© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2003] VSC 376
plaintiff. Byrne J declared that the Magistrates' Court erred in refusing jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's s 16 revocation application and in refusing to accept the plaintiff's application to set aside...
Byrne J held that intervention order proceedings are civil in nature so Magistrates' Court civil practice rules apply. The Magistrates' Court and its Registrar erred in refusing to accept or to hear the plaintiff's applications to revoke or set aside an intervention order made in his absence; the Supreme Court set aside the refusal and remitted the revocation and re-hearing applications to the Magistrates' Court to be determined according to law by a different magistrate, leaving merits to that court.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,020 words · generated 13/07/2026
Maria Barca, a widow living at 15A Rawdon Hill Drive, Dandenong North, brought an intervention order application against her neighbour's son, Lance Miles, alleging stalking and intimidation after an incident on 24 April 2003 in which she claimed to have seen Mr Miles on her garage roof and felt threatened [11], [23], [27]. The factual background included a contemporaneous civil dispute between Mrs Barca and the Miles family about a gum tree and damaged fence; that dispute had produced a settlement at a pre-hearing conference on 26 May 2003 in which Mrs Barca, represented by a solicitor, signed an unconditional withdrawal of her intervention application; Mr Miles was not present at that conference and was not a party to the settlement [30], [33]. The withdrawal was communicated to Miles's solicitor by letter dated 30 May so Mr Miles believed he did not need to attend the listed hearing on 11 June [38].
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Mrs Barca later went back to the court on 10 June, asserting breach of the settlement, and the Registrar reinstated the intervention application and adjourned it for final orders to 18 June [41], [44]. Mr Miles said he received no notice of the reinstated adjourned hearing and did not attend [47]. On 18 June the Magistrate heard Mrs Barca's complaint in Mr Miles's absence and made an intervention order prohibiting various conduct including stalking and approaching the premises at 15A/15B Rawdon Hill Drive until 18 June 2004 [50]. Mr Miles's solicitors did not bring the fact of the order to his attention until 24 June [54]. On 30 June Mr Miles applied to revoke the order pursuant to s 16 of the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 (Vic), and the matter came on before the same Magistrate on 28 July. The Magistrate refused to entertain the revocation application on the basis that she lacked jurisdiction and regarded the application as an attempt to appeal her earlier order; accordingly, the revocation application was dismissed without stay [60]. Attempts to file an application on 18 August to set aside the 18 June order and seek a re-hearing were refused by the Registrar on the ground the court had no jurisdiction; the Registrar suggested the applicant should file for revocation [66]. Mr Miles then filed an originating motion in the Supreme Court, seeking orders in the nature of mandamus compelling the Magistrates' Court to entertain the revocation and re-hearing applications, and asking in the alternative for final determination [69].
Byrne J found the Magistrate and Registrar had erred in law by concluding they lacked jurisdiction to hear the revocation and re-hearing applications. The Supreme Court accordingly declared those errors, set aside the Magistrates' Court order refusing to hear the revocation application (28 July 2003), ordered the Magistrates' Court to accept and hear the plaintiff's set-aside/re-hearing application, and remitted both the revocation and re-hearing proceedings to the Magistrates' Court to be heard according to law by a magistrate other than the one who made the intervention order on 18 June 2003 [72], [75], [78], [90], [93].
Central to Byrne J's reasoning were three interlocked legal points.
Intervention order proceedings are civil in character and thus the civil practice and jurisdictional regime of the Magistrates' Court applies to them unless inconsistent with the enabling statutes [75]. Byrne J expressly stated: "An application for an intervention order is a proceeding which is civil in character" [75]. That characterization imports the civil provision for re-hearings and related procedural relief.
Statutory empowerment to revoke. Section 16 of the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 expressly empowers the Magistrates' Court to order the revocation of an intervention order. The section does not limit the grounds upon which revocation may be sought; thus the court should not be read as deprived of power to hear revocation or set-aside applications where procedural unfairness is alleged [78]. Byrne J emphasised that the Magistrate was wrong to say she had no power to entertain the revocation application and that the power to revoke or vary exists where justice requires it [78].
