THE AUTHORITIES
23 The applicant relies upon a line of cases in bankruptcy commencing with In re Dagnall Ex parte Soan & Morley [1896] 2 QB 407. Pursuant to the Married Women's Property Act 1982, 'Every married woman carrying on a trade separately from her husband shall, in respect of her separate property, be subject to the bankruptcy laws in the same way as if she were a feme sole.' Mrs Dagnall had been carrying on a trade separately from her husband. Having sold her business, she gave notice to creditors that she was about to suspend payment of their debts. As a result a bankruptcy petition was presented. The question was whether or not the bankruptcy laws continued to apply to her after she had ceased trading but whilst she still owed trading debts. The Divisional Court (Vaughan Williams J and Wright J) found that the bankruptcy legislation continued to apply. Vaughan Williams J said (at 410-11):
'But whether a person is carrying on a trade or not is a question of fact; and if it were not for the decision in Ex parte McGeorge…, I would have said without any hesitation that as long as a woman trading separately from her husband had not paid the trade debts which she had incurred, so long she was continuing to trade. It seems to me that trading is not completed until you have performed all the obligations that the fact of trading imposed upon you. And that was the view that was taken in the older cases. Then we have to consider whether there is anything in the decision in Ex parte McGeorge… which prevents us from holding that the non-payment of debts incurred by a married woman while trading separately is evidence that she is still continuing to trade.'
24 His Lordship then referred to numerous "older" cases, noting that the decision in Ex parte McGeorge had departed from them on the basis of differences in the wording of the relevant bankruptcy legislation. Two alternative lines of reasoning emerge from his Lordship's brief judgment. The first is that a trader continues to trade until he or she has performed all obligations incurred as a result of such trading. The second is that non-payment of trading debts is evidence of continued trading, presumably to be considered in the light of other evidence. Wright J disposed of the matter on a different basis, holding (at 411) that:
'… this appeal must be allowed, upon the short ground that in my view the natural meaning of the section is that a married woman who trades separately is to be subject to the bankruptcy laws in respect of all debts incurred by her in the period during which she was carrying on the trade.'
25 The reference by Vaughan Williams J to the "older cases" is explained in the summary of argument by counsel for the petitioning creditor. At 408-9, counsels' submissions are summarized as follows:
'The meaning of s.1, sub-s 5, of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 is that a woman who once carries on a trade and contracts debts as a trader becomes subject to the bankruptcy laws, and continues to be so until she has discharged her trade debts, even though she may have ceased to carry on her trade. Under the old law of bankruptcy, in force at a time when only traders could be made bankrupt, a man who had retired from business might be made a bankrupt in respect of debts contracted before he did retire: Meggot v Mills … . Similarly, in Ex parte Bamford …, a case decided on an Act of Parliament which provided that persons "using the trade of merchandise" might be made bankrupt, it was held that an act of bankruptcy committed after retiring from trade was sufficient.'
26 Those "older cases" are of some assistance in understanding the decision in Dagnall. In Meggot v Mills, 1 Ld Raym 286; 91 ER 1088, it was said that:
'… though a man quits his trade, yet he may be a bankrupt for the debts that he owed before.'
27 In Ex parte Bamford (1809) 15 Ves Jun 449; 33 ER 824, Lord Eldon said (at 827):
'Upon the point, which has been taken at the trial, whether a Commission can be sustained by an act of bankruptcy, committed after retiring from trade, the debts, contracted in the course of that trade, remaining unpaid, I shall say no more, than that my clear opinion, unqualified by any doubt, is, that the Commission may be sustained; and I should not have heard so much upon it, if I had not understood, that two of the Judges held different opinions upon that question at the Assizes.'
28 Neither of these authorities supports the proposition that a trader, who ceases trading in the usual sense, continues to trade for so long as trade debts remain owing. They rather establish the proposition advanced by Wright J that a person who has traded may be bankrupted upon debts incurred during trading, notwithstanding the fact that he has ceased to trade.
29 In bankruptcy matters, Dagnall has been followed in Theophile v The Solicitor-General [1950] AC 186 at 201-203; In re Bird v Inland Revenue Commissioner [1962] 1 WLR 686 at 695-697 and In re a Debtor [1992] Ch 554. However, in Avondale Motors (Parts) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 124 CLR 97 at 102-103, Gibbs J (as his Honour then was) doubted the applicability of the decision in Dagnall 'beyond the field of bankruptcy and into that of taxation law', referring to the decision of Tryka Ltd v Newall (1963) 41 TC 146 where Wilberforce J (as his Lordship then was) said:
'I do not think I can accept the application of the bankruptcy cases here. It seems to me that the two fields are quite different. When one is considering the question whether for purposes of bankruptcy laws a person is carrying on business, it may be necessary to hold that he does not cease to carry on business when trading activity has ceased, and for that reason, the Courts have been ready to extend the Section so as to cover a case where he has left debts unpaid. But to apply the same line of thought to Income Tax cases would lead to very great difficulties and, indeed, would mean that almost every case which one finds in the books on such questions as cessation of business would have been complicated by the introduction of this question and might, indeed, have been otherwise decided.'
