Consideration
39 The grounds on which an application to set aside a statutory demand can be made under s 459G are set out in ss 459H and 459J of the Corporations Act. Those provisions prescribe the following four grounds on which a statutory demand may be set aside. Those sections are enlivened if the Court is satisfied that:
(a) there is a genuine dispute between the company and the person serving the statutory demand about the existence or amount of a debt to which the demand relates: s 459H(1)(a);
(b) the company has an offsetting claim: s 459H(1)(b);
(c) because of a defect in the demand, substantial injustice will be caused unless the demand is set aside: s 459J(1)(a); or
(d) there is some other reason why the demand should be set aside: s 459J(1)(b).
40 Here, Mesha Feet contended there was a genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the debts the subject of the statutory demand.
41 It is clear on the authorities that spurious, hypothetical, illusory or misconceived arguments do not qualify as giving rise to a "genuine dispute" about the existence or amount of the debt to which a statutory demand relates: eg MNWA Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2016) 250 FCR 381; [2016] FCAFC 154 at [98] (Rares, Farrell and Davies JJ), referring to Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G&M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452 at 464F (Northrop, Merkel and Goldberg JJ), applied in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1997) 80 FCR 296 at 301F-G (French, Kiefel and Sundberg JJ). Similarly, a claim will not be an "offsetting claim" for the purposes of s 459H(1)(b) of the Corporations Act if there is no serious question to be tried, or the asserted claim is frivolous or vexatious: eg First Equilibrium Pty Ltd v Bluestone Property Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (2013) 95 ACSR 654; [2013] FCAFC 108 at [21] (Gordon, Griffiths and Farrell JJ).
42 The conclusion that the means by which Mesha Feet purported to pay its taxation liabilities are not approved means for payment, is dispositive of the present application. There is no "genuine dispute" as to the existence or amount of the debt to which the statutory demand relates (s 459H(1)(a) of the Corporations Act).
43 As noted above, Mesha Feet did not advance any submissions in support of the existence of an offsetting claim. As such, while raised in the originating process, the point was abandoned. In any event, even if not abandoned, I do not accept that the invoices and demands issued by Mesha Feet demonstrate that Mesha Feet has a credible offsetting claim (s 459H(1)(b) of the Corporations Act). Any suggestion that the ATO is indebted to Mesha Feet is spurious. For completeness, I note that Mesha Feet did not contend that there is any defect in the demand causing substantial injustice, or "some other reason" by reference to which the statutory demand may be set aside pursuant to s 459J of the Corporations Act.
44 Mesha Feet's contention that it effectively discharged its taxation liabilities by the "Promissory Note" and the "Bill of Exchange" are spurious and must be rejected. Payment by those means is not a means of payment approved by the Commissioner (reg 21(2) of the Regulations). As the Defendant submitted, this is dispositive and it is not necessary to get bogged down in arguments regarding whether the particular "Promissory Note" and "Bill of Exchange" constitute "Australian currency" for the purposes of reg 21(1) of the Regulations.
45 Regulation 21(2) is expressed in positive terms. It refers to means of payment that are "approved by the Commissioner". The fact that there is no legislation specifying that promissory notes and bills of exchange cannot be used as means to pay tax debts is beside the point. The point is that they are not means of payment that have been approved. The negative (absence of an express prohibition on payment by bills of exchange or promissory notes) does not establish the positive (approval of those means of payment by the Commissioner).
46 I also do not accept Mesha Feet's argument that a promissory note is "cash", and that a bill of exchange is a "cheque". That argument was run as the ATO says it accepts cash and cheques as means by which tax debts can be paid. The argument is a specious "bootstraps" argument, which proceeded by suggesting that a $100 note was a promissory note, and that a cheque was a bill of exchange. Even accepting the premise, it does not follow that all promissory notes are cash and all bills of exchange are cheques.
47 Nor do I accept that, as submitted by Mesha Feet, this presents a tension between different pieces of Federal legislation, or is inconsistent with the eight pieces of Federal legislation to which Mesha Feet referred.
48 The first of the eight pieces of legislation Mesha Feet relied on was s 89(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) (the Bills of Exchange Act). That provision is in the following terms:
(1) A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money, to or to the order of a specified person, or to bearer.
49 As may be seen, s 89(1) only describes what constitutes a promissory note. It says nothing about whether particular liabilities may be discharged by delivery of a promissory note, even if the note issued by Mr Tobgui comes within the description of "promissory note" in s 89(1).
50 The second of eight pieces of legislation was s 51 of the Constitution which refers, at (xvi), to bills of exchange and promissory notes. The fact that instruments of that kind are stated to be within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth parliament is not to the point.
51 The third of eight pieces of legislation is s 39(8) of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth) (Banking Act). Section 39 of that Act is a regulation making power, and the definition of "Australian currency" in s 39(8) only establishes the meaning of "Australian currency" in s 39 of the Banking Act. It has no wider significance and, in any event, the disposition of this case does not turn on the meaning given to "Australian currency" in reg 21(1) of the Regulations.
52 The fourth of eight pieces of legislation is s 9 of the Currency Act 1965 (Cth). It concerns transactions being in Australian currency. It does not assist Mesha Feet's arguments.