Civil procedural rules permit re-hearing where a party did not appear. Byrne J relied on s 110 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 and Order 30 of the Magistrates' Court Civil Procedure Rules 1989 which provide the framework for rehearings and for filings; because the plaintiff's proposed application was not irregular in form, the Registrar should have accepted it and the Magistrates' Court had power to hear it [75]. The Supreme Court therefore found both the Registrar and the Magistrate mistaken in law in refusing to accept or hear the applications [75], [78].
Byrne J also weighed supervisory-discretion concerns. Although an appeal to the County Court had been lodged, that fact did not preclude the Supreme Court from exercising its prerogative jurisdiction to cure a grave injustice evidenced by procedural irregularities. The judge regarded the stakes as high: an intervention order and a finding of stalking carry serious consequences and public opprobrium; therefore remitting the matters to the Magistrates' Court for proper determination was appropriate [81], [84], [90].
He expressly declined to decide the merits of the stalking allegation, leaving that for the Magistrates' Court on re-hearing or revocation [87], [90].
Before this decision, intervention order proceedings under the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 and stalking provisions of the Crimes Act 1958 were understood to be civil in some respects but also attracted specialised practice. Byrne J clarified and applied the principle that such proceedings are civil in character for procedural purposes, so that the civil jurisdictional apparatus of the Magistrates' Court (statutes and court rules) governs filing, rehearings and the capacity to revoke or vary orders, absent express inconsistency in the governing legislation [75], [78].
After this decision, practitioners should understand that:
The decision does not alter the substantive test for stalking under s 21A of the Crimes Act 1958; it deals with procedural jurisdiction and remedy rather than the substantive sufficiency of evidence.
"An application for an intervention order is a proceeding which is civil in character." [75]
"Section 16 of the 1987 Act empowers the Magistrates' Court to order the revocation of an intervention order." [78]
"It is apparent that, for one reason or another, that this application has suffered from serious procedural irregularities which I must endeavour to cure." [84]
"To my mind, the proper course is for Mr Miles to be permitted to bring his re-hearing application before the Magistrates' Court." [90]
"I did not understand the solicitor for Mrs Barca to contend before me to the contrary." [75]
The decision is relevant where:
Practitioners should invoke this authority when the Magistrates' Court declines to exercise its civil procedural powers in intervention proceedings, or when a registrar improperly refuses to accept a properly constituted application.
This decision is a supervisory, declaratory ruling by a single judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria that clarifies the application of civil procedural rules to intervention order proceedings and affirms the Magistrates' Court's power to hear revocation and re-hearing applications. Subsequent courts confronted with the same factual matrix, an intervention order made in the absence of the defendant, a registrar's refusal to accept a set-aside application, or a magistrate declining jurisdiction, would treat Miles v Barca as authority that the Magistrates' Court's civil practices apply and that s 16 revocation applications are within the court's competence.
Where later courts must weigh interlocutory fairness or the availability of prerogative relief in the presence of an appeal, Miles v Barca supports the proposition that an appeal is not an automatic bar to supervisory relief where procedural unfairness risks grave injustice. That said, whether later courts depart from or limit Byrne J's approach will depend on distinguishing the facts; the central holdings are procedural and are likely to be followed in materially similar circumstances.
Limits of "civil character" applicability: Byrne J held intervention applications are civil in character so civil practice rules apply unless inconsistent with the enabling legislation [75]. A point of uncertainty remains about the outer limits of that characterization where the statute includes specific procedural provisions; can a Registrar or Magistrate rely on any implied procedural limitation in the particular enabling Act? Byrne J's formulation invites careful statutory comparison in future cases.
