Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 2020 (Standard Module)

INTERIM ORDER - whether an interim order stopping the body corporate from acting on a potentially defective resolution is warranted.

1. That the Body Corporate for Melton Crest Apartments CTS 32121 must not take any further steps to implement the alleged resolution of the committee issued via email on or around 30 August 2025 and resolved on or around 31 August 2025 via a vote outside of committee meeting relating to engagement of a contractor for the purposes of providing a civil and structural water ingress assessment.
2. This interim order has effect until (12) months have elapsed from the date of this order, a further interim or final order for the application is issued, or until the application is withdrawn or otherwise ended.

• [1] This is an application for interim orders brought against the body corporate by the owner of Lot 209 in the scheme.
• [2] The applicant takes issue with the manner in which the body corporate alleges it resolved to engage an expert to investigate water ingress issues at the scheme. Namely, that the proposed cost was incorrect, that a second quote was required but not obtained nor considered, that the proposal was required to be considered at a general meeting, and even if it was not, that the committee did not follow the correct processes for a vote outside of committee meeting. The applicant seeks interim orders that would have the effect of stopping the body corporate from acting on the disputed resolution.
• [3] I have made interim order as I have found that, on my preliminary review:
  1. The applicant has raised a prima facie case in relation to the arguments that:
     1. A second quote should have been obtained and considered.
     2. The committee did not give owners advice of the motion to be decided, nor minutes of the resolution made, at a vote outside of committee meeting.
  2. The balance of convenience favours the interim order being made, as:
     1. Without the interim order, the final order may be of little utility.
     2. The interim order does not prevent the body corporate from progressing the matter by obtaining a second quote and making a further decision in relation to engagement of a contractor for the matter (via the relevant prescribed processes in the legislation).

• [4] The scheme is comprised of 30 lots and common property in Townsville. The survey plans show the scheme is a building format plan subdivision. The community management statement for the scheme shows the Standard Module applies.
• [5] It is not disputed that there has been a history of water ingress issues impacting Lot 101 from ground level during significant rainfall events since at least 2019. It is also not disputed that in January 2025, both Lot 101 and Lot 102 suffered water ingress. The cause of the water ingress appears to be unknown or at least not confirmed.
• [6] Lots 101 and 102 have balconies (that form part of the lots), and have the benefit of exclusive use over courtyard areas surrounding part of their lots. It is not clear whether the water ingress is connected to these areas, and it is not disputed that the body corporate is not or could not be responsible for the cause of the water ingress.

• [7] Ultimately, on 31 August 2025, the committee says it resolved the following motion via a vote outside of committee meeting, which appears to have only been issued via email to committee members (Disputed Resolution):

That the Body Corporate engage STP Consultants for the purposes of providing a Civil & Structural: Water Ingress Assessment. The scope of works as detailed in their quote of 6th August 2025 is > > - Detailed survey (by others) scope of work. Includes extent of survey and information required to allow Civil Design and Documentation of a Stormwater rectification. > > - Structural inspection to identify damage, causation, and recommendations for rectification. > > - Civil Stormwater Design and Documentation of remedial design based on report findings. > > Costs advised up to $11.500.00 are to be met from the sinking fund

• [8] The applicant seeks the following interim order:

An order ceasing any action authorised by the carried committee motion of 31 Aug 25 to engage STP Consultants, pending the outcome of a final order.

• [9] The final order the applicant seeks, which is not being determined at this time, reads as follows:

An order that the carried committee motion of 31 Aug 25 to engage STP Consultants be rescinded.

• [10] The applicant argues the Disputed Resolution is void on the basis that:
  1. The amount the Disputed Resolution authorises is up to $11,500. However, the quoted amount includes GST taking the total to $12,650.
  2. The works form part of a larger project, which would require the proposal to be approved by the body corporate via an ordinary resolution pursuant to 172 of the Standard Module.
  3. The cost is above the scheme's limit for major spending, and therefore, a second quote for the works is necessary pursuant to section 174 of the Standard Module.
  4. Advice of the motion to be voted on outside of a committee meeting was not circulated to all owners as required under section 68 of the Standard Module.
• [11] While there appears to have been concerns raised in emails about conflict of interests by committee members who have voted on the Disputed Resolution, this does not appear to be a point expressly argued in the application itself.

