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[2025] NSWCA 112
respondent. The applicant’s motion filed on 6 May 2025 was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
The Court of Appeal refused to reopen its earlier decision refusing Renuka Mendonca leave to appeal. It said reopening is reserved for limited situations such as an identifiable oversight, not simply because a litigant considers the result wrong or wishes to repeat arguments. Mendonca had not identified an irregularity, illegality, lack of good faith, or qualifying oversight. She had also been warned to join the trustees for sale before the earlier decision, so the Court considered it too late to seek joinder through this motion. The motion was dismissed without a costs order.
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2,282 words · generated 06/10/2026
In Mendonca v Tonna [2025] NSWCA 112, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, constituted by Kirk JA and Price AJA, dismissed Renuka Mendonca's motion to reopen an earlier decision. The motion was decided on the papers on 26 May 2025. The earlier decision, delivered on 29 April 2025, had refused Mendonca leave to appeal in litigation concerning a property in Galston and, in related proceedings, dismissed an appeal as incompetent because leave to appeal was required ([2]).
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The background was a long-running property dispute between Mendonca and Mark and Lorraine Tonna. By the time of the earlier leave application, the dispute before the Court of Appeal related substantially to costs arising from Supreme Court proceedings. The Supreme Court costs judgment was handed down on 15 August 2024, and orders were made on 3 September 2024 ([2]).
Mendonca's 6 May 2025 motion sought several forms of relief. She asked for the motion to be determined by different Court of Appeal judges, sought to join the trustees for sale, and sought orders setting aside the earlier judgment under rr 36.15 and 36.16(3A) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), together with other relief connected with her proposed appeal ([3], [5]).
The Court addressed those requests in turn. It rejected the request for different judges because a reopening application is properly considered by the judges who made the decision. It rejected the attempt to join the trustees because Mendonca had been clearly warned before the earlier decision that they needed to be joined. It then considered the reopening grounds and concluded that they substantially repeated arguments already addressed, rather than identifying a recognised basis for reopening ([6]-[10], [15]-[18]).
The motion was dismissed. The Court made no order as to costs because it had determined the motion on the papers and had not required or provided for the respondents to file submissions ([20]).
The central distinction in the judgment is between correcting an identifiable error of oversight and asking the Court to reconsider a decision because a party believes it was wrong. The Court described the purpose of judicial power as resolving disputes, and observed that dissatisfaction with an adverse outcome is not, by itself, a reason to reopen it ([1]). It accepted that reopening can be justified in some cases, for example, where the Court overlooked an argument or evidence that had been brought to its attention. But the Court said those cases are rare, and that this was not one of them ([1]).
For r 36.15, the Court set out the rule's relevant threshold: an order may be set aside for sufficient cause if made irregularly, illegally or against good faith. The applicant's submissions did not identify a defect of that kind ([8]). The judgment therefore did not find it necessary to decide that the earlier decision had been made irregularly, illegally or in bad faith; rather, it found that the applicant had not identified such a ground.
For r 36.16(3A), the Court adopted principles summarised in State of New South Wales v Hollingsworth (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 283. Reopening must be approached sparingly and cautiously, because the finality of litigation is important. The power is not a licence to re-agitate issues in the hope of securing a more favourable outcome. The cited principles describe its purpose as correcting readily identifiable and readily rectifiable inadvertent errors without the expense and complexity of an appeal ([9]).
The judgment also relied on the distinction between an inadvertent misapprehension and a deliberate decision said to be wrong. As the Court explained through the authorities cited in [9], a relevant misapprehension concerns oversight or inadvertence. It does not include a complaint that the Court deliberately reached the wrong conclusion. The Court understood Mendonca's submissions as attempts to reargue points already considered, not as identification of an overlooked issue ([10]).
The applicant's arguments about substantial injustice and inadequate reasons did not alter that characterisation. The Court recalled that the earlier decision had involved a discretionary decision about whether to grant leave to appeal, with the interests of justice as the ultimate consideration ([11]-[13]). It said that a party's conviction that the primary judge was wrong did not, by itself, establish a basis for leave or justify reopening the refusal of leave ([13]). It also explained that requiring extensive reasons on every argument would undermine the purpose of a leave gateway ([14]).