Interaction with criminal enforcement powers: The judgment treats intervention proceedings as civil for procedure, but intervention orders may involve criminal sanctions for breach. How that dual civil-criminal character affects other procedural rights (for example, disclosure rules, standard of proof, or rights to representation) in marginal cases might require further delineation.
Concurrent appeal and supervisory relief: Byrne J accepted that an appeal being on foot was not an absolute bar to Supreme Court intervention given strong evidence of procedural unfairness [81], [84]. The precise threshold for when the Supreme Court should intervene despite an appeal remains fact-sensitive; future cases will test where the balance lies between respect for the appellate process and prevention of injustice.
Administrative practice of registrars: The decision mandates that registrars should accept properly constituted applications; however, practical limits may arise where filings are later shown to be defective in form or substance. The scope of a registrar's gatekeeping power is not exhaustively explored here and may require further gloss in future decisions.
Concluding note: Miles v Barca is principally a procedural ruling. It protects access to the remedial mechanisms available in the Magistrates' Court where an intervention order has been made in the absence of a defendant who had not been given notice of an adjourned hearing, and it instructs both magistrates and registrars not to decline jurisdiction or refuse to accept filings on the basis of erroneous views about their power to hear revocation or re-hearing applications.
[2003] VSC 376
Courts - Magistrates' Court - intervention order - stalking - order made when defendant had no notice of hearing - whether jurisdiction to entertain revocation application - whether Magistrates' Court had jurisdiction to entertain re-hearing application.
"3. On 24th April 2003, I arrived home at about 1:15pm and saw the Plaintiff walking on top of my garage roof. I felt threatened by the Plaintiff, he came onto my property, the fence was damaged as a result of the Plaintiff using it as a ladder to get up and down from my garage roof. I felt as though I was continually being harassed and intimidated by the Plaintiff, he has also made derogatory comments about me, saying I was `part of the mafia' etc."
"(5) Despite anything to the contrary in the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987, the Court within the meaning of that Act may make an intervention order under that Act in respect of a person (the defendant) if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has stalked another person and is likely to continue to do so or to do so again and for this purpose that Act has effect as if the other person were a family member in relation to the defendant within the meaning of the Act if he or she would not otherwise be so."
"(2) A person (the offender) stalks another person (the victim) if the offender engages in a course of conduct which includes any of the following - (a) following the victim or any other person; (b) telephoning, sending electronic messages to, or otherwise contacting, the victim or any other person; (c) entering or loitering outside or near the victim's or any other person's place of residence or of business or any other place frequented by the victim or the other person; (d) interfering with property in the victim's or any other person's possession (whether or not the offender has an interest in the property); (e) giving offensive material to the victim or any other person or leaving it where it will be found by, given to or brought to the attention of, the victim or the other person; (f) keeping the victim or any other person under surveillance; (g) acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected to arouse apprehension or fear in the victim for his or her own safety or that of any other person - with the intention of causing physical or mental harm to the victim or of arousing apprehension or fear in the victim for his or her own safety or that of any other person and the course of conduct engaged in actually did have that result. (3) For the purposes of this section an offender also has the intention to cause physical or mental harm to the victim or to arouse apprehension or fear in the victim for his or her own safety or that of any other person if that offender knows, or in all the particular circumstances that offender ought to have understood, that engaging in a course of conduct of that kind would be likely to cause such harm or arouse such apprehension or fear and it actually did have that result."
