RELEVANT PRINCIPLES
15 The Court has jurisdiction to make the extension orders sought by reason of s 439A(6) CA. In exercising that jurisdiction, the Court should have regard to, and balance, the interests of creditors in a speedy administration and the need to allow sufficient time to administrators to carry out their function properly and maximise the benefit to creditors through a proper administration: Re Diamond Press Australia Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 313 at [10], Re Austcorp Group Ltd [2009] FCA 636 at [18].
16 In order for the administrators to carry out their function properly, it is necessary that they should have sufficient time to investigate the affairs of the companies under administration and to provide sensible information and advice to the creditors: Hayes, in the matter of Estate Property Group Limited (Administrators Appointed) [2007] FCA 935 at [1]. That includes sufficient time to investigate and carry out a sale process in which structured 'due diligence' procedures are adopted: Re Diamond Press at [11], Re Hans Continental Smallgoods Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1933 at [21]. It also includes time to pursue a possible recapitalisation. In Re Chemeq Ltd; ex parte McMaster [2007] WASC 154 an extension of six months was allowed for this purpose.
17 What will be 'sufficient' will obviously depend on the complexities of the issues involved in the administration.
18 A variety of other reasons which would also justify an extension are categorised by Austin J in Re; Riviera Group Pty Ltd (2009) 72 ACSR 352 at 355, [13] where his Honour said:
[13] The reasons given for an extension in subsequent cases can be grouped into the following broad categories:
• the size and scope of the business: Re Lombe; Babcock & Brown Ltd (admins apptd) [2009] FCA 349 (Re Lombe); Re Worrell; Storm Financial Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (2009) 69 ACSR 584 ; [2009] FCA 70 (Re Worrell); Re ABC Learning Centres Ltd; Application by Walker (No 5) [2008] FCA 1947;
• substantial offshore activities: Re Lehman Bros Australia Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1132;
• large number of employees with complex entitlements: Re S & D International Pty Ltd (in liq); Malhotra v Tiwari [2005] VSC 496; Re Ansett Australia Ltd and Korda; sub nom Ansett Australia Ltd (No 3) (FCR) (2002) 115 FCR 409 ; 40 ACSR 433 ; [2002] FCA 90;
• complex corporate group structure and intercompany loans: Re Lombe; Re Octaviar Ltd (admins apptd) (recs and mgrs apptd) (ACN 107 863 436) [2008] QSC 272; Re LED Builders Pty Ltd (admin apptd) [2008] NSWSC 633; Hall; Re Australian Capital Reserve Ltd (admins apptd) [2007] FCA 1328;
• complex transactions entered into by the company (for example securities lending or derivatives transactions): In Re Lift Capital Partners Pty Ltd (admin apptd) [2008] NSWSC 446 (Re Lift Capital);
• complex prospects of recovery proceedings: Re Worrell; Coal Developments (German Creek) Pty Ltd v Cmr of Taxation (2007) 241 ALR 667 ; [2007] FCA 1324;
• lack of access to corporate financial records: Re Sims; Destra Corp Ltd [2008] FCA 2002; Re Fincorp Group Holdings Pty Ltd (2007) 62 ACSR 192 ; [2007] NSWSC 363;
• the time needed to execute an orderly process of disposal of assets: Re Carter, SFM Australasia Pty Ltd (admin apptd) (ACN 105 317 333) (No 2) [2009] FCA 419; Re ABC Learning Centres Ltd; Application by Walker (No 7) (2009) 71 ACSR 560 ; [2009] FCA 454;
• the time needed for thorough assessment of a proposal for a deed of company arrangement: Silvia, Re Austcorp Group Ltd (admin apptd) [2009] FCA 636;
• where the extension will allow sale of the business as a going concern: Re Lombe; Australian Discount Retail Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 110; Stewart, Re Kleins Franchising Pty Ltd (admin apptd) [2008] FCA 721; Re Uni-Aire Security Pty Ltd (admin apptd) [2006] FCA 1423;
• more generally, that additional time is likely to enhance the return for unsecured creditors: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Scottsdale Homes No Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 190; Re Fitzgerald; Primebroker Securities Ltd (admin apptd) (recs and mgrs apptd) [2008] FCA 1247; Re Vouris; Marrickville Bowling and Recreation Club Ltd [2008] FCA 622.
