2 and Super Fund 3; and

(g) any other personal property in his possession and/or control including choses in action.

1. Forthwith, save for as specifically set out in these Orders, the Wife be solely responsible for paying and indemnify the Husband, and keep him indemnified, in respect of any debt associated with or encumbering any property she receives or retains pursuant to the terms of these Orders.
2. Forthwith, save for as specifically set out in these Orders, the Husband be solely responsible for paying and indemnify the Wife, and keep her indemnified, in respect of any debt associated with or encumbering any property he receives or retains pursuant to the terms of these Orders, and any debt associated with or remaining payable to ANZ beyond the amounts necessary to discharge the mortgages referred to in paragraph 5(b), or any other creditor of the company F Pty Ltd, and any other corporate entity which the husband has an interest in and liability in connection with.
3. All extant applications are dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. Ms Milner and Mr Milner married in 1992, separated under the one roof in July 2018, and physically separated in September 2018.
2. Arising for determination are their competing applications for orders altering their interests in property.
3. Ms Milner proposes that she retain the proceeds of sale of a real property in Town C, and that Mr Milner retain the chattels contained in that property.
4. Mr Milner proposes in his Amended Response that Ms Milner retain 25% of the proceeds of sale of the Town C property and that he retain the balance of those proceeds. Somewhat inconsistently, he contends in his Outline of Case for a distribution of the parties' interests in non-superannuation assets in the proportions of 65% to him and 35% to Ms Milner.
5. The parties agree to an equalisation of their superannuation interests.
6. The parties rely on the documents identified in their Outlines of Case and the documents tendered into evidence during the hearing.
7. After the hearing, Ms Milner submitted a Minute of Order Sought which included some agreed orders with respect to superannuation. Mr Milner did not oppose the amendment of Ms Milner's application by that means and did not seek to be heard in relation to it. I will mark that document as Exhibit A13.

1. Pursuant to section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), I have a discretion to make such order altering the parties' interests in property as I consider appropriate. I am prohibited from making an order unless I am satisfied, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to do so.[1] If I am so satisfied, I am required to take into account the considerations prescribed by subsections 79(4) and 79(5).[2]

1. It is necessary to begin by identifying the existing legal and equitable rights and interests of the parties in property and their existing liabilities.[3] For reasons that follow, I find those interests to comprise:

1. It is agreed that the parties owe $329,280 to the Australia and New Zealand Bank ('ANZ') for the home loan secured against the Town C property. Ms Milner does not accept Mr Milner's evidence that the parties owe the ANZ a further sum of $80,506 that is secured against the Town C property. She complains that she was excluded from the conversations between Mr Milner and the bank manager in relation to the liability and that no timely discovery was provided to her in relation to the liability. Those complaints do not establish that the asserted liability is not owing to the ANZ.
2. Mr Milner deposes that the payout figure to discharge the mortgages secured against the Town C property is $409,786. Ms Milner deposes to having received correspondence consistent with that evidence from Mr Milner's lawyers on 28 August 2025.
3. Ms Milner put to Mr Milner in cross-examination that he was unable to tell the Court the terms of the agreement he had reached with the ANZ in relation to the disputed liability. Mr Milner gave oral evidence that the bank considered the parties to be personally responsible for a business liability outstanding after the finalisation of the liquidation of the parties' former business. He also gave oral evidence that the ANZ had agreed to waive interest and fees on the liability. I do not accept any suggestion that his inability to articulate any further terms of the agreement should lead to a rejection of his evidence.
4. Ms Milner gave oral evidence that she had recent contact with the ANZ, and that she understood the $409,000 figure to relate to the mortgage on the house and an amount the ANZ would accept to close out the parties' former business' loan.
5. I am satisfied that the parties are liable for the further sum of $80,506 to the ANZ. Even if I am wrong in that conclusion, because the Town C property will be sold, the mortgages will be discharged and the balance distributed proportionally between the parties, the parties will be proportionally responsible for all of the liability to the ANZ. In closing address, Ms Milner abandoned any suggestion that Mr Milner would be required to indemnify her in relation to the additional ANZ liability.
6. Mr Milner deposes to having other personal property described as "[t]railer and miscellaneous" worth an estimated $500.[4] He contends there should be a corresponding inclusion in the balance sheet. Ms Milner asserts that she does not know the value of a caravan and two trailers because Mr Milner "has failed to disclose what has occurred with the caravan and trailers which remained at the former family home upon separation".[5] However, she makes no positive assertion with respect to the value of the caravan and two trailers. Ms Milner did not challenge Mr Milner's evidence in cross-examination and I find no reason to reject it. I find Mr Milner to have a caravan and trailers worth $500.
7. The parties otherwise agree on the identity and value of their interests in property and their liabilities.