• [12] I may make interim orders without seeking submissions from the respondent or any affected parties.[1] However, where appropriate, I may seek comment from parties the order may negatively impact. In the circumstances, I found it appropriate to give opportunity of response from the body corporate.
• [13] The body corporate opposes the application and submits that:
  1. While the proposal is over the relevant limit for major spending, a second quote is not necessary as exceptional circumstances exist, pursuant to section 174(5) of the Standard Module. Namely, that the proposed contractor
  2. That the committee 'notes' that the outcome of a vote outside of a committee meeting should be circulated to all owners, but not the advice of the motion.
  3. There was an administrative oversight in the Disputed Resolution by listing the quoted amount as $11,500. Despite this, the amount is within the relevant limit for committee spending which is set at $20,000.
  4. The proposal does not form part of a larger project. The proposal is for investigation and assessment. Referring to the proposal as an 'extension' was to reflect STP Consultants' knowledge and reports dating from 2020, and nothing more.
• [14] There was another submission from a person who indicates they are an owner. I had only invited submissions from the committee itself, so have not had regard to this submission.

• [15] Interim orders are temporary in their effect. Typically, their purpose is to maintain the status quo, preserving a party's rights or interest until the matter can be finally determined, usually by stopping a party from taking certain actions.
• [16] The ability for an adjudicator to make an interim order is provided for in the legislation. An adjudicator may make an interim order where satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that the order is necessary due to the nature or urgency of the circumstances.[2] Adjudicators often follow the test applied by courts in interlocutory applications, being whether the applicant has shown that it has a prima facie case, and whether the applicant has shown that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the relief claimed.[3]
• [17] Therefore, to be successful in their application for interim orders, the applicant must satisfy me that:
  1. there is a prima facie case to justify relief, and
  2. the balance of convenience justifies the interim relief.

• [18] While I am not determining the final orders sought, determining whether there is a genuine legal issue at the interim stage requires some level of assessment of the final orders.
• [19] The onus is on the applicants to prove there is a prima facie case to justify the relief they seek. The applicants do not need to show that it is more probable than not that they will succeed. The applicants need to show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the interim orders pending a final determination of the matter.[4] How strong the possibility of success that is needed depends upon the nature of the rights the applicants assert, and the consequences of the order sought.[5]

• [20] The applicant says the Disputed Resolution does not reflect the true cost of the proposal. The motion approves expenditure of up to $11,500. However, the quoted costs are $12,650 as GST is likely to apply. The body corporate says this was an administrative oversight.
• [21] While there does appear to be an inconsistency, I will draw the applicant's attention to comments made by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal in Carroll and Ors v Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences CTS 29467 [2013] QCATA 21:

[22] The BCCMA is a lengthy, technical and complex instrument, with no fewer than six sets of subordinate and similarly complex 'module regulations'. It cannot be the case that the legislature expected all, or even most committee members of a body corporate, small, large or very large, to be experts in corporate law, or masters of community management. Indeed, the BCCMA implicitly recognises that, if this legislation were at all times, and in all circumstances applied with the utmost rigour and most precious attention to detail, its objects and policies would be retarded by endemic disputation, rather than advanced. > > [23] The direction that a 'body corporate must act reasonably' in the performance of its 'general functions' does not suggest that every minor irregularity should be pounced on to impede or paralyse the normal conduct of business. The Code of Conduct for committee members does not demand administrative perfection, but simply directs them to 'take reasonable steps' to comply with the BCCMA. [citations omitted]

• [22] It is difficult to say that this error would justify voiding the motion on its own, but I accept that a prima facie case has arguably been established where there may be other issues with the Disputed Resolution that I will discuss below.

• [23] It is not disputed that the relevant limit for committee spending at the scheme is $20,000. This means that, on face value, the decision to proceed with a proposal at a cost of $12,650 is within the committee's powers pursuant to section 172 of the Standard Module.
• [24] Although, subsection (2) provides that:

For this section, if a series of proposals forms a single project, the cost of carrying out any 1 of the proposals is taken to be more than the relevant limit for committee spending if the cost of the project, as a whole, is more than the relevant limit.

• [25] Therein lies the rub. The applicant argues that the proposal forms part of a larger project, which may cause the need for the proposal to be approved by ordinary resolution. The applicant draws attention to an email a committee member sent STP Consulting where they stated:

.. this scope of works should be considered an extension of the works completed in 2020...

• [26] The body corporate suggests that this comment does not evidence the engagement forms part of a larger project, but rather draws attention to the fact that STP Consultants has existing knowledge of the scheme. Further, the proposal is for assessment, and not for the completion of works.
• [27] On my preliminary view, the point the applicant raises is somewhat arguable, but seems farfetched. There has been approximately 5 years between the engagements, and where the nature of the engagement is for investigation of the cause of water ingress, the nexus between what took place in 2020 and the current issue cannot be ascertained. Further, the applicant has not provided evidence that if it did form one project, that the project total would be over the relevant limit.