On the set-off issue, the Court rejected an asserted inconsistency between an earlier order by Darke J and the orders made by Kunc J. Darke J's order provided for the proceeds of sale to be held on trust, subject to adjustments reflecting the co-owners' rights. The Court considered that provision to recognise that adjustments might require later consideration. In seeking a set-off, Mendonca was herself asking for a further order, and the Court saw no inconsistency ([15]).
The trustees' proposed joinder was a separate procedural problem. The Court recorded that Basten AJA had said the trustees needed to be joined if the appeal required reconsideration of amounts payable to them. The point had also been repeated in a letter from the respondents' solicitors dated 6 March 2025 ([7]). Because Mendonca had not joined them before the earlier decision, the Court considered it too late to seek joinder through the reopening motion. It added that there was no basis for complaint about the Court itself not joining them, given the warnings she had received ([7], [16]).
The judgment does not purport to change the law on reopening appellate decisions. It applies existing principles under UCPR rr 36.15 and 36.16(3A), relying on earlier Court of Appeal and High Court authorities. In particular, it repeats the established caution that a reopening power is not an alternative appeal route and is not available simply to give an unsuccessful litigant another opportunity to present arguments ([9]-[10], [18]).
Before this decision, the cited authorities had already established the principles the Court applied. Hollingsworth (No 2) summarised the need for caution and the significance of finality. Autodesk v Dyason (No 2) was cited for the requirement that the Court's apparent misapprehension not be attributable solely to the applicant's neglect or default, and for the warning that reopening is not a means of re-arguing a case. Dickson v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (No 2) was cited for the distinction between inadvertence and a deliberate decision said to be incorrect ([9]).
The judgment's contribution is chiefly its application of those principles to this motion. It identifies the applicant's complaints as disagreement with the Court's prior reasoning, repeated contentions about injustice, an asserted failure to give adequate reasons, and a belated attempt to join trustees. It finds those matters insufficient in the circumstances described ([10]-[18]). It also restates that an application to reopen is appropriately decided by the original decision-makers, because they are best placed to identify whether they overlooked a matter or misunderstood the facts ([6]).
The judgment separately records a practical boundary concerning joinder. In this case, the applicant had been warned before the earlier decision that the trustees needed to be joined. The Court treated the later attempt to join them as too late in the context of this reopening motion ([7], [16]). That is a case-specific application, not a general ruling that every late joinder application must fail.
At [6], the Court said that an application for reopening is appropriately determined by the judge or judges who made the decision. In plain English, the Court considered the original decision-makers best placed to assess whether they overlooked an argument or made a factual mistake. This was the answer to Mendonca's request for different judges.
At [8], the Court set out the relevant language of r 36.15(1): an order may be set aside for sufficient cause if it was made “irregularly, illegally or against good faith”. It then said that the applicant had not identified any such matter. In plain English, the rule requires more than dissatisfaction with the decision; the applicant needed to point to a defect of the kind identified by the rule.
At [9], the Court adopted the principle that r 36.16 is to be exercised “sparingly and with caution” because litigation needs finality. It also quoted the warning that the rule does not give disgruntled litigants a licence to re-agitate decided issues. In plain English, reopening is exceptional and is not a second hearing on arguments the Court has already considered.
At [10], the Court characterised the applicant's submissions as an attempt to re-agitate arguments that had already been considered and rejected. That characterisation mattered because r 36.16(3A) is concerned with oversight and inadvertence, not a deliberate decision alleged to be wrong.
At [18], the Court stated that dissatisfaction with the result, a belief that the decision was wrong, and a wish to persuade the Court again do not suffice for reopening. It described making such arguments as vexatious and an abuse of process, citing Woolf v Brandt (No 4) [2024] NSWCA 47. The Court also noted that a party who considers the Court of Appeal to have erred may seek special leave to appeal in the High Court. This passage explains the difference between an application to correct an inadvertent problem and an attempt to challenge the substance of a decision.
The judgment is relevant to motions asking a New South Wales court to reopen a decision under UCPR r 36.16(3A), particularly where the applicant's main complaint is that the court reached the wrong conclusion or did not give sufficient reasons. It confirms that a litigant's strong belief in the merits of an already rejected argument does not itself show oversight or inadvertence ([10], [13]-[14], [18]).