1. Both parties seek an alteration of their property interests in order to finally determine the financial relationships between them.[6] Implicit in both parties' requests that the Court make orders is an acceptance that the making of an order would be just and equitable.[7] I consider it to be just and equitable to make a property settlement order because there will no longer be the common use of property by the parties.[8]

1. I am required to take into account the matters prescribed by subsection 79(4) of the Act, so far as they are relevant.
2. At the commencement of the parties' relationship, Ms Milner had a motor vehicle, savings of approximately $30,000, and some superannuation. Mr Milner then owned a block of land in G Street, Town C worth approximately $30,000, a motor vehicle worth approximately $15,000 and superannuation.
3. Prior to their marriage, the parties constructed a home on the Town C land which was financed by way of joint loan. They moved into the home upon its completion after their marriage in 1992.
4. Both parties were initially employed full time and contributed their income to joint purposes.
5. In 2000, the parties sold the G Street property for approximately $145,000 and purchased a property in Suburb H, Queensland, where the parties lived until 2003.
6. In 2001, the parties' triplets, J, K, L, were born. Ms Milner ceased work and was primarily responsible for the children's care.
7. In 2003, the parties sold the Suburb H property and returned to Victoria. They purchased a property in Town N and commenced building the home at B Street in 2004.
8. Also in approximately 2004, Ms Milner returned to work one day per week in an administration role.
9. In January 2011, the parties, along with another couple, established the business known as F Pty Ltd. In August 2012, the parties bought out the other couple's share in the business for $40,000. They borrowed those funds from Mr Milner's mother-in-law, which loan was repaid in less than a year.
10. Both parties worked in the business, with Ms Milner being responsible for setting up and developing business systems and accounts while Mr Milner handled technical work and management. Ms Milner ceased all other employment in late 2012 or early 2013.
11. In 2015 or 2016, the parties purchased a real property in Suburb M from which the business operated. It was purchased through the Milner Family Trust which was controlled by Ms Milner.
12. The F Pty Ltd business was profitable. Both parties received income from it. That income totalled approximately $213,000 in the Financial Year ending 30 June 2017. Both parties were nevertheless responsible for a variety of business loan facilities with the ANZ, for which they were both guarantors, and for which the ANZ held mortgages over the Suburb M and B Street properties.
13. Ms Milner deposes that she was "unofficially demoted" in the business by Mr Milner in 2017.[9] She accepted in oral evidence that was incorrect and in fact she had removed herself from the business, and "chose to leave". That oral evidence was consistent with emails sent by her in May 2017 advising of her intention to resign both from her responsibility for safety at F Pty Ltd, and to resign entirely from the business. I do not accept Ms Milner's evidence that Mr Milner demoted her in the business.
14. At the time of the parties' separation under the one roof in July 2018, the children were 17 years old. They were then attending a private school.
15. In August 2018, Ms Milner received an insurance payment of $204,000 as a result of having been diagnosed with cancer. From those funds, she paid for the final term of private schooling that year as well as some outstanding school fees, joint credit card debts and other liabilities, paid $10,000 into the bank account of each of the children, and deposes to the balance of approximately $60,000 being applied to her business. She was unable to recall the amounts she spent on her hospitality business in her oral evidence, and I do not feel an actual persuasion of her evidence in relation to the dispersal of the totality of those funds.[10] What is clear is that they no longer exist.
16. After the parties' physical separation in September 2018, the children continued to live with Mr Milner. He met the children's expenses and paid their private school fees for their final year of schooling. He has continued to financially support the children after separation.
17. Mr Milner has remained in occupation of the parties' former matrimonial home. He has continued to service the associated home loan, the balance of which has reduced from approximately $375,000 to approximately $329,000.
18. Ms Milner initially moved to a cabin at a caravan park. She continued to receive income from F Pty Ltd until January 2019, when such payments ceased.
19. In March 2019, Ms Milner set up a hospitality business. She received a transfer of $40,000 from the F Pty Ltd accounts to purchase the business.
20. In May 2019, Ms Milner applied the $30,000 she had deposited into bank accounts for the children to the repayment of a motor vehicle lease for a vehicle driven by her mother.
21. In November 2019, Ms Milner sold the Suburb M property. The proceeds of sale were applied to the reduction of loan facilities from the ANZ.
22. In November 2020, Mr Milner was ordered to make interim spousal maintenance payments to Ms Milner of $100 per week. He has honoured his obligations to do so since that time.
23. Ms Milner contends that contributions ought to be assessed as equal between the parties.
24. Mr Milner contends that contributions favour him in the proportions of 55% to 45%. In relation to non-superannuation assets, such an outcome would see him credited for contributing $63,121 more than Ms Milner. He essentially contends that the contributions favour him because of the contributions made by him after the parties' separation. I agree. Although the children were 17 at the time of separation, there were three of them, and he was solely responsible for their care and support and met their final year of private school fees. He has also made funds available to Ms Milner and made significant repayments on their home loan.
25. I determine that Mr Milner's contributions ought be assessed at 55% and Ms Milner's at 45%.
26. It is common ground that contributions to superannuation ought be treated equally.

