MILES -v- WA POLICE [2025] WASC 439 (14 October 2025)

1. I also made programming orders providing that the parties file and serve submissions in relation to the sixth ground of appeal. The respondent filed an outline of submissions on 13 October 2025 by which it concedes this ground of appeal. For the reasons that follow, I am of the view that the concession is properly made.
2. The appellant is granted leave to appeal on ground 6, the appeal is allowed and the conviction is quashed. The respondent does not seek an order for a retrial.

1. Section s 7(1) of the CA Act provides that a person who is aggrieved by a decision of a court of summary jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court against that decision. A 'decision' of a court of summary jurisdiction includes a decision to convict an accused of a charge.[1]
2. The grounds of an appeal pursuant to s 7(1) of the CA Act may be that the court of summary jurisdiction made an error of law or fact, or of both law and fact, or that there has been a miscarriage of justice.
3. The appellant must obtain leave to appeal.[2] If leave to appeal is not granted on at least one ground, the appeal is taken to have been dismissed.[3] The court must not grant leave to appeal on a ground of appeal unless the court is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding.[4]
4. Even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, the court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.[5]

1. The trial took place in the Magistrates Court in Margaret River on 21 July 2025. At the commencement of the trial, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
2. In order to prove the charge, the prosecution was required to prove the following elements beyond reasonable doubt:

(1) the identity of the offender - that is it was the appellant who committed the offence and not somebody else;

(2) that the appellant drove a motor vehicle; and

(3) that the appellant failed to stop at an intersection with a stop sign or stop line.

1. The prosecution and the appellant each made an opening address. During her opening address, the appellant outlined that the issue in the trial was the identity of the offender - the appellant's case was that it was not her car that the police officers observed driving through the stop sign as she did not drive through that intersection.
2. The prosecution called two police witnesses: Senior Constable Winters and Senior Constable Eley.
3. Senior Constable Winters gave the following evidence‑in‑chief:

(1) on 14 December 2024, he was on duty with Senior Constable Eley in a marked police car on traffic recall duty;[6]

(2) he was the passenger and Senior Constable Eley was the driver;[7]

(3) at around 8.22 pm, they were travelling south on Bussell Highway, driving through town, past Settlers Tavern, with the nearest intersection being Willmott Avenue;[8]

(4) from approximately 50 m away, he observed a vehicle driving down Willmott Avenue, approaching Bussell Highway, which is a stop sign stop line;[9]

(5) when the police vehicle was approximately 20 m away from the intersection, the appellant's vehicle 'slowed slightly by just losing a few ks, didn't make any attempt to stop, pulled out, turned left onto Bussell Highway in front of us, continued towards Augusta';[10]

(6) he immediately decided to stop the appellant's vehicle, turned on the police vehicle lights and sirens and the appellant's vehicle stopped a short distance further away on Bussell Highway on the left‑hand side;[11]

(7) he activated his body‑worn camera as the appellant's vehicle breached the Willmott Avenue/Bussell Highway intersection;[12]

(8) he did not lose sight of the appellant's vehicle throughout the entire incident - from the time the vehicle went through the stop sign to the time the vehicle stopped;[13] and

(9) there were no cars between the police vehicle and the appellant's vehicle during that time.[14]

1. During cross‑examination, Senior Constable Winters gave evidence that:

(1) there was, at the time of the alleged offence, construction going on at the Margaret River Hotel;[15]

(2) the appellant's vehicle travelled less than a kilometre before being stopped;[16]

(3) the appellant's vehicle, being a silver Holden Captiva, was not a 'particularly common' one in the area;[17] and

(4) he did not accept the proposition put to him by the appellant that her vehicle was not the vehicle that went through the stop sign.[18]

1. Senior Constable Eley gave the following evidence‑in‑chief:

(1) on 14 December 2024, he was working an afternoon traffic patrol shift with Senior Constable Winters starting at 6.00 pm;[19]