It is also relevant where an applicant alleges that the court overlooked an argument or evidence. The judgment recognises that such a failure can, in principle, provide a basis to reopen, while emphasising that the alleged omission must be identified and must fit the limited purpose of the power ([1], [9]). The decision does not set out a checklist for establishing oversight, so it should not be read as defining every circumstance in which reopening could be available.
For r 36.15, the case is relevant where a party seeks to set aside an order on the basis of irregularity, illegality or lack of good faith. The Court's application turned on the absence of any identified defect of those kinds ([8]).
The joinder discussion is relevant to a procedural situation where a party seeks to add affected parties after an earlier appeal or leave application has been decided, despite having been warned beforehand that joinder was necessary. The Court's reasoning was tied to the warnings given in this case and the fact that the trustees' interests were implicated by the issues raised ([7], [16]). It does not establish that a late joinder request will always be refused, regardless of the procedural history or applicable rules.
The judgment is dated 26 May 2025, and the supplied text does not describe any later judicial treatment of Mendonca v Tonna [2025] NSWCA 112. It would therefore be unsupported to say that a later court has followed, distinguished or criticised this decision.
The judgment itself explains its reliance on earlier authorities. It follows the principles summarised in State of New South Wales v Hollingsworth (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 283, and cites Autodesk v Dyason (No 2), Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No 2), Lawrence v Ciantar (No 2) and Dickson v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (No 2) when setting out the framework for reopening ([9]). It also cites Mohareb v Local Court of New South Wales for leave-to-appeal principles and the scope of reasons required at a leave gateway ([11], [14]).
The two Woolf v Brandt decisions are cited for the practice of determining reopening applications on the papers and for the Court's observations about vexatious applications and available remedies ([4], [18]-[19]). These are authorities the Court used in reaching its decision, not later treatments of this 2025 judgment.
The judgment does not decide what evidence or explanation would have been sufficient to establish an actual oversight or inadvertence in another case. It confirms that an overlooked argument or evidence can potentially justify reopening, but does not set out a general test for when an alleged omission is sufficiently material or demonstrable ([1], [9]).
It also does not determine the outer limits of the phrase “sufficient cause” in r 36.15. The Court resolved the point by finding that Mendonca had not identified irregularity, illegality or lack of good faith, rather than elaborating on every circumstance that might fall within the rule ([8]).
Nor does it decide how a court should approach a late joinder request where the party was not warned, where the proposed parties' interests are different, or where the request is made through a procedure other than a reopening motion. Its conclusion arose from the particular warnings given before the earlier decision and the applicant's failure to join the trustees at that stage ([7], [16]).
Finally, the decision does not address the merits of the underlying costs dispute afresh. The motion concerned whether the earlier decision should be reopened, not whether the primary judge's costs orders were correct on their merits. The Court's disposition was procedural: the motion was dismissed, and no costs order was made ([20]).
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Mendonca v Tonna [2025] NSWCA 112
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 26 May 2025
Decision date: 26 May 2025
Before: Kirk JA; Price AJA at [1]
Decision: The applicant’s motion filed on 6 May 2025 is dismissed.