1. I am required to take into account the matters prescribed by subsection 79(5) of the Act, so far as they are relevant.
2. Ms Milner is 57 years old. She has cancer and has been advised that she is likely to enjoy a reasonable quality of life for the next two to five years. She is unemployed and unable to return to paid employment because of her health needs, which include taking regular medication with attendant side effects.
3. Ms Milner receives income protection insurance payments of approximately $30,500 per annum and government benefits of approximately $23,500 per annum. Her income protection insurance payments will cease in around mid-2027.
4. Mr Milner is also 57 years old. He is employed as a tradesperson and earns approximately $115,000 per annum.
5. Mr Milner lives with his new partner who earns approximately $57,000 per annum.
6. Ms Milner expressly relies on the following paragraphs of subsection 79(5) of the Act:

(d) the effect the effect of any material wastage, caused intentionally or recklessly by a party to the marriage, of property or financial resources of either of the parties to the marriage or both of them;

(e) any liabilities incurred by either of the parties to the marriage or both of them, including the nature of the liabilities and the circumstances relating to them;

1. Consistent with section 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), Ms Milner refers the Court to the explanatory memorandum associated with those amended provisions. That document refers to an intention to "codify concepts of liabilities and wastage",[11] and that it is "not intended that this factor would displace existing case law concerning the treatment of wastage".[12] It describes paragraph 79(5)(d) as being intended "to identify that the family law courts will consider such wastage, where it would be unjust and inequitable for that detriment or diminution to be shared equally by both parties".[13] It relevantly refers to what is said to be a common example of wastage as:

undermining the profitability of a business or investment, for example, by intentionally or recklessly undermining the goodwill of a business or damaging its reputation.[14]