19 In Re; Riviera Group at 354 - 357, [8]-[18] it was also observed by Austin J:
[8] It is striking that the voluntary administration provisions set a single statutory timetable for every administration of every company "from the smallest to the greatest": as Young J said in Mann v Abruzzi Sports Club Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 611 at 612 (Mann). The attempt to set a single timetable was bound to create distortions and pressures for relief. The statutory power of courts to extend the convening period is the mechanism for adjusting the statutory timetable to meet the exigencies of the instant case.
[9] When the voluntary administration provisions were introduced into the corporations legislation, by the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth), it was contemplated that extensions of the convening period would not be given frequently; that is, there was thought to be a predisposition or a kind of factual presumption against an extension. The explanatory memorandum to the Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 said (para 507):
The court will be given a power to extend these periods … though it is not expected that this power would be exercised frequently, since it is an important objective of the new provisions for creditors to be fully informed about the company's position as early as possible and to have an opportunity to vote on its future as soon as possible.
[10] As is noted in Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, LexisNexis, looseleaf, at [26.201], an additional reason for reluctance to extend the convening period is that the statutory moratorium on the prosecution of proceedings against the company and on enforcement of rights by chargees and owners or lessors of property during administration should not be prolonged without good cause.
[11] Some remarks in early cases on s 439A(6) applications appeared to reflect the sentiment expressed in the explanatory memorandum. For example, in Mann, Young J (at 612) expressed the opinion that "it would be quite contrary to the whole spirit of [Part 5.3A] to allow administration to be unduly extended or, indeed, to over-encourage administrators to apply to the court". In Re Witta Coola Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 148 the same judge expressed the view that the voluntary administration regime required an accelerated program of work on the part of the administrator; see also Allbuild Construction Co Pty Ltd; Ex parte Featherby [2000] WASC 227 (Allbuild Construction).
[12] However, if one looks more closely at these cases it is less clear that there was any significant leaning against granting an extension, provided that adequate reasons were given in support of the application for extra time. In all three cases, extensions were granted as requested on grounds equivalent to those accepted in later cases. In Mann, for example, although Young J spoke in the manner indicated above about not allowing an administration to be unduly extended, he granted the extension sought on the grounds that the administration was complicated by the appointment of a receiver, the evidence indicated that the administrator was doing his best to deal speedily with negotiations that would enable the company to go back into survival mode, there was no evidence of prejudice to creditors or members in granting the extension, and if the meeting were convened without the extension the administrator would not have sufficient material to give a meaningful account of his administration.
[13] …
[14] Thecases show that where a substantial issue in any of these categories is established (and a fortiori, where the facts fit into more than one category), the court tends to grant an extension, and the extension tends to be for the time sought by the administrator provided that the evidentiary case has been properly prepared, there is no evidence of material prejudice to those affected by the moratorium imposed by an administration, and the court is satisfied that the administrator's estimate of time has a reasonable basis.
[15] It is difficult to discern, especially in the most recent cases, any substantial remnant of the predisposition against extension. It is true that in Re Diamond Press Australia Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 313, Barrett J adverted to "an expectation reflected in the case law that an administration should proceed very quickly and should not be unduly prolonged, particularly in view of the moratorium situation it involves", and he said "it is intended to produce a reasonably speedy fate for the company, one way or another: at [8]. But his Honour continued (at [10]):
[10] The function of the Court on an application such as this is, as I see it, to strike an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, the expectation that administration will be a relatively speedy and summary matter and, on the other, the requirement that undue speed should not be allowed to prejudice sensible and constructive actions directed towards maximising the return for creditors and any return for shareholders.