Catchwords: JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – Court of Appeal – motion to set aside or vary orders – application for re-opening appropriate to be determined by judges who made the decision – too late for applicant to seek to join parties to proceedings where she was clearly warned she needed to do so before – no irregularity, illegality or lack of good faith identified – a party’s dissatisfaction with result of litigation does not suffice as basis for re-opening
Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 36.15, 36.16(3A), 51.4(3)
Cases Cited: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
Mendonca v Tonna [2024] NSWCA 288
Mendonca v Tonna; Mendonca v Hathaway; The application of Hathaway and Hosking [2024] NSWSC 1024
Mohareb v Local Court of New South Wales [2024] NSWCA 235
State of New South Wales v Hollingsworth (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 283
Woolf v Brandt (No 3) [2024] NSWCA 6
Woolf v Brandt (No 4) [2024] NSWCA 47
Category: Consequential orders
Parties: Renuka Mendonca (Applicant; self-represented)
Mark Tonna (First respondent)
Lorraine Tonna (Second respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
D Stewart / D Emmerig (Respondents)
Solicitors:
BlackBay Lawyers (Respondents)
File Number(s): 2025/039861
Publication restriction: Nil
THE COURT**:** This judgment concerns a motion seeking re-opening of an earlier decision. The core purpose of judicial power is to quell disputes. In the nature of things, many litigants are unhappy with the result of proceedings. In some cases such litigants will exercise a right to appeal or seek leave to appeal. However, some litigants, commonly unrepresented, find it difficult to accept that a court has ruled against them and approach that court asking it to re-open its decision. Such applications often manifest the subjective certitude of the litigant that any court which properly understood and considered their contentions could not possibly reject them. Of course, in some cases there is due cause to re-open judicial decisions. It is possible, for example, that the court in question has simply overlooked some argument that was made or some evidence that had been drawn to attention. But such cases are rare. This is not one of them.
On 29 April 2025 we handed down a decision refusing the applicant, Dr Renuka Mendonca, leave to appeal in a dispute relating in substance to costs: Mendonca v Tonna [2025] NSWCA 82 (J). The applicant had also filed a notice of appeal in separate proceedings but she conceded that she needed leave to appeal. On that basis we also made orders dismissing her appeal as incompetent. We summarised the context of the application for leave to appeal as follows:
[1] The applicant, Dr Renuka Mendonca, and the current respondents, Mr Mark Tonna and Ms Lorraine Tonna, have been engaged in a long-running dispute about a property in Galston in the Hills District of Sydney. The last set of iterations of that dispute were case managed and determined by Kunc J in the Supreme Court, leading up to a long judgment on various costs disputes handed down on 15 August 2024: Mendonca v Tonna; Mendonca v Hathaway; The application of Hathaway and Hosking [2024] NSWSC 1024 (Costs Judgment). The decisions reached in that judgment were crystallised in orders made on 3 September 2024.
[2] The applicant seeks leave to appeal from part of the orders made as a result of the Costs Judgment, along with various earlier orders made by his Honour (on 24 October 2023, 14 February 2024, and 3, 5 and 10 April 2024). The current respondents – whom we shall refer to as the Tonnas to avoid possible confusion with the trustee parties in the proceedings below – resist a grant of leave.
On 6 May 2025 the applicant filed a notice of motion in her leave to appeal proceedings seeking to set aside the orders we made on 29 April 2025. The motion was supported by an affidavit by the applicant sworn on 5 May 2025, to which was attached a nine page submission.
On 8 May 2025 the Registrar of the Court of Appeal sent the parties an email indicating that the Court would consider how to proceed and inform the parties in due course. No order was then made for the respondents to file submissions in response to the application. In the event, it has not been necessary to put the respondents to the expense of taking that step. The applicant’s motion has been determined on the papers, as is common practice for such applications: see eg Woolf v Brandt (No 3) [2024] NSWCA 6 at [21], and cases there cited.
The orders sought in the motion fall into three broad categories:
The applicant seeks that the motion be determined by “different Court of Appeal Judges that includes Judge Basten AJA” (prayer 1).
She now seeks an order joining the trustees for sale to the proceedings (prayer 4).
She asks that our judgment be set aside pursuant to rr 36.15 and 36.16(3A) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), that leave to appeal be granted, the objection to competency dismissed and that she have a related extension of time (prayers 1-3 and 5-8).
As to the first, “[j]udges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges”: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 at [19]. An application for re-opening is appropriately directed to and determined by the judge or judges who made the decision sought to be re-opened. It is they who are best placed to determine whether they have mistaken the facts or overlooked some issue or the like. As it happens, incidentally, the long and distinguished period of Justice Basten sitting in this Court came to a statutorily-required end last month.