1. The existing case law held that generally, financial losses incurred by parties should be shared between them unless one of the parties has embarked upon a course of conduct designed to reduce or minimise the effective value or worth of the matrimonial assets, or acted recklessly, negligently or wantonly with matrimonial assets, the overall effect of which has reduced or minimised their value.[15]
2. Because parties generally expect to share the economic profits of a marriage, good and substantial reasons are required to depart from the principle that economic losses incurred in a marriage should be shared, absent any negligence, recklessness, or deliberate dissipation of assets by one party.[16] Where, as here, the overall pool is reduced by the failure of a project or business, the question arising is whether "one party, or alternatively both parties, should as a matter of justice and equity bear the financial loss in question".[17]
3. Central to Ms Milner's assertion that there should be an adjustment of 50% in her favour such that she effectively retain all of the value of the parties' interests in non-superannuation property is a contention that Mr Milner is solely responsible for the liquidation of the F Pty Ltd business in June 2019. Certainly, it is true that the business was placed into voluntary liquidation at his request. It is also true that the business had been valued as at 30 June 2018 at between $592,636 and $658,360. However, for reasons that follow, I find both parties contributed to the liquidation of F Pty Ltd and accordingly both should bear the associated financial loss.
4. Ms Milner submits that the foundation for the "intentional course of conduct on the part of the husband" was his alleged representation to her on 18 March 2019 that "he would make the business worth nothing". Ms Milner gives the following evidence with respect to the occasion:

... [Mr Milner] came to my home without my consent on numerous occasions. He told me he had heard a rumour that I was seeing someone. I was not. On 18 March 2019 at 6.15pm [Mr Milner] attended at my home again uninvited. He saw a friend of my mine Mr O (nicknamed '[...]') cooking us dinner in my kitchen. [Mr Milner] yelled at me and told me I had lied to him and said he would ensure the boys knew "what kind of person I was" and that I would "never see them again" and neither would my mother. I asked [Mr Milner] to leave and refused. He further said "I will make sure you get nothing. You will get nothing. The business will be worth nothing. You won't get a cent".[18]

