[2022] FWC 589
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2022-03-16
Original judgment source is linked above.
[2022] FWC 589 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2022/1965) was lodged against this decision.]
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - whether the Applicant was not unfairly dismissed - the Applicant was unfairly dismissed because while there was a valid reason, dismissal was harsh in all the circumstances - where it was appropriate to reinstate the Applicant
(a) he had acted in an unsafe manner by stationing his personal motor vehicle across an unsecured train line at Portsmith Yard without ensuring appropriate protection;
(b) he failed to ensure the appropriate use of the Respondent's resources by pumping up the tyres of his personal motor vehicle and/or washing his boat at Portsmith Yard;
(c) upon being approached by management in relation to his conduct, the Applicant made inappropriate and/or unprofessional comments, using words to the effect of the following:
- "I'm sick of this shit";
- "I know you'll take it to HR, do whatever you want, I don't care anymore";
- "I don't give a shit"; and/or
- "I'm booking off and don't know when I'll be back.""
"Of course you would. We've got two Kuranda trains. We know every train that's in the yard. We know exactly where they are and where they're going at all times. It's not Brisbane or some big station. We know every carriage, every bit of rolling stock in the yard. We know when it's moving and when it's not moving."
Unreasonable and harsh in all of the circumstances
"...traversing across rail lines it's our responsibility and part of our training to make sure we have personal vigilance, so that's part of our induction, our training for lock‑out, just to make sure that when you're entering a site that you're always looking around, because there's that risk which everyone is aware of, movement of rolling stock. So when you're walking, driving a vehicle across lines, you're required to maintain personal vigilance. When you are working on a line or you have parked a vehicle and you're there for a period of time, you are required to apply what we call lock‑out protection. So, that will secure the road so that no incoming traffic is able to move through those areas."
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person's capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees);
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason;
(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person;
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal;
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person - whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal;
(f) the degree to which the size of the employer's enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal;
(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(h) any other matters that the Commission considers relevant.
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal
"[125] Vice President Hatcher went on to observe that it is well established that a dismissal for misconduct may be found to be harsh on the basis that the sanction of dismissal is a disproportionate penalty to the gravity of the misconduct, and that the issue of proportionality is usually considered having regard to all relevant circumstances of the dismissed employee and his or her conduct. His Honour also noted that there is divergence in the authorities in relation to whether the gravity of the misconduct is considered separately from the factors subjective to the particular employee with the former consideration arising under s. 387(a) and the latter under s. 387(h). His Honour observed that proportionality of dismissal as discussed by Moore J in Edwards v Giudice, was not concerned with proportionality of dismissal in the sense where the gravity of the misconduct is weighed against a range of other potentially mitigating factors. Rather it was concerned with whether the conduct in question, considered in isolation, was intrinsically capable of constituting a valid reason for dismissal if it only involved a minor misdemeanour.
[126] I do not understand that there is a rule that the gravity of the misconduct must be considered under s. 387(a) devoid of any mitigating factors a dismissed employee may raise. While the gravity of the conduct must be considered and assessed, in my view, there are some mitigating factors which may also go directly to the validity of a reason for dismissal by mitigating the seriousness of the conduct for which a person was dismissed. Examples of some of these factors may be lack of training or the dismissed employee being placed under undue pressure by some failure on the part of the employer, which contributed to the conduct for which the employee was dismissed. Those matters may go to the reasonableness of the dismissal on the basis that they mitigate the gravity of the employee's conduct. There are other mitigating factors which relate to personal circumstances of the dismissed employee and which may render the dismissal harsh, notwithstanding that the gravity of the employee's conduct justifies dismissal. The first category of mitigating factors falls for consideration under s. 387(a) of the Act and the second category under s. 387(h)." (citations omitted)[10]
(b) and (c) whether the person was notified of that reason and had an opportunity to respond
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person - whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal
(f) and (g) the degree to which the size of the employer's enterprise and the absence of dedicated human resource management expertise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed
(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant
"390 When the FWC may order remedy for unfair dismissal
(1) Subject to subsection (3), the FWC may order a person's reinstatement, or the payment of compensation to a person, if:
(a) the FWC is satisfied that the person was protected from unfair dismissal (see Division 2) at the time of being dismissed; and
(b) the person has been unfairly dismissed (see Division 3).
(2) The FWC may make the order only if the person has made an application under section 394.
(3) The FWC must not order the payment of compensation to the person unless:
(a) the FWC is satisfied that reinstatement of the person is inappropriate; and
(b) the FWC considers an order for payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
Note: Division 5 deals with procedural matters such as applications for remedies."