As to the second, there were two trustees for sale who had been appointed to implement the sale of the property which was at the heart of the dispute between the applicant and the Tonnas. As we noted at J [13], the applicant had not joined the trustees as parties to her application for leave to appeal (or her appeal). That was despite the fact that in an interlocutory hearing in this Court, prior to determination of the application for leave, Basten AJA had said that “the appeal appears to require reconsideration of amounts payable to the trustees, either by way of remuneration or costs”, and that being so, “the trustees would need to be joined as respondents to the appeal”: Mendonca v Tonna [2024] NSWCA 288 at [15]. This point had then been reiterated to the applicant in a letter to her from the solicitors for the Tonnas dated 6 March 2025. The fact that the trustees had not been joined was one of our reasons for rejecting one of the applicant’s main arguments, relating to procedural fairness: J [25]. It is now too late for her to seek to take the step that she was clearly warned she needed to take.
[17] As is well-established, the power conferred by UCPR, r 36.16 is to be exercised “sparingly and with caution” having regard to the importance of the finality of litigation, and “does not give a licence to disgruntled litigants to re-agitate, in the hope of obtaining a more favourable outcome, issues that have been determined against them”: Majak v Rose (No 5) [2017] NSWCA 238 (“Majak”) at [12]-[13] (Leeming and Simpson JJA, Emmett AJA). The purpose of the power is “to permit readily identifiable, readily rectifiable, inadvertent errors to be corrected without the complication and expense of an appeal”: Majak at [12].
[18] In Autodesk v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 302-303; [1993] HCA 6 Mason CJ said:
“What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing.
…
However, it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction is not to be exercised for the purpose of re-agitating arguments already considered by the Court; nor is it to be exercised simply because the party seeking a rehearing has failed to present the argument in all its aspects or as well as it might have been put ... The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to re-argue their cases.”
[19] These principles apply to applications under UCPR, r 36.16(3A): Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 205 at [9] (Campbell JA, McColl JA and Handley AJA agreeing) and Lawrence v Ciantar (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 186 (Bathurst CJ, Meagher and Gleeson JJA) at [6]. The power under r 36.16(3A) should be “exercised with great caution, having regard to the importance of the public interest in the finality of litigation”: Lawrence v Ciantar (No 2) at [7].
[20] Whilst, as set out above, jurisdiction under UCPR, r 36.16(3A) may be exercised where the Court has apparently proceeded under a misapprehension, the reference to misapprehension in this context is concerned with matters of oversight and inadvertence, and not with deliberate decisions which are said to be incorrect: Dickson v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 111 at [4] (Meagher and Brereton JJA).
Here, contrary to these principles, insofar as the applicant’s submissions can be understood – and they are far from clear – they represent in substance an attempt to re-agitate arguments already considered and rejected. The applicant’s documents refer to the judgment of “Judge Kirk”. In fact it, like this judgment, was a joint judgment of both of us. In what follows we will assume familiarity with that judgment in order to avoid repetition.
Two general points should be made at the outset. First, our decision was a discretionary judgment as to whether or not to grant leave to appeal. We referred to the relevant principles and summarised our conclusion as follows:
[6] It is generally only appropriate to grant leave to appeal concerning matters that involve issues of principle, questions of general public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable ([Mohareb v Local Court of New South Wales [2024] NSWCA 235] at [25]). The “ultimate issue is the interests of justice, taking into account both the circumstances of the particular case and broader interests in resolving matters of public importance and clarifying the law” (ibid at [26]). Also relevant in that regard, in relation to disputes about costs, is that the issue of awarding costs is an invariable one in litigation, and it is trial judges who are generally best placed to weigh up the interests involved in such awards: John Anthony Arena Pty Ltd v Franpina Developments Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 139 at [18].
[7] Taking account of those principles, we are not persuaded that the applicant has raised any issue of principle or question of general public importance, nor shown a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable. More generally and in any event, it is in the interests of justice that this disputation – which is essentially now about costs – should come to an end. The application for leave to appeal, the appeal, and the motion seeking an extension of time should all be dismissed, with costs.
Injustice: I suffer a substantial injustice in relation to failure to make cost orders in my favour under UCPR 42.1 for my success on (a) Tonnas unsuccessfully disputing amounts in independent accountant’s report and (b) Tonnas opposing set off and (c) denial of procedural fairness in relation to at least determining the correct quantum of court orders made in my favour on 6 December 2021 in relation to trustees fees.