30 Similarly, in Northern Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 42 FLR 301, Deane J considered that the decision in Theophile could not be applied in considering whether a taxpayer was carrying on business for so long as any debt owing to him remained uncollected. In that case Brennan J (as his Honour then was) said (at 304):
'When a company's business is closing down there comes a time when the activity of a trading or profit-making nature comes to an end. The business of the company is not carried on merely by managing or disposing of the company's assets otherwise than in a business. There was, as it seems to me, no element of business in the circumstances of the case here appearing in the movement of funds between the appellant and the other companies in the group. It was not shown that the movement of those funds was for the purpose of deriving any commercial benefit for the appellant and the mere existence of a debt owing by the holding company during the income year had no element of a business about it, nor was it in an relevant sense an incident of the trading business in which the appellant had been engaged.'
I infer that Brennan J also saw no reason to apply Theophile.
31 In face of these views expressed by highly respected judges, the applicant cites the decision of the House of Lords in South Behar Railway Company Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1925] AC 476. That case concerned a taxpayer company incorporated in order to enter into a contract with the Secretary of State for India for the construction of a railway in that country. The company was to supply the Secretary of State with the necessary funds and materials. The Secretary of State was to provide, free of cost, the land required for the railway, of which the company was to retain possession during the continuance of the contract. The Secretary of State was also to construct the railway, using such agency as he should appoint, and according to his design and specifications, but at the entire risk and cost of the company. From the opening of the railway until the determination of the contract, the Secretary of State was to work and maintain it and keep it supplied with rolling stock, plant and machinery. In each half-year he was to retain 45% of the gross earnings of the railway and remit the remaining 55% to the company. The company could not, during the continuance of the contract, without the written approval of the Secretary of State, engage in, carry on, or apply capital to any other business. The Secretary of State might determine the contract on twelve months' notice, given either on 30 June 1919 or on 30 June in the last year of any subsequent period of ten years. Thereupon the company was to give up to the Secretary of State all land, buildings, stores and other things which were to become the absolute property of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State was to pay to the company, out of the revenues of India, such sum as, when added to any unspent capital, should amount to the total paid-up capital of the company, so far as such capital had been expended on the undertaking with the authorization of the Secretary of State.
32 The railway was constructed and opened. Although the original agreement remained in place, a further agreement was made on 11 December 1906. By it the company agreed that until determination of the contract, the Secretary of State should be entitled to hold and deal with the railway for his own benefit, without any interference or control by the company, and that he should be under no obligation to work the railway. As and from that date, and until determination of the contract, the Secretary of State was to pay a lump sum to the company by half-yearly payments. Amounts otherwise payable pursuant to the original contract ceased to be payable. It was also agreed that upon determination of the contract by notice of purchase the sum of ₤684,580 should be the sum payable in respect of capital expended on the undertaking.
33 Following the 1906 agreement, the company ceased to maintain an office in India. It maintained an office in England, with three directors and a secretary in that country. They received the annuity of ₤30,000 payable half-yearly and, after paying interest on the company's debentures, held meetings and declared dividends in the ordinary way. The company, in 1925, had ₤6,000 in a war loan but no other investments (apart from the railway).
34 The question was whether or not the company continued to carry on a business pursuant to s 50(2) of the Finance Act 1920 (Imp) which taxed 'the profits of a British company carrying on any trade or business or any undertaking of a similar character.' At p 483-484, Viscount Cave LC said:
'Until the execution of the agreement of 1906 the yearly sum receivable by the company was dependent on the gross earnings of the railway; but except in that respect the company had no interest in the railway, and it had no right to interfere in its working. By the agreement of 1906 this fluctuating annuity was converted into a fixed annuity, and as the fixed annuity was made independent of the earnings of the railway, those provisions of the original agreement which compelled the Indian government to continue to work the line were cancelled; but in other respects the original agreement remained and still remains in operation. The company can no longer be called upon to fulfil its first purpose - namely, to make advances for the construction of the line - because all the necessary funds have been already advanced; but it is still fulfilling its second purpose, which was to receive an income for its shareholders while the line was running and to distribute it among them, and if and when the principal agreement comes to an end, it will have the further function of recovering and dividing the capital to be repaid. I think, therefore, that the company still carries on a business or similar undertaking within the meaning of s 52 of the Finance Act 1920.'
35 Lord Dunedin said (at 484):
'The sole question, therefore, seems to be, did the agreement of 1906 have the effect of sending the company out of business? What was the agreement of 1906? It was simply this, that instead of taking its remuneration in the form of a percentage of profits, a sum which must necessarily fluctuate, it agreed to take a fixed sum. My Lords, I cannot think that that operated any change in what the company was doing.'