(2) he was driving the police vehicle;[20]

(3) at about 8.20 pm, they were heading south on Bussell Highway and approaching the intersection of Willmott Avenue when he observed, within 50 m of the intersection, a 'vehicle slow down but not stop for the junction and pull, basically, onto my lane in front of me and continued heading south in front of me';[21]

(4) the intersection of Willmott Avenue has a stop sign;[22]

(5) he had unrestricted views to minor roads and major roads and at the time there were a few cars going in the other direction and a few people milling around;[23]

(6) there were no cars between the vehicle that went through the stop sign and the police vehicle;[24]

(7) after he observed the appellant's vehicle go through the stop sign, he followed the vehicle and waited for a safe place to pull over, because there was nowhere to pull over on the main street;[25]

(8) the police vehicle continued south and turned right onto Wallcliffe Road at a roundabout, which is when the vehicle's lights and sirens were activated;[26] and

(9) he did not lose sight of the appellant's vehicle from the time of the offence to the point where the car was pulled over and no one was between the police vehicle and the appellant's vehicle during that time.[27]

1. During cross‑examination, Senior Constable Eley gave evidence that:

(1) there was construction on the Margaret River Hotel at the corner of that intersection on the night of the alleged offending;[28]

(2) Saturday night, the night of the alleged offending, is one of the busier nights in Margaret River town for traffic;[29]

(3) they did not stop the appellant on the main street in order to avoid backing up traffic in town and waited to activate the lights and sirens of the police vehicle until it was safe to pull the appellant's vehicle over;[30]

(4) it was not raining;[31] and

(5) there were no cars in between the police vehicle and the appellant's vehicle - they had line of sight behind the appellant's vehicle the entire time.[32]

1. Senior Constable Eley was asked by the learned magistrate if his view of the appellant's vehicle was obstructed in any way when he observed it failing to stop at the stop sign, to which he said that it was not.[33]
2. The body‑worn camera vision of Senior Constable Winters and Senior Constable Eley was tendered.[34] This vision did not, however, capture the incident.
3. The appellant elected to give evidence. She gave the following evidence‑in‑chief:

(1) she was driving down Willmott Avenue towards Bussell Highway;[35]

(2) due to obstacles on the road, she made a u‑turn about halfway down Willmott Avenue as she was heading down to Bussell Highway, to go back up Willmott Avenue and travel south along Townview Road, which is a parallel road to Bussell Highway;[36]

(3) when she pulled back onto Forest Avenue, which became Wallcliffe Drive, she saw the police vehicle activate its lights;[37]

(4) she did not recall going through the intersection of Willmott Avenue and Bussell Highway;[38] and

(5) that she 'take[s] the road rules very seriously, especially stop signs'.[39]

1. The appellant then gave the following evidence during cross‑examination:

(1) there was 'some blockage' that prevented her from driving through the intersection of Bussell Highway/Willmott Avenue that night;[40]

(2) she thought that the police were pulling her over for making a u-turn on Willmott Avenue;[41]

(3) she was the driver of the vehicle with registration BSN215N that night;[42]

(4) she was alone in the vehicle;[43]

(5) at the time of the alleged offending, she had entered into a good behaviour period with the Department of Transport due to losing demerit points for speeding offences and this meant that, if she incurred any demerit points during that period, she would lose her licence for a period of time;[44] and

(6) it would be devastating for her to lose her licence, and she was terrified that she was going to incur demerit points when the police vehicle pulled her over.[45]

1. On 21 July 2025, the learned magistrate delivered his decision following trial, convicting the appellant of the offence. In his reasons, the learned magistrate:

(1) identified that the key element in dispute was identity;[46]

(2) found that Senior Constable Eley was a more reliable witness than Senior Constable Winter as Senior Constable Winter had difficulties in recollection and focused his evidence on the appellant's vehicle going through the stop sign;[47]

(3) whilst finding that Senior Constable Eley more reliable, did not ignore the evidence of Senior Constable Winter;[48]