1. Mr Milner accepted in oral evidence that he attended Ms Milner's home uninvited on that occasion. He denied that he had said Ms Milner wouldn't get a cent and the business would be worth nothing. There was nothing about the way in which Mr Milner gave his evidence that caused me to doubt its reliability or veracity.
2. By contrast, Ms Milner's evidence left me with significant concerns abouts its reliability. Contrary to her written evidence, she gave oral evidence that Mr O was a man she was "dating at the time". I have already referred to the inconsistency between her written evidence of having been demoted by Mr Milner and both her oral evidence and the contemporaneous materials. Ms Milner also gave oral evidence that she is currently on medication which affects her recall.
3. I am not satisfied that Mr Milner made the threats to Ms Milner asserted by her on 18 March 2019.
4. In that event, Ms Milner effectively submits that Mr Milner acted recklessly to cause wastage of the parties' property. She contends that it was reckless of him "not to have so much as written a letter or instructed his lawyers to write a letter putting her on notice that the business had a critical issue, in his opinion, that needed to be resolved by way of her action".
5. Ms Milner gave oral evidence that the business was a joint project of the parties, and that she had administered the finances of the business. In July 2017, she wrote to the business manager and described the tasks she would continue to be involved in to include "Finance Management - allocation/handling of funds, auditing of all data entry, payroll, invoicing, bank reconciliation, liaise with accountant/bank".
6. Having been significantly involved in the management of the business since its inception, Ms Milner's oral evidence with respect to the ANZ loan facilities was significant. She agreed that she knew them to be the "lifeline" to the business, and gave evidence that she was aware of them having that role. She also agreed that she was aware the nature of the business was such that it needed to commit capital towards works before achieving critical project milestones for which the business was then paid. She accepted this had been the ongoing course of things for years. She also accepted that the business' loan facilities were necessary for major milestone projects in order for the business to put money into projects before their completion. She gave oral evidence that at times in the past, she knew the business was reliant upon extension of its loan facilities.
7. In early 2019, Ms Milner made application for an Intervention Order against Mr Milner. On 16 April 2019 the parties entered into mutual Undertakings that relevantly provided for the parties not to have any communication with each other or cause any other person do so, except by communicating through a lawyer or mediator.
8. Ms Milner submits that she received no further request for finance extension after 31 March 2019. I reject the submission. Mr Milner gives unchallenged evidence that Ms Milner "refused to sign off on the ANZ requests" to extend the business overdraft and refused to sign two bank guarantees.[19] He was not challenged on that evidence. Ms Milner does not deny that she received such requests. Consistently with Mr Milner's evidence, she admitted in oral evidence that in May 2019 she didn't agree to a further extension of the finance. I find that Ms Milner was asked to extend the business' ANZ finance in or around May 2019.
9. Despite Ms Milner being aware of the significance of the business' loan facilities for its operations, she accepts that she made no enquiries as to the purposes for which the loan extensions were sought in May 2019. Based on her knowledge of the fact that the facilities had, in the past, been the business' lifeline and its reliance upon them, I consider her conduct in refusing to extend the business' finance without making any enquiries into the purpose of the extension was reckless.
10. I also accept that Mr Milner's conduct in failing to provide further information to Ms Milner with respect to the finance was reckless. I accept her counsel's submission that the manager's unsuccessful attempts to call Ms Milner to speak with her were insufficient. I also accept her suggestion that Mr Milner could have instructed his lawyers to write to Ms Milner to provide information as to the business' predicament and provided disclosure. But his recklessness by way of those failures does not, in my determination, lead to the conclusion that he should be solely responsible for the liquidation of the business.
11. The event that precipitated its liquidation was Ms Milner' refusal to extend necessary finance. So much resulted in the business being "cash poor and unable to meet payroll and ATO obligations but also placed the business in breach of contract" with one of its main customers.[20] I accept Mr Milner's evidence that "the decision to put the business into voluntary administration was a commercial decision necessitated by [Ms Milner's] refusal to co-operate to secure finance required to keep the business afloat at the time".[21]
12. To the extent it is suggested that Mr Milner acted recklessly so as to cause material wastage of property of the parties, I am satisfied that Ms Milner also did so. Both failed to communicate with each other with respect to what was known by both to be a crucial issue for the ongoing business operations. Both needed to cooperate in order to ensure the business' continued operation. I do not accept that it was solely Mr Milner's responsibility to ensure the ongoing viability and operation of the business in circumstances where Ms Milner controlled all of the assets that had were used as security for business finance.
13. Ms Milner has had access to significant capital after the parties' separation which is no longer in existence. Properly, Mr Milner does not allege that she has acted recklessly with respect to that capital. Nevertheless, it is the case that Ms Milner also pursued a failed business after the parties' separation. Mr Milner gives unchallenged evidence that she received $40,000 to invest in her business. She deposes to applying a further $60,000 from an insurance payment received by her in mid-2018 to the business. Ms Milner gave oral evidence that she agreed she had lost well over $100,000 on the business. Just as I do not determine Ms Milner's conduct in investing in a failed business to amount to wastage of the type to which paragraph 79(5)(d) is directed, so I do not determine the parties' conduct which resulted in the winding up of F Pty Ltd to be wastage of a type for which Mr Milner should be solely responsible.
14. Ms Milner submits that she should be provided some dignity to live out her limited life expectancy. I am required to consider a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable.[22] Nevertheless, I do not consider that the factors prescribed by subsection 79(5) warrant a significant adjustment in favour of Ms Milner.
15. Ms Milner submits that her lower life expectancy is not a matter which ought form any significant part of the assessment. She nevertheless did not directly join issue with the proposition advanced by Mr Milner that where a party has a limited life expectancy, an allowance should be made in favour of the other party to reflect the other party's greater long term needs.[23]
16. Mr Milner submits that an adjustment in his favour should be made of 10%. I do not agree. Mr Milner has a significantly greater income and earning capacity than Ms Milner which will enable him to improve his financial position in the medium term. Ms Milner has no such capacity. Despite her limited life expectancy, I consider that a modest adjustment in her favour is appropriate in all of the circumstances.
17. The discrepancy between the parties' income, coupled with the relatively modest value of the non-superannuation assets available for distribution, would ordinarily sound in a relatively significant adjustment in favour of Ms Milner. Given her limited life expectancy, I determine that a relatively modest adjustment in her favour of 5% is appropriate, creating a differential between the assessment of the parties' contributions of $63,121.
18. It is agreed that no adjustment is warranted in relation to the parties' superannuation assets.