• [28] It is not disputed that the scheme's relevant limit for major spending is $10,000, and it is not disputed that the proposed engagement is over that limit.
• [29] Section 174 of the Standard Module is relevant to proposals over that limit being decided by the committee. It provides that, where a motion to be moved proposes carrying out work where the cost would be over the scheme's major spending limit, 2 quotations for the work should be obtained and considered. It is not disputed that the body corporate did not obtain and consider 2 quotes.
• [30] It also provides that, if for exceptional reasons it is not practicable to obtain 2 quotes, 1 quote can be considered. A provided example for exceptional reason is:

The proposal is for the acquisition of goods of a particular characteristic. Goods of that characteristic are only obtainable from 1 source.

• [31] The body corporate argues that exceptional circumstances exist due as:
  1. Previous meetings of the committee show an intent to engage STP Consultants.
  2. STP Consultant's pre-existing knowledge of the scheme made them uniquely suitable, and the insurer suggested using the same engineer.
  3. An email from STP Consultants, who were coordinating quotes from surveyors which forms part of the proposal, implies that it is difficult to obtain such quotes.
  4. The insurer will not proceed with remedial works unless the cause of the water ingress is investigated and addressed, and the body corporate believes delaying the investigation and works would impact the ability to lodge future claims.
• [32] On my preliminary review of the material in front of me, I have my reservations that there were exceptional circumstances that made it impracticable to obtain a second quote, particularly where it does not appear that the committee has made any attempt to obtain a second quote. Although, the applicant has not sought quotes either. On my preliminary view, it appears the reasons for proceeding with one quote is a matter of convenience or preference, rather than exceptional circumstances and impracticality. I am satisfied that the applicant has established a prima facie case.

• [33] The applicant raises that the committee passed the Disputed Resolution via a vote outside of committee meeting without following the necessary processes for doing so.
• [34] The body corporate appears to believe that there is no requirement for it to give advice of the motion to owners before the motion is resolved. This is not correct. Section 68 of the Standard Module is clear. It states:

(3) Advice of the motion must be given, at the same time notice of the motion is given or, in an emergency, as soon as practicable, to each owner of a lot

• [35] Curiously, none of the materials in front of me evidence that the record of motion has been created or disseminated to owners by the body corporate, either. In submissions, the body corporate only 'notes' that owners should be notified of the outcome, pursuant to section 71 of the Standard Module. However, does not confirm that this has actually taken place.
• [36] Notifying owners of decisions about to be made, and when made, is important. Aside from keeping owners abreast what is taking place in their scheme where they have proprietary interests, it gives owners opportunity to contact committee members with concerns, to lodge disputes, or to give a notice of opposition to the committee.[6]

• [37] I am currently satisfied the body corporate has raised a prima facie case for the final order sought. However, before granting an interim order, I must balance the inconvenience to the respondent lot owners if I were to grant the interim relief now, in the knowledge that final orders might ultimately be refused, against the inconvenience to the applicant body corporate if I were to not grant relief now, in the knowledge that final orders might ultimately be granted.[7]
• [38] The obvious risk for the applicant is that, if I do not make this interim order, the engagement will continue which would largely render the final order of little utility.
• [39] On the other hand, the body corporate says the cause needs to be identified and rectified before insurance will rectify the damage to the lots. The body corporate also has concerns that future claims could be negatively impacted. However, the ingress arose in January and it the Disputed Resolution passed in August, which appears to suggest it is not immediately urgent.
• [40] There are copies of emails in front of me that indicate a representative of the body corporate may have engaged the contractors before the Disputed Resolution made. However, and the body corporate has not indicated that there would be any risk of a contractual breach if the order was made.
• [41] Most relevantly, if I was to grant the interim relief sought, the order would not stop the body corporate from addressing the issues raised in the application. It would be open to the body corporate to obtain a second quote and propose and consider motions more inline with the processes set out in the legislation.
• [42] For the above reasons, I am satisfied the balance of convenience justifies the interim relief sought.

• [43] On my preliminary review of the material currently in front of me, I am satisfied the applicant has raised a prima facie case for the final orders, on the basis that a second quote was not obtained and considered, and the processes for a resolution passed for a vote outside of committee meeting appear to have not been followed.
• [44] I am satisfied the balance of convenience justifies interim relief in the circumstances. The order does not stop the body corporate from obtaining a second quote, or putting forward proposals and making decisions on the matter via the appropriate processes set out in the legislation.
• [45] There appears to be at least the beginning of a breakdown in relationship between some committee members. It appears that all parties wish to see the body corporate flourish, and I would encourage all members to consider if a more conciliatory approach to issues would be beneficial. Defects in resolutions can (usually) be easily rectified, but positive neighbourly relations can be more difficult to fix once broken.

[3] SDW2 Pty. Ltd. V JLF Corporation Pty Ltd [2017] QSC 1 at [21].

[4] Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at [622-623].

[5] Australian Broadcasting Corp v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57, at [65], [19].

[7] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65] citing Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at [5].