The paragraph illustrates her discontent with our decision and her view that the arguments she raised before us were meritorious. That she is convinced she is correct and that the decision of Kunc J as primary judge was incorrect does not suffice to warrant a grant of leave to appeal. Even if his Honour had erred in some way, the applicant has failed to recognise the discretionary nature of the decision whether to grant leave to appeal, where the ultimate issue is the interests of justice. Nor has she recognised that we concluded it was in the interests of justice for this disputation to come to an end.
Second, many of the grounds and submissions put by the applicant allege that we “failed to conclude with adequate reasons”. Yet “[t]o require extensive reasons – eg addressing in detail all arguments made or grounds raised by an applicant – would be to defeat the very purpose of having a leave gateway”: Mohareb v Local Court of New South Wales [2024] NSWCA 235 at [34].
As for the grounds now raised by the applicant, grounds 1 and 2 relate to J [17]-[22] which dealt with the “set-off issue”. Beyond seeking to re-agitate arguments as to why Kunc J’s judgment manifests errors of principle or caused her a substantial injustice, the main additional point seemed to be an assertion that there was some kind of inconsistency between order 6(b) made by Darke J on 4 June 2021 and the orders of Kunc J. Darke J made orders on 4 June 2021 for the sale by trustees of the property in question. Order 6(b) was to the effect that the trustees were to hold the balance of the proceeds of sale (after accounting for various costs) on trust for the applicant and the Tonnas in proportion to their beneficial ownership, “subject to any adjustments made to reflect the rights of the co-owners in their capacity as such”. The applicant’s complaint seems to be that the effect of the orders of Kunc J was to depart from the quoted words of order 6(b) because in declining to order a set-off an appropriate adjustment was not made. Yet the very provision for future adjustments recognised that this was a matter that might require further consideration. By seeking a set-off it was the applicant herself who was seeking a further order of the Court. No inconsistency is apparent.
Ground 3 relates to the “procedural fairness issue” that we addressed at J [23]-[27]. It begins by asserting that we erred “in failing to consider and conclude with adequate reasons that (upon the Court of Appeal joining trustees as a respondent under UCPR r 51.4(3) on its own motion or by way of this notice of motion) I am entitled as a matter of procedural fairness to receive …”. The applicant thus belatedly recognises that her application was not properly constituted to make that argument. It was not for this Court to join the trustees, and the applicant can have no conceivable cause for complaint on this front given the clear warnings she was given.
Ground 4 says that we erred in failing to consider a remark apparently made in the course of argument by Basten AJA during the interlocutory hearing before his Honour. There was no need for us to do so, and it is difficult to see the relevance of the remark to the current issues in any event.
**********
Mendonca
Tonna [2025] NSWCA 112
(2000) 205 CLR 337
(1993) 176 CLR 300
The applicant’s motion filed on 6 May 2025 was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
That then leads to the re-opening application. The applicant’s motion referred to r 36.15, subrule (1) of which provides that a judgment or order “may, on sufficient cause being shown, be set aside by order of the court if the judgment was given or entered, or the order was made, irregularly, illegally or against good faith”. The applicant did not identify in her submissions any claimed irregularity, illegality or lack of good faith in the relevant sense.
The motion also referred to r 36.16(3A). As regards such re-opening applications, this Court summarised relevant principles in State of New South Wales v Hollingsworth (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 283:
Ground 5 involves an assertion that we erred in numerous identified paragraphs of our reasons. The core complaint seems to be that we erred in our conclusion. That a party is dissatisfied with the result of litigation, considers the decision wrong, and wishes to have another go at persuading the Court of their position, does not suffice as a basis for re-opening under r 36.16(3A), let alone under r 36.15. Making such arguments is vexatious and an abuse of process: Woolf v Brandt (No 4) [2024] NSWCA 47 at [14]. Where a litigant considers that this Court has erred in its conclusion in an appeal or application for leave to appeal the relevant remedy is to seek special leave to appeal in the High Court.
The Court has remedies available to it in relation to repeated and vexatious applications: ibid at [15]-[16]. It is not appropriate on this occasion for such orders to be considered.
The applicant’s motion will be dismissed. As the Court has determined the application on the papers, and it did not require or provide for the respondents to file and serve submissions, there is no reason to make any order as to costs.