"I HAVE KNOWN THE DEFENDANT FOR 14 YEARS. HIS PARENTS ARE LIVING NEXT DOOR TO ME. HE ALSO LIVED WITH HIS PARENTS UNTIL HE GOT MARRIED. HE TRESPASSED INTO MY PROPERTY AND I AM AFRAID OF HIM. TO SEE HIM OVER MY GARAGE ROOF GAVE ME TREMENDOUS SHOCK. I HAVE A LONG DISPUTE WITH THE FAMILY REGARDING AN OLD GUM TREE AND FENCE FOR OVER 2 AND A HALF YEARS AND MY TENANTS BEFORE ME. WE HAVE HAD MEDIATION THAT FAILED AND ENDED WITH LANCE SAYING I WAS PART OF THE MAFIA AND LOTS MORE. SINCE THIS TIME I HAVE FELT HARASSED AND INTIMIDATED BY HIS FAMILY ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS. THERE IS CURRENTLY A CIVIL DISPUTE BEFORE THE COURT WITH HIS FAMILY. THE CONDUCT WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE COURT WILL HELP ME TO PUT A FULL STOP TO THIS NIGHTMARE. I HAVE TRIED EVERY AVENUE AND MY SITUATION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY. I AM A WIDOW AND LIVE ALONE. I AM AFRAID THAT THE FENCE WILL FALL DOWN AND THEIR DOG WILL COME IN MY YARD."
"To Registrar Intervention Orders Dandenong Magistrates court R01029969 I, MARIA BARCA of 15 Rawdon Hill Drive, Dandenong North hereby unconditionally withdraw my application against MILES which had otherwise been set down for hearing on 11th June 2003."
The document was signed by Mrs Barca and witnessed by her solicitor. Mr Miles was not present at this conference and was not a party to the settlement.
"* STALKING, ASSAULTING, HARASSING, THREATENING OR INTIMIDATING THE VICTIM/S OF STALKING. * APPROACHING, TELEPHONING OR CONTACTING THE VICTIM/S OF STALKING EXCEPT TO PARTICIPATE IN MEDIATION BY AGREEMENT WITH THE VICTIM/S OF STALKING. * KNOWINGLY BEING AT OR ON THE PREMISES SITUATED AT 15A AND 15B ROWDON HILL DVE DANDENONG NTH OR ANY OTHER PREMISES WHERE THE VICTIM/S OF STALKING LIVES OR WORKS. * DAMAGING PROPERTY OWNED/JOINTLY OWNED BY THE VICTIM/S OF STALKING. * CAUSING ANOTHER PERSON TO ENGAGE IN CONDUCT PROHIBITED BY THIS ORDER. * THIS ORDER WILL LAST UNTIL 18/6/2004."
1. Declare that the Magistrates' Court of Victoria at Dandenong fell into error in concluding on 28 July 2003 that it had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the plaintiff's application pursuant to s. 16 of the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 for revocation of the intervention order made on 18 June 2003.
2. Declare that the Magistrates' Court of Victoria at Dandenong fell into error on 18 August 2003 in refusing to accept the application of the plaintiff for an order setting aside the intervention order made in his absence on 18 June 2003 and for a re-hearing of the complaint of the firstnamed defendant made on 12 May 2003.
3. Order that the order of the Magistrates' Court of Victoria at Dandenong on 28 July 2003 whereby it refused the application of the plaintiff for an order revoking the intervention order made on 18 June 2003 be set aside and that the revocation application be remitted to that court, constituted by a magistrate other than the Magistrate who made that order, to be determined according to law.
4. Order that the Magistrates' Court of Victoria accept the application of the plaintiff being Exhibit LM16 to the affidavit of Lance Miles sworn 25 August 2003 and that the Magistrates' Court, constituted by a magistrate other than the Magistrate who made the intervention order on 18 June 2003, hear and determine the application for re-hearing according to law.
[1] Fisher v Fisher [1988] VicRp 93; [1988] VR 1028
Miles
Barca [2003] VSC 376
Byrne J declared that the Magistrates' Court erred in refusing jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's s 16 revocation application and in refusing to accept the plaintiff's application to set aside the intervention order and for re-hearing; the Supreme Court set aside the Magistrates' Court order of 28 July 2003 and remitted the revocation application and the re-hearing application to the Magistrates' Court to be determined according to law by a magistrate other than the original decision-maker, and ordered the Magistrates' Court to accept the plaintiff's filed application (orders and declarations at [93]).