(4) found that 'there was cogent, clear, and persuasive evidence from both police witnesses that they saw Ms Miles' vehicle ... going through the stop sign';[49]

(5) found that the body‑worn camera footage 'was corroborative of the account that the vehicle was stopped on Wallcliffe Road, given the actions of the [police vehicle's] steering wheel';[50]

(6) was satisfied, without the appellant's evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it was the appellant's vehicle that went through the stop sign and was witnessed going through the stop sign before being pulled over on Wallcliffe Road;[51]

(7) observed that the 'question then arises as to whether or not there may have been a mistake on the part of the police as to seeing another vehicle that has driven through the roundabout ... coming from the road that turns into Wallcliffe Road after it goes through the roundabout';[52]

(8) in assessing the appellant's evidence stated that it was 'a matter where the concerns as to her being on 'double or nothing ... is a matter that harkens to sympathy, and I ought put that to one side, but otherwise consider that as both incentive to question reliability, but also the fact that Ms Miles does not have an exemplary driving record otherwise' (emphasis added);[53] and

(9) was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who drove through the intersection with the stop sign on Willmott Avenue and Bussell Highway, and that the short distance between the roundabout and the vehicle being pulled over reiterates that the officers did not lose sight of the appellant's vehicle at any point and were comfortably able to identify the appellant's vehicle as being the vehicle that went through the stop sign.[54]

1. The learned magistrate entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a $450 fine and ordered that the appellant pay costs in the sum of $300.50.[55]
2. A primary decision‑maker is not permitted to discount the evidence of an accused simply because she has a particular interest in the outcome of the trial. In the case of XHA v State of Western Australia,[56] the Court of Appeal upheld an appeal against conviction on the basis that the trial judge, in a trial by judge alone, did not accept the accused's evidence because the accused had a motivation to deny his offending because he was eligible for release from prison the following year for other offending and wanted to pursue a relationship upon a release. By discounting the accused's evidence for this reason, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had undermined the benefit of the presumption of innocence.[57]
3. The learned magistrate took into account the appellant's interest in the outcome of the trial, in particular her interest in not losing her licence for demerit points, in assessing the reliability of the appellant's evidence. The learned magistrate also permitted the appellant to be cross‑examined as to the consequences of receiving the infringement. The inference open on the appellant's evidence that the loss of her licence would have a devastating impact on her, was that her evidence should be treated as suspect.
4. I find that the learned magistrate erred in law in discounting the evidence of the appellant on the basis that she had a particular interest in the outcome of the trial.
5. I therefore grant leave to appeal and allow the appeal on ground 6.

Is the court satisfied, on a review of the evidence, that the evidence properly admitted at trial proved, beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's guilt?

1. Section 14(2) of the CA Act provides that the court may dismiss an appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred, even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of an appellant. This is referred to as the 'proviso'.
2. In order to apply the proviso, I must be satisfied that the evidence properly admitted in the trial proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The issue at the trial was identity - that is, was it the appellant who went through the stop sign or someone else? The appellant gave evidence that she did not go through the stop sign as she took an alternate route. The guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt required the learned magistrate to accept the evidence of the police officers and to not accept the evidence of the appellant. The learned magistrate did not give any reasons, other than that the reliability of the appellant's evidence was affected by her interest in not losing her licence, for not accepting the appellant's evidence. I cannot otherwise conclude that the appellant's evidence was so implausible as to be incapable of being accepted. It follows that I am not satisfied that the evidence properly admitted in the trial proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The proviso cannot be applied, and the appeal must be allowed.

1. Given that I have granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal in relation to ground of appeal 6, it is not necessary to consider grounds of appeal 1 to 5.
2. I make the following orders:

(1) Leave to appeal on ground 6 is granted.

(2) The appeal is allowed.

(3) The conviction recorded against the appellant is set aside.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[4] Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193.

[56] XHA v State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 8 (XHA).