(1) An order for a person's reinstatement must be an order that the person's employer at the time of the dismissal reinstate the person by:
(a) reappointing the person to the position in which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal; or
(b) appointing the person to another position on terms and conditions no less favourable than those on which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal.
(a) the position in which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal is no longer a position with the person's employer at the time of the dismissal; and
(b) that position, or an equivalent position, is a position with an associated entity of the employer;
the order under subsection (1) may be an order to the associated entity to:
(c) appoint the person to the position in which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal; or
(d) appoint the person to another position on terms and conditions no less favourable than those on which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal.
(2) If the FWC makes an order under subsection (1) and considers it appropriate to do so, the FWC may also make any order that the FWC considers appropriate to maintain the following:
(b) the period of the person's continuous service with the employer, or (if subsection (1A) applies) the associated entity.
(3) If the FWC makes an order under subsection (1) and considers it appropriate to do so, the FWC may also make any order that the FWC considers appropriate to cause the employer to pay to the person an amount for the remuneration lost, or likely to have been lost, by the person because of the dismissal.
(4) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (3), the FWC must take into account:
(a) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for reinstatement; and
(b) the amount of any remuneration reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for reinstatement and the actual reinstatement."
(1) An order for the payment of compensation to a person must be an order that the person's employer at the time of the dismissal pay compensation to the person in lieu of reinstatement.
(2) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (1), the FWC must take into account all the circumstances of the case including:
(a) the effect of the order on the viability of the employer's enterprise; and
(b) the length of the person's service with the employer; and
(c) the remuneration that the person would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if the person had not been dismissed; and
(d) the efforts of the person (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered by the person because of the dismissal; and
(e) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation; and
(f) the amount of any income reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation; and
(g) any other matter that the FWC considers relevant.
(3) If the FWC is satisfied that misconduct of a person contributed to the employer's decision to dismiss the person, the FWC must reduce the amount it would otherwise order under subsection (1) by an appropriate amount on account of the misconduct.
(4) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt, caused to the person by the manner of the person's dismissal.
(5) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not exceed the lesser of:
(a) the amount worked out under subsection (6); and
(b) half the amount of the high income threshold immediately before the dismissal.
(6) The amount is the total of the following amounts:
(ii) to which the person was entitled; (whichever is higher) for any period of employment with the employer during the 26 weeks immediately before the dismissal; and
(b) if the employee was on leave without pay or without full pay while so employed during any part of that period - the amount of remuneration taken to have been received by the employee for the period of leave in accordance with the regulations."
[1] Smith v Aussie Waste Management Pty Ltd [2015] FWC 1044.
[2] Ward v Kimberley Ports Authority [2015] FWC 5449.
[3] Sayer v Melsteel Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 7498 [14]; Smith v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd PR915674 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Lacy SDP, Simmonds C, 21 March 2002) [69].
[4] Raj Bista v Group Pty Ltd t/a Glad Commercial Cleaning [2016] FWC 3009.
[5] Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 333; (1995) 62 IR 371, 373.
[7] Smith v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2021] FWC 4 [122].
[9] Raj Bista v Group Pty Ltd t/a Glad Commercial Cleaning [2016] FWC 3009.
[10] Smith v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2021] FWC 4 [125]-[126].
[11] Walton v Mermaid Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd [1996] IRCA 267; (1996) 142 ALR 681, 685.
[12] Allied Express Transport Pty Ltd v Anderson (1998) 81 IR 410, 413.
[13] Matthew Gosek v Illawarra Coal Holdings Pty Limited T/A South32 [2017] FWC 4574 [104].
[14] For example, Parmalat Food Products Pty Ltd v Wililo [2011] FWAFB 1166; Gottwald v Downer EDI Rail Pty Ltd [2007] AIRC 969.
[15] Butson v BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2010] FWA 640 (McCarthy DP, 1 February 2010).
[16] Browne v Coles Group Supply Chain Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 3670 [62]; citing B, C and D v Australian Postal Corporation T/A Australia Post [2013] FWCFB 6191 [36].
[17] B, C and D v Australian Postal Corporation T/A Australia Post [2013] FWCFB 6191 [48]; Lee v Superior Wood Pty Ltd [2019] FWCFB 2946.
[19] Ngyuen v Vietnamese Community in Australia [2014] FWCFB 7198.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Michael Rainbow
Queensland Rail T/A Queensland Rail [2022] FWC 589
(1995) 62 IR 371
(1999) 94 FCR 561
(1996) 142 ALR 681
(1998) 81 IR 410