1. It is common ground that the parties will be required to sell the Town C property, apply the proceeds to the costs, commissions, and expenses of sale and to the discharge of the ANZ mortgage.
2. On 18 August 2025, the parties entered into detailed interim consent Orders providing for the mechanism of sale. The making of final orders, ipso facto, discharges those and all interlocutory orders.[24] Ms Milner's proposal that the Court only discharge some interim does not have the effect of continuing the obligations created by other interim orders. I will accordingly re-make the relevant Orders made 18 August 2025. For the same reason, I will re-make the costs Order made on 24 June 2025 which remains outstanding.
3. Mr Milner currently has non-superannuation assets worth $23,000 and Ms Milner has non-superannuation assets worth $18,000. The difference between those values is accordingly $5,000, or less than 1% of the value of the parties' total interests in non-superannuation assets. Neither party proposed an adjustment to the distribution of the sale proceeds of the Town C property to account for that differential. Given its quantum, I am not satisfied it is just and equitable to make such an allowance.
4. I accordingly determine it is just and equitable for each of the parties to retain 50% of the proceeds of sale of the B Street property.
5. Both parties propose to indemnify each other with respect to their personal liabilities. Ms Milner proposes that Mr Milner also indemnify her with respect to any further indebtedness to the ANZ or any other creditor of F Pty Ltd. Mr Milner did not address the application. I am satisfied that the indemnity sought is appropriate in circumstances where Mr Milner was solely responsible for F Pty Ltd prior to its liquidation and has not involved Ms Milner in negotiations with respect to any outstanding liabilities to the ANZ. However, the form of order proposed by Ms Milner is ambiguous in the sense that it is agreed the ANZ will be repaid such sums so as to discharge their mortgages on the Town C property. I will amend the proposed orders to take that into account.
6. The parties agree on the form order to give effect to the equalisation of their superannuation. I am not satisfied that Ms Milner's entitlement ought be increased in the event the ANZ requires more than $409,786 to discharge their mortgages. I am not satisfied any such liability is one for which Mr Milner should be solely responsibility.
7. It is common ground that orders should be made providing for the parties to otherwise retain their property. I prefer the orders proposed by Ms Milner which have greater particularity.

I certify that the preceding seventy-nine (79) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Glass.

[1] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 79(2).

[2] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 79(3)(b).

[3] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 79(3)(a).

[4] Financial Statement of Mr Milner filed 26 August 2025, paragraph 43.

[6] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 81.

[7] Russo & Wylie [2016] FamCAFC 227; (2016) FLC 93-747 at [54].

[8] Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 at [42].

[9] Affidavit of Ms Milner filed 29 August 2025, paragraph 21.

[10] Keane & Keane [2021] FamCAFC 1; (2021) 62 Fam LR 190 at [73] and the cases there cited.

[11] Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2024 (Cth), page 8.

[12] Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2024 (Cth), page 45.

[13] Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2024 (Cth), page 45.

[14] Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2024 (Cth), page 45.

[15] Kowaliw & Kowaliw [1981] FamCA 70; (1981) FLC 91-092 at 76,644.

[16] Browne & Green [1999] FamCA 1483; (1999) FLC 92-873 ("Browne & Green") at [53].

[18] Affidavit of Ms Milner filed 29 August 2025, paragraph 11.

[19] Affidavit of Mr Milner filed 29 August 2025, paragraph 38.

[20] Affidavit of Mr Milner filed 29 August 2025, paragraph 39.

[21] Affidavit of Mr Milner filed 29 August 2025, paragraph 34.

[22] Family Law Act 1975 s 79(5)(k).

[23] Morcomb & Lennox [2016] FCCA 485 at [47]; Lawrie & Lawrie [1981] FamCA 73; (1981) FLC 91-102 at 76,749.

[24] Keskin & Keskin & Anor [2019] FamCAFC 236; (2019) FLC 93-932 at [31] and the cases there cited.