36 Lord Sumner said (at 485-6):
'To ascertain the business of a limited liability company one must look first at its memorandum and see for what business that provides and whether its objects are still being pursued … . It is common ground that the company, when first incorporated and for some years afterwards, did carry on a business, or an undertaking of a similar character, for it embarked its very considerable capital in making a railway, and there, as a matter of fact, that capital still remains. That the actual construction and working of the line were by agreement entrusted by the company to third parties does not affect the matter, for this was merely the way in which the company's business was carried on. Under the contract with the Secretary of State for India, which the company was formed to enter into, the line may be sufficiently, if not exactly, described as a line built with the company's money on land provided by the Secretary of State, and worked for the company by the Secretary's nominee for 45% of the gross earnings. …'
37 At 487-488, his Lordship continued:
'The present is not the case of a company existing to one act only and once for all. Not only did the company make the agreement of 1896, but it plays its recurring part in every payment and receipt of gains, and there is here, therefore, that"repetition of acts" which Brett LJ says … is implied in "carrying on business". The important thing is that the old business still continues of getting some return for capital embarked in the line. There has not been such a termination of the business formerly carried on or such a complete transfer of it to a new trading company as has been held to be the criterion of ceasing to carry on business under the Bank Charter Act 1844 … If, as was held in In Re Dagnall …, a married woman continues to carry on business for the purpose of [the bankruptcy legislation] as long as her trade debts remain undischarged, there would seem to be a presumption that a company continues to carry on business as long as it is engaged in collecting debts periodically falling due to it in the course of its former business. Business is not confined to being busy; in many businesses long intervals of inactivity occur. In the present case, at any rate, I think that no change has occurred to enable your Lordships to say that the company's carrying on a business is a thing of the past, or that the Commissioners could properly find that it is so.'
38 One might well say that the railway company was in a position similar to that of the applicant prior to 25 June 2001. It had an interest in an asset, which was being managed by another party, and derived income from such interest. However the change in the undertaking of the railway company effected by the 1906 agreement was quite different from that made to the applicant's position by the agreement of 25 June 2001. The railway company's capital continued to be tied up in the railway, and it continued to derive income from that source. In the present case the applicant terminated its investment in the joint venture and ceased to derive income from it. Although Lord Sumner's reference to Dagnall may suggest some support for the applicant's case, the reference hardly amounted to an endorsement of the decision, and his Lordship clearly decided the case on its own facts. The other Law Lords made no reference to Dagnall. The applicant also refers to decisions applying the Dagnall-Theophile line of authorities in the Australian Taxation Board of Review and in Canada where Bowman CJ said:
'It is, I believe, settled law that a business continues to be carried on so long as the obligations arising out of the business remain unfulfilled … .'
39 The cases cited in Dagnall and the reasons of Wright J do not support that proposition, even in the bankruptcy context. The rule is rather that, under bankruptcy legislation then in force, trading debts were recoverable in bankruptcy after trading had ceased. In Australia two eminent judges have doubted the wisdom of applying that proposition in the tax context, and a third (Brennan J) appears to have had a similar view. In England another eminent judge has expressed similar reservations. The decision in South Behar Railway cannot be interpreted as an endorsement of the wider application of the decision in Dagnall. Only one member of the House of Lords referred to it, and in a qualified way. Decisions in the Australian Taxation Board of Review can hardly be set against the views of the judges to whom I have referred. The observation in the Canadian case is not persuasive. In the circumstances I decline to follow Dagnall for present purposes.
40 In Fielder Downs (WA) Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of Taxation [1980] QdR 283 at 290, WB Campbell J (as his Honour then was) said, concerning legislation which was analogous to the present legislation:
'Although dictionary definitions may be of assistance in some cases, it seems to me that the determination of the issue whether the business carried on by the company in each of the three relevant years was the same business, or one of a similar kind, as was carried on by it before March 1969 depends upon an investigation of fact so as to characterize the kind of nature of the business which was undertaken during each respective period.'
41 For present purposes the applicant must show that until 31 December 2001, it continued to carry on the same business as that carried on before 25 March 1998, as explained by Gibbs J in Avondale Motors. It claims that its interests pursuant to the joint venture agreement, at all relevant times prior to 25 June 2001 were:
'(a) … rights, duties, obligations and liabilities which were several to those of other participants …;
(b) a beneficial interest in the property and assets of the (joint venture) as a tenant in common with the other participants, proportionate to its interest in the (joint venture) …;
(c) (several responsibility) for the expenditure and operational expenses incurred by the (joint venture); and
(d) (ownership of) coal produced by the (joint venture) in proportion to its interests in the (joint venture) which was to be divided and sold separately. This was achieved by each participant appointing (the manager of the joint venture) to market and sell the coal produced by the (joint venture) on its behalf.'
42 The applicant submits that prior to 25 March 1998 and thereafter, until 25 June 2001, it carried on a business properly characterized as that of developing and exploiting deposits of coal at German Creek in Queensland through participation in the joint venture, conducting such business through an agent who was responsible for day-to-day management. In the 2002 tax year (ie 1 January-31 December 2001) the applicant conducted such business until 25 June 2001. Thereafter, as it asserts:
'(It) was engaged in various activities arising out of its participation in (the joint venture), including the transfer of its rights and obligations under the Corporation User Agreement and the German Creek East Agreement which were both essential to the operation of the (joint venture).'