[16] This "balancing test" has been applied frequently in later cases: for example Re Georges, Midas Australia Pty Ltd (admin apptd) [2009] FCA 38; Re Hayes; Estate Property Group Ltd [2007] FCA 935. If the approach is to "balance" the expectation of speedy administration against the risk of prejudice, there cannot be any predisposition in favour of speedy administration, for that would skew the balancing process. Rather, the cases suggest that where the administrator proves a substantial ground in any of the categories that I have set out, and there is no specific evidence of prejudice, an extension commensurate with the administrator's task will be granted, notwithstanding that the explanatory memorandum suggested that extensions would not be granted frequently.
[17] It seems to me the degree of complexity of the administration is the key to understanding the court's current approach. It is obvious from the nature of the applications that have been made in recent years that, while there remain many voluntary administrations of small business companies that are relatively simple and can be carried out within the statutory timetable, there is an increasing number of more complex tasks for insolvency practitioners. Obviously, an increased number of the larger corporate groups are likely to be placed in administration in economically difficult times, and when they are, their sheer size, and their complex corporate structures and intercorporate finances, will create many problems for their administrators. Increasingly, companies in administration will have entered into complex funding arrangements, treasury instruments, and perhaps arrangements involving the use of trusts and managed investment schemes, rather than traditional funding. Business transactions are frequently overlaid with complexity because they are supported by collateral arrangements: for example, retention of title clauses or the use of derivatives for hedging and other purposes. Certain kinds of business are inherently complex, such as the securities lending arrangements in the Re Lift Capital case.
[18] Where there is evidence of complexity of these kinds, it seems to me there is no place for a predisposition against extension. However, an important principle from the older cases remains good law: the applicant for an extension must adduce evidence establishing grounds, adequate to enable the court to carry out the balancing exercise about which the modern cases speak. The administrator is expected to explain with some particularity the problems that make the extension necessary: see Re Levi (1996) 19 ACSR 521; Allbuild Construction, above. Additionally, where there is a particular person or group who might be prejudiced by the extension that has been sought or the accompanying moratorium, evidence should be adduced about their position. Indeed, one can envisage cases where particular creditors who will be prejudiced by the extension should be notified of or joined as respondents to the application. The longer the extension that is sought, the more important it is for the court to be given a clear and complete explanation of the state of the administration, the grounds for the extension and any potential prejudice that would flow from granting it.
20 As to the effect, if any, of an extension upon creditors, particularly those who are subject to a statutory moratorium upon exercising their rights: Re Diamond Press at [8], Re Austcorp at [18], it will be relevant to take into account that no objection to an extension was raised at a first meeting of creditors or in response to a circular notifying creditors of an extension application: In the matter of Henry Walker Eltin Group Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2005] FCA 316 at [2], Re Hans at [13], Re Babcock and Brown Ltd [2009] FCA 349 at [35]. I am told that the administrators are not aware of any creditors whose claim would be barred as a result of the extensions sought.
21 If an objection is raised, it is necessary to consider its basis- whether the objection is to the steps proposed by administrators or whether it is only to the time which those steps may take. If an objection of the second type is raised, the reasoning on which it is based should be carefully scrutinised as it is easy for creditors to assert that administrators should act more swiftly. Compare Re Hans at [16].
22 The plaintiffs submit that while it is always a matter of assessing the individual circumstances of a case, it is not unusual for extensions to be granted in the order of two and half to three months: Re Hans at [26]. Recent examples of extensions in the cases referred to above and others include Henry Walker Eltin (3 months), Hayes (just over 1 month), Re Chemeq (6 months), Re; Capital Partners Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 446 (3 months), Re Hans (3 months), Re Babcock and Brown (4 months), Re ABC Learning Centres Ltd (No 7) (2009) 71 ACSR 560 (6 months), Re Austcorp (4 months), Re; Riviera (1 month), Re Fincorp Holdings Pty Ltd (2007) 62 ACSR 192 (3 months) and Re Windimurra Vanadium Ltd [2009] WASC 71 (3 months).