53 The fifth of eight pieces of legislation is s 195-1 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth). That section contains a definition of "money", which includes promissory notes and bills of exchange. The definition of "money" in legislation concerning the goods and services tax has no bearing on the means by which Mesha Feet's income tax debts could be discharged under s 16A of the TAA and reg 21 of the Regulations.
54 The sixth of eight pieces of legislation is s 131.7(4) of the Criminal Code, being the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). It states, in s 131, that "money" includes negotiable instruments. Again, that is irrelevant to the question of by which means Mesha Feet's tax debts could be discharged.
55 The seventh of eight pieces of legislation is s 17(2)(a)(ii) of the TAA. It provides for the conversion into decimal currency of amounts stated in "the previous currency", which is a reference to the currency provided for by the (now repealed) Coinage Act 1909 (Cth). That Act permitted Australia to have its own coins, several years after Federation, denominated in pounds, sovereigns, shillings, pence etc. Conversion between imperial and decimal currency is not relevant and not of assistance to Mesha Feet.
56 The final piece of the eight pieces of legislation is s 8J of the TAA. It provides that, for the purposes of Subdiv B of Div 2 of Pt III of the TAA, "accounting records" includes bills of exchange and promissory notes. The statutory stipulation as to the breadth of what constitutes an "accounting record" for the purposes of that subdivision says nothing of how tax debts may be paid.
57 Accordingly, none of the pieces of legislation relied on either assist in establishing that tax debts can by paid by promissory notes or bills of exchange, or suggest that there is any tension or disharmony in Federal legislation if tax debts cannot be paid by such means.
58 Mesha Feet also referred to and relied on a number of other provisions in the Bills of Exchange Act, as well as various legal and general dictionary definitions of "note", "bank note", "cash", "cheque", "promissory note", "negotiable instrument", and "bill of exchange". None of that material assists Mesha Feet as none of it supports the proposition that a taxation liability may be discharged by delivery of instruments of the kind delivered by Mesha Feet in purported discharge of its taxation liabilities.
59 I also do not accept that the Defendant became bound to accept the "Promissory Note" or the "Bill of Exchange" by virtue of the ATO's failure to return those instruments within the stipulated time frames (or at all), its failure to return the cheque, its banking of the cheque, or its failure to write back to Mesha Feet expressly rejecting the proffered means of discharging its tax debts. The self-serving statements embedded by Mesha Feet and Mr Tobgui in the correspondence do not elevate the "Promissory Note" or the "Bill of Exchange" to means of payment approved by the Commissioner.
60 While it would have been desirable for the ATO to write back to Mr Tobgui and Mesha Feet expressly rejecting the proffered means of payment, and while the ATO's own Practice Statement recognises that the ATO should write back in response to proposals it does not accept, its failure to do so does not make the ineffective forms of payment effective to discharge Mesha Feet's tax liabilities.
61 I also do not accept that the "Statement of Account" issued by the ATO to Mesha Feet was an "offer" to contract with Mesha Feet regarding the discharge of its tax liabilities. It was nothing of the sort. It was, as was plain on the face of the document, a statement of the amounts that the ATO considered Mesha Feet owed to it. It was not open to Mr Tobgui to load it up with annotations and thereby purport to create some kind of contract. There plainly was no objectively ascertained mutual intention to create legal relations on the terms of that annotated document. Nor is there any discernible basis upon which an equitable estoppel might be said to arise. As Jagot J observed in Atkinson v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 1217, a case involving facts not dissimilar to those here, at [47]:
The statement of account is not a bill of exchange as defined in s 8(1) of the Act. The first applicant was not authorised to do anything with the statement of account under the Act. Writing and putting various stamps on the statement of account had no legal effect under the Act. Nor did delivering that statement of account back to the ATO. The Act is simply not engaged at all by the facts of this case. The notion that a person who owes the ATO money for non-payment of tax can transform the ATO's statement of account into a bill of exchange and then deliver the statement of account back to the ATO and, in so doing, discharge the person's own indebtedness for some nominal amount ($1) and render the ATO liable to pay the original amount owed to the ATO plus interest and other charges is some form of fantasy, unconnected to the operation of the Act.
62 Although the above passage was confined to notations made on a statement of account, the Defendant submitted, and I accept, that Jagot J's observations apply with equal force to other documents unilaterally created by a taxpayer, such as the "Bill of Exchange" and "Promissory Note" issued by Mesha Feet.
63 None of the English authority relied on by Mesha Feet, in which statements have been made about bills of exchange and promissory notes being treated as cash, assist it (Mesha Feet referred to the judgment of Lord Denning in Fielding & Platt Ltd v Najjar [1969] 2 All ER 150; 1 WLR 357 at 361, Ex parte Matthew (1884) 12 QBD 506 and a passage said to be from a case named Jackson v Murphy [1887] 4 TLR 92, but which is in fact from Ferson Contractors Ltd v John Owner Ferris [1981] 1 WLUK 636). Those cases have nothing to do with the means by which taxation liabilities in Australia may be paid.
64 For completeness, I note that the Defendant made additional submissions to the effect that the "Promissory Note" issued by Mesha Feet was not even an effective promissory note and the "Bill of Exchange" was not an effective bill of exchange. However, given that the points referred to above are dispositive, it is not necessary to address those arguments.
65 